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IDENTITY IN A POST-COMMUNIST BALKAN STATE:
A STUDY IN NORTH ALBANIA 
SYNOPSIS
This study is concerned with further understanding the social, economic and political 
changes occuring in post-communist Albania. Questioning the view that what is taking 
place is a unilinear transition to a market economy, the research elucidates the socially 
embedded nature of the Albanian political economy by means of field work undertaken 
in two peri-urban communities in north Albania. This approach was used so as to better 
understand how identity was being renegotiated in post-communist Albania and the 
implications of this in the formation of a civil society.
After providing some historical background, the thesis describes the two villages in 
which the research took place and gives information about their administrative setting. 
This is followed by an analysis of village life from the perspectives of community, 
economy and state, concluding in each case with a summary of the effect on identity.
The research describes how the market, and the political institutions which control the 
economic environment, have been socially mediated and how, from a village perspective, 
existing institutional forms were being reconfigured.
It demonstrates that developments in post-communist Albania are part of a complex and 
ongoing process of transformation of which economic factors are just a part. Within this 
context the research describes how the negotiation of identity is an exploratory and 
adaptive process rather than a simple a transition to the identities associated with 
market democracies and are invoked by class, party and business.
In the absence of models of solidarity and cooperation appropriate to the novel political 
and economic environment, the thesis concludes that there is a need to adapt, 
reconfigure and improve a range of institutional forms, particularly those of a civic 
nature, so as to generate confidence in the new institutional setting.
N.B. For reasons of confidentiality the names of villages and individuals have been changed.
v
GLOSSARY
bajraktar - community leader, literally a standard bearer
Bashkia - Municipality
besa - word of honour, pledge, faith, creed, protection, loyalty, trust, agreement,
promise, pact, treaty, armistice, pact (see §6.5).
?iflik- a semi-feudal share cropping arrangement.
Dukajini - a person from the Dukajin mountains, a term commonly used to describe a 
recent migrant from the north, 
fis - tribe or clan
krye- chief or head
kryeplak- village chief (literally - chief old man)
llagja- city district
mehalla- village zone encompassing a collection of dwellings
nder- honour
perscutim - the persecuted, i.e. those detained for political reasons under communism 
Rreth - District or County
shtepi - house
vilayjet- province (Turkish administrative region)
vllazni - a group of brothers, literally a brotherhood
zoti i shtepi - head of house
1 denim - one tenth of a hectare or 100 sq.mtrs. 1 hectare = 2.471 acres
ABBREVIATION S
ACP Albanian Communist Party
APL Albanian Party of Labour




GDP Gross Domestic Product
MNC Multi-national corporation
NIE New institutional economics
NGO Non Governmental Organisation




USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU Western European Union
vis
Shkodar
® . ' •
Durrfe
K o v g 'f f t




ft*  bounthrh*. colors, donommotions 
Wirf <*r/y cMw inforrnotvon tKowt* 011
I O N I A N
on * 0  lc®o/ ctatus o f o r y ttn'Hory, or 


















L i k e
Sftfadret
3ELOW 2 0 0  











Me reo/v m . •  S h e n i k u t/n»ust
m. e RoshH
Valbone
m. aRadoMmfe n>- e  P a p lu k u ti
W B a n e s a  e  




C e /w u rra Trabojin Tpatojw ■
K u H a e  ' 
Lulash K qpt 
TIb»R rapsh-Siafje \
°  C a « t a k u t  q .  aTtrthores
2250
■ B a b is
m. •  MardomH
2179






a A q ro r ,! / ,  Lekbjb
Kurora e  Lobes 
i a t  a
fijw a j- fc to
m. Guri 1 Kurores l ata; 
. J 1539
|  C llCv il  I




Xurt-fariaiG rutw ire 
Demtraj ,
feude-Fuj&t /  \





K o m a n
Palaj-GusMe
nfcarSoUsh#
Sabot - * 
ShiroJc* A
0 * H H l
Oblike e  Siperme
L iq ite n i
V;:M1
L ajtiia j
!ics e Siperms 
XiC \  
k  Vkkaiane \
SuVe-Oajc
N eftsh al
B a rh u llu s h
Gjoobarithaj
U  litam sli
H
Sukaafcf m t u n i S bengierai
K lH m et i V ogrl
*
( a t a e t  i M adti
S fM tlt \  '














At their peak, during the latter half of the 20th century, communist regimes controlled a large 
part of the world's land surface stretching from Central Europe and the Balkans to the Pacific 
Ocean. Other communist states existed in south east Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. The 
failure of the Eastern European states and the Soviet Union to maintain viable and competitive 
centrally planned economies to varying degrees resulted in the collapse of authoritarian social 
control, the disbanding of central economic planning and the interruption of trade relations. 
This breakdown took place over a period of about 2 years. By 1991 over 400 million people 
in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) experienced the collapse of communist 
rule and a massive decline in the standard of living. These former communist states then 
embarked on a process of political and economic transformation. In 1998 only the states of 
China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba remain controlled by regimes espousing the ideology 
of communism. Nevertheless even these states, perhaps with the exception of North Korea, 
are moving towards an economic orientation which is distinctively different from that which 
has been associated with state socialism and central planning.
It was Lenin's pragmatic interpretation of Marxist philosophy which set the horizons and tone 
of life for many millions during the 20th century. At the heart of the ideology was the 
Communist Party whose function was to mobilise public opinion in support of the regime and 
its programme and to hold together the leadership, the masses and the various bureaucratic 
structures in between (Hammer 1986:77). This model of Marxism-Leninism was modified by 
those such as Mao Tse Tung, Tito and Hoxha to meet their particular circumstances. The 
socialist identity was largely derived from a mixture of personal fears for survival and by the 
use of arbitrary power. State security services were responsible for the protection of frontiers, 
foreign espionage, political crimes and ensuring the protection of state secrets. They were the 
agencies of coercion and terror. The internal security forces, bolstered by large numbers of 
informers, served to intimidate populations and were the principal mechanism of social control 
(Eyal 1991:2).
Albania, the site of this study on identity, was one such communist state. It had a number of 
characteristics which made its situation distinctive from other forms of European communism. 
Historically it has been isolated and slow to develop. Like North Korea, Albania became
1
almost completely shut off from the rest of the world. For 45 years its people endured one the 
most extreme forms of communist rule. Its end in 1990/1 was particularly painful. The country 
was bankrupt, its industry moribund, the agricultural sector dislocated, there were extreme 
food shortages and much social disorder. This research examines what has happened in Albania 
during the period of accelerated change which followed the collapse of its communist regime. 
It does so by interpreting subjective experiences recorded as a result of time spent in two 
Albanian villages.
This introductory chapter contains an outline of the thesis and describes what it intends to 
achieve. This is followed by a review of the literature used to inform and orientate the research 
and indicates how it intends to contribute to the body of information about Albania. In order 
to locate the study within the emerging discourse on post-communism, the notions of transition 
and transformation are then discussed, defined and differentiated. The introduction concludes 
with an outline of how the research questions will be addressed and a description of the thesis 
structure.
1.2 The Thesis:
This study has been structured and implemented so that by means of observing and interacting 
with people as they conduct their daily affairs, information can be gained which will contribute 
towards a better qualitative understanding of social and economic transformation in post­
communist Albania. To achieve this the research examines how members of two specific 
collectivities were reconstructing their lives in the context of novel political, economic and 
ideological circumstances.
Having embarked upon the project I soon became aware that in order to understand the 
implications of the Albanian economic transition there was a need to extend my investigation 
both qualitatively and longitudinally. This derived firstly from the inadequacy of the notion of 
transition in providing a satisfactory basis for describing the changes taking place, and secondly 
from the realisation that a historical perspective was required to give a more informed 
understanding of how and why people were responding to change as they were. Central to my 
explanation of social change which has taken place in Albania during the twentieth century is 
the notion of structuration, a body of sociological theory which understands the reflexivity 
within and between structures as being integral to the constitution of those structures.
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In order to contribute to the formulation of a more objective account of the Albanian economic 
transition and its social and political transformation, I draw upon the subjective experiences 
of individuals. Firstly, to better understand how identity was being renegotiated in the light of 
the changes associated with the collapse of Albanian state socialism. And secondly, to examine 
how civil society was being formed in the aftermath of communism from a culture still 
relatively traditional in character.
A subsidiary, but no less relevant, aspect of the research is to follow on from the two 
formidable British anthropologists, Edith Durham and Margaret Hasluck, who have provided 
some of the most detailed studies of this region. In various ways the field work continues the 
stories which they described during the first half of the 20th century. In its own way this 
account seeks to complement these narratives by describing circumstances and events as they 
have occurred in two north Albanian villages at the end of what has been an eventful century 
for the country.
My hypothesis is that Albania’s "transition" from communism can usefully be understood 
through being placed within the setting of the social, economic and political transformations 
which have taken place during the twentieth century and that these transformations can best 
be explained not only by the changes which have taken place in the nature of community, 
economy and state, but also in the changes that have taken place between these structures.
In order to demonstrate this hypothesis I will be using empirical data to examine how identity 
is being renegotiated in circumstances of structural change. The approach used in this study, 
which is that of interacting with people on an informal basis, is one particularly suitable to 
examining identity, the principal focus of my attention. It is through interpreting this 
information that I seek to shed light not just on the "transition" from communism but also on 
the concomitant transformation of Albanian society.
1.3 Literature Review:
Stavros Skendi (1957,1967) has provided the student of Albanian social and political history 
with a painstakingly assembled and detailed account of Albania's path to independence and 
its subsequent development during the first half of the twentieth century. Fischer (1984) has 
written a wry but penetrating account of Zog's life and his impact on Albania. A flavour of
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Albania during World War n, which encompasses the tensions existing within the partisan 
movement, can be gained through study of Amery (1947) and Smiley (1984). The Albanian 
communist period up until 1977 has been comprehensively covered by Prifti (1978) in which 
he provides a great deal of valuable historical and sociological detail. Logoreci (1977) and 
Marmullaku (1975) provide their own perspectives of this period. Backer (1982) describes the 
communist regime's development policy of self-reliance. Biberaj (1990) covers the latter years 
o f communism as does Pano (1997) who in addition succinctly describes communism and the 
democratisation of Albanian political life.
Some useful and comprehensive accounts of Albania which provide the foundations for 
detailed study of the country and its people have been published during the 1990s. Winnifrith 
(1992) contains a diverse range of contributions covering Albania's prehistoiy to a panegyric 
on the fruits of communism. Hall, D (1994) produced an authoritative social, economic and 
historical account of Albania which contains a comprehensive bibliography. When combined 
with the annotated bibliography assembled by Young (1998), the student of Albanian affairs 
is comprehensively provided for, at least until 1998. Vickers and Pettifer (1997) have covered 
the democratic period in Albania prior to the disorders of 1997. Biberaj (1998) also provides 
a detailed description of this period which includes a commentary on the 1997 collapse.
The development of higher education in Albania only began during the 1950s. Initially the 
social sciences were heavily dependent on Russian models of interpretation. As they became 
further ideologized and politicized, their value was rapidly debased. Every piece of scholarly 
writing had to begin with a related piece of Marxist-Leninist theory and refer repeatedly to the 
works of Enver Hoxha. A wide range of writers were banned from Plato to Sartre (Tarifa 
1993:37). All philosophical and social theory other than Marxism-Leninism was labelled as 
either false and suspicious or decadent and reactionary. Such research as did take place during 
the communist period appears to have been limited to a small amount of physical anthropology 
producing ethno-genetical data (Dhima 1994) and research related to various aspects of 
Albanian culture relevant to the regime's desire, for political ends, to promote a particular 
vision of the nation's heritage. When genuine independent research started to be undertaken 
in the late 1980s, there were problems with publishing results (see Tarifa 1996). It seems that 
politicisation of the social sciences continued beyond the communist period. After some initial 
problems with the Democratic Party, a Faculty of Social Sciences was established in the 
University of Tirane in 1994. One example of its research concerning tolerance in Albania and
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touching on press freedom, has been published by Fuga (1996).
In addressing my task I have relied heavily on the ethnographical work of Durham (1928, 
1987) and Hasluck (1954) whose writings cover in considerable detail the nature of tribal 
relations in north Albania during the first half of the twentieth century and still have relevance 
to this day. Little sociologically related material meeting internationally accepted norms was 
published during the communist period. An exception were the primarily desk studies of 
Whitaker (1968, 1976) which concerned social organisation in traditional north Albanian 
society including one article on the role of women (Whitaker 1981).
Although work had been published, such as Prifti (1978), which contained useful economic 
information, the first detailed comprehensive analysis of the Albanian communist economy was 
by Schnytzer (1982). His gloomy prognostications were confirmed by Sandstrom and Sjoberg 
(1991) who chart the steep decline of the Albanian economy after Hoxha's death in 1985. The 
economic dimensions of the collapse which took place between 1989-91 are described by 
Blejer (1992) and Kaiser (1993). Pashko (1993) described the obstacles to economic reform 
freed by the democratically elected government in 1992. Subsequent to this there has been a 
plethora of macro economic data published about Albania, most notably in the Transition 
Reports by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International 
Monetary Fund. The World Bank has produced some income data sets. Clunies-Ross et al.
(1998) have produced a comprehensive description and analysis of the Albanian economy from 
1990 until 1997 which touches on social and political issues, as does Vaughan-Whitehead
(1999) who additionally provides an evaluation of the 1997 collapse on the economy.
At the time when Albania became open to the world relatively little was known about the 
country, particularly in respect of the nature and influence of social control exercised by its 
communist regime. In this respect Sjoberg (1991,1993) provided valuable information on the 
nature of urbanisation and social structures during the communist period. During the 1990s a 
considerable amount of research has been undertaken and published, but since most of it has 
been funded by aid agencies, its focus has understandably tended to be concentrated on their 
practical concerns. Nevertheless useful contributions to understanding social change in Albania 
have been published in the English language, such as by Lewis and McGregor (1992) who 
produced an analysis of rural poverty in north Albania, de Waal (1995) who commented on 
issues of decollectivisation and dispute settlement and Hall, D. (1996) on rural development
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and migration.
The need for development agendas to be better informed has resulted in a number of studies 
such as Miall’s (1995) work on minorities in Albania in which he also highlights issues of 
potential conflict. The way in which ideology has been translated into practice is discussed by 
Sampson (1996) who focuses on how civil society is promoted as an ideal and then 
manipulated and exploited by local brokers. The relationship between aid and social capital in 
southern Albania is the subject of an article by Holland (1998). While Emadi (1993), Daci 
(1995) and Douglas (1994) provide some information, little has been published on the position 
of women in post-communist Albania. Prifti (1975) provides a valuable account of women’s 
struggle for emancipation from the strictures of traditional society. A glimpse of how the family 
was promoted under communism is provided by Begeja (1984)
The nature of religious life in Albania has received some attention. A description of this 
complex landscape is provided by Liolin (1997). There has been a strong focus on Islam, most 
notably by Lederer (1994) and Trix (1995). Clayer (1997) discuss Islam, its relation to the 
other religions in Albania and its setting in the country's post-communist development. The 
more exotic peculiarities associated with Albania have received considerable attention. These 
include the sworn virgins who assume male social roles (Young 1996), the body of customary 
law called the Kanun (Gjecov 1989) and the blood feud. Much journalistic attention has been 
given to these issues. Of particular note is an article by Yamamoto (1994) who presents an 
interesting interpretation of the Kanun. Using Albania as one of his case studies, rarely cited 
Black-Michaud (1975) applies a comparative approach to the blood feud which produces some 
useful insights.
This brief literature review draws attention to some of the sources which have assisted with 
this research. I found the historical information most useful in providing a basis for the research 
and in helping me understand the significance of oral testimonies. However, while the material 
published since the collapse of communism until the end of 1998 extensively covers macro 
contexts, a sustained sociologically based account and analysis of how recent changes have 
impacted upon identifiable groups of people has not as yet been published. This has led to an 
absence of information which addresses the practicalities of how individuals and communities 
in Albania have been adapting to post-communist circumstances and the implications of their 
responses in respect of identity change and social transformation. It is my intention to address
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these issues. I start by questioning whether "transition” is an accurate description of what has 
been taking place, a subject discussed extensively elsewhere (for example Bryant and 
Mokrzycki 1994; Hann 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Verdery 1996) but which has not been 
widely aired in the literature concerning Albania.
1.4 Transition or Transformation?:
Since this study is concerned with the set of changes associated with "transition", it is 
important at the outset to examine what "the transition from communism" might signify. In 
order to address this, I use the semantic descriptions of transition and transformation as a 
starting point for a discussion of how these notions can applied to post-communist change. 
Transition in a literal sense means the passing from one location to another. Within the context 
of post-communism, the meaning of transition is concerned with the movement from central 
economic planning to the market. Transition is thus prescriptive in nature and has been 
challenged as a term which accurately captures what is taking place in former communist 
states. Some commentators suggest that since it implies the changing of form or character, the 
notion of transformation is a more appropriate term. Transformation is concerned with 
fundamental change, a change in the nature of structures. Unlike transition, it is less concerned 
with an end state. It is an open-ended analytical concept which allows for the substantial 
differences which exist between former communist countries. While transition is concerned 
with moving between two known points, transformation can be characterised as a negotiated 
approach to the unknown, the emphasis being on means rather than ends.
Before examining these two notions in relation to the passing of communism, a few words 
about historical analysis. The use of periodisation based on the assumption of history being a 
process where significant "events" cause or spur an accelerated or intensified process of change 
is neither accurate or useful. Such an interpretation, while convenient for certain didactic or 
polemical approaches, can obscure the fact that "events" derive from, and are an integral part 
of ongoing interactions. Furthermore profound social change is rarely, if ever, abrupt. Given 
this, the question arises as to whether the collapse of communism and the change to alternative 
forms of economic and political management represents a sufficiently deep and rapid set of 
discontinuities to justify being called a "transition". Nevertheless, western aid to post­
communist states has been based on the assumption that this is the case. The transition 
discourse which has evolved reflects certain beliefs and attitudes towards communism and
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about the value of neo-classical economics. This discourse has provided the basis for policy 
formulation and has determined the way in which assistance has been delivered to post- 
communist states.
The World Bank uses the phrase “From Plan to Market” to describe its position towards what 
it terms as "the transition of centrally planned economies to a market orientation" (World Bank 
Development Report 1996:iii). It states the “utter necessity of both liberalising economies 
through opening trade and market opportunities and stabilising them through reducing inflation 
and practising fiscal discipline (ibid p. 1). The Bank sees the long term goal of these states as 
being to build a thriving market economy capable of giving long-term growth. It defines the 
types of reform as being "all out" (the big bang approach) or partial and phased. It defines the 
key components of reform as being liberalisation and stabilisation. The latter consists of 
containing inflation and imposing hard budget restraints; instituting property rights and 
enterprise reform. It recognises that these measures will bring about increased inequality and 
poverty and advocates appropriate support for those so disadvantaged. The components 
intrinsic to transition are therefore "liberalisation, stabilisation, privatisation (WB 
emphases) and poverty relief1 (ibid p.85). Subsidiary to, but supporting these objectives, the 
Bank assists with the development of legal institutions and the creation of legal frameworks 
so as to permit private sector development, foreign investment, to regulate bankruptcy and to 
constrain state power. It seeks to assist in the establishment of financial systems including the 
creation of central banks responsible for monetary policy. It seeks to promote better but leaner 
government while ensuring that health and education are adequately addressed. Issues of 
democratic consolidation are not directly within the Bank's purview since it claims its brief 
does not cover politics.
The reforming agenda for the transition to a market orientated economy is governed and 
funded by the OECD countries, either bilaterally or more usually through proxies such as 
IMF/WB, the EBRD or UN. The interpretation of this policy and the administering of 
transitional aid is dominated by economists. Their technical task is to effect the implementation 
of stabilisation and restructuring programmes. In practical terms this includes assisting with 
the development of measures to encourage private savings; the privatisation of state assets; 
wage inflation and unemployment; the improvement of financial, tax and legal systems so as 
to maximise incentives to work, invest and save; the establishment of social safety nets to care 
for those who cannot compete. For a more general account of the economist's technical task
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see Thiessen (1994). For an example of the application of this technical approach see 
Mancellari et al.(1995) who have undertaken a study concerned with the economic modelling 
of job flows and unemployment in Albania.
The final dimension to the market orientated vision of transition is the integration, or prospect 
of integration, of the former communist states into the world economy. Some claim this will 
be brought about by increasing convergence resulting from states adopting liberal democratic 
institutions and moving towards market orientated economies. Such views are expressed by 
Fukuyama (1992) who envisages the broad evolution of human societies towards a final goal 
brought about by the convergence of institutions around the model of democratic capitalism.
It would be inaccurate to describe the transition agenda as representing an entirely market- 
orientated approach to change. Donors such as the WB and the EU, have been concerned with 
assisting with restructuring government departments and legal reform. A small proportion of 
aid budgets has also allocated for the promotion of pluralism and civil society. Most often this 
has been linked to support for NGO development. While NGOs have provided some valuable 
contributions towards the development of civil society, they have had significant drawbacks. 
Certainly this was so in Albania, where not atypically, they were concentrated in the 
metropolitan zone and had localised and weak penetration in the regions. As this research will 
show, they were unfamiliar organisations to the villagers of this study who looked upon them 
with caution, if not suspicion. The nature of development and the role of aid is hazily 
understood by publics in post-communist states who remain deprived of knowledge and 
balanced information. With the concentration which has taken place on economic reform, 
issues of governance, especially local government, have received relatively little attention.
There are grounds for asserting that since it requires a strong central state able to push through 
the radical programmes associated with the removal of price controls, macro economic 
stabilisation and privatisation of state assets, the ethos which lies behind the use of the term 
"transition" is one which demands a form of authoritarian modernisation. In the light of the 
authoritarian nature of communism, to advocate the imposition of another set of economic 
policies has been paradoxical and also practically unrealistic. The collapse of employment and 
welfare provision has caused widespread poverty and distress. Politicians in former communist 
states, unwilling to lose the benefits of their position and conscious of the need for re-election, 
have been tardy and reluctant to further increase the burden of their fellow citizens.
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Nevertheless pushing through stabilisation packages has been at the heart of Western 
assistance to former communist states. The term "transition" thus represents a set of 
conceptual attitudes which see change almost exclusively in terms of market orientated reform. 
It is associated with the assumption that once this is complete then everything else will fall into 
place. This approach forms a distinctive discourse (Foucault 1972:31-36) in that it is 
dominated by a clear object of analysis (economic restructuring), a particular approach towards 
its presentation (the market), there is a system of coherent concepts (liberalism) and there is 
a persisting theoretical theme (neo-classical economic theory).
However by introducing the notion of transformation, the parameters of this discourse can be 
both widened and deepened. Assisting in transformation by no means precludes providing 
support to post-communist states in becoming market-orientated polities, but the notion of 
transformation is one which implies more flexible, less dogmatic approaches which respect 
cultures, sovereignty and the caution of people (often interpreted as conservatism). It is a far 
less certain enterprise in respect of outcomes. Transformation implies adaptation and 
rearrangement leading to the development of permutations and reconfigurations of already 
existing institutional forms. In bringing our attention to these dimensions Stark (1992:22) 
notes how such seemingly descriptive terms as "the transition to a market economy" or "the 
transition to capitalism" are in fact "teleological constructs in which concepts are driven by 
hypothesised end states".
Rather than interpret transition through general models there is a need to take into account the 
highly diverse nature of those states which have experienced communism. This points to a 
further problem of transition management which is that the imposition of post-communist 
transitional strategies has not been sufficiently sensitive to their impact on formal and informal 
institutions. Indeed if there had been a wholesale and undiluted implementation of the neo- 
liberal prescription then it would have created what Polanyi has termed a stark utopia "which 
could not exist without annihilating the human and natural substance of society and the 
environment" (Polanyi 1957:3). This extreme of self regulation and efficient management of 
industrial life is inevitably diluted by measures taken to protect society. The reality is that to 
varying degrees political and social imperatives temper the market one way or another (cf. 
Granovetter 1992). The crucial issue is how they do so. The problems of post-communism are 
therefore not simply technical ones concerned with effecting an economic transition from one 
state to another, but rather relate to a larger and more complex process of transformation of
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which the economic dimension is just a part.
To create a consensus around a new political order which reflects the moral imperatives of a 
national community takes time. The way in which the market is mediated changes with each 
society. The nature of participation, the means of accountability, welfare provision and issues 
of redistribution can only be decided by continuous and evolving interactions rooted in the 
culture of individual states. Time is an important factor in transformation.
What he calls "cookbook capitalism" is viewed sceptically by Stark (1992:8) who draws 
attention to the changes taking place in the political, economic and social domains of post­
communist states as often being asynchronous and unharmoniously articulated. In part this is 
due to the considerable overhang in political attitudes, social relations and economic 
management from the communist past. Furthermore there has been a sense in which the 
former communist states were seen as being without form or in some type of limbo. This has 
led to the misapprehension in the west that no civil institutions existed prior to the collapse of 
communism: "Civil society is often “resurrected” in democratic transitions in capitalist 
countries, but in most post-communist transitions it must be created from almost nothing.” 
(McFaul 1993:xiv). This type of assumption emanating from such an influential source as the 
Centre for Strategic Studies in Washington exhibits startling ignorance. I will be illustrating 
how there exists a rich tradition of cooperation and civility in the Albanian communities of this 
study. However the point needs to be stressed that transformation is a variegated process. The 
existence of a range of institutions and relationships unique to each country, and which can 
indeed differ within each country, makes the imposition of a standardised model of economic 
transition unlikely to achieve the desired effect.
One way of handling the complexities created by diversity is by means of the path dependence 
approach (Stark 1992; Linz and Stepen 1996; Stark and Bruszt 1998) which in this context 
is based on the premise that each country has a distinctive and unique path of extrication from 
state socialism. These paths are influenced by the history, culture, politics and economic 
structures of individual countries. However the analysis of pathways can not assume that 
outcomes are determined or predictable since social and technical change continuously 
influence choices and decisions (Levy 1996:46). Changes in social structure and of institutions 
provide key reference points in the analysis of states which are struggling to deal with the 
failure of communist systems to provide adequate frameworks for economic development and
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social provision. The comparative analysis of different paths has brought into question the 
extent to which rapid and wholesale markedsation of economic life should form the main plank 
of economic policy in the circumstances of the post-communist transformation. So much so 
that some argue the imposition of a market economy and democracy leads to forms of 
retrogression which are chronic and persistent. Burawoy (1996:1105) suggests that a process 
of involution (Le. the inverse of evolution) takes place when a post-communist economy eats 
away at its own reserves by funnelling resources from production to exchange. Williams and 
Balaz (1999:165) describe the neo-liberal model as being a framework for the re-working of 
inequalities. Others have gone further and argued that the transition is not from socialism to 
capitalism but to feudalism (Verderey 1996:205) or anarcho-capitalism (Gray 1998:133).
From this it can be seen that policy advice and support to post-communist states has been 
based on the supposition that the operation of market principles is both the ends and the 
means to a successful transition. It has assumed that such states are able to conduct the process 
of creative destruction which is required in economic restructuring. It has assumed that they 
will generate growth and new jobs. It has assumed that capital markets can be created and that 
these will bring about investment and savings. However the problem has been that policy 
advice did not adequately take into account the extent to which markets and privatisation of 
state assets were to be influenced by interest groups within and outside of government. It did 
not take into account the complexity of reforming judiciaries, police forces, banking systems 
and of addressing issues related to economic growth such as credit and training. Furthermore, 
the consequences of a lack of regulation and a widespread lack of confidence in the rule of law 
has resulted in the hesitant formation of markets which have been inevitably poorly articulated.
Many of the transitions from totalitarian-like rule during the latter half of the twentieth century 
have taken place in states where market economies were already established. The particular 
challenge posed by post-communism is the comprehensive nature of change that is being 
required. So far we have largely concentrated on the economic dimension of change but any 
lasting economic transformation needs to be underpinned by democratic consolidation. Just 
as with economic relations, political relations are uniquely embedded in every culture so that 
under communism political relations were attenuated and distorted in a particular fashion in 
each state. There were thus significant variations between states, as is witnessed in the different 
ways in which they have responded to the challenges of liberalisation. The major elements of 
democratisation have been the formation of a pluralist society, understanding the nature of
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democratic process, the development and administration of a rule of law and lastly, issues of 
governance. Efficient and effective governance in post-communist states has been constrained 
by a lack of a clear distinction between party and state, the politicisation of the civil service and 
the inheritance of a culture of informing (Linz and Stepan 1996:251). This latter issue has 
caused problems, in many cases acute problems, with the lustration (purification) of the state 
apparatus and representative institutions. Arguments over the participation of individual actors 
in former communist regimes has disrupted, and many cases, poisoned the political discourse, 
damaged bureaucracies and led to the loss of technical specialists. Particular difficulties have 
been experienced firstly in handling the interests of those whose human rights were abused 
under communism and secondly of coming to terms with the widespread involvement with the 
communist organs of internal security.
The very different nature of political institutions prior to the communist experience, the 
differing nature of communist regimes themselves, issues of frontiers and ethnicity, all 
contribute to make any realistic institutional analysis of post-communist states dependent on 
a study of particular pathways (ibid. p.254). I have so far touched upon the privatisation of 
state property but the way in which state power has been taken into private hands has been an 
important factor determining the nature of post-communist transformation. This privatisation 
of power has led to the development of mafia type organisations (see Fiorentini and Peltzman 
1995; Frisby 1998). These organisations come in many shapes sizes and work in a multiplicity 
of ways. Reference will be made to their activities in the region of Albania where this study 
took place. Anderson (1995) argues that there are three origins of mafias; an abdication of 
legitimate power, excessive bureaucratic power, and the potential of illegal markets. In Albania 
the first reason is the paramount explanation of their growth. In the absence of strong and 
effective central government localised allegiances have emerged with horizontal and more 
penetrative structures than those of the state. It is these that have then gone on to exploit 
illegal markets. In addition there has been a disturbing tendency for the state and the 
democratic process to be pervaded by networks of reciprocity, both vertical and horizontal, 
which have their roots in the communist period.
The study of post-communism means therefore not just examining the effects of prescription 
and deciding what should take place in order to achieve the idealised market end state. Under 
communism the economic order and redistributive practices were constructed in such a way 
as to reinforce the power of the centre. As Verdery says (1996:10) "..what was rational in
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socialism differed from capitalist rationality. Both are stupid in their own way, but differently 
so." The study of post-communism also involves acknowledging that such phenomena as 
privatisation, markets, and civil society are objects of investigation saturated with ideological 
significance (ibid.p.26).
Bryant and Mokrzycki state (1994:9), so long as "transition" remains a project devised by 
technical experts and imposed upon populations and there manipulated for its own good, there 
can be little hope of success. However if we move away from examining transition as a macro- 
economic process and look to its sociological dimensions, which includes the study of micro- 
economic affairs, we can begin to theorise about the "transition" in a more informed way 
through trying to understand what is being transformed and how it is being transformed. One 
dimension of this involves understanding the nature of socialism as it was practised in 
individual countries and how the different forms of ideology affected social practice (Hann 
1994:236). The critics of the "transition" approach, including all those mentioned here, express 
concern about the problem of creating a new centralism and a new orthodoxy in post­
communist states whose populations are weary of centralism and wary of ideology. The neo­
liberal enthusiasts tend to forget the length of time it has taken to evolve economic and social 
arrangements with which we in the west are familiar. They forget, ignore or discount the 
limitations of western liberal individualism. They also avoid confronting how far their own 
societies fell short of the ideal of the market. It is impossible to think of an OECD state which 
does not regulate its markets, judiciously invest state funds, provide soft credit in some form, 
protect its markets and redistribute wealth. All these are policies which undermine the 
unfettered operation of the market are instituted to promote and maintain social cohesion.
"For better or for worse the economists have had their big bangs and their shock 
therapies: for better, in sofar as currencies have been stabilised; for worse, in so 
far as the hopes of many for economic prosperity were raised only to be cruelly 
dashed. It is time now for sociologists to try lower expectations and fortify resolve 
for the long haul."(Bryant 1994:75)
Since the paths towards transformation are highly dependent on the particular circumstances 
of a particular state, any meaningful understanding of "transition" therefore involves an 
appreciation of how communism operated in specific countries. From a sociological 
perspective it involves examining the rational choices being made by ordinary people as they
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negotiate their way through novel and rapidly evolving circumstances. It is understanding how 
well or in what way these histories accord with reality which is, in part, the work of the 
anthropologist. Hann (1995b:222) describes the anthropological task as one of understanding 
the subjective experiences of socialism and the recent transformations so as to assist in 
formulating a more objective account of the transitional process. In practical terms this 
involves analysing and understanding how post-communist societies are being transformed: 
what has happened to ownership and property; the way in which social relations are used to 
mediate the market and politics; the nature and role of the state; the meaning of citizenship and 
the nation. Essentially, this is what this study seeks to do in the context of Albania.
I have discussed the changes taking place in the aftermath of communism by use of the terms 
transition and transformation. By so doing I have sought to highlight two different approaches 
to understanding these changes. The study of transformation involves understanding diversity, 
the various ways in which capitalism is being established and what this implies for social 
relations and their regulation. It requires shifting away from a transitional analysis which is 
preoccupied by a particular end state towards an analysis of institutions and process so as to 
understand particular evolutionary paths. It involves identifying what forms of relations are 
being carried over from communism and the way in which assets, relations and practices are 
being recombined in response to a new political and economic environment (see Pickles and 
Smith 1998). In particular this research has been formulated and orientated so as to better 
understand how power is being reconfigured in Albania and what this implies in respect of the 
establishment of democratic arrangements and the nature of identity.
1.5 Content and Structure:
The empirical research is presented within the analytical framework of community, economy 
and state. In each case there is a description of these domains during the communist period, 
supported by subjective accounts provided by respondents from the villages of the study. This 
is followed by an examination of the transformations taking place in community, market and 
state during the post-communist period. Interlinked with this is an examination of agency 
which delineates how individuals and collectivities were seen to be negotiating their way 
through a highly charged period of change.
As discussed, policy towards former communist states has been formulated around the notion
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of their transition to a market economy. Reform policies have been heavily reliant on the neo­
classical economic model under the assumption that if correctly sequenced and properly 
applied, the reform programme would provide the basis for sound economic development and 
integration into the world economy. Except for a few countries in Eastern Europe where there 
has been a certain measure of success, this has not worked. Rather than view this period as 
being an economic transition, my intention is to focus on the social dimensions of change. The 
field research provides an opportunity to identify and contextualise the nature and extent of 
Albanian post-communist transformation as seen and experienced from the village perspective. 
In so doing it provides an opportunity to challenge some of the accepted notions of transition.
I will be seeking to apply formal theories by means of grounding them in real life circumstances 
(see Glaser and Strauss 1967:99) and using them to analyse the field experience through the 
exploration of identity. Identity, adaptation and the growth of a civil society are closely 
interlinked. In order to disentangle and explicate the various elements of which they are 
composed, I shall be drawing upon theories concerning the nation, communities and 
households.
The thesis concludes with an examination of my hypothesis that the various transformations 
which have taken place in Albania during the twentieth century can be explained by the 
changing nature of relationships between the state, community and the economy/market. This 
is achieved by applying the empirical data to an explicatory framework derived from the notion 
of structuration.
I deduce from these findings that the Albanian state does not so much require assistance in 
creating a market economy, the Albanians are quite good at that, the problem is one of 
administration of the market place and political accountability. In the absence of models of 
solidarity and cooperation appropriate to the novel political and economic environment, I 
suggest that there is a need for space, time and assistance to adapt, reconfigure and improve 
a range of institutional forms1, particularly those of a civic nature, so as to generate trust and 
confidence in a new institutional setting. The conclusion will elaborate on this.
By institutions I am referring to what are described by Bourdieu (1990) as embodied routines, practices and 
predispositions. Institutions will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
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In order to achieve these objectives, the thesis is laid out as follows. Chapter two provides 
background information about Albania concerning its history, the communist experience and 
post-communist developments. Chapter three provides a description of the two villages which 
formed the focus for this study and gives details of their administrative setting.
Chapter Four outlines the theoretical perspectives used in this analysis. Chapter Five discusses 
the research methodology and includes a rationale for the way in which the empirical data is 
structured.
The empirical core of the thesis is contained in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. They describe 
the communist experience and subsequent developments from the perspectives of the two 
villages of the study. This material has been analysed under the headings of community, 
economy and state. These chapters respectively relate to trust and social structures; risk and 
survival strategies; organisation and the possibility of shaping society. Together they describe 
the Albanian path of extrication from communism. It is in these chapters that first-hand, 
subjective accounts deriving from the fieldwork are systematised and analysed. Each of these 
three chapters concludes with a summary of its findings in relation to identity.
Chapter nine, the final chapter, draws together the conclusions from the chapters on 
community, economy and state. By explaining the changes which have taken place both in the 
nature of structures and the relationships between them, structuration theory is used to 
elucidate the process of identity change in twentieth century Albania. The implications of these 
findings are discussed in relation to the development of civil society and the meaning of 
transformation in post-communist Albania.
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2.0 ALBANIA - BACKGROUND
2.1 The Country:
The territory occupied by the modem state of Albania is about the size of Wales. It is situated 
on the Balkan peninsular on the southern Adriatic coast. The country extends 340 km from 
north to south and at its widest is 150 km from east to west. It consists for the greater part of 
rugged mountains set around a coastal plain which extends along the eastern Adriatic 
seaboard. The country is dissected by a number of rivers running roughly east to west which 
are prone to flooding. In the highlands the climate is characterised by cold and wet winters. In 
the lowlands winter is softened by the warm currents brought up from the Ionian Sea which 
in summer make the lowlands humid with little precipitation. Climate is conditioned by altitude 
and locality. The vegetation is Mediterranean on the coastal plain, where nowadays the full 
range of Mediterranean crops is grown. As the altitude increases, the climate becomes 
increasingly continental in character and the flora correspondingly changes to the Alpine type. 
Where there is sufficient soil, the mountains are covered with oak, beech and pine. The poorer 
shrub-covered land provides grazing. For its size, the country has considerable mineral 
resources, principally oil, chrome, copper and iron ore. (Hall, D. 1994:13-24)
2.2 History:
The history of the Albanian people over the past 2 millennia has largely been one of domination 
by foreign powers. Despite this, the Albanians have managed to maintain an independent and 
distinctive identity. The land they have occupied has always been important as a bridgehead 
for those from the Italian peninsular who have sought to expand their interests eastward as 
well as to those coming from the east who have wished to expand westward. In the turmoil 
created by disintegrating empires at the beginning of the 20th century the Albanian people 
managed to achieve sovereignty over some of the territory they inhabited, despite powerful 
land-hungry neighbours. In 1997 there were approximately 3.2 million Albanians living within 
the frontiers of this Albanian state. There are probably as many ethnic Albanians living in the 
territories surrounding Albania. There is a sizeable Albanian diaspora with concentrations in 
Italy and the USA.
The modem Albanians descend from the Illyrians who were a people of Indo-European origin. 
Earliest references to the Illyrians are dated around 500 BC and indicate that they had long
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been present in the region. The archeological records show them as being a distinctive culture 
as far back as 1,000 BC. This leads to supposing their migration to the Balkans probably 
occurred at the end of the Bronze Age and perhaps even further back in time to the 3rd 
millennium BC (Harding 1992:16). Linguistic analysis categorises Illyrian, which is similar to 
Armenian, as being an early branch of the Indo-European stream of languages (Pipa 
1989:153). It is reasonable to conclude that Indo-European speakers ancestral to the later 
Illyrians were present in Albania by 2000 BC (Harding 1992:17). A number of Albanian 
scholars claim that their Illyrian forefathers were the original inhabitants of the region and are 
the oldest of the Balkan peoples (Pipa 1989:3).
The organisation of Albanian tribes was conditioned by the geography of the region which 
consists of rugged mountains and flood prone plains. These features contributed to splitting 
the people into small isolated communities. In this harsh environment full of the perils of nature 
and man, communities coalesced to form larger groupings with a common name which came 
to form the basis of tribes. One such Illyrian tribe which managed to retain the most 
independence was the Albani who inhabited the region around Durres and from whom the 
name used by foreigners to describe the country is derived. An alliance of Illyrian tribes formed 
a state which existed between the 5th and 3rd centuries BC.
In the classical Greek period there was considerable hellenisation of southern Albania which, 
though short in duration, was of lasting influence (Hammond 1992:37). Because it controlled 
one side of the narrow entrance to the Adriatic Sea, Illyria was strategically important to 
traders and those with political and military interests in the region. The Via Egnatia was an 
important trade route running from the modem day Durres on the Adriatic, eastwards to 
Thessalonika, Constantinople and beyond. However the geography of the territory occupied 
by the Illyrians contributed to their isolation. The marshy, flood-prone lowlands surrounded 
by inhospitable mountains kept the land free from the main north/south invasion routes which 
ran through present day Serbia and Macedonia.
Illyria was brought under the full control of Rome by 167 BC and formed a bridgehead for the 
expansion of its Empire. The Romans were primarily interested in protecting their trade routes 
and left the mountainous areas largely untouched. Christianity was introduced to the region 
during the 2nd century AD and was initially an urban phenomenon. In 395 when the Roman 
Empire was split into its eastern and western parts, southern Illyria went to the eastern church
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and empire while northern Illyria went to the western empire under the authority of the Pope 
(Hill 1992:48). With the collapse of the Roman Empire in the 6th centuiy AD, Illyria came 
under the sway of Byzantium but was subject to invasions and occupation by Huns, Avars and 
Slavic tribes. For a while it was part of the Bulgar Empire. Byzantine writers started to use the 
terms "Arbanite" and "Albanian”.
The religious position of Albania was somewhat ambiguous since the country was 
administratively under the Eastern Empire and yet ecclesiastically dependent on Rome. The 
majority of Albanians tended to follow the Patriarch of Constantinople. In 1054 the schism 
between the two branches of Christendom took place. This was to have a lasting affect on 
Albania and is reflected in the pattern of religious affiliation which can be seen to this day, with 
a Catholic enclave in the north and Orthodox Christians concentrated in the centre and south 
of the country.
The Normans invaded in 1081 and the country was later plundered by the Crusaders, whose 
eventual seizure of Constantinople in 1204, hastened the decline of Byzantine power. In 1272 
the King of Naples, Charles I of Anjou, entered Albania and created the Kingdom of Arberie 
which lasted a century (Skendi 1957: 4). During the 14th century Serb influence increased to 
include Albania, Thessaly and Epirus but was to founder as a result of their defeat by the 
Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Kosova in 1389. This defeat has been a defining feature of 
Serbian national identity and served to differentiate them from the other Slav groups in the 
region.
Ottoman control over the territories inhabited by the Albanian tribes was temporarily halted 
by Gjergj Kastrioti (1405-1468), known as Skanderbeg, who galvanised them to resist the 
Turkish invaders. He struck alliances with the Venetians and the King of Naples and was used 
by the Christian powers to act as a bulwark against the marauding Turks. By uniting the 
Albanian chieftains, Skanderbeg was able to forge an independent, predominantly Catholic, 
Albanian state which lasted for twenty years. His family flag, with the double headed eagle, 
remains the emblem of the modem Albanian state. Albanians refer to themselves as being 
Shqipetare and their country as being Shqiperi, probably deriving from shqiponje (eagle). 
Skanderbeg had all the attributes of a national hero. He has proven to be a useful and non­
partisan focus for nationalist propaganda. Although there are many stirring legends about him, 
there are few, if any, authentically unbiased historical accounts. He has been used by
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communists and non-communists alike. Such is his status in the national mythology of Albania 
that with poor primary sources of information and partisan secondary historians, the true facts 
of his life are hard to determine (Winnifrith 1992:74).
After the death of Skanderbeg succession was passed to Lek Dukagjin who became known for 
the Kanun or legal code which was named after him. Lek fled to Italy after the Turks took 
Shkoder in 1472. He codified customary laws and norms to form the Kanun, a rigidly applied 
system of tribal justice which was particularly strong in northern Albania. The code regulated 
a range of issues concerning land, water, rights of way, marriage, assault and theft. Integral to 
the Kanun was the definition of the circumstances surrounding the operation of the blood feud 
and the "besa" or sworn truce. Feuds developed, persisted and intensified until the killings 
created a cycle of conflict which was bound up with the codes of honour. In the absence of 
anything other than a succession of colonial powers primarily interested in the subjugation of 
local peoples and the extraction of resources, there were certain positive aspects to the Kanun. 
However the ultimate sanction, the blood feud, came to have an increasingly pernicious effect 
on the social fabric and economy of the mountain peoples. The operation and complexities of 
the Kanun are described by Edith Durham (1987). She outlines how, unchanged for centuries, 
the system operated in the early 1900s. Although essentially an oral tradition, a version of the 
Kanun has been collected by Gjecov (1989). The effects of the Kanun and the blood feud are 
vividly described at a more personal and emotional level in the novel "Broken April" by Ismail 
Kadare (1990), probably the most well known contemporary Albanian writer.
Once absorbed into the Ottoman Empire, the Albanian resistance to the Turks was limited to 
intermittent revolts. When not fighting amongst themselves the Albanian tribes spent more time 
fighting with the Turks than against them. Many individual Albanians rose to important 
positions in the Ottoman administration. Despite the economic stagnation under the Turks, 
they provided the Albanians with a sense of security from their Slav and Greek neighbours 
(Vickers 1995:31) and large numbers converted to Islam.
During the period of Turkish occupation the Albanian tribes operated under a patrilineal 
system. In the north, tribes were divided into bajraks each of which was composed of a clan 
ifis) and was led by a hereditary bajraktar (literally standard bearers. Each bajrak was 
subdivided into mehallas (groups of houses) which were presided over by hereditary “byes’’ 
or “jobars” (heads). Each mehalla was subdivided into single households {shtepi) which
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formed viable social and economic units consisting of several brothers and their families. Their 
head was called the “zoti i shtepi (lord of the house). The Kanun of Lek Dukagjin was 
administered in each bajrak by a council of elders presided over by a bajraktar (Swire 
1929:23). In southern Albania the original extended families were absorbed into estates owned 
by Muslim Albanian Beys who became important administrative and controlling agents in the 
Ottoman system (Lopasic 1992:89; Skendi 1957:6). Although the Ottomans ruthlessly crushed 
all resistance, control over their unwieldy empire was beginning to erode in the early nineteenth 
century.
A further feature important to any general introduction to the Albanians concerns their division 
into two main groups which speak distinctive dialects. The Ghegs come from the mountainous 
country to the north of the Shkumbi river, which traverses the centre of the country. Ghegs 
also migrated to the plains of Kosovo. The Tosks are those Albanians who come from the 
southern lowlands and plains. The tribal and clan linkages associated with this distinction have 
played, and to some extent continue to play, a significant part in Albanian social and political 
life
2.3 Independence:
The Albanian national awakening took place at a time when Europe was coming to the end of 
a period of intensive redefinition of state structures and boundaries. As the antiquated, archaic 
and corrupt Ottoman Empire began to fall apart, the Balkan peoples began to seek autonomy. 
After the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8 the Treaty of San Stefeno was imposed on the defeated 
Turks whereby they were forced to concede large portions of Albanian occupied areas to the 
Balkan Slavs (Skendi 1967:33). A group of Albanians in Istanbul founded the League of 
Prizren in 1878. Its main objectives were to prevent the dismemberment of the Albanian 
dominated Ottoman administrative zones (vilayets) of Janina, Kosova, Monastir and Shkoder 
and to seek for their administrative unification while still remaining under Turkish control. 
Although the Albanians were by then predominantly Muslim, theirs was an inclusive 
nationalism in which ethnicity was not defined by religion but by language and tradition. 
Despite the demise of the League of Prizren, Albanian nationalists increasingly sought 
autonomy from the Turks. Particular emphasis was given to the development of a common 
language which could form a link between the various Albanian religious and regional
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groupings. Language was linked to the texts and scripts to be used in schools and was fused 
with political symbolism. The Latin script was adopted in 1908.
After theTurkish defeat in the First Balkan War, independence was opportunistically declared 
in November 1912 by a group of Albanian nationalists and intellectuals. The situation was 
accepted by the Great Powers at the London peace conference and Albanian frontiers were 
eventually fixed and guaranteed by them. Austria-Hungary succeeded in having its nominee, 
Prince William of Wied, created head of the autonomous principality of Abania. However he 
proved incapable of handling the machinations of Abanian politics and fled the country after 
six months at the outbreak of the Great War. Whitaker (1968:286) describes him as being "...a 
German princeling, who lacked not merely sympathy and good sense, but even common animal 
courage.”
During the First World War Austria- Hungary, France, Italy and Greece all for a time occupied 
one part or other of Abania, as did the Serbs and Montenegrins. Concerned about its 
dismemberment in the aftermath of the war, an Abanian delegation attended the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919. With the tacit support of Woodrow Wilson, who advocated the principal 
of self-determination, they argued vehemently and successfully for confirmation of Abania's 
sovereign status (Hall, D. 1994:11). In 1920 a provisional government was formed. Against 
the strenuous objections of its neighbours, Abania was accepted into the League of Nations 
with its border finally being settled in November 1921. It was at this point that the modem 
Abanian state could be said to have become sovereign.
The country continued to be governed by tribal and clan relations. There was often conflict 
and the government was unstable. The economy was largely non-monetised and of a 
subsistence nature. There was a very weak internal market. From 1920 to 1922 there were 
seven heads of government. In no sense could the society be called democratic. Personalities 
rather than parties dominated the assembly. There was no effective rule of law and much 
brigandage. One government from this early period which has retained its place in the Abanian 
national memory was led by Fan Noli, a Harvard educated Orthodox Bishop. For six months 
he led a democratic-style government which sought to modernise Abania by asserting the 
authority of the state through the reform of civil and military structures and by disarming the 
people. He was perhaps an example of a man whose time was wrong since he “lacked the two
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crucial elements without which no one could have carried such a list of reforms through: 
financial backing and domestic support”(Fischer 1984:66)1.
Noli was driven from Albania by a tribal chieftain who became president and then went on to 
proclaim himself "King Zog of the Albanians". Zog achieved his monarchical status as a result 
of a rigged poll. On the basis of its results the puppet Assembly modified the constitution to 
make Albania an hereditary monarchy and offered the crown to Zog. This took place on the 
morning of 1 September 1928. He was crowned King of the Albanians just before 5.00 pm the 
same day2. Fischer, one of Zog’s biographers, describes him as having a flair for intrigue and 
of being relentlessly ambitious, unscrupulous and ruthless. He had a limited education and was 
vain. He could not organise or coordinate, and being deeply suspicious was unable to delegate 
(ibid p.6/17). Chronically short of money, Zog's Albanian state became indebted to fascist 
Italy, which eventually annexed the country in 1939. Zog fled to Greece with his young 
consort and their newly bom son. He was said to have taken with him a bucket of mbies and 
one of emeralds as well as a substantial part of the gold reserves remaining in the State Bank 
estimated at $10 million. Anti-Zogists in London maintained he took between £1-4 million 
(ibid p.293). The remainder of his life was spent in exile. He died in Paris in 1961.
It is hard to imagine anything positive coining about from such a ruler as this. Yet 
commentators observe that despite Zog’s failings, and the climate of patronage and corruption 
he generated, certain changes took place which contributed towards a feeling of national 
identity. Zog's reign was characterised by a strange combination of Oriental rule and Western 
reform (Skendi 1957:16). A period of stability came about whereby “Albanianness” could be 
explored and expressed at a local level without being penalised by the Ottomans. At the 
national level change only occurred through the autocratic will of Zog who controlled the 
judiciary, appointed and dismissed cabinet ministers, had the sole right to introduce bills and
It is interesting to note how Noli was interpreted by the c o m m u n ist  regime. The APL claimed that in 1925 it was 
the industrial bourgeoisie who mobilised the masses to demand radical change, the threat of which caused Zog to 
flee to Yugoslavia. Noli became the leader of the new liberal government only to be thrown out by an invasion led 
by Zog and financed and armed by the Yugoslavs (Bland 1992:124).
2
Zog was intensely conscious of his personal security. He spent much of his time chain smoking in his office. His 
meals would be cooked by his mother in her villa opposite the palace and delivered to Zog in a locked container by 
an armed guard. His coronation was in fact scheduled for 5.00 pm but actually took place at 4.45 following his 
practice, instituted for security reasons, to avoid doing anything at a time which he had appointed. The consequence 
on this occasion was that the Italian and other important ambassadors failed to be present at the crowning ceremony.
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could dismiss parliament at will. Through a variety of means, including murder, all internal 
opposition was stifled. Nevertheless efforts were made to establish the rule of law, to 
undertake agrarian reform and land redistribution, to develop an education system and to 
improve the lot of women. While none of these initiatives could in any sense be called 
successful, sufficient occurred to allow a climate in which the attribute “Albanian” started to 
have a significance which it had never had before.
2.4 Communism:
Skendi (1957: 76/77) dates the start of serious interest by Albanians in Marxism to the Noli 
regime of 1924. The Bishop and a number of his younger associates were influenced by 
Marxist ideology and the developments in Russia. Austin (1996:155) states that Noli's 
precipitate recognition of the Soviet government was one of the main reasons for his downfall. 
This made the Great Powers suspicious of his intentions and they never offered him support. 
During the 1930s communist groups financed by Comintern were started in Albania. They 
consisted predominantly of craftsmen, students and intellectuals. Membership probably 
numbered no more than a few hundred in total. Though they were a focus for anti-fascist and 
anti-monarchist sentiment, they did not pose a serious threat to King Zog, but their formation 
indicated a reaction against his regime and the power of the establishment. The groups from 
Korce and Shkoder came together in 1941 to form the Albanian Communist Party (ACP), later 
to be named the Albanian Party of Labour (APL). Within 3 years of its founding the ACP had 
become the supreme political force in Albania. The ideological and political ambitions of the 
communist leader were masked by their activities in the partisan movement. They were 
perceived as fighting for the liberation of Albania from its fascist occupiers in order to lay the 
foundations for a prosperous, egalitarian and democratic nation state.
At the time it was taken over by the communist partisans, Albania was still essentially a rural 
economy. It had barely been touched by those features which, even then, were assumed to be 
part of the modem state. Approximately 87% of its people derived a living from agriculture 
(Prifti 1978:52). For the greater part, they still lived under forms of customary law which 
regulated property rights, inheritance, generational and gender arrangements. The considerable 
variations in these matters between Ghegs and Tosks and between lowland and highland 
regions could be attributed to the degree to which they had been exposed to foreign influences.
25
The use of nationalism became an important legitimizing element behind the policies of the 
APL once they had eliminated all opposition. They paid homage to the national figures, 
predominantly Skanderbeg, but also to the Frasheri brothers and others who had played a part 
in the independence struggle dating from 1878. The communist government preserved a range 
of national monuments and the museum cities of Kruje, Berat and Girokaster. Much emphasis 
was placed on traditional Albanian culture: folk costumes, songs and dances were all fostered. 
The Institute of Popular Culture collected over a million verses, 40,000 proverbs and around
10,000 musical recordings (Pettifer 1994:67). Linguistics, literature, history , geography, 
folklore and ethnology were cultivated, not only to give people a sense of their past but to 
inculcate xenophobic, slavophobic, isolationist sentiments and foster a sense of ethnic 
compactness (Pipa 1990:121). All these elements contributed to the formation and defining of 
an “us” so that a definition from “them” could take place.
As the APL became established and confident in its role of supreme power, its brand of 
communism, largely fashioned by Enver Hoxha, came to be one of the most extreme 
expressions of Marxism-Leninism in the twentieth century. In establishing his dictatorship 
Hoxha modelled himself on Stalin. This entailed the rejection of all other forms of socialism 
and brought about the eventual isolation of Albania. The means by which control was 
maintained was through the use of terror and coercion. Sweeping purges were used to 
consolidate his personal rule. All forms of dissent and deviance from the Party line were 
repressed3. Pipa (1990:142) describes the means used to exert control as being: lies, slander, 
hypocrisy, peijuiy, treachery, generalised espionage, falsification of history and corruption of 
science; these tactics were combined with the use of arbitrary imprisonment, psychiatric
3
Just one example will suffice. A special conference was held in Tirana in April 1956, two months after Khrushchev's 
famous speech denouncing Stalin. During this meeting delegate after delegate spoke in criticism of the philosophy 
and policies of the Albanian Party of Labour. Hoxha had missed the early parts of the debate and on altering quickly 
picked up on the dangerous mood which was prevalent. He called for an immediate vote of confidence in his 
leadership. Having obtained this he dissolved the meeting. Those who had spoken were expelled from the party and 
imprisoned. Hoxha thus used his tactical skill and made full use of his coercive powers whenever his authority was 
threatened. (Logoreci 1977:120).
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confinement, gulags, torture and murder4. The communist regime was controlled by one 
individual during all but 5 of the 45 years of its existence.
Albania under Hoxha experienced one of the most extreme forms of totalitarianism in modem 
times. The core of the regime was an all-embracing ideology which denied the autonomy of 
the individual. It was characterised by a single political party with a charismatic leader which 
denied any moral authority other than that provided by the state. The state controlled a secret 
police force, monopolised mass communications and by means of central planning, directed 
the economy. Propaganda was used to create and heighten the population's sense of isolation 
by instilling fear of the outside world which the government suggested was waiting for the 
opportunity to invade Albania. In order to combat this threat a large army was created which 
also served as a source of forced labour. An extensive civil defence programme was instituted 
to further instil fear, paranoia and xenophobia amongst the populace. Internal security and 
obedience to the will of the Party was enforced by the Sigurimi backed up by concentration 
camps, internal exile and various forms of social exclusion.
However it was the failure of central planning to generate sustained economic growth which 
probably more than anything else undermined the regime and led to the collapse of 
communism. The government’s autarchic polices resulted in a loss of competitiveness brought 
about by a failure to innovate, to trade and make adequate use of those sectors in which 
Albania could compete. Refusal to allow any devolution of economic decision-making 
excluded the participation of the vast mass of people from influencing the policy process. It 
diminished any sense of responsibility in the workforce and reinforced attitudes of minimal 
compliance.
The APL was largely a creation of Tosk elements of Albanian society. Before World War II 
it had been the children of Tosk officials and traders, such as Hoxha, who received an 
education, either at home or abroad. Lacking roots in either clan allegiance or property, they 
were at the core of the Albanian communist movement (Whitaker 1968:282). These Tosk 
elements successfully undermined the control of the southern beys and the clan hierarchies of
According to Amnesty International there were 18 labour camps in Albania which in 1976 contained about 12,000 
political prisoners. Wives were allowed to visit their husbands once a year for a period of a few minutes under the 
scrutiny of a guard.
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the north. This legacy of Hoxha and the APL served to widen the gaps between the Ghegs and 
the Tosks, and thus between the north and south. Communism sought to destroy and subvert 
those features such as fam ily,^, religious affiliation, education and the market which could 
be used in the formation of individual identity. One important means of social control was the 
creation of a pariah group within every community. These armiq te popullit (enemies of the 
people) who existed in almost every community were treated dreadfully. They formed an ever 
present example of the consequences of departing from the Party line. The armiq te popullit 
were the last people to receive allocations of food, fuel or other goods. They were denied 
access to any but the most menial jobs. Their children were only permitted to receive 
elementary education. Their movement was heavily restricted. Most significantly, anyone who 
had contact with them also risked being so condemned. The Albanian communist identity was 
thus moulded by three main features: isolation, economic deprivation and an imposed ideology.
By creating distinctions between friends and enemies, the regime imposed a strong sense of 
social identity upon the people. This was done quite simply, but at great cost, by walling 
people in and keeping out wide swathes of ideas and information. The regime controlled 
reason, the minds of the people and their emotions. It was compulsory for them to have 
confidence in the optimism exuded by the state. Initially most communist regimes had a 
charismatic leader who was capable of inspiring trust. Typically he would have had no 
antecedents and no contact with former regimes. At the outset such leaders were able to strike 
a chord amongst their people which enabled to them to mobilise support in periods of great 
turmoil and uncertainty. Their regimes initially offered hope and a confidence in the future. 
Once that basic contract of belief was struck, albeit under various degrees of information 
manipulation and coercion, it thenceforth offered security and predictability. The trade-off was 
between suffering, in the forms of unemployment, anomie, hunger and despair, and the 
reassurance of being provided for from cradle to grave, no matter that it be at the most meagre 
of levels. As regularly emerges in the writings and stories of those who have lived under 
communism, it meant living with institutional oppression, purges and summary justice (cfi 
Solzhenitsyn 1972).
2.5 Post-Communism:
The collapse of communism was sudden and dramatic. The members of the ruling parties, the 
military elites and the economic sub-elites of managers, the professional classes and those in
28
the arts and journalism had all milked the system for what surpluses it could produce. The 
ideological veneer under which they had done so had been maintained by means of "terror, 
cajolery, personal corruption and nepotism" (Eyal 1991:21). By the end of 1989 all the East 
European states had been allowed to break free from the USSR and had overthrown their 
communist governments. In 1990 the USSR itself was torn apart by the political and economic 
chaos caused by Gorbachev's limited reforms and the national aspirations of its peripheral 
republics.
Albania was the last communist regime in Europe to collapse. The violent disintegration of 
Ceau§escu's regime at the end of 1989 spurred the Albanian government to implement limited 
political and economic reforms which included the decriminalisation of religious worship. 
However these measures were insufficient. Anti-government demonstrations in 1990 resulted 
in several thousand Albanians invading Western European embassies in Tirana in search of 
asylum. Large numbers of young men crossed into Greece in search of work. Student unrest 
in February 1991 resulted in the toppling of Enver Hoxha's statue in Tirana. In March 1991 
many thousands of unemployed and desperate Albanians commandeered boats and ships in 
Albanian ports and sailed to Italy.
Lederer comments (1994:342) "In their messianic zeal, the communists destroyed norms and 
values without proposing anything worthy or human to replace them". In order to fill that 
vacuum there was a resurgence of religion. Churches and mosques were built with external 
support. A wide variety of religious groups sought to establish themselves in Albania. 
Nominally relations between the faiths were good. While Albanians are quick to assert that 
religion did not divide, tensions nevertheless existed.
Elections in March 1991 were won by the APL. The poor showing of the Democrats was 
attributed to the conservatism of the rural voters who were suspicious of change and were 
concerned about the negative impact of land redistribution. The government led by Fatos Nano 
was faced with a rapidly deteriorating economy and with rampant inflation which in 1991 
reached 300%. The GDP per capita in 1992 was $222 (EBRD 1998). There were strikes in 
the industrial and mining sectors. The economy became paralysed. Emergency food aid was 
granted by the European Union in an attempt to staunch the continuing number of Albanian 
economic migrants. During this period there was much destruction and vandalism of public
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buildings and schools. The Nano government resigned to be replaced in March 1992 by the 
Democratic Party led by Sali Berisha who was strongly backed by the Americans.
Once in power Berisha's DP received considerable assistance from a wide range of bilateral and 
multilateral sources. Albania received the highest level of assistance per capita of any of the 
former communist states. The government grew in confidence as it learned how to wield 
power internally and to capitalise upon the desires of Western Europe and the USA to see 
Albania develop as a zone of stability in a volatile region. The DP took note of Western 
inaction towards increasingly poor governance and human rights abuse (see Abrahams 1996). 
The newfound political confidence of the ruling party went hand in hand with a period of 
national economic consolidation as the subsidies to unprofitable state enterprises ceased with 
their closure, aid flows and technical assistance began to have an impact and internal and 
external markets started to articulate. The result was a real improvement in living standards 
for the majority of Albanians.
However the consequences of widespread corruption and abuse of human rights was leading 
to one party rule and an increasingly poisonous political atmosphere. The political discourse 
on any topic quickly degenerated into mutual abuse between the two main protagonists, the 
Democrats and the Socialists. At the time of the research no constitution existed. One was 
eventually passed by the Albanian Parliament in November 1998 but without the support of 
the Democratic Party. Despite the blatant and widespread rigging of the May 1996 national 
election, largely ignored by the European Union states, the Albanian public seemed prepared 
to grudgingly tolerate the increasingly authoritarian Berisha regime provided that the economy 
maintained a steady improvement. However the collapse of the pyramid schemes in early 1997 
in which $1 billion, equivalent to 1/3 of GDP, of personal savings were lost by as many as
300,000 Albanians (Financial Times 4/3/97) proved to be the catalyst of collapse, particularly 
since it was evident that there was considerable contact between the pyramid entrepreneurs and 
the DP government. The subsequent civil disorder demonstrated the fragile nature of Albanian 
civil society. Government armouries were looted and armed groups took control of the south 
of the country in a vicious spasm of looting and banditry. More than 3,000 people were killed 
and many more injured in the widespread strife that spring. A multi-national military force 
assisted in the restoration of stability. Elections in June 1997 were won by the Socialist Party 
whose leader, Fatos Nano, then became Prime Minister. This covers the political developments 
which had taken place up until the end of the last phase of the field research.
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There has always been a degree of illegality in post-communist Albania. Initially the country 
was the destination for stolen vehicles from western Europe. The sanctions imposed on 
Yugoslavia provided an opportunity to smuggle a range of goods across the frontier. One of 
the outcomes of corrupt government and societal breakdown was the growth of gangs, some 
of which developed links with political parties. As criminal activity became more organised, 
the trafficking in people, drugs, arms and other forms of contraband has become increasingly 
integrated with international criminal networks.
This study took place in the northern Gheg region of Albania around the town of Shkoder, an 
ancient and formerly important trading centre. Most of Albania's Catholics live in the north. 
Northern Albanians have a strong regional identity and pride in their culture and history. 
Shkoder has been renowned for its writers, artists, actors and musicians. Despite Hoxha having 
chosen a Shkoder man, Ramiz Alia, as his successor, the people of the north were never 
trusted by the dictator and as a consequence the region received relatively low levels of 
investment. With the collapse of communism, the focus of economic development has been in 
the central and southern zones of Albania to the detriment of the north where, after the closure 
of most of the state enterprises, there has been high unemployment exacerbated by migration 
from the mountains. The next chapter describes the two north Albanian villages in which the 
research took place.
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3.0 THE VILLAGES AND THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE CONTEXT
3.1 Introduction:
At the time of this study Albania was administratively composed of 12 Prefectures, 36 
Districts, 315 Communes, 65 Municipalities and about 12,000 villages. This chapter will 
describe the villages of Gura and Malaj, the two principle locations for the field work which 
forms the basis of this study. The villages were of similar size and each was situated within one 
hour's cycling distance of the regional centre of Shkoder (pop. 100,000). Gura was substantially 
dependent on agriculture whereas Malaj, though in the past heavily reliant upon fishing, had 
developed closer economic and political arrangements with the city. For this and other reasons 
it had a distinctively different character than Gura. As will be discussed in the methodological 
sections §5.4.1 and §5.4.2,1 was working in the two villages in somewhat different ways and 
this accounts for some differences in their description. The chapter concludes with an outline 
of local government structures, their function and relation to central government.
As background to this description I wish to draw attention to two features. Firstly like any 
society, Albania has its own forms of division and compartmentalisation. One notable feature 
of post-communist Albania was the existence, for many reasons and at many levels, there were 
a number of heavily enforced boundaries. These extended from the number and type of fences 
being created in villages to various forms of individuation which have brought about differing 
perceptions of the national entity. Restrictions on movement, particularly policies of rural 
retention during the communist period, resulted in urban dwellers having little appreciation of 
life in the villages and intensified other divisions in Albanian society so that the average 
metropolitan inhabitant had very little interest in, or knowledge of, the situation in the regions. 
Albania was characterised by poor information flows. The second underlying feature was the 
deeply patriarchal nature of Albanian society, particularly in the north. Despite the somewhat 
two-edged attempts (ref. §6.3) to emancipate women during the communist period, the partial 
return to traditional values and the general increase in lawlessness in the post-communist 
period had a negative impact on the position of women in north Albania. This is not to say that 
women did not effect great influence within the household or that they were discriminated 
against in any formal or legal sense. However their position was inferior to men, and their 




3.2.1 Geographic Location: Gura is situated on the northern Albanian coastal plain. It 
borders a large river flowing from the mountains which rise to the north and east. The village 
covers an area of 120 hectares, of which about one quarter is hilly scrubland. Within this area 
dwellings were scattered in clusters. There was no obvious centre to the village, although a 
large number of the houses were situated around the dirt road which bisects its territory. From 
afar it hardly looked like a settlement since there were many olive and other orchard trees 
which obscured the houses.
The climate in the coastal plains of northern Albania makes for lengthy, wet winters and hot 
dry summers. In Gura there was some winter wheat but the majority of crops were sown 
during April after which temperatures increased rapidly. Sowing times were critical and had 
to be completed before the soil lost its natural moisture and friability. The land was generally 
fertile, although some areas were markedly better than others. Access to irrigation water was 
key to successful crop production.
3.2.2 Village History: During the first phase of my work in Gura I was fortunate to be 
offered a village history compiled by a communist chronicler around 1968 (see Appendix 2). 
It had remained forgotten in someone's house. Such testaments to communism were apparently 
not uncommon, although their survival is probably veiy rare. The account was written in a 
tatty exercise book in stumbling and blotchy script. In addition to providing an example of 
local communist polemic, the anonymous writer gives a fascinating account of the village by 
drawing upon an oral history which was becoming fast forgotten. Some of the older people 
have had the spark of life and memory beaten out of them by working and surviving under fifty 
years of the harsh communist regime.
By means of this story and oral accounts it was possible to understand something of the 
migratory processes which have taken place over the past 300 years. I was fortunate to meet 
an 80 year old man who could trace his family line through 8 generations to a tribal leader 
named Ali Vilaj who, by my calculations, was living in the early 18th century. Like many since, 
he had left the mountains of Dukajin to seek a better life. It appears he was able to negotiate 
with the Turkish authorities in Shkoder the right to settle on the edge of the forest in the 
foothills above what is now the village of Gura. Part of these negotiations involved his 
accepting Islam. However on his death bed he demanded attendance by Catholic priests,
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several of whom came and gave him the last rites and a Christian burial. When the Sultan in 
Shkoder heard what had taken place he was consumed with rage. To set an example he sent 
troops to destroy the houses, land and every descendent of this turncoat and heretic. Ali Vilaj's 
son, Met Ali, was killed but Met's baby son named Dem Meti1 was hidden in some rushes by 
the river and escaped death. There were 7 Catholic families who claimed descent from him 
riving in this hamlet above Gura.
3.2.3 Migration: The alluvial land below this hamlet encompasses what is now known as 
Gura. It came to be owned by a few rich merchants from Shkoder who planted orchards and 
vineyards. The labour to work these lands was provided by a small number of Muslim families 
who, it was thought, settled in the village during the 1890s. There was verifiable evidence that 
a number of migrants arrived between 1910 and 1914 when Albania was achieving its first 
phase of independence. At the end of the 1st World War the village consisted of about 19 
families living in 7 or 8 houses. After Albania had achieved full independence in the mid 1920s 
when there was a measure of stability under Zog's regime, a further wave of Muslim migrants 
descended from the uplands. The tales which were told indicated that most of these migrants 
were families escaping from blood feuds. The four principal Muslim fis  came to Gura during 
this period to work for the land-owning merchants under the giflik system, a semi-feudal share 
cropping arrangement whereby a landlord would divide his land into areas which could be 
worked by one family, typically about 7 hectares in this region. This would be farmed by the 
tenant who would give 50% of the crop to the landlord. In many cases the villagers were able 
to negotiate the purchase of some land from their landlord.
It seems that only one Catholic family, which came from the nearby mountain district of Shllak 
in 1916, was resident in Gura prior to 1943. Most Catholic families came between 1944-47 
when the communists were encouraging the predominantly Catholic highlanders to come and 
work the fertile soils owned by the "latifundists". The APL had only to mention this possibility 
for people to seize the opportunity to leave the harsh existence of the highlands. These 
predominantly Catholic migrants used whatever connections they could to secure themselves 
a livelihood on the plains.
Albanians of this region have a formal family name which is that of their Clan or Fis. Each individual then has a first 
name which is followed by the name of his father. In this case the word “Meti” means “of Met”.
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The formulation of economic policies, particularly those demanding rural labour retention, saw 
the establishment of strict administrative controls (see Sjoberg 1991) which soon halted this 
migration. During the period 1950-1982, only a few families were able to get permission to 
reside in Gura. Those that did so were either well connected or had a very good reason to do 
so. A Party member who lived in poor upland village was able to get permission to move to 
Gura. He came to the village with his wife and 8 children and eventually became secretary to 
the village council. Another immigrant was an electrician who lived in a village drowned in one 
of the big hydro-electrical projects. He was permitted to come to Gura to join his wife's 
relations. This type of officially sanctioned move entailed rights to employment in the 
cooperative and the full range of social benefits which went with this.
One or two others had come during the communist period and illegally built shacks on Gura 
land. This was done with the tacit consent of the Head of the People's Council who chose 
(evidence indicated that he was prepared to be induced) to turn a blind eye. At least one man 
gained entry to the village by means of marriage. He joined his wife's family and paid bribes 
to the Heads of the United Council and the village People's Council. None of these individuals 
were permitted to work in the cooperative but found low grade jobs in Shkoder or canal 
building. Although only representing a small proportion of the village, the numbers of these 
primarily Catholic settlers/economic migrants increased during the latter of half of the 1980s 
indicating that the regime was losing its ability to control movement. Since its collapse in 1991 
there was a steady trickle of migrants settling in Gura, an increasing number of whom had no 
relatives in the village.
3.2.4 Infrastructure: There was an untarmacked road running alongside the river which 
connected the villages situated along its banks. At right angles to this a branch road formed 
the main thoroughfare of Gura and was used by most families. A number of small tracks led 
off from this central road to clusters of dwellings around the area of the village. Road 
maintenance was the responsibility of the state, but apart from the occasional filling of potholes 
little was done to maintain thoroughfares. With the absence of culvert maintenance the roads 
were prone to flooding and in bad condition. Above Gura was the home of the Sokols, one of 
the most powerful gangs in the region who had risen to power during the events of March 
1997. They used some of their newly gotten gains to resurface the roads leading through the 
village to their property.
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A canal constructed during the communist period along the base of the foothills on one side 
of the village was capable of providing irrigation water for the entire village provided it was 
not broken by natural causes or vandalism. Drinking water was a problem in that the wells 
soon became depleted and brackish during the summer months.
Electricity to the village was fed through a decrepit transformer regularly subject to failure. 
There were also frequent cuts in supply, especially in winter. The electrical system was 
constructed during the communist period solely to provide power for lighting. It was 
inadequate to meet the demands of the wide range of electrical equipment which had come into 
use. Electricity tariffs were unrealistically low and collection rates were poor. In the spring of 
1997 the system was improved by the Sokols so as to bring a better supply to their steading.
The only public facilities remaining in Gura were the village school and the Muslim cemetery. 
The school provided education for 4 grades up to the age of 11 years. It was badly vandalised 
in the disorders of 1991 and subsequently had been broken into several times. The outside 
toilet facilities were never cleaned and offered no privacy to the children using them. The 
attendance of teachers during the winter months was at best to be intermittent. Primaiy health 
care for Gura and two other villages was provided in a clinic situated in a neighbouring village. 
The village mosque had been converted by the communists into a health centre. This was also 
vandalised and destroyed in the 1991 civil disorders.
3.2.5 The Village Survey: With the consent of the members of the village council, I 
conducted a household survey. This was important, not only to provide precise information 
about the village, but also to give me an opportunity to meet each family and to introduce 
myself.
The survey sought the following information from each family: their name and that of their fis, 
religion, numbers in family disagregated by age and sex, length of time in the village, 
occupations, land area, receipt of remittances from abroad and numbers who had voted in the 
last election. In April 1996 there were found to be 791 people forming 184 families living in 
1212 dwellings. There were 22 houses under construction, most of which were providing for
2
The term dwelling, as opposed to house, is used here to describe a separate place of residence. Families were 
classed as living together when they shared the main facilities of the house. However there were a number of
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the expansion of existing families.
Table 1: BASIC DATA FROM GURA
Total Muslim Catholic
Number of families 184 112 72 (39%)
Numbers of people 791 470 321
Average numbers per family 4.29 4.19 4.45
Numbers who voted in 1992 election 424 249 175
Average size of holding (denim)® 3.71 3.68 3.77
% of families receiving remittances*® 11.3 14.2(16) 7.1 (4)
% of families admitting to regular work* 30.3 34 (38) 20.8 (15)
% of families rec’d assist from 1.95 - 4.96*® 16 12.5 (14) 23.2 (13)
Notes:
(D 1 denim = one tenth of a hectare/100 sq.mtrs. 1 hectare = 2.471 acres 
(D This refers to families with one or more members who have worked outside Albania 
(S> Refers to receipt on one or more occasions of welfare assistance since Jan. 1995 
* Figures in brackets refer to actual number of families
N.B. I chose to distinguish between the two religious persuasions in the presentation of this 
data. This is not without contention. I was criticised for so doing when presenting some 
preliminary findings at the University of Tirane. Nevertheless I intend to maintain this 
distinction on the grounds that firstly, religious background has a part to play in identity 
formation; secondly, the allusions by certain respondents as to differences between the two 
faiths; and thirdly, that in all but one or two cases, the Catholics and Muslims in Gura lived 
apart from each other. While religious affiliation might not be relevant in defining membership 
of the national community, the evidence from this locality indicated that religion had a defining 
role. This will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
instances w here fam ily  m em bers created  an an n exe to  an ex is tin g  structure or  con verted  an an im al sh ed  for hum an  
habitation. Such dw ellings, although o ften  structurally part o f  o n e  h o u se , w ere  in  fa c t separate h o m es each  h avin g  
a separate pit latrine and cooking facilities. T h e  largest “h o u se” co n sisted  o f  7  separate fa m ilie s  to talling 4 3  p eop le .
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3.2.6 Property Ownership: During the course of the 20th century the ownership and 
distribution of land in Gura has gone through several phases. The modes of ownership and 
production associated with the giflik system have been noted. In 1944 the communists assumed 
control of an economy which was primarily dependent upon agriculture. Once they had 
eliminated all challenges to their power they set about modernising the Albanian economy. The 
first phase of this programme was to maximise agricultural production by means of agrarian 
reform and technical development. As noted in the village history, while this gave the peasant 
formers nominal "ownership” of land, it took their surpluses so as "to pay back the debt to the 
State". In fact the villagers were compelled to meet stringent production norms.
Despite the mood of hope generated by the communist take-over, the euphoria soon 
evaporated. Land reform went far from smoothly. Disputes over land quality and allocation 
caused dissension between the Muslim and Catholics in Gura. The decisions as to where 
newcomers should live were taken by village Party members who were mostly Muslim. They 
kept the best land for their own fis  leaving the Catholic families with the poorer land on the 
village periphery. Tensions over land allocation were further exacerbated by priority being 
given to the settlement of Albanians expelled by Greece from Chameria (now Northern 
Greece).
Life in the decade after 1946 was not easy. The Party exercised increasing economic and 
ideological control over the villagers. Leading villagers were coopted into Party institutions. 
In 1956 the area designated as Gura was split up. Contemporary Gura became the centre of 
a cooperative and a state form serviced by a new settlement was created on the best land. This 
was achieved by the villagers signing over ownership of their land to the state. Party members 
set an example and eventually, with great reluctance, every other villager did the same3. The 
penalty for not doing so was to be branded an enemy of the people or "kulak" and to be denied 
access to goods, social benefits and association with others. Everyone in Gura ceded their land 
to the cooperative. One man expressed the view that the burden of fulfilling the norms required 
by the state had been so demanding that villagers were happy to join the cooperative so as not 
to have to work so hard.
3
The process of collectivisation took place over about 5 years. The highlanders were particularly stubborn in their 
resistance to the process. I heard anecdotes describing how villagers were dragged to the signing. They had their 
big toes dipped in ink and pressed upon die document authorizing the donation of their land to the State.
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Each family was initially left with 3 denim of land (1 denim=100 sq.mt.) and 25 animals per 
family. In 1960 this was reduced to 1 denim and 10 sheep or 1 cow per family. In 1967 all land 
was taken away from householders and it was prohibited to own any animals. People became 
demoralised as they were compelled to work in what was essentially a feudal system in which 
they were the chattels of the state. The state would frequently send men for extended periods 
to work on projects where there were labour shortages. Living conditions deteriorated, 
particularly after 1979 when the villagers were rationed to 700 gm of maize per day. This was 
made into bread or a gruel mixed with Cuban sugar. Meat and cheese were hard to find. It was 
said people would start queuing in Shkoder at 2 a.m. in order to buy cheese. After the death 
of Hoxha in 1985, Party control eased sufficiently for villagers to be able to keep a few 
animals. Under communism the house and its garden (typically 100 sq.metres) remained 
privately owned. However trade in property was rare since residency permission and 
employment in state enterprises was strictly controlled by the Party organs.
A programme of privatisation of state assets was instigated by the Democratic Party when it 
came to power in 1992. The redistribution of agricultural land was undertaken by village 
commissions. These groups were established by Commune administrations to allocate land 
according to the number of residents in each house. The Gura Commission undertook its work 
speedily and relatively smoothly. Land was allocated on the basis of 1 denim per adult. The 
market in land was dependent on being able to demonstrate title. However, it was constrained 
by the slow pace of registration in the region and further hampered by the disturbances in 
1997.
3.2.7 The Village Economy: Agriculture was the main activity of the village. The average 
size of holding was 3.71 denim. Productivity of land was dependent on soil type and the 
availability of irrigation water which varied according to location. Livestock were an important 
resource and formed an important source of protein. Better off families had two cows. Poorer 
families kept one or two goats which provided milk for most of the year. A small number of 
families kept sheep. Lambs were sold for meat and wool was often home processed and knitted 
into garments. Wheat and maize were the principal grain crops. Other crops were: tomatoes, 
cucumbers, carrots, onions, peppers, potatoes, water melons and tobacco. Grapes were 
produced primarily for home consumption and making into raki. The common orchard trees 
were olives, figs and cherries. Many families made oil from their olives. The staple grain crops 
tended to be retained for domestic consumption. Income from marketed surpluses of other
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crops was an important component of the income of many families.
In April 1996 the following businesses were in existence: a shoemaker, a bakery, a carpentry 
workshop, a building supplies haulage business, two shops and one stall. During the twelve 
months to October 1997 there was a significant shift in the way that the village interacted with 
the city. The bakery business had failed, a significant change had occurred in the balance of 
custom being gained by the two shops and two businesses had been created, one transporting 
people in a mini bus and the other transporting/dealing in herbs and sundry goods from the 
north to dealers in Tirana.
For those families without direct access to the benefits accruing from allegiance to the party 
of government, remittances were the most common means of providing economic security. 
Those vllazm and families which had built houses or started businesses had done so as a result 
of money earned by their young men going to Greece or Italy. Capital earned as a result of 
temporary migration formed an important element in the economic development of the village.
The state sector provided employment for about 30% of village families. The following 
occupations were recorded: nurse, drivers, policeman, security guards, forestry workers, army 
officer, teachers, commune employees (two, both related to the commune director). Only 2 
females were employed by the state, one as a teacher and one as a nurse.
The majority of adult male villagers found work in the informal sector. The bulk of their 
income deriving from casual labour, occasionally in the village but more usually in Shkoder. 
In 1996 this market was over-supplied. Unskilled labouring work, if it could be found, was 
paid at the rate of $2 per day. Those villagers who had received training in building skills were 
able to command a significantly better rate with the differential increasing significantly during 
the period of the study. By the autumn of 1997 most male villagers were finding work or doing 
business in the town. As one man put it, "you have to think seriously about how to make best 
use o f your resourcesSetting aside the cases of corrupt allocation of social assistance, to be 
in receipt of the benefit indicated serious poverty.
Examination of the figures in Table 1 indicates some significant differences between Catholics 
and Muslims. Compared to the Catholics, double the percentage of Muslims families were in 
receipt of remittances. Compared to Catholic families, 75% more Muslim families had a person
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in regular work. Finally as an indicator of poverty, in percentage terms only half as many 
Muslim families received welfare assistance when compared with the Catholics. The data thus 
indicates that the income generating capacity of the Catholics in this village was less than the 
Muslims.
3.2.8 The Village Entity: There are sociological dimensions to the way in which spatial 
arrangements are made in all communities. In Gura the structure of the village largely came 
about as a result of fis members clustering together to form what were called mehallas. Each 
mehalla was subdivided into single households (shtepi). Commonly these were nuclear 
families. Sometimes a dwelling was partitioned or had extensions to accommodate brothers 
and their families. On occasion a compound had been constructed in which brothers lived in 
separate houses. Where parents were alive they tended to live with the family of the eldest son. 
A family would usually segment when sons married. They would construct their houses in 
close proximity to their father. However in the post-communist period, the greater mobility 
of young men was resulting in them settling in towns or abroad. Although the fis  and vllazni 
had remained remarkably intact during fifty years of communism, these institutions were 
changing significantly as a result of the pressures of the new political and economic 
circumstances.
Gura was composed of 5 mehallas each of which was largely composed of one particular fis. 
However fis  dominance of the mehalla was being eroded as a result of three pressures. The 
first was as a result of communist planning controls which had tended to undermine the spatial 
cohesiveness offis  groupings by compelling sons setting up home to live elsewhere in the 
village. Secondly the fis  itself was becoming undermined as some of its members had migrated 
once free to do so. Thirdly the lucrative opportunities presented by the development of a grey 
market in agricultural land since 1992 had resulted in holdings being sold to immigrants from 
the highlands thus bringing greater heterogeneity to mehallas.
The mehalla was not entirely a spatially defined zone, it also had fis  and religious 
connotations. The main body of the Catholic population resided on one side of the village 
where they formed a discrete unit. However there were 3 Catholic families living in the midst 
of Muslim mehallas and there were 3 clusters of dwellings on the opposite periphery of the 
village to the Catholic "zone" which housed several Catholic families. Wherever they might 
be located the Catholics saw themselves as forming a single mehalla and looked to the
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Catholic council member to represent, support and advise them. Similarly scions of a fis  who 
had built houses in another mehalla could still turn to their "parent" mehalla to deal with 
issues that would normally be addressed to the leader of the mehalla in which they resided (cf. 
fission/fusion §4.5.3).
In the absence of an effective state, Gura was largely administered under customary law which 
was interpreted by councils of elders. The state had proved itself impotent in controlling petty 
robbery by bands of armed youths. This was a constant problem for the poorer families who 
could ill afford to lose anything. The cluster of villages of which Gura was a part were believed 
to be home to a number of criminals and hoodlums. Ironically villagers felt more secure when 
state control had collapsed: they were all in possession of looted guns and the Sokols provided 
protection and administered justice.
The Kanun of Lek Dukajin (Gjecov 1989), or rather its current local interpretation, symbolised 
for most villagers the values of traditional Albania and provided the framework by which they 
conducted relations between each other. The code of revenge dictated by the Kanun and 
community based judicial and enforcement procedures (ref. §8.6.2) represented one aspect of 
the limited re-traditionalisation taking place in lieu of effective state administration.
3.2.9 The Village Council: When examining post 1991 government institutions it is 
important to recall the nature of the ones they replaced. The expansion of the village from 
1944 occurred in the context of an entirely novel polity which required absolute allegiance and 
accountability to the APL and the state. The communists instituted the first village level 
administrative structures which were called People's Councils (PCS). These formed an 
important function in maintaining control and disseminating propaganda.
The elections of 1992 brought with them real political change. The Democratic government 
was elected in April and Local elections took place in July of that year. By all accounts they 
were properly conducted. A new type of village council was created as a result of a 
government directive in 1992. Councils were constituted in a number of ways, some by votes 
in public meetings and in others, such as Gura, representatives were chosen from within their 
mehallas by fis  members essentially to represent the fis. The Gura village council was 
composed of four Muslim representatives and one Catholic, each of whom nominally 
represented an administrative zone. Three of the councillors supported the DP but the other
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two did not declare an alignment and were consequently labelled by the DP members as being 
socialist, even though this may not have been the case. In Gura the kryeplak was chosen by the 
DP council members and not by villagers in a public meeting. This served not only to exclude 
villagers from the council as an institution but also was a further way of demonstrating how 
power in the village rested with the older Muslim fis.
The Gura council never effectively functioned. A few villagers knew nothing about it. The 
Democratic Party operated more or less as it wished by virtue of its dominant position on the 
Commune Council (to be discussed below), and effectively sidelined village councils until the 
1996 local elections. The effect of the state collapse in March 1997 exposed the fragility of 
political loyalty among the village council members. These events also prompted some vestigial 
action by the council on behalf of the village in its negotiation with the Commune.
The duties of the kryeplak were laid down in Presidential Decree 7605 dated September 1992 
(see Appendix 3). The main functions of the kryeplak were: to cooperate with the police in the 
maintenance of public order, to ensure that services to the village were maintained and that 
common resources were fairly allocated. The kryeplak was also charged with ensuring state 
employees, such as teachers, nurses and doctors, attended their work in the village. The most 
time consuming part of the kryeplak s responsibilities was to ensure young men enlisted for 
military service.
3.3 Malaj
3.3.1 Geographic Location: The village had grown around an indentation on the scenic 
shores of Lake Shkoder. Behind the village the land rose sharply to a 650 metre high mountain 
ridge which bounds this side of the lake. Malaj could be reached by bicycle within the hour 
from Shkoder and was relatively close to the frontier with Montenegro. The village 
administrative area extended along the lake for about 4 kilometres. Houses were built from the 
lake side to two or three hundred metres up the hill. The village centre consisted of a 
promenade about half kilometre along which were situated a few cafes and restaurants and two 
shops. Two stone quarries were situated near the village.
The land in and around the village was stony and dry. There were just a few areas suitable for 
agricultural use. Above the settlement lay a wood extending to around fifty hectares. This had
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suffered in recent years with timber being cut by villagers for their domestic needs and for sale. 
On the lower slopes of the mountain there was scrub and rough grazing. The higher slopes 
were barren. The mountain was the habitat for a herb called sherbil which after having been 
picked and dried was exported for use in medications for the common cold. The lake was 
home to a wide variety of fresh water fish which were netted at every season of the year.
3.3.2 Village History: Malaj was a settlement inhabited since time beyond memory by people 
who have gained a living fishing the lake. It was said that until the middle of the 20th century 
the village was predominantly Catholic. Its history remains in oral legend. One Catholic elder 
told me the story of a Turkish Bey who had acquired rights of tribute over the villagers and 
constructed a villa near the village. He instituted a practice by which he required each week 
a donkey packed with firewood to be brought to him by one of the daughters of a village 
family. The donkey and the daughter would be returned the following week. This demand 
caused deep offence to the villagers. On the day appointed for my respondent’s grandfather 
to send the firewood and his daughter to the Bey, the grandfather dressed as a woman and 
took his donkey loaded with wood to the Bey's villa. However instead of entering the house 
he threw burning brands on the building and set it alight. Through his actions, proudly retold 
by his descendant, the Turk left the neighbourhood. Perhaps this anecdote is apocryphal, 
nevertheless it illustrates how violence has often been the only remedy against repression 
available to Albanians and how, when forced to do so, they will use it.
The village is somewhat out of the ordinary in that it contained one of the first schools in 
Albania. It was reputed to have been created in 1882, probably as a result of a Catholic 
initiative. The school building, which predates the communist accession, is in grounds which 
have reverted to their original owners, the Catholic Church. A large villa above the village was 
used during the war by the axis forces as a regional HQ. In the middle of Malaj there was a 
gulley. On the west side of the gulley used to live Catholics and on the east, Muslims. The 
church was thus built on one side of the gulley and the mosque on the other.
The Catholic origins of the village are reflected in the feast of the local saint which has been 
resuscitated since the demise of communism. The feast day celebrations begin with a 
procession led by a man ringing a hand bell and followed by a little girl dressed in red, who is 
in turn followed by a group of young girls dressed in white carrying a cross. Behind them come 
the priests followed by a group of young men who carry an effigy of the saint. Following
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behind are the villagers and many other people from the surrounding region. Led by the bell 
ringer, the procession beats the bounds of the village before bringing the effigy to the courtyard 
in front of the ruined church where many people gather to celebrate Mass. When religion was 
proscribed in 1968 the church was destroyed and the mosque converted into a dwelling.
Malaj was distinctive from all but a very few villages in the region in having been solely 
dependent on fishing rather than agriculture. Under communism the village became part of a 
state farm administered from Kalla, a village located 7 km away on the other side of the 
mountain. Until about 1985 fishing and ancillary activities remained the principal feature of 
Malaj's economy. The village was also a place where townspeople would visit in their leisure 
time to promenade along the front. It had one sizeable restaurant and a small hotel. However 
proximity to the Yugoslav border meant this area was kept under tight surveillance during the 
communist era when exit from the country was strictly controlled. A story was told to me of 
how in 1985 (the year of Hoxha's death) two men were discovered near the border trying to 
escape to Yugoslavia. They were shot and dumped in the village centre where their faces were 
horribly disfigured with gunshot. The corpses were then dragged behind a vehicle from Malaj 
through the streets of Shkoder as an example to all. This story is still remembered with horror.
3.3.3 Migration: Being a long settled community, many of the older Malaj families were 
related to Albanians living in Montenegro. Although under Turkish rule the Albanians were 
under the administrative authority of different Vilayjets, in a cultural sense they had a common 
identity. After World War I, when the country became fully independent, the northern 
Albanians, particularly those along the coastal zone, maintained their close social and 
commercial contacts across the new international frontiers. The more isolated highland 
Albanians remained less touched by such developments. Cautious, proud and volatile were the 
qualities ascribed to the highlanders by earlier commentators. To this day such a description 
would not be inaccurate. There remained a contrast between the relatively softer and more 
pragmatic lowlanders and the more tradition bound highlanders. These distinctions, coupled 
with the change in the religious balance of the village, were important factors in understanding 
the impact of migration which had taken place in Malaj.
The picture which emerges of Malaj at the beginning of the 20th century was of a small, 
predominantly Catholic village with a relatively cosmopolitan outlook. It had a school, a most 
unusual feature until the 1950s, and families were connected with Albanians in Montenegro
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and Italy. Although it was not possible to obtain such a clear picture of the settlement process 
as in Gura, it was apparent that the guarantees provided by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, 
spurred a number of Albanians outside the frontiers of the new state to move to Albania. 
Several families came to Malaj between 1920 and 1940 from Montenegro and at least one from 
the Albanian community in the Arberesh of southern Italy.
An older resident stated that in 1944 the village had about 100 families of which about 80 were 
Catholics. The communist period saw the village expand in size and become increasingly 
populated by Muslims. Villagers said that the Catholics tended to be better educated and that 
over time they gravitated to the jobs requiring higher qualifications in Shkoder where they 
became managers, doctors or engineers. As they did so, Muslims bought their houses. At the 
time of the study about 47 families out of the 210 families in the village were Catholic. With 
one exception, their economic status was in the middle or lower range, with most Catholic 
families being classified as poor.
The village expanded at its fastest during the early years of the cooperative between 1960 and 
1975. Most migrants came from Kalla, the cooperative centre. Approximately 40% of the 
families currently living in Malaj came during this period. Thereafter the rate of entry of 
migrants dropped until 1991. The ancillary benefits which were supposed to make up for the 
low pay in the cooperatives did not materialise. As a result a few people left the cooperatives 
to settle in peri-urban villages such as Malaj in order to find better paid jobs working on the 
State Farms and Enterprises located in the vicinity of Shkoder. The move to a village like 
Malaj was only possible after surmounting considerable administrative hurdles. To gain 
permission to reside in a town was even more difficult. Marriage to a local girl provided 
grounds on which a man might be given permission to reside in the village. During the 1980s 
it appeared that registration procedures were more laxly administered and a few families settled 
without proper registration. In the post communist period a further wave of migrants had come 
from Kalla and also the highlands, the latter were mostly related to families already living in 
Malaj. Those who had come since 1991 represented about 10% of the population.
There was an important distinction made by residents between old families and recent arrivals. 
A recent arrival could be anyone who had come to the village in the last 35 years. Belonging 
to the village was bound up with relationships. Trying to understand the nature of relationships 
was one of the tasks of this project. From the families surveyed around 30% were classed as
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original or "old” families. Length of residency was, in part, a qualifying factor. I asked two 
"old" respondents to go through the voters list marking old and new families. Their perceptions 
about who belonged in which class clashed in certain cases. By and large residency of over 40 
years or 2 generations would seem to qualify a family for native status. Families who had been 
resident for 30 years fell into a sort of grey area in which the more literal minded would 
categorise them as being "new" whereas the more pragmatic person would classify them as 
being "old". It was evident that individuals who were seen to be religious or who helped their 
neighbours or who showed respect to the community through paying visits on the occasion of 
life events, became more quickly accepted as members of the "old" community. The nature of 
community differed signficantly between the two villages. In Gura relationships were largely 
dominated by fis  and the capacity for the community to mobilise itself in its interactions with 
the outside world was much weaker.
3.3.4 Infrastructure: With the village doubling in size over the past 40 years, the main 
problem was with the supply of drinking water. A substantial pump drew water from a well 
which was distributed to about 20 houses. Otherwise water was drawn from wells situated in 
various places around the village. Those who had a supply of water more often than not made 
arrangements to assist their neighbours. Many families washed their clothes in the lake. Water 
availability was a significant factor constraining the expansion of the village. Since many wells 
were served by electric pumps, a further problem was caused by the deterioration in electricity 
supply. During the winter months there were frequent and extensive power cuts. When these 
occurred the labourious and time-consuming task of drawing and carrying water customarily 
fell to the women. There was a tarmacked road connecting the village to trunk roads and the 
city. One house had a telephone which was used by villagers in case of emergency.
The village school was housed in a sound building some 70 years old. Although infinitely better 
than many village schools, without adequate maintenance it was becoming increasingly 
dilapidated. Classroom furniture was rudimentary. In 1996 there were 156 pupils between 6 
and 14 years and 12 teachers. In the scholastic year ending 1995,18 pupils left: and only 3 went 
on for further education in Shkoder.
There was a clinic in the centre of the village built during the communist period which 
remained a model for primary health care provision. It also served two other villages. The 
doctor had been working in the practice for 17 years. She attended her clinic daily and was
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well known and trusted. The building consisted of a consulting room, dispensary and operating 
room. It was clean and well kept. However the range of drugs available and treatments offered 
were limited.
3.3.5 Village Statistics: The following information refers to August 1997. As will be 
discussed in §5.4.2, at the outset of this project it was intended to conduct the research in 
Gura. However the events of 1997 made this impossible and led to the incorporation of Malaj 
into the research. My work in Malaj was primarily concerned with producing detailed 
economic data. It utilised a representative sample of the village and did not include a village 
wide survey as was conducted in Gura. More general information about the village was drawn 
from voter lists. For these reasons the statistical information provided for the two villages is 
not completely comparable. The data presented here therefore complements and supplements 
that obtained from Gura.
Table 2: BASIC DATA FROM MALAJ
Population 1,097
Number of families 210
Number of houses 170
Number of Muslim families 163
Number of Catholic families 47
Average number in household (hh) 4.4
Average area of productive land per household* 0.6 denim
Average annual household income 8.96 - 7.97* $1,923
Average income per capita 8.96 - 7.97* $437
Average household income from state as % of total income*® 23.7%
Average hh income from market related activities as % of total 
income*©
66.8%
Average hh income from sale of food and fuel as % of total income*® 9.4%
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Notes:
* Figures from Lawson, McGregor and Saltmarshe 1999, which derived its data from
a randomly selected sample of households composing 25% of the village.
(D This included pensions, social assistance, unemployment benefit and disability 
payments.
d> This included formal and casual employment, remittances, trading and the sale of 
fish and sherbil.
(D This figure relates to the sale of dairy products and sheep and goats grazed on the 
mountain (8.4 %) and the sale of wood (0.5%).
33.6 Property Ownership: Title to domestic property was retained into the post-communist 
period. The issue of agricultural land was not relevant to Malaj. However there were a number 
of other valuable resources over which title was sought as a result of the privatisation 
programme instituted by the DP after its 1992 election success. These included the hotel, the 
restaurant, two shops and the fishing enterprise. Transfer of ownership was conducted in 
different ways.
The two shops and the restaurant were offered by the government to the people employed in 
their operation. The sale price was relatively modest and both shop managers bought the 
businesses. One shop concentrated on food items and the other on clothes and hardware. The 
restaurant was controversially sold to the staff. The restaurant and the hotel were built during 
the communist period on land belonging to two old Malaj families. Both businesses had 
significant economic potential and the previous owners of the freehold on which the hotel and 
restaurant stood went to considerable trouble to gain control of the properties. In both cases 
this involved joining the Democratic Party, giving of hospitality and a degree of bribery. The 
assets of the fishing enterprise, including boats, nets and a building, were conveyed to a group 
o f"Persekutim", a number of whom came from Malaj. The price they paid was reported to be 
unrealistically low and the way in which the sale was handled caused considerable resentment 
amongst the other Malaj fishermen. The lack of transparency in small scale privatisation and 
corruption of privatisation boards was a widespread national problem (Vaughan-Whitehead 
1999: 152-67).
In 1997 two hotels were being constructed, one by a well known DP politician whose family 
had come from Malaj. The latter was a high cost project which was being administered by the
49
owner of the large restaurant who admitted to close links with the Sokol gang from Gura.
"They are good friends" he said. Petrit Sokol was released from detention in February 1997 
due to the intervention of the aforementioned politician. Sources in Shkoder (see §7.6.3) 
indicated that the Sokols had close links with the DP who it was said urged them to instigate 
the civil disorder in Shkoder in March 1997.
33.7 The Village Economy: While houses usually had a small garden, a substantial number 
had no productive land. The average holding was 0.6 denim per household. Almost every 
household which could do so produced something from their gardens. Sometimes this was only 
grapes which were made into raki, but in most instances, even in the smallest of areas of 
unpromising land, villagers would cultivate tomatoes, peppers and onions. There would often 
be a fig or cherry tree. Of the sample surveyed around 40% kept one or more chickens and 
about 30% had some form of livestock, mostly goats but occasionally a cow. At an aggregate 
level, the village produced only between 10% and 15% of the food it consumed. This figure 
included fish taken from the lake.
There existed a number of small enterprises: 2 shops and a couple of stalls, a furniture maker, 
a welder, 2 bicycle repairers, a TV repairer, a butcher, boat builder and netmaker. The 
principal breadwinners in about 6% of families were directly employed in some way by the 
state such as teachers or nurses. Only about 13% of households had a regular job in the formal 
sector i.e. were permanently and formally employed in a registered firm which contributed to 
their insurance and paid their tax. The majority of households were dependent on income from 
the informal sector. Most depended on casual building work in the city, however there was still 
some fishing and a few worked in local quarries.
One of the most significant sources of income came through income derived abroad. The 
survey indicated that 46% (24 out 53 families) had at one time or another a family member 
earning money by travelling abroad. Around 10% of householders were engaged in smuggling 
(cross border trading) in Montenegro.
A final point which arose from the survey was that about 89% of households were in receipt 
of some form of state payment, be it pension, disability payments, unemployment benefits or 
social assistance. However while some 38% of families were dependent on state payments of 
one kind or another as their main source of income, what all were attempting to do was to
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assemble a range of survival strategies. Relationships were a key component in this endeavour 
and will be discussed extensively (ref. institutions §4.4.1). Dependency on a single livelihood 
strategy, weak fis  relations and the inability to be involved in reciprocal exchange in the village 
were the features which characterised the poorest families (ref. social capital §4.4.2).
33.8 The Village Entity: A tarmacked road, which ran beside the lake, led to the village and 
formed its central street. Above it were the houses, the oldest of which were built close to the 
road in the centre of the village. From this central core, houses had been constructed along 
paths which ran along and up the hillside. Some of the paths had been made into roadways. 
There was a pleasurable lack of symmetry in the way the dwellings had been constructed. With 
the constraints on the availability of drinking water, the maximum distance houses were built 
above the road was about 200 metres. New construction extended the village along the road 
and lake side. However planning permission was required from the Municipality. The village 
also had a part to play in the process. The opinion of neighbours and the strength offis  
connections influenced the formal planning process. The poorest households tended to live on 
the outskirts of the village and were characterised by their lack of relationships in the village 
and the world outside it.
Although there was some clustering, by and large villagers of both religions lived side by side, 
certainly this was so in the central part of the village. However one issue which caused 
irritation among the "old" Malaj residents was the way in which newcomers had maintained 
fis  relations at the expense of relations with the village as a community. Other complaints 
about newcomers included the keeping of animals which fouled the village paths, and being 
untidy, impolite or unruly. Such anti-social behaviour, it was claimed by "old" Malaj residents, 
had altered the character of the village for the worse.
In spite of the complaints about the predominance of fis relations in the more newly arrived 
families, the fis  did not have the same importance as it did in the more archetypal rural village 
such as Gura. Houses were not situated and grouped together exclusively in relation to fis. It 
was apparent that the fis  was diminishing as family and other forms of relationship were 
predominating. The importance of maintaining good neighbourly relations was universally 
recognised. Similarly although religious affiliation had a significance, Catholics and Muslims 
were on the whole spatially integrated.
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Malaj was not a typical village of the region. Its particularity was that it represented something 
of a half way stage between a traditional rural community and an urban community. Social 
relations in Malaj were conducted in a considerably more open manner than they were in Gura. 
Women, for example, had a different status - not only did I have a cup of coffee in public with 
a 33 year old Malaj woman shop keeper but she insisted on paying for it. Such conduct would 
have been shocking in the Gura context. The culture in Malaj could be described as a synthesis 
between more easy going and enlightened urban attitudes and the traditional values of a north 
Albanian village community. The intriguing feature about Malaj was that it maintained a sense 
of community not found to the same extent in city administrative zones or Uagjas (ref.3.4.5).
Prior to 1997 crime was a minor problem in Malaj. However the village did not escape the 
troubles of 1997. Threats were made to business people by protection rackets. There were 
robberies and explosions. The first feud in living memory took place in the village during the 
period of the research. Families with young girls feared for their safety. The norms associated 
with the Kanun existed, but not to the degree that they operated in Gura. Villagers still looked 
to the state and the police force for the regulation of law and order.
3.3.9 The Village Council: Malaj had a village council which effectively represented the 
village. It fought for issues of common concern and addressed disputes. The village council's 
greatest success was in effect to dissolve itself. This came about through the widespread 
dissatisfaction with the corrupt administration of the Commune to which it belonged. The 
village council were constantly at loggerheads with Commune officials over one matter or 
another. In 1996 the village council had three main issues before it: to improve the water 
supply; to have a foreign language teacher assigned to the school; and to remove the village 
from the Commune so as to become of part of the Municipality of Shkoder. One year later they 
had failed only in not obtaining an improvement in the water supply, the one issue which had 
major resource implications.
In shifting their administrative locus, the council, as an official body, ceased to exist. However 
the village elders still informally consulted with their representative about negotiations with the 
Municipality. The village leaders were skilled politicians adept at using every contact they 
could. How they negotiated the various issues which composed their political agenda will be 
discussed more fully in the analytical chapters. The move to the Bashkia could not have 




3.4.1 Introduction: In order to provide a more comprehensive picture of life in these villages 
it is necessary to outline their administrative setting. This requires a description of local 
government structures and gaining an appreciation of the relationship between local and central 
government (see Figure 1, p.54). Obtaining this information was neither straightforward or 
easy. Initially some DP officials were obfiiscatory. Often public documents were not available 
and sometimes they quite simply did not exist.
How local government operated was not commonly understood. Knowledge of its operation 
was specialist knowledge. In this respect the situation in Albania is probably no different from 
many other democratic states. However this lack of public understanding was compounded by 
a corresponding lack of openness by government institutions which to a certain extent 
represented an overhang from the communist period. Despite their legal rights, citizens were 
unable to obtain accurate information about local government affairs or to have access to basic 
budgetary data. The bureaucracy was highly politicised (ref. §7.9, §8.5.5). One consequence 
of this was that officials tended to presume that any information they provided would be used 
against the state/government. As a matter of course citizens asking for information were 
viewed with suspicion and refused information unless express permission was given from a 
higher authority. Persistent enquirers were liable to find those aspects of their affairs which 
touched the bureaucracy not proceeding as successfully as they might. If an individual required 
information, he or she would normally use informal means. However information normally in 
the public domain such as crime statistics, were at that time state secrets and not available to 
journalists for fear that they might be used against the government.
Gura and Malaj were originally part of the same Commune but, as has been mentioned, the 
people of Malaj had become weary of the irregularities associated with the Commune 
administration and were successful in their application to become part of the Municipality 
{Bashkia) of Shkoder. Further details of why and how this process took place will be given in 
Chapter 8. Because the two villages ended up operating within two different administrative 
settings descriptions will be provided of the Commune and Bashkia administrations and their 
linkage with the District (Rreth) Council.
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Figure 1:












3.4.2 Local Government Overview: The Ministry of Local Government was part of the 
Interior Ministry based in Tirana. It was this ministry, and ultimately the Interior Minister, 
which had final responsibility for local government policy and implementation. Close links were 
maintained with the Ministiy of Finance through which all payments were authorised. There 
was also a parallel powerful administrative tier consisting of twelve Prefects who had sweeping 
powers to control elected bodies and their administrations. Albania was split into 36 Districts 
or Rreth. Each Rreth had an elected council. A Rreth was split into a number of Communes 
each of which had an elected council. A Commune had responsibility for a number of villages, 
each of which also had an elected council. Urban conurbations of sufficient size were accorded 
the title of Municipality or Bashkia. The Bashkia had an elected council led by a directly 
elected mayor. The Bashkia council was nominally under the authority of the Rreth Council. 
Local elections for the Rreth and Bashkia took place at four year intervals. The first was in 
1992 and the next in 1996.
3.43 The Prefecture: The office of Prefect was created in 1994 under the government of Sali 
Berisha. The Prefect was an appointee of the Prime Minister. Prefects were therefore trusted 
party members closely linked to the policy making core of government. Albania was split into 
12 Prefectures each of which was usually responsible for three Rreth. The Prefecture based in 
Shkoder was responsible for the Rreth of Shkoder, Malesia e Madhe and Puke. Twenty 
employees worked in inspectorates which oversaw the social, economic and political affairs 
of the Rreth. All policy documents and budgets had to be passed to the Prefect who could hold 
them for up to 10 days in order to assess whether or not they were "legal". The Prefect (1996 
salary $220/month) had the right to appoint and dismiss all functionaries in the Rreth 
administration. Perhaps the most significant of these appointments were the "secretaries". 
These functionaries, who reported to the Prefect, were charged with monitoring and advising 
the elected leaders of the Rreth, Bashkia and individual Communes. One of the principal 
functions of the Prefect was to monitor and control local government councils and 
administrations by exerting rights of approval and rights of appointment. These powers of 
patronage and control were sweeping and provided a mechanism whereby any locally 
formulated policy originating from an elected council could be overridden, or more often 
influenced, should it not be in accord with the wishes of central government4.
A similar system was instituted in Romania, although power was not quite so concentrated: there were 41 prefects 
who were appointed by the Department of Local Public Administration which was placed in the prime minister's
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3.4.4 The Rreth: The Shkoder Rreth had an elected council of 35 members which met four 
times a year. From this council was drawn a seven person executive committee which met 
weekly and was led by a directly elected Chairman (salaiy $ 150/month) whose activities were 
monitored and assisted by advice from a Secretary appointed by the Prefect. The Rreth 
administration employed 60 people and was composed of a number of departments which 
included: finance, registration, infrastructure, organisation (responsible for the conduct of 
elections and explaining laws and directives from central government), property commission 
and foreign investment. The affairs of the Ministries of Finance, Health and Education were 
conducted directly by representatives of these central government ministries located in the 
Rreth's main office in Shkoder.
The 1997 budget was divided into 4 parts: materials and equipment for existing infrastructure, 
staff salaries, social insurance and council costs. These totalled 95.9 million lek ($640,000). 
In addition the Rreth had a budget of 29.7 million leks ($198,000) for public works which 
included new buildings, water supply, electricity and roads. These projects were let out to 
tender with the work being inspected by Rreth officials.
The Chairman of the Rreth stated that the institution was little more than a conduit for the 
affairs of the Communes and the Bashkia. Its role was to examine their budgets and pass them 
to central government in Tirana via the Prefecture. Although the Bashkia was nominally under 
the Rreth, owing to the concentration of people and economic resources in the city, it was a 
more influential and active institution than the Rreth. This put the Rreth in a somewhat 
anomalous position of being left to coordinate the less populated and less economically 
significant agricultural regions. The constraints imposed by the Prefecture in hiring and firing 
personnel rankled with the Rreth administration. In effect their only discretionary powers were 
the granting of business licences, tenders and planning permission.
A fundamental problem for the Rreth Council was that it had no authority to control the 
institutions for which it was responsible (i.e. the Communes and the Bashkia). This was 
primarily because its legal and constitutional role was uncertain as a result of there being no 
detailed legislation which laid down its responsibilities. Yet in circumstances of poor and
office. The prefect occupied the nearest role to that of the party district first secretary under the communist system. 
This role carried immense informal power and circumvented the nominal authority o f local representatives and 
officials (Campbell 1995:81).
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deteriorating government delivered services, it was charged with the onerous task of providing 
an effective interface between government and public. With central government being 
geographically remote and administratively inaccessible, it was to the Rreth that individuals, 
groups, organisations and businesses came to seek remedies and voice their many complaints. 
The primary role of the Rreth Chairman was to act as a mediator in the settlement of disputes 
and difficulties. In 1997 his problems were compounded by the consequences of the civil 
disturbances which resulted in the Rreth budget being slashed by 40% from that of the 
previous year and by having to use a large proportion of the 1997 capital budget to meet 
shortfalls from the previous year. On top of this an annual inflation rate in 1996/7 of over 30% 
further eroded the slender resources available to Rreth.
3.4.5 The Bashkia: The twenty one member Bashkia Council was an elected body headed 
by a directly elected Mayor (1996 salary $ 120/month) who had overall responsibility for the 
administration of the city. However this excluded security, health and education which were 
funded and administered directly by central government ministries through their local 
representatives. The Mayor's activities were monitored and assisted by a Secretary appointed 
by the Prefect.
In December 1996 the population of the Bashkia was 97,304 of which 40,903 were classified 
as being available for work. Of those available for work, 40% (16,732) had formal employment 
with the state or private companies. By excluding emigrants, market traders, artisans, 
smugglers and black market workers as well as those in formal employment, the statistical 
department recorded the number unable to find employment as being 32% of those available 
for work (see Appendix 4). By mid 1997, as a result of administrative enlargement and a 
steady flow of immigrants, the Bashkia consisted of 100,000 people (28,000 families). Prior 
to the troubles of March 1997, unemployment was around 14,000. In September 1997, as a 
result of the destruction of plant and the closure of businesses due to high levels of insecurity, 
over 20,000 were recorded as unemployed and 7,500 families, about 25% of families, were 
receiving social assistance.
Bashkia departments include planning, public works (roads, sewage, parks, transport, housing 
and cemeteries), industrial development, statistics, finance, welfare assistance, sport and 
culture and registration. A department head received 11,000 lek/month (1997 salary $75). 
Budgets were firstly approved by the Rreth then by the Prefect who passed them with his
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recommendations to the Ministry of Local Government which, if approved, would then 
sanction payments through the Ministry of Finance. The Bashkia was also responsible for 
administering sport and culture with funds from the Ministry of Sport, Youth and Culture. The 
total budget for which the Bashkia was directly responsible was about 120 million lek 
($800,000)(see Appendix 5). This excluded running costs for education and health which were 
financed and administered by their respective ministries. Social assistance funds came through 
the Ministry of Labour.
Taxes were raised by the Bashkia from business rates, shops, small traders and from the 
registration of businesses. This revenue was used for the payment of tax collectors, repair of 
the electrical system, kindergartens and to make up shortfalls in central government subsidies 
to loss making state enterprises. The Bashkia was allowed to keep up to 18 million leks 
($120,000) of any taxes it levied. Anything raised above this amount had to be returned to the 
central exchequer. The average raised in 1995 and 1996 was 25 million lek ($166,000).
The city was divided into four quarters each containing about 25,000 people with an 
administration led by a chief or Krye (salary $48/month) who reported directly to the Mayor 
on a weekly basis. A Krye was responsible for a team consisting of social assistance 
administrators (2 people), inspectors of roads and other public services (2 people) and for the 
registration of births, deaths, marriages and the issuing of identification documents (2 people). 
The quarters were split into llagjas containing between 1-3,000 people. In each llagja the Krye 
appointed an individual who was paid $16/month to act on a part time basis as his agent in the 
locality.
The social assistance budget was used to help about 7,500 families (1997 budget allocation - 
200 million lek / $1.33 million). This represented the largest item over which the Bashkia had 
discretionary powers. Only families with all members out of work, who did not receive any 
pension and who had no land or vehicle were eligible to receive assistance. Applicants 
presented claims and supporting documentation to the administrators in their quarter. Their 
claims were scrutinised and households inspected. If all was as stated their claims were 
examined by the Krye who then passed them to a three person committee drawn from the 
Bashkia Council which had the final responsibility for approving an application.
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3.4.6 The Commune: There were 15 Communes in the Rreth of Shkoder in which lived 
approximately 115,000 people. The Commune in which Gura was located consisted of 10 
villages containing a total of 15,000 people in 4,100 families. There was an elected council of 
13 representatives from these villages who had nominal control over the affairs of the 
Commune. The Commune Council was answerable to the Rreth Council. The work of the 
Commune was executed by a directly elected Director whose duties were to execute the 
instructions of the Commune Council and administer the affairs of the commune. The Council 
met monthly to receive reports from the Commune Director and further instruct him. The 
Director was assisted in his duties by a Secretary appointed by the Prefect. Although the 
Director was charged with executing the instructions of the Commune Council, he was 
responsible to the Prefect. As was the case in the Rreth and Bashkia, the task of the Secretary, 
who was invariably a member of the ruling party, was to monitor the activities of the 
Commune and to advise the council and Director on "what is legal and what is not legaF.
The Commune in which Gura was located had an administration which consisted of 13 people: 
3 responsible for social assistance, 3 for finance, a vice director, a registrar of births and 
deaths, a registrar of land, inspector of health and education, inspector of commune services, 
clerical secretary, driver and caretaker. Budget details were not to be found in the Commune 
office. In an interview, the Director quoted figures verbatim. The original Commune office was 
burnt down in the riots of March 1997. The new office was housed in a building consisting of 
2 small rooms. As a rule few staff were present. There was no telephone.
Discussions about the budget indicated that the main task of the Commune Council was to 
sanction social assistance payments to those names approved by the Director. In September 
1997 there were 1,020 families (25% of families) receiving assistance to a maximum of 2,500 
lek ($16) per month. Claimants for assistance completed a form stating amount of land owned, 
employment status, size of family etc. The Director presented scrutinised claims for final 
approval at the monthly Council meetings. Setting aside the amount allocated for assistance, 
the sums received by Communes for their other duties were minimal. Infrastructure 
maintenance, such as it was, was funded by a non-governmental body called "Peace and 
Justice" which acted as a channel for foreign aid to be used in job creation projects.
Further responsibilities of the Commune included registering land, presenting and 
recommending planning applications to the Rreth, administration of land privatisation and
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issues concerning the registration of migrants from the highlands. With low levels of 
transparency these responsibilities, particularly the administration of social assistance, were 
open to abuse (ref. §8.5.2, §8.5.3, §8.5.5) and was one of the reasons why Malaj sought to leave 
the Commune.
However it was evident that these shortcomings should not be seen in isolation from their larger 
administrative setting. The Commune Director complained about the impotence of the 
Commune and how its activities were largely regulated by government decrees rather than by 
legislation sanctioned by Parliament He said that the absence of an effective parliament led to 
ill judged legislation and decrees which placed unrealistic demands on every tier of government 
all of which were ill-equipped to handle their responsibilities. Administration of Commune 
affairs was further complicated by dual lines of responsibility whereby the Commune Council 
was responsible to the Rreth Council, whereas the Commune Director, while reporting to the 
Council and receiving instructions from it, was answerable to the Prefect.
3.4.7 Summary: From every perspective local government was problematic. It was greatly 
compromised by the lack of an independent bureaucracy. It was beset by constitutional and 
legal uncertainties. The nervousness of central government in allowing any meaningful 
devolution of power had led to tangled administrative structures and distorted loyalties. The 
lack of transparency had resulted in low levels of accountability. When coupled with gross 
underesourcing, this created conditions in which the advancement of self interest, frequently 
interwoven with political allegiance, distorted the purpose and function of the institutions 
which officials were supposed to be serving. The destruction and vandalising of state offices 
and property during the riots of March 1997 paralysed already weak administrations in the front 
line of service delivery. The consequences of underesourced, poorly administered local 
government institutions undermined public confidence in the larger community represented 
by the state and in the notion of accountable government.
In order to examine the transformation of the various facets of Albanian society which have 
been described and alluded to, there is a need for a theoretical framework within which to 
analyse, interpret and integrate the empirical material which derived from spending time in the 
communities of Gura and Malaj. This forms the subject of the next chapter.
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4.0 THE THEORETICAL SETTING
4.1 Introduction:
This chapter has two functions. It is principally concerned with presenting a theoretical setting 
within which to examine the empirical evidence. It also applies the discussions on national 
identity and the notion of modernity to the situation of Albania. In so doing it enlarges upon 
the contextual material presented in Chapter 2.
In the introductory chapter I differentiated transition from transformation by associating 
transition with a western vision of market orientated change which defines and prescribes a 
particular type of economic restructuring and which leads to a hypothesised end state. I 
outlined the limitations of this discourse. By using the notion of transformation, I indicated 
how I would be locating this enquiry into the changing nature of identity in post-communist 
Albania.
The use of the term transformation extends the notion of economic transition to include 
historical dimensions and the incorporation of social and political perspectives. It avoids 
postulating an ideal end state. The broadening and deepening of the post-communist discourse 
requires an improved qualitative understanding of the political, social and economic structures 
which exist in individual states. Transformation is an iterative process deriving from specific 
culturally influenced experiences which compose each country's trajectory from state socialism. 
Furthermore the local approach used in this study reflects my belief that any comprehensive 
understanding of a particular transformation needs to include micro level information. This 
research presents such information to complement the interpretations of macro sociologists, 
political scientists and economists so as to contribute to a fuller understanding of the Albanian 
"transition" and concomitant social transformation.
The main purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical setting used to analyse 
institutional change, economic liberalisation, political democratisation and their impact on 
identity as observed in two north Albanian villages. Theorising transformation within the 
context of a specific country requires a range of perspectives. It requires contextualising 
historically, socially and politically. It requires making explicit and understanding the nature 
of institutions. It requires an examination and interpretation of organisational activity. Finally 
it requires the synthesis and integration of these perspectives.
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j To address this agenda I firstly discuss identity and outline how it has been applied to direct 
I and inform the empirical analysis. A sociological setting for transformational change is 
provided by a discussion of tradition, modernisation and modernity. Post-communist 
, transformation is also concerned with adaptation to a novel political economy. This is 
j discussed within the context of civil society, the ideology which has supposedly vanquished 
| socialism (see Bauman 1994:175; Fukuyama 1992). In order to analyse and interpret the nature 
I of transformation within this post-communist context, I then draw on theories which relate 
more immediately to the everyday lives of people. These include new institutionalism, social 
capital and theories relating to households and communities. This is followed by an outline of 
structuration, a body of theory concerned with the integration of structure and agency which 
I use to explain the social changes taking place in twentieth century Albania and which 
provides a framework for presenting the conclusions deriving from the empirical material. 
Finally, using the example of civil society, a model is introduced which will be used in the 
concluding chapter to illustrate how structuration assists in explaining the changing nature of 
identity.
4.2 Identity:
4.2.1 Defining Identity: The classic sociological conception of identity is that it is formed 
in the interaction between self and society. The subject’s inner core is formed and modified in 
a continuous dialogue with the cultural world outside. Identity is the bridge between the 
internal and the external, the personal and the public worlds (Hall,S. 1992:266). Perception of 
identity is relative and by no means static. It changes with age and other circumstances. 
Perceptions of self as having an individual or group identity differ between cultures and also 
with time. In pre-modem societies such as have existed until relatively recently in north 
Albania, individual identity was to a great degree subsumed in the larger identity of the fis. 
This outline of various aspects of individual, cultural and national identity concludes with a 
short account of the development of a national consciousness in twentieth century Albania.
Human beings have a variety of culturally embedded relationships which provide them with 
identity and meaning. In addition to membership of some larger grouping, be it clan, tribe, 
ethnic group or nation, identities are influenced by gender, family relations, profession, religion 
and work. At the individual level nation building requires a certain minimum acceptance, 
internalisation and sharing of those features and attributes which relate to the homogenised
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entity which is the nation. From these beliefs individuals construct political beliefs which lead 
them to individual political action. It is the aggregation of individual beliefs which forms a 
continuum leading to the formation of political structures (Bloom 1987:236). In the aftermath 
of communism individuals are being required to understand and accept an unfamiliar state and 
polity. This involves the generation of a new sense of belonging and trust in the national 
community.
Looking at these larger groupings which form bonds of belonging, collective cultural identity 
refers to a shared sense of a group's past and destiny (Smith 1990:179). A different language 
or different religious belief can contribute to the formation of cultural identity. Ethnicity is a 
more forceful projection of cultural identity. It formalises cultural identity by providing a 
proper name, a formalised myth of a common ancestry and one or more differentiating 
elements of common culture. It signifies membership of, and identification with, an ethnic 
group. It is sometimes used synonymously, and erroneously, with the term race (Smith 
1991:21) and has also come to imply a sub-group or minority.
Though differentiated from it, ethnic identity is intimately bound up with national identity. This 
can be positive or negative. An important feature of ethnicity is that it is defined in relation to 
that which it is not. It is best understood in cultural rather than racial terms, even though race 
might be a factor in defining it. The Croatian and Serbian Slavs for example are of the same 
racial kind but identify themselves as being profoundly different in a cultural sense. Eriksen 
(1993:12) states ethnicity is "essentially an aspect of a relationship not a property of a group". 
In the Albanian context this study touches upon region, dialect and religion, all of which have 
implications in respect of identity, social division and the hegemonic exploitation of difference 
(Laitin 1986). Whether, how, or the extent to which ethnicity will play a part in post­
communist Albanian self-definition is by no means clear. Although the Tosk/Gheg cleavage1 
resurfaced during the 1997 civil conflict, it did not prove to be a significantly divisive issue.
Arshi Pipa notes how the Tosk dialect was used to form the basis of Unified Literary Albanian (ULA). He called 
it "a sly contrived language premised on the murder of its sibling (the Gheg dialect), on whose remains it then 
proceed to fatten itself'. Pipa claimed ULA was a Stalinist instrument of power imposed by Enver Hoxha which 
was intended to consecrate and perpetuate Tosk hegemony over the Ghegs (northeners). The imposition of ULA 
disregarded the risk of splitting the nation into first and second class citizens with language being the discriminatory 
test Pipa (1989:228) claimed that ULA would create regional differences and "conjures up the ghost o f separation". 
To a very limited extent the events of 1997 justify this assertion. Pipa came from Shkoder.
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While Albanian minorities in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia maintain their Albanian 
ethnicity, they have not as yet sought to become Albanian nationals.
The links between cultural and ethnic identity are close but are distinct from national identity. 
Membership of a national community demands different forms of participation such as voting, 
the paying of taxes and military service. It involves the encouragement of an idealised belief 
in locus and the promulgation of a common public culture by the state (Miller 1995:24). This 
public culture incorporates a set of common understandings composed of norms, values and 
customs (cf. new economic institutionalism §4.5.1) and contribute to the generation of a 
distinct and common national character. From this we can see how closely cultural/ethnic 
identity is linked with national identity and of how the latter seeks, and indeed needs, to 
incorporate the former.
It is the manipulation of the individual’s need for identity which is exploited by nationalists. 
The nationalist message provides a rationale for change and gives the socially uprooted 
something to which they can anchor their identity. The grafting of nationalist ideology has 
taken place in many ways. Typically it has been through the various arts, scholarship, 
architecture, monuments and ceremonies. The education system has been an important vehicle 
for promoting the national concept. These and other features have been used to fashion and 
coopt tradition into national identities (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983:263/307). Alluding to this 
refashioning of the past, Winrdfrith (1992:11) makes the salient point that in far too many cases 
the history of the Balkans has been rewritten by historians of the present "whose attitudes have 
been conditioned by events in the recent past and amplified and distorted by romantic 
propaganda and a particular political stance".
The demise of communism has had a profound impact on the lives and identity of many who 
have lived under the system. The state of crisis brought about by the collapse of old certainties 
has created a range of tensions. When societies are in a state of crisis which threatens them 
en masse, citizens seek to make new sets of identification in order to provide themselves with 
psychological security. They need to secure what Bloom (1987:266) describes as “an 
interpretive system for the new political experience and its realities”. Within an Albanian 
context this study has been concerned with learning how people were achieving this.
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4.2.2 The Nation State and National Consciousness: There is a substantial literature on 
nationalism. In grounding this study of identity I have drawn on Anderson and Gellner for 
reason of the particular sociological and historical perspectives they bring to the subject. The 
growth of the nation state is described by Anderson (1991) as being a process where a 
universalist, pre-modem world operating under the sway of dynasties and religious sodalities2 
was replaced by one of fragmented national units. A profound and distinctive shift in the 
perception of the world occurred as a result of these changes which was galvanised by what 
Anderson refers to as print capitalism whereby growing numbers of people began to think 
about themselves and to relate to each other in very different ways (ibid p.37). Print languages 
laid the basis for national consciousness by unified fields of exchange and communication in 
vernacular languages below Latin and above the wide variety of dialects which then existed. 
This allowed contact to be made with fellow readers through print and thus to form the embiyo 
of what were to become nationally imagined communities.
In the pre-nationalist world the apprehension of time was one in which all the historical and 
cosmological features of existence were indistinguishable (ibid.p.22). This conception of time 
is concerned with periods, repetition and circularity (Leach 1966:124-36). The sacred and 
largely inaccessible languages, such as Latin or Arabic, bound together the religious traditions 
of communities in a supra-national manner while political power was wielded by dynasties 
legitimated by a belief that they operated under divine dispensation. The pre-nationalist world 
existed not only within a framework of warfare but also of dynastic alliances which were a 
product of sexual politics of a kind veiy different from that practised today (Anderson 
1991:20). These temporal issues had roots in the past and connections with the spiritual realm 
so that all were indistinguishably linked in simultaneity. Anderson's attention to the perception 
of time and its linkage with how individuality was perceived, was important in helping me 
understand certain comments made by respondents in this study.
The way in which time is conceived, managed and manipulated is key to establishing the tenor 
of our lives. It is also a key feature in establishing relations of power. This is illustrated in 
E.P.Thompson's account of how the defining and control of time was integral to the
2
The term used by Anderson to describe die classical religious communities linked by sacred languages and which 
shared a common conception of the world. Social groups were conceived of as centripetal and hierarchical, rather 
than boundary-orientated and horizontal. (Anderson 1991:12-19).
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establishment of capitalist relations: the creation of the measuring device and the increased 
degrees of synchronicity made possible by the clock; "time is now currency: it is not passed 
but spent” (Thompson 1967:61); the concern with "time-sense in its technological 
conditioning, and time-measurement as a means of labour exploitation” (ibid. p. 80). In one of 
her comments on communism Verdery (1996) writes of the etatization of time whereby 
regimes filled people's time up with a few essential activities such as provisioning and 
commuting so that the shortage of goods was converted into shortage of time thus producing 
incapacity and enhanced power (ibid.p.46). She alludes to the seizure of time as being crucial 
to the expropriation of initiative and one of the means of producing subjects who would not 
see themselves as independent agents (ibid.p.56).
Perceptions about time were expressed by respondents during the course of the study. Time 
also formed a sub-theme which reflected norms and values. Anderson's (1991:22) reference 
to time draws attention to the clash between two worlds: the primordial one of 
corporate/tribal/clan identity, in which the temporal and spiritual were linked in simultaneity, 
with the modem world which is targeted, rational and linear (or is thought to be so). He claims 
that the national construct represented a dramatic shift in the perception of time from being an 
arena where events mediated by the supernormal (the Divine) were placed simultaneously in 
the past, present and future, to the perception of time as a chronological phenomenon. 
Anderson further argues that this fundamental change in how the world was apprehended made 
it possible for people to intellectually construct events which took place within a linear 
framework. It allowed the construction and stylization of history and ultimately for people to 
"think the nation". I shall be seeing how this applied to those with whom I was working.
Gellner (1984) integrated the formation of the nation state into a sociologically informed 
historical perspective. He advances the proposition that humankind has evolved through three 
phases - hunter gatherer, agrarian and industrial. The social groups associated with the hunter 
gatherer phase were too small for a state to be viable. The agrarian phase, which began about 
5,000 years ago, saw the emergence of an exclusive clerical class using a script, often 
transcribed in a non-vernacular language, which provided the state with a bureaucracy by 
means of which it was able to administrate, extract taxes and maintain order. The political unit, 
tended to consist of two poles, the norm being a large centrally dominating authority and small 
self-governing communities. Control extended to the official wisdoms enshrined in scripts and 
which dominated the moral climate. It was exercised by a centralised clerisy be it of the
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Catholic church, Ulama, Brahmins or the Confiician bureaucracies. In the case of Albania it 
was occupied for four hundred years by the Turks.
Industrial society, which relies on sustained and perpetual growth, invented the concept and 
ideal of progress and of the nation as we now know it. It is characterised by high levels of 
organisation which rely upon mass participation. The norms, values, customs and propaganda 
which are associated with a pre-eminent national "high" culture create the context for public 
participation. The maintenance of a high culture requires the sustained attention of the national 
polity. Since the favoured method of social control used by the predominant elements of a 
nation state is to buy off social aggression, the greatest weakness of this type of polity is its 
inability to survive any temporary reduction of, what Gellner terms, social bribery, which 
brings with it a loss of legitimacy.
The nation state requires a system of mass education to meet the demands of a technologically 
advanced society and to provide its members with a common conceptual currency. This 
permits the development of a mobile division of labour and meets the retraining needs 
demanded by changes in the national economy. The second demand of education is that it 
confers an identity on the individual which is linked to the high culture of the nation which is 
turn linked to the state. This linkage is at the heart of nationalism. Nationalism favours a 
society in which homogeneity, literacy and anonymity are the key traits. It is characterised by 
a strong centralised state which monopolizes legitimate culture even more than legitimate 
violence. "Modem man is loyal to his culture and is not bound to his kin group" (ibid p.36).
4.2.4 The Albanian National Identity: Over the past five hundred years Albanian nationalist 
sentiment has been expressed in a series of unsuccessful revolts which came about largely as 
a result of the determined leadership of certain individuals. In 19th century Europe, nationalism 
was catalysed by the development of transport, the revolutionary growth of capitalism and the 
middle classes, the creation of national (as opposed to local) markets, the move away from 
feudalism towards a national secularism and the creation of state churches. However the 
Albanians were largely isolated from changes taking place elsewhere in Europe. They suffered 
from the Ottoman legacy of poor economic and social development.
It was not until a movement rooted in nationalist ideology was formed towards the end of the 
19th century that it was possible to muster sufficient widespread and coordinated support for
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an independent Albanian entity. The nationalist movement was initially inspired by those such 
as the Frasheri brothers who had been educated and were resident in Istanbul. Initially its 
appeal was primarily to a small group of intellectuals. Language had a key part to play in the 
national awakening. It provided a basis for the formation of the national community. Its 
importance was reflected in the pressure that was put on the Turks to allow education to be 
undertaken in Albanian. The choice of Latin as the Albanian official script was a deeply 
political one. Newspapers Journals and literature were important in developing and mobilising 
national sentiment among the Albanians from the 1880s until independence.
Even after independence, the nation remained a novel set of allegiances for most Albanian 
speakers whose life remained dominated by tribal and feudal relations. Albanian development 
was constrained by poor infrastructure. Economic activity was low and mainly confined to 
agricultural production and small scale artisan manufacture. Trade was mainly confined to the 
region. Local allegiances were therefore of great importance. Generally speaking religion was 
not used in advancing the Albanian national project. During the communist period when 
nationalism was most strongly promoted, religious worship was proscribed.
The construction of a new Albanian identity was precisely what Hoxha addressed when he 
achieved power in 1944. Prior to the Italian annexation of 1939 Albania was probably the least 
developed nation in Europe. Virtually nothing had been done to modernize the country. There 
were no roads, bridges, education or health system. Hoxha sought to make Albania into a 
modem industrial society and in so doing had to bring its people through an industrial 
revolution which required the creation of an allegiance to a new conception of an Albanian 
state and the dilution of local and personal loyalties. This was partly achieved through the 
revival of the national myth, the invention of traditions and a redrawing of history, 
fundamental to which was the creation of a new set of loyalties. So extreme did this process 
become that party, state and nation became synonymous and any deviation from the ideological 
norms associated with them was proscribed. This ultimately led to Albania becoming the 
world’s first atheist state when religion was banned by the APL in 1966. Other integrative 
projects were the imposition of Unified Literary Albanian and the compulsory integration of 
the Roma (gypsies) into Albanian society. The Roma were able to resist these pressures to a 
remarkable extent with a number of them maintaining a migratory existence even under the 
tight regulation of Hoxha's communist regime.
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A keen interest in national destiny persisted and had not been diminished by communist 
indoctrination or post-communist confusion. In the villages men complained about the 
decisions made at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 which went contrary to Albanian nationalist 
aspirations. I was personally berated about the frontiers drawn at the 1913 London 
Conference, as though I was in some way involved in the process. Taking place in the early 
post-communist period, this study is in part concerned with understanding how Albanian 
national identity was evolving.
4.3 Tradition. Modernisation and Modernity:
4.3.1 Sociological dimensions of change: An important element in twentieth century Albanian 
transformation has been the growth of a national identity and the shift of loyalty from kin 
group to a national culture. The approach I am taking in this thesis is that this transformation 
has been a complex process of reflexive interaction between exogenous factors, institutions and 
human agency described as structuration (ref.§4.6 and §5.2). In order to supplement the 
historical description in Chapter 2, I discuss here the process of modernisation and then 
examine the nature of the contemporary world into which Albania and other post-communist 
states have emerged. This leads to a discussion of Albania and modernity. However in order 
to understand the nature of transformation it is firstly useful to establish what is represented 
by the notion of tradition.
As a result of the development of rationality and the growth of scientific knowledge associated 
with the Enlightenment, the concept of tradition has suffered through being associated with 
ignorance (Shils 1981:5). Tradition refers to something which is handed down. It can include 
material objects but also actions, rituals, songs and stories which create, or can be used to 
create, normative precedents or prescriptions. Traditions are important in creating a sense of 
identity and affiliation which extends from the present to the past. They are distinguished by 
ritual and repetition and are always properties of groups. They provide a framework for action, 
which can go largely unquestioned, particularly over such institutions such as the family, 
sexuality and gender differentiation (Giddens 1999). The acceptance of a practice or symbol 
as tradition has little bearing on how long it has existed. The value of traditions are that they 
contribute to stability, the creation of common bonds and a sense of security. It has been the 
inherent power of traditions, deriving from the responses they can evoke, that has led to their 
being transformed, manipulated and invented (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Traditions fall
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into three overlapping types: those that bring social cohesion, those that legitimise institutions 
and those whose main purpose is socialisation (ibid. p.9). Socially cohesive traditional cultures 
such as pre-modem Gheg society, are risk averse and tend to be conservative. They are 
concerned with maintaining the status quo and dealing with the known and proven. 
Nevertheless such risk-averse cultures are still open to hazards, particularly those which come 
through failure to innovate.
At a technical level, the changes involved in modernising an economy from one purely 
dependent on agriculture are substantial, however the social dimensions associated with such 
modernisation are no less great. Modernisation requires a shift of loyalty, and thus of 
identification, away from the intimate and primordial towards the larger national community 
(Kamenka 1993:82). In Albania, this shift was partially accomplished under communism, but 
the proscription of traditional institutions and religion coupled with a harsh life in the villages 
produced widespread anomie3. The disillusionment experienced by many with the realities of 
post-communist life to some extent explains the re-traditionalisation which has taken place in 
respect of security, attitudes to gender, property laws and justice (Schwandner-Sievers 1999).
Post-communist states have been faced with a major systemic challenge in restructuring their 
political economies. Western society prides itself in its dynamism, innovation and capacity to 
change. The governments of post-communist states find it difficult, if not impossible, to act in 
the same way as to the type, extent and cost of measures required to maintain national 
cohesiveness, their own legitimacy and a competitive position in world markets. This is 
especially so in the circumstances of the increasing globalization of economic activity taking 
place during the late twentieth century when world trade has grown in scope and intensity 
across societies and between people. It is now possible to shift capital almost instantaneously 
and there is increasing integration of markets, the effect of which has been to radically increase 
global competition and the global organisation of production. This has shifted structural power 
to global markets and firms and has led to a corresponding weakness of state power over 
national production and finance (Perraton et al.1997).
Defined as pathological structures of desire for unattainable ends (Gan 1988:53). Durkheim (1964:370-1) describes 
anomie occurring when moral regulation is outstripped by the division of economic functions.
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The world into which post-communist states now find themselves is therefore one of increased 
market competition and increased economic, political and cultural change. The significance of 
national boundaries and protectionist proclivities are being reduced so that not to participate 
is tantamount to marginalisation and failure (Duffield 1999). This is bringing about a complex 
range of challenges to the authority and legitimacy of nation states and is creating new and 
persisting forms of division, inequality and instability described by Cemy (1998:46) as a 
neomedieval durable disorder. It is a situation of relative, but increasing, entropy in which the 
increasing speed and scale of global activity combined with rapid information dissemination 
and technological innovation is outgrowing the political capacities of the existing institutional 
order. Where the governance gap grows to large there are developing increasingly intractable 
and complex civil and regional conflicts (ibid.p.60). These trends are undermining liberal 
assumptions that market reform will promote growth and stability (Duffield 1999).
Post-socialism adds another layer of complexity to global change. Communist states provided 
basic welfare and employment. With their collapse, citizens of these states have been compelled 
to become self-reliant. They were suddenly given a far greater degree of choice. But choice 
is ultimately linked to self assertion, an unfamiliar right to those living in communist states. The 
transition from state socialism to market capitalism is a transition from the ideal of a balanced 
economy which constrained consumption by dictating and restricting needs, to one which 
requires constant growth through increasing consumption by producing and catering for new 
needs (Bauman 1992:169).
The developed economies are able to maintain and protect their positions through their 
controlling influence of multilateral institutions, through regional groupings and the brute 
exercise of military and economic power. The result has been an increasing differentiation 
between the world's rich and poor. Over the past thirty years the ratio of income held by the 
richest fifth of the world's population has doubled from 30:1 to 61:1 and is still increasing 
(UNDP 1996). However this domination of the formal, measurable economy belies the effects 
of globalization on the informal economy which operates beyond conventional accounting and 
is increasingly influencing the political economies of those states which have not achieved 
similar levels of integration and economic development. This is most evident in the former 
communist world where weak governments have been penetrated by mafia type organisations 
(Anderson, A. 1995; Frisby 1998). The vacuum created by weak states administered by corrupt 
governments has seen the development of multiple sovereignties and the privatisation of
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security through the emergence of war lords and gang leaders (Duffield 1998). The violent 
consequences of political authority no longer being anchored into conventional, bureaucratic 
or consent based structures is described by Duffield (ibid. pp.97) as post-modern conflict. 
Pillage, protection levies and the controlling or monopolisation of trade form the economic 
incentives to the privatisation of violence in weak states (Keen 1998). This has been most 
evident in Albania.
Modernity has been described as rapid and all-encompassing change with origins going back 
several centuries (Haferkamp and Smelser 1992:14). It is distinguished from the traditional 
order by the increased pace of change, scope of change and the nature of institutions (Giddens 
1990:106). It is bound up with both the affirmation and, paradoxically, the undermining of the 
nation state, highly fluid patterns of investment brought about by the globalization of market 
capital, the development of science and technology and new forms of organised violence. 
These themes cut across each other in numerous ways to produce many areas of contention 
including ideology, trade and the abuse of the commons. Nevertheless the homogenising 
influence of globalization has not destroyed cultural diversity, rather it has a potential to 
intensify cultural pride and attachment. Any sociological enquiry therefore needs to take into 
account the extent and diversity of local responses to the pressures of globalization (Long 
1994).
Increased global prosperity, wider availability of education and welfare, increased social 
mobility and greater participation in national affairs have contributed to producing a radical 
shift in how those individuals able to enjoy these developments conceive themselves and how 
they relate to those around them. However the nature of the globalizing world, unified in its 
common understandings of space and time, is that it constantly impinges and influences the 
manner in which individuals negotiate identities. Allegiance to the ideals promoted in the 
modernised and economically successful nation state have been at the expense of familial and 
kin ties. Identity has become a substantially more negotiable phenomenon located in more 
flexible classificatoiy categories. In the more prosperous economies these reflect changes from 
the former bourgeois stylisation whereby greater affluence and independence, different training 
and job types, urbanisation, life styles, media proliferation and interests have all contributed 
to the postmodern identity (Lash 1990:18-25). The arena in which postmodern actors define 
themselves concerns sociality, habitat, self-constitution and self-assembly (Bauman 1994:191).
72
The emergence of single issue politics is indicative of the new primacy of identity politics in 
the network society that has grown from the communications revolution (Castells 1997:11).
I have characterised the process of change in this section almost as being a transition between 
the poles of tradition and modernity. If unqualified this represents a mistaken dichotomy which 
risks understanding change as firstly being a progression and secondly as being dictated by 
western models of modernisation. The sociological dimensions of the western model of 
development are seen as being structural differentiation and the integration of new social 
structures to meet the demands of modernised economies (Smelser 1976:150-57). As such this 
represents a form of transition to a specific end state. Certain weaknesses and assumptions are 
inherent in such a proposition (Long 1977:26). For example the empirical evidence presented 
here indicates that change is highly mediated and furthermore that it is neither uniform or 
determined. As noted below (Geertz 1963), many ascriptive orientations are also integrated 
into modem settings. Cultural and historical traditions have influenced the development of 
specific pathways which incorporate the acceptance, rejection or fusion of modem forms 
(Stark 1992). Hence the focus on transformation in this thesis and the rejection of the notion 
Of post-communist change being a transition to a defined end state. Implicit also in western 
models of development is the unwarranted assumption that change in pre-modem societies is 
simply a product of exogenous factors. This causes internally generated responses to change 
to be overlooked and differing response to external factors to be ignored. It results in a failure 
to capitalise on those so-called traditional values and relationships which are congruent with 
development (Long 1997:18).
In examining the changing nature of identity as individuals from a traditional society become 
part of a modernising nation state, Geertz (1963) describes the clash between primordial 
sentiments and the demands of a civil society as producing an integrative revolution. Geertz 
suggests that while peoples of new states wish to have an efficient and dynamic state which 
can provide material and social improvements, they also desire to be recognised and have their 
identity acknowledged. Acute tensions can occur when people, whose sense of self is 
intimately bound up with their race, language or locality are asked to subordinate these 
commitments to a new and alien civil order. Geertz describes as heroic the political process of 
balancing the need of a people to be visible and to matter, with their will to be modem and 
dynamic.
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Primordial sentiments deriving from "the longing not to belong to any other group" (Geertz 
1963: 111) foster a tendency towards tribalism and parochialism. They are thus antipathetic to 
the forging of new unities within a nation. Furthermore, the pride and suspicion which form 
part of primordial sentiment often play a significant role in national politics. While the thrusting 
of modem political consciousness upon those who are unfamiliar with formal types of 
representational democracy stimulates popular interest in government, the existence of strong 
feelings of attachment to clan, region or sect can all too easily stimulate parochialism and 
racism. Geertz therefore argues that where the primordial diverges too greatly from the civil, 
the ensuing para-political warfare can be located anywhere in society - over school curricula, 
over language, literature or even censuses4.
Transformational change is therefore a synthetic process mediated by actors and informal 
institutions just as much as by formal institutions and external factors. However while modem 
societies institutionalise individualism and provide a context in which roles and status are 
achieved rather than ascribed (Kabeer 1994:16), the distinction between the traditional world 
and that of modernity is never straightforward. Albania's extreme isolation, the persistence of 
certain traditional forms, its severe communist regime, the discontinuities caused as a result 
of the shift to market capitalism and exposure to modernity have contributed to making its 
transformation particularly problematic. Where such changes have taken place over time in a 
relatively ordered manner, their impact is muted. Where this is not so, stresses can be 
considerable and self-identity has to be shaped and reflexively sustained in relation to rapidly 
changing local and global circumstances (Giddens 1991:215).
4.3.2 Modernity and Albania: Until 1991/2 the people of Albania had never had the 
opportunity of generating and legitimating their polity through genuinely democratic process. 
Prior to the emergence of nationalist sentiment towards the end of the 19th centuiy, the 
Albanians had been subjects of the Ottoman Empire for almost 500 years. Well into the 20th 
century Albanian society was characterised by tribal and feudal relations. The ethnological 
accounts of Durham (1928, 1987) and Hasluck (1954) describe traditional Gheg society. At 
first, the values of Albanian public administration and civic ethos were largely conditioned by 
the norms inherited from the decaying Turkish Empire and tended to reflect the values of the
As in the case of the Albanian minority in Macedonia who in recent years have resisted taking part in Government 
censuses and have produced their own population statistics.
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patrician/military/mercantile elite who regarded the state as a source of private income. At the 
time this set of arrangements was considered to be the embodiment of modernization 
(Schdpflin 1993:16). Transformation in twentieth century Albania can be seen to have been 
influenced by the alien rule of the Turks; concern over Slavic domination; world wars; the 
vagaries of a self-imposed "king", and those of a dictator. Then in 1991 the Albanians were 
peremptorily faced with having to adjust to market capitalism, democracy and a fast changing 
world.
As has been described, considerable economic modernisation and social engineering took place 
during the communist period. Albanian state socialism was characterised by rigid structures 
which inhibited and prohibited reflexive responses in the social, economic and political spheres. 
Given the choices of exit, voice and loyalty (Hirschman 1970), the options of exercising rights 
to voice or exit during the communist period were severely proscribed. Loyalty was the only 
option on offer. With the collapse of communism Albanians have found themselves thrust into 
a set of circumstances where voice, exit and loyalty are all operating in a novel ideological 
landscape. They have had to incorporate into their lives democratic procedures, international 
economic regimes, religious creeds, TV stations pumping out a range of alien cultural, moral 
and social values, and the activities of foreign and home grown mafias. This represents a highly 
complex management task. From a slender resource base and moribund infrastructure they 
have been attempting to construct and administer a cohesive state and a competitive economy.
In post-communist Albania, the slogans of democracy and the free market have been used to 
delegitimate communism and fill the ideological void created by the collapse of the old order. 
However in order to function effectively democratic government requires a range of 
institutions and a set of commonly held values. The lack of tolerance and widely divergent 
political positions compromised consensual democratic government in Albania. The social 
atomisation brought about by totalitarian rule had left little understanding and virtually no 
capacity to relate to political process in the early post-communist years, other than in terms 
of self interested linkages (see Boissevain 1974). Unaccustomed to political participation, and 
in any case preoccupied in solving their own acute economic problems, citizens were confused 
by the vicious invective associated with the new political discourse and angered by high levels 
of corruption. Consequently there was little confidence in the state which continued to be 
perceived as a source of patronage rather than as an agency for the impartial administration 
of public affairs.
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The contemporary world was commonly perceived in Albania to be composed of nation states 
and conspiracies, individualism, wealth, freedom of movement, scientific and technological 
development. This is how Europe was presented through the media, the press and by some 
migrants. There was a widespread yearning to belong and share in all these things. Yet the 
everyday story of life in post-communist Albania brought a multiplicity of signals which were 
hard for ordinary people to make sense of. With the decline in state provision the capacity to 
become self-supporting was paramount. Social mobility was being achieved in new ways, most 
commonly by temporary or permanent migration. While some were successful in negotiating 
the market economy, others were not. The 1997 collapse of law and order and consequent 
anarchy which originated in the failure of the pyramid schemes (see Korovilas 1998; Biberaj 
1998) reflected the profound confusion about how to structure and administer society.
Albania has been one of a number of Balkan states faced with structural adjustment, coping 
with the radical extension of markets and developing democratic systems. The difficulties 
associated with negotiating these changes are varied and complex, however Mestrovic et al. 
have proposed some common factors. Echoing aspects of Parekh's thesis (1992) on the 
particularism of liberal democracy, they state that democracy and free market institutions are 
cultural artifacts specific in time and place to the West and are thus not universally valid 
(Mestrovic et al. 1993:4). These Balkan scholars argue that so convinced is the West in its 
ideology that it has shown itself blind to other social forces, particularly nationalism. They 
argue that the Balkans are particularly predisposed to certain autocratic traits predating 
communism which have metamorphosed after its demise into a new form of authoritarianism 
incorporating nationalism, ethnocentrism and fundamentalism. These contribute to the creation 
of what Mestrovic et al. calls habits of the heart, which, once established, come to feel like 
instincts and have led to the creation of a specific type of authoritarian character in Eastern 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union (ibid p. 13). At an individual level once these habits have 
been inculcated they are difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge. Since this is so, they claim it 
remains possible for new totalitarian systems to develop.
Although arguments for a specifically Balkan interpretation of modernity are a subject of 
debate, the evidence of this study broadly concurs with the view expressed by Mestrovic et al. 
that the Balkan cultural traditions which have survived communism are nationalism, religion 
and the family. It is these feature which have deepened the gulf between Balkan particularism 
and Western cosmopolitanism. The resultant anomic condition has altered notions of identity,
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belonging, nonnative structures and standards of good and evil. This has been vividly evident 
during the 1990s, not only in Albania but elsewhere in the Balkans and leads me to suggest that 
the deepest conflict in Albania is over values and knowing how to jointly belong and 
participate in new political and economic arrangements.
4.4 Civil Society:
4.4.1 Outline: The notion of civil society offers a means by which the political economy of 
post-communist transformation can be understood. The formal and informal social institutions 
which are part of or impinge upon village society are a part of civil society. Institutions, 
transactions and their role in building social capital in village society are discussed later in this 
chapter (§4.5). Effective institutions are integral to the formation of systems of government 
and the establishment of democratic process. Understanding the operation of institutions, 
particularly the way in which the transactions which take place within and between them are 
economically and politically embedded, forms an important part in understanding the nature 
of post-communist transformation. It is the subject of the fieldwork analysis. However these 
micro-level events take place within the wider setting of civil society which is now discussed.
Although long used in political science, in recent years the term has been extensively employed 
in the context of the political, economic and social changes which are occurring as a result of 
the collapse of communism. It has been used to describe the lofty and benign ideals claimed 
and defended by the Atlantic alliance against what Reagan called the "evil empire". Solana 
(1996:8) for example speaks of NATO as being one of the mechanisms to create a European 
and Atlantic "civic space". White,J. (1995) describes the term civil society as having emerged 
to provide a kind of litmus test for the democratic potential of the non-western regimes. Civil 
society has come to be presented by the West as the goal towards which all states should be 
aiming.
4.4.2 Background: The roots of civil society can be seen in Greek civic organisation and in 
Roman republicanism. However in late medieval Europe the shift away from feudalism towards 
more independent and autonomous territorial units marked a significant phase in its 
development. The period saw the undermining of monarchies ruling by Divine Right and the 
growth of an urban-based bourgeoisie, educated by the development of print, who were 
trading and accumulating wealth. As the anomalies, shortcomings and inconsistencies of
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monarchical rule and mercantilism became apparent, it was John Locke and the 18th century 
Scottish thinkers of the Enlightenment who presented arguments for the natural right to life, 
liberty and estate, the rule of law and of the self-regulating allocative mechanism we call the 
market. The French Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence both 
contributed to the shift away from autocracy towards democratically administered polities. De 
Tocqueville's (1966) description of the evolution of the liberal-individualist position and the 
role of civil associations in American society added an important dimension to the notion of 
civil society.
The concept of civil society has been called a Western dream. As it has been made concrete, 
it has become part of the social history of the Western Europe (Mardin 1995:278). The 
concept is a theoretical construct and like any such patterning does not explain all that takes 
place. The term came about as a result of the need to find a framework within which to 
understand the changes associated with the transition from a feudal society to one with more 
complex political and economic relations. At its simplest, it is used to describe all those 
features of a society which are not part of the state. It operates principally in the spheres of the 
economy, communications, politics, religion, education, science and culture (Rau 1991:4). A 
civil society welcomes diversity and acts as a check on those who are exercising power.
4.4.3 The Operation of Civil Society: The political context associated with the operation 
of a civil society is that of a liberal democracy which includes the participation of all shades of 
opinion. A civil society implies a society in which there are a range of public institutions, 
autonomous associations and private institutions. The institutions through which civil society 
operates include political opposition parties, the courts, the judiciary, the police, a free press 
and independent universities, publishing houses, NGOs, trade unions, banks, commercial firms 
and so on (Ignatieff 1995:136). The institutions of civil society have an important role in 
checking abuses of power by the state. Civil society is founded on the notion that social order 
is dependent upon the presence of autonomous and moral individuals whose activities result 
in a wide variety of interdependent processes which together form the fabric of society 
(Seligman 1995:215). Although the main features of civil society are seen to be universal, the 
texture of each civil society is unique since its character is conditioned by the particular cultural 
circumstances in which it is operating.
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Civil society is founded on toleration and the belief that the individual represents the core of 
society. These principles give primacy to the freedom of the individual to make autonomous 
decisions. Civil society accords with a liberal vision of the state which is governed by the norm 
of minimal intervention in the society of individuals. It sees the state as confining its activities 
to: maintaining the integrity of its frontiers; creating and maintaining the necessary regulatory 
mechanisms; maintaining macro economic stability; and undertaking a redistributive function. 
The manner and extent to which it undertakes these tasks is defined by the citizens through the 
election of a government at regular intervals.
This is civil society presented as an ideal type. In reality, the ideal suffers from its innate 
dysfunctions. The nature and definition of civil society is that it is highly segmented: there is 
a division of labour and a class system which inevitably comes about as result of the unequal 
distribution of goods and rewards associated with a market economy. In order to address this 
class bias, the only avenues open are action by egalitarian social movements or government 
intervention. However this latter option, unless it comes in the form of dismantling state 
agencies or deregulation, is at odds with liberal orthodoxy which holds that the role of the state 
is solely to uphold the law, keep the peace and sustain the law of contract (Giner 1995:308).
As the world has become more technologically sophisticated, capital has become more 
concentrated leading to increased corporatisation, both within societies and transnationally. 
Powerful groups have developed, and by means of monopolies, oligopolies and cartels are able 
to influence or distort the scope of the market, the social allocation of goods, the free press, 
labour relations and so on, to the detriment and expense of the less able or less well organised 
members of society. A further threat to civil society has been the growth of the state itself. In 
an increasingly technically complex world the state and its regulatory functions have penetrated 
many areas which threaten individual autonomy5. This often occurs for plausible reasons and 
is justified by the needs of governance. Despite the activities of civil rights groups, the extent 
of state surveillance and interference in the lives of citizens is increasing.
5
The Conservative government in the United Kingdom (1979-1997) provides a good case in point. It used to the 
hill its legislative power and right to the legitimate use of force to emasculate the trade unions during the 1980s. 
It produced an Immigration Act and a far-reaching Criminal Justice Act in the mid 1990s which placed severe 
constraints on a wide range of civil and political liberties formerly enjoyed in Britain. The strong centralising 
tendency of the Conservative government during the years of its rule further constrained the democratic process in 
the UK by substantially reducing the extent of local decision making.
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4.4.4 The Problem with Civil Society: As may be observed there are some inherent and 
unresolved contradictions in the concept of civil society which revolve around the locus of 
power and the role of the state. While it represents a grand sweep of ideas, the concept is 
amorphous and vague. Tester comments that the imagination of civil society is a thoroughly 
contradictory affair since it is difficult to establish what the concept means. As soon as its 
narrative conventions are either extended or developed, the precise meaning of civil society 
begins to disappear. "It might even be said that civil society is rather like the Cheshire cat; all 
that remains is the smile." (Tester 1992:143). However in respect of my enquiry, there are two 
aspects of civil society which I wish to focus on. The first concerns the locus of power and the 
second concerns the role of the domestic sphere.
The Hegelian vision of civil society was one which emphasised national historical perspectives 
and sought to protect the national ideal from revolutionary influences. Although the functions 
of the state took place in the realm of civil society, it was the state which directed and 
regulated them. In his view the state was paramount and was equated with divine will (Sabine 
1973: 598). Below the state were civil society and then the private sphere. Although Hegel 
acknowledged the functional value of social pluralism there is no mistaking where he believed 
the locus of power to lie.
Marx on the other hand saw civil society as being primarily economic in structure, with its 
anatomy being the political economy. From this he argued that it was the economic order 
which determined consciousness. He asserted that since democratic governance and civil and 
political liberties were formulated solely to serve the interests of a bourgeois dominated polity, 
it was not possible for the proletariat to benefit from them. This theme was reworked by 
Gramsci who put much greater emphasis upon the various features of civil society being 
constitutive of the state and serving the hegemonic interests of the beneficiaries of capitalism 
who had a stake in the means of production. Gramsci understood civil society to be comprised 
of ideological-cultural relations, rather than material relationships and commercial and 
industrial life (Bobbio 1988:83). Civil society was coopted by the state whose position was in 
any case well entrenched through its monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Gramsci saw civil 
society as a product of asymmetric power relations. It was an arena open to regulation by the 
state and which provided the state with various ideological means to further its hegemonic 
ambitions which of course included the accumulating and safeguarding of material wealth.
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In both these visions of civil society the state plays a pre-eminent role, one view being benign 
and the other exploitative and hegemonic. There is then the liberal tradition exemplified by de 
Tocqueville (1966) which emphasises the role of autonomous individuals who, by means of 
a rich associationa! life composed of diverse autonomous civic organisations, influence the 
democratic process. This realm of self-organisation, which includes the market, conditions the 
texture of society and provides a check on the state. The liberal vision is one of a diffusion of 
power throughout society and the existence of an accountable state operating within strictly 
defined parameters. Putnam’s (1993) social capital approach can be seen to have roots in this 
vision. He asserts that it is the proliferation of cross cutting civic organisations which provides 
the foundation for a thriving democracy. The liberal view of the relationship between civil 
society and the state sees the latter as an accountable body operating in the service of society 
as opposed to it being patronising, exploitative or hegemonic. Each of these perspectives 
colour the political approach to governance.
As the debate over civil society has developed, the domestic sphere has almost completely 
dropped out of the discourse. In her argument demonstrating the fraternal nature of the social 
contract, Pateman (1988:102) draws attention to how the family has become separated and 
forgotten as a part of social life in the civil society debate. She links this "forgetting" with the 
patriarchal character and perspective of ostensibly universal categories. Her view is that the 
family is not separate from civil society but is an important means by which it is reproduced. 
As Kabeer (1994:58) also notes, familial relationships are a primary mechanism through which 
social meanings and social control can be brought into effect. What Pateman describes as the 
"fraternal" social contract is a reflection of the inferior position of women in society at large. 
Certainly this was so in contemporary Albania which, as I have already noted, remains greatly 
influenced by the decisions, actions and attitudes of men. The study draws attention to the role 
of women in village life and its significance in strengthening the family, possibly the most 
important institution in post-communist Albania.
There are many nuances in the interpretation of civil society. What I wish to do here is to draw 
attention to the complexity and contested nature of the notion by posing two dilemmas 
exposed by this cursory examination. Firstly, does the state exert a controlling influence over 
civil society or is the state essentially an extension of civil society with a mandate to administer, 
subject to being limited and accountable under the rule of law? The issue of the locus of 
power hovers in the background of this account. Secondly, there is an inadequacy associated
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with the framing and presentation of civil society as a schema in that it ignores or implicitly 
dismisses alternative systems of organisation and patterns of behaviour. In addition to the 
family, there is also an ethnocentrism associated with the implementation of the civil society 
agenda in which local tradition tends to be disregarded.
Despite its shortcomings the concept of civil society has been widely used to represent the 
ideal towards which post-communist states should aspire. An unproblematised, attenuated, 
sloganised vision of civil society is presented by the West as the solution to the problems being 
faced by the former communist states. The notion of civil society forms the basis upon which 
multilateral and bilateral aid is prescribed and provided by the West. Support has been 
conditional on post communist governments liberalising their economies, achieving and 
maintaining macro economic stability, reforming bureaucracies and introducing legislation 
which reflects an acceptance of the principles of pluralism i.e. political parties and other types 
of non-governmental activity in the commercial and non-commercial sectors.
The way in which civil society has been understood and negotiated in Albania, particularly in 
respect of western support for pluralism and NGO formation, has been described by Sampson 
(1996:121). He speaks of it being perceived by many Albanians as a form of magic which is 
manipulated and exploited by local brokers who have understood the ideology and, most 
importantly, the abstruse language associated with development. Just as they had been good 
at the "wooden language" of socialism, these people thrive off their mastery of the jargon 
associated with the promulgation of the civil society agenda and their ability to interpret and 
adapt the magic to local circumstances (ibid p. 141).
A pragmatic approach to the study of civil society is advanced by Hann (1996:1-25) who, 
rather than investigate "the textual discourses of elite groups", suggests that an appropriate 
agenda would be to understand the different referents being used to achieve the form of social 
stability reflected in the norms associated with civil society. This entails an examination of the 
inclusive aspects of civil society in which the positive features of cooperation and trust 
predominate. This in turn involves understanding how existing ideal moral codes, forms of 
social organisation and cooperation (i.e. institutions) have been able to provide a basis for a 
culturally distinct mode of existence and how they have been fashioned to provide social 
cohesion and trust. It is therefore from this perspective that I will primarily be looking at civil 
society. The theoretical perspectives which inform this approach are next outlined.
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4.5 The Local:
4.5.1 Introduction: It has been proposed that post-communist change is more accurately 
described in terms of structural transformation rather than something as abrupt and decisive 
as a transition. The issues of identity and transformation have been described and discussed 
within sociological, economic and political contexts. However transformation takes place by 
virtue of the actions of identifiable individuals who live in specific cultural, social and spatial 
environments and who are simultaneously being acted upon and influenced by the social, 
economic and political structures of which they are a part (ref. §4.6). In order to more clearly 
understand transformational change and the way in which civil society is being formed, it is 
important to understand in practical terms how individuals and collectivities are negotiating 
change. It is for this reason that this project has largely been informed by the study of village 
life.
The analysis of the empirical data presented here needs to be informed by bodies of theory 
which address the twin goals of the thesis: understanding identity change within the context 
of post-communist transformation and the development of civil society in a culture still 
relatively traditional in character. The theoretical approaches I have used to analyse and 
interpret the research data concern institutions, social capital and various aspects associated 
with the notion of community. Each of these bodies of theory represents a facet of civil society. 
Each illustrates the embedded nature of institutions and how this is reflected in social, 
economic and political cooperation. They also permit the examination of alignments of 
inclusion and exclusion.
4.5.2 Institutions: Institutions influence and regulate our daily lives and can be defined as 
being the social rules of the game. They are composed of norms, which are a reflection of 
values, constructed by people to govern their social, political and economic interactions. The 
nature of institutions is crucial to the way in which a society is shaped and in which its 
economy operates. The cultural particularity of institutions is the reason why a path dependent 
approach is required in any meaningful study of "transition”. Institutions reduce uncertainty 
by providing structures to everyday life. They guide and constrain every day activities. 
Institutions can be formal such as injudicial codes, or they can be informal codes behaviour. 
Institutions need to be differentiated from organisations which are purposive entities set up to 
achieve certain objectives. Organisations are influenced by institutions at the same time as 
being important agents for institutional change (North 1990:5).
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In challenging the validity of transition as a description of post-communist change (§ 1.4), I am 
also challenging the primacy of the neo-classical economic model and its premise of a reality 
in which rational economic actors allocate resources by means of price-directed markets. In 
support of this I draw upon new institutional economics (NIE), a body of theory which 
provides an alternative to understanding the economic, social and political relationships which 
take place between human actors. NIE incorporates notions of power into the neoclassical 
analysis of economic exchange. It does not see markets as being autonomous but as linked to 
political systems. It challenges neoclassical laissez-faire notions and raises issues of the "public 
good", the role of the state as a mediating instrument in society, the regulation and distribution 
of property rights, the role of corporate organisations and the redistribution of wealth. NIE is 
therefore concerned with norms and values and their policy implications (Solo 1989:265-7).
New institutionalism integrates the sociological and economic approaches. Max Weber 
believed that the split between the two theoretical positions had become damagingly wide. 
Rather than attempt to place them in a coherent logical system, he sought to bring them 
together under a common umbrella (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992:9). The synthesis of the 
disciplines represented by NEE is a reflection of this. It operates on the premise that economic 
action is a form of social action. It is thus founded on the contention that economic institutions 
are social constructions (ibid. pp.6-8). The growing awareness of the nature and role of 
institutions has shown that the rigid categorisation of behaviour into economic and non­
economic is stilted and even perverse. Market relations, relations of power, the exercising of 
property rights, the nature of networks, security and transaction costs are all instances of 
where sociological and economic dimensions are closely interwoven. One way in which I shall 
be analysing the empirical data will be through an examination of the linkages between 
institutional structures and economic behaviour.
Empirically, economies operate through reciprocity, redistribution and exchange (Polanyi 
1992:35). This study is concerned with establishing the nature of these functions within the 
context of two Albanian villages. It will be achieved by examining how the collectivities, and 
the individuals of which they are composed, construct their social and economic relations, how 
they use their capabilities and how they define strategies. Polanyi's assertion that economic life 
in pre-industrial societies was embedded in a range of non-economic institutions (ibid p.39) 
is widely accepted. However the liberal argument is that with modernisation social relations 
have become largely autonomous. This proposition is challenged by Granovetter who in his
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description of contemporary advanced economies extends Polyani's assertions by illustrating 
how economic actions remain deeply embedded in interpersonal relations. He further 
demonstrates how this influences the strategies and internal relations of organisations operating 
in developed economies (Granovetter 1992:53-81).
The nature of embeddedness in the two villages forms a further focus of study. It is concerned 
with examining the relationship between institutions and transaction costs. Where there are 
efficient markets there are low transaction costs. These occur where trust, how ever it be 
formed, and information are in adequate supply. In the real world neither are sufficiently 
present to enable markets to operate efficiently in the neoclassical sense. In other words it is 
extremely rare for supply and demand to be operating in an unmediated fashion. Where there 
is a lack of trust and inadequate information, there is a need for formal and informal 
institutions. Transaction costs are a crucial issue in economic markets and are a measure of 
their efficiency (see Acheson 1994:11). The high cost of measuring, monitoring and enforcing 
agreements made for goods and services in developed economies are lessened by effective 
institutions which facilitate exchange and reduce information costs. Institutions provide 
guarantees, either as a result of trust between parties, or through warranties and judicial 
process. Since the nature and operation of institutions are culturally defined, not only are there 
different transformative trajectories between states but there can also be differences within a 
single state.
Historically most exchange has been of small-scale local production which has taken place on 
a personal level. Such was the case in pre-communist Albania. It was influenced by moral and 
social considerations6 and characterised by informal institutions, common values, repeat 
dealing and lack of third party enforcement resulting in low transaction costs. However with 
little specialisation and a rudimentary division of labour, unit costs of production were high. 
The situation in a modernised economy is almost the reverse of this. The costs of transforming 
a product decreases rapidly as a result of technology and economies of scale but transaction 
costs substantially increase as a result of the variety and number of exchanges which take place
6
Thompson (1971:135) draws attention to die market as a social nexus where many social and personal transactions 
took place, where news, gossip and rumour were passed around and politics discussed. Marketing becomes 
increasingly impersonal in the mature industrial society.
where informal exchange has given way to impersonal exchange with third party enforcement. 
(North 1990:17-35).
The greater the move away from personalised exchange, the greater are the problems revolving 
around trust and enforcement and the activities of free-riders. Game theory, to which I make 
occasional reference, is a theoretical tool used to analyse issues of actor cooperation and 
strategising. Critical factors in game theory relate to the degree of inherent antagonism in pay­
offs, whether binding agreements can be reached, the degree of symmetry of information, 
sequencing within games and frequency of games (Lyons and Varoufakis 1989:80). "Zero- 
sum" situations are where one actor loses what the other gains or vice-versa (Schelling 
1984:213). The prisoner's dilemma game produces the paradox that individually rational 
strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes and challenges assumptions as to whether 
rational human beings can provide rational outcomes (Ostrom 1990:3).
An essential part of NIE is looking at the way in which informal and formal constraints 
combine to shape performance. Nee (1998) notes that while transaction costs may identify the 
optimal institutional arrangements from the perspective of the corporate actor, these can be 
abraded by informal norms and networks operating to realise interests and preferences of 
individuals and sub-groups such as has been described by Granovetter (1992). Nee suggests 
that achieving the optimal balance between formal and informal constraints is critical to the 
development of transition economies. What has occurred, and this is most evident in Albania, 
is that where formal rules are at variance with the preferences and interests of sub-groups then 
there is a decoupling of informal norms from formal rules. This has highly negative 
consequences for the performance of organisations, particularly the state. Additionally it can 
cause conflict, factionalism and low morale.
The weakness of NIE is that while it has a range of applications at the micro and sectoral 
levels, it has not yet proved successful as a grand theory of development. It does not contribute 
any regular predictive ability to a model of the role of ideology in institutional change (Bardhan 
1991:13). Toye calls it "empty". He claims that despite its use in analysing cultures, ideologies 
and property relations as determinants of economic performance, the theory adds nothing to 
what we already have. "No new predictions can be derived; no new policies can be 
recommended. No historical episodes can be explained better.." (Toye 1995:64). However 
Toye concedes that NIE has provided a means firstly to extend the scope of economics and
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secondly to explore opportunism and rationally self-interested behaviour which extends beyond 
game theory towards a more general application to human behaviour (ibid. p.67).
My argument for the use of NIE is precisely for these reasons. It extends the scope and 
qualitative dimensions of economics and it pursues the theme of rational self interest, 
particularly as it is reflected in the way in which people choose their identity and community 
(see fission/fusion discussion below). There is also a global dimension. The changes which are 
undermining the basis of global prosperity on which the neo-liberal project depends derive 
from new forms of division, inequality and instability (see Gray 1998). The transformation of 
post-socialist states is one major factor in this situation. The institutional legacies of such states 
have constrained their ability to become integrated into the neo-liberal project. NIE provides 
a useful means of identifying and analysing the nature of these institutions. It thus assists in 
explaining the different pathways which have come about as states have sought to integrate 
their pre-communist and communist inheritance of dense social networks with the institutional 
responses demanded by the "transition” agenda.
4.5.3 Social Capital: NIE raises issues which relate to how communities operate and, most 
importantly, how they cooperate. In recent years the concept of social capital has come to the 
fore in development agendas largely as a result of linkages claimed between social capital and 
democratic consolidation. The work that drew widespread attention to the approach was 
Putnam's longitudinal social study (1993) covering twenty Italian regions. His conclusions 
which cover the linkages between democracy, organisational probity and effectiveness with 
community cohesion and civic engagement, have been subject to considerable criticisms. 
Putnam drew from Coleman's (1988) theoretical framework for social capital. Coleman defined 
social capital as being concerned with the function of certain positive relationships between 
people which encouraged reciprocity, information flows and the existence of norms and 
sanctions. He understood social capital as referring to socio-structural resources which 
facilitated certain actions within structures. Social capital was a productive resource which was 
not entirely fungible and which could be used either negatively or positively.
However by defining social capital as "those expectations for action within a collectivity that 
affect the economic goals and goals-seeking behaviour of its members, even if these 
expectations are not orientated toward the economic sphere" Portes and Sensenbrenner 
(1998:129) have sought to extend Coleman and Putnam's more structurally orientated
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definition. They have defined social capital as being composed of: value introjection7; 
reciprocal exchange; bounded solidarity and enforceable trust. On the negative side they draw 
attention to the costs of communal solidarity and maintaining networks of trust. Examples 
cited were where successful entrepreneurs were inhibited by numerous claims being made on 
them and by expectations that their profits will directly benefit the community. Such pressures 
and expectations check economic growth and expansion and lead to the problem of free riders. 
The norms associated with bounded communities also constrain freedom of expression and the 
development of extra community contacts (ibid p. 140-2). Enthusiasm for social capital has 
tended to overlook that there are sanctioning aspects to the notion and that social capital is not 
good for everyone. As I was to find in this project, it can and does lead to exclusion.
Putnam's influential study (1993) sought to apply the notion of social capital through using 
certain selected phenomena and easily measured indicators to answer the question of how to 
make democracy work. In this respect he drew particular attention to the development of 
associational networks and the degree to which they were cross-cutting. In elucidating his 
thesis he indicated some quite direct causal connections between associational life, the 
establishment of a civic identity and efficient democratic governance. It has been the seeming 
clarity and directness of his conclusions which has appealed to neo-liberal policy makers in the 
Word Bank and elsewhere (Harris and De Renzio 1997:920). Putnam's conclusions have been 
used to support the policy of funding non governmental organisations in order to assist post­
communist states in their transition to democratic governance. Some of the critiques of Putnam 
have been fairly harsh: for example that he has produced a romanticised image of community 
(Levi 1996:49); his rather cavalier and idiosyncratic approach to interpreting history (Tarrow 
1996:393); almost ignoring the Italian fascist period (Putzel 1997:943); his conflation of 
associational membership with the wider attributes of the "civic community" is linked to a 
weak set of indicators defining civic engagement (ibid. p.944); there is a dark side to social 
capital as reflected in the forms of association, networks and collaboration manifest in 
organised crime and cartels (Ostrom 1997:162).
A criticism of Putnam's social capital approach relevant to this study is made by Tarrrow 
(1996:396) who comments that the absence of civic capacity is a by-product of politics, state
Concerned with the content of professional activity which promotes behaviour not inspired by naked greed and 
which forms a resource appropriable by others e.g. the impartial administration of the rule of law; education.
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building and social structure. Tarrow believes the reasons behind the absence of civic capacity 
are thus structural in nature and relate to capital flight (in Albania we could say communist 
expropriation, subsequent privatisations, the pyramid schemes) and exploitative governments 
rather than the lack of networks and cooperative arrangements. Indeed the research undertaken 
in the two villages of this study reveals many forms of cooperation pre-dating communism, 
which were vestigially maintained under communism and have subsequently assumed 
importance in the post-communist period. To what extent is this social capital? Holland (1998) 
documents a European Union project based in southern Albania which attempted to foster 
social capital so as to "empower disadvantaged groups and enable local populations to 
participate equally in development decisions to create sustainable and locally integrated 
development "(ibid. p.68). Holland's conclusion was that Albania's history had produced a 
vicious circle of distrust which had reinforced a primitive form of social capital residing in the 
family and clan and not in the formal institutions of the state and the market (ibid. p70). My 
research will comment upon the nature of social and economic linkages in such a way as to 
explore why there is distrust in the state and reliance on "primitive" forms of social capital and 
how this is reflected in the establishment and consolidation of civil society in Albania.
It is unclear whether social capital is generated by the personality characteristics of individuals 
as a result of socialisation within the family, by an individual's normative beliefs and moral 
codes, through membership of a community, or the extent to which it is a combination of all 
these factors. While the notion is contested, there is undoubtedly something which has been 
identified which relates trust to civic and other forms of association. The product of this 
symbiotic relationship permits collectivities to advance communal and individual interests, the 
study of which is very much in the domain of the new institutionalists. The Resource Profile 
Approach (RPA), which I describe in detail in the subsequent methodology chapter, represents 
a complementary approach to identifying and elucidating the institutions, networks and 
coercive patterns which are encapsulated by the notion of social capital. The application of the 
RPA involves micro-level examination using a wide range of physical resources categories as 
well as including within its scope social and cultural resources. It is these latter two resources 
which I found to be particularly fruitful in revealing the values, norms and networks which 
shaped identity.
4.5.3 Communities: The term community is laden with meaning and is discussed more fully 
in §5.5.2. However at this point I am using the term to describe a form of collectivity. Where
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it has geographic connotations this will be made explicit. Having discussed the larger imagined 
community of the nation, I now wish to examine theories which relate to smaller and more 
local forms of community as represented by the village and household. Common residence 
brings about a need to cooperate and requires a degree of mutual toleration. Membership and 
association have been vital to survival in post-communist Albania. In order to understand why 
this is so and how cooperation has taken place there is a need to make reference to theories 
which more closely relate to the subjects of this micro-level investigation.
The Household: represents the core collectivity of the communities in which I was working. 
Understanding the function of the household and the way it was responding to rapidly 
changing circumstances formed a key part of the study. The analysis of households can be 
defined as responding to the questions of who owns what? who does what? who gets what? 
and what do they do with it? (Crehan 1992:87). This form of enquiry connects with Moser’s 
(1996,1998) discussion of social capital which focuses on what people have rather than do not 
have, and how they manage their portfolio of assets. She associates social capital with forms 
of reciprocity within communities and between households which are based on trust deriving 
from social ties (Moser 1998:4).
The household is a complex institution which exists in many forms. In the villages of this study 
the main forms were conjugal, joint (zadruga) or female headed. The role of the head of 
household and decision making within the household occur in different ways. The nature of 
inter-generational relationships are important to the survival of a household and change with 
time and circumstance. Rather than seeing the household as being a unit which is in someway 
glued together, or which operates purely in the interests of utility maximisation (e.g. the 
Chayanov model, see Hunt 1978:59-66), or as being despotic in nature, Sen (1984:369) 
describes it as a zone of cooperative conflict. Elsewhere Sen (1992:124) draws attention to the 
systematic disparities in the household unit enjoyed by men and women. Furthermore, culture, 
as reflected by socialisation in the family and in school, reinforces existing gender and age 
inequalities so that in any analysis, the economic and social position of men, women and 
children need to be differentiated. Micro-analyses therefore need to be aware of gender and 
age band inequalities and their interaction with wider spheres of social and political activity 
(Folbre 1985).
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While this study is not directly focused on intra-household dynamics, I will nevertheless be 
looking at the role of women in the villages and the way in which recent changes have 
impacted on them. The social and psychological legacy of communism is long outlasting its 
collapse. In general women have suffered disproportionately and there has been a resurgence 
of traditional views about their role in society and they have experienced higher unemployment 
(Stent 1993). In Albania they have suffered inordinately as the rule of law has deteriorated. 
Moreover patriarchal traditions in Albania have seen women suppressed, excluded from 
education and in some cases kept in total confinement (Emadi 1993:81). While the APL sought 
to liberate women, it did so as much for its own economic ends as for ideals of equality. In fact 
women carried a double, if not treble, burden: working for the state, taking care of the home 
and producing children so as to increase the labour force. In contemporary Albania, women 
have found it difficult to achieve any fundamental change in society's perception of their role 
(ibid. p94). Because of their multiple responsibilities women have frequently assumed a 
disproportionate share of coping with the pressures caused by adverse economic circumstances 
(cf. Moser 1996:9). Nevertheless Albanian society was changing fast. Communications, social 
fragmentation and access to education was creating significant increases in the resources, 
independence and status of women in the metropolitan region of Albania. In the rural areas 
where this study took place, although women endured tighter social constraints than under 
communism, they were able to operate within these confines so as to create, appropriate and 
conserve space for themselves (cf. Arce, Villareal, de Vries 1994:169).
Shifting notions of community: Having looked at the household unit, it is equally important 
to study the relationships between households (Hill 1986:82) and wider notions of community. 
The research was concerned with examining the relationship between various levels of kin 
groups, neighbours, village zones (mehallas) and the villages as communities. It sought to 
establish how these various collectivities related to other social and economic spheres which 
contributed to the way in which identities were constructed. These included the nation, party, 
region, clan, village. The choice of identification with a group reflects a complex range of 
needs and fears. Belonging to a group relates to issues of competition. Divisions within smaller 
groups prevent them standing in opposition to larger ones. Individuals can only belong to a 
larger society through membership of smaller ones. Cross cutting loyalties contribute towards 
a more homogenous society, one which is less polarised and fragmented. Notions of 
membership thus shift according to levels of threat or opportunity. This creates a social 
landscape characterised by the fission or fusion of groups resulting from the different levels of
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threat or competition which individuals are perceiving or experiencing (Gluckman 1963:8). A 
number of ties which can claim the allegiance of individuals and which they cultivate according 
to need are studied and discussed.
Collective Action: There is a need for institutions to allow for the management of certain 
issues for the common good. This is particularly so in the case of common property resources 
(CPR). In this study irrigation water, a fishery, timber, grazing, medicinal herbs and bridges 
represented important common resources. CPR tend to come under pressure during times of 
social and economic change particularly when the state no longer has the capacity to enforce 
regulations, provide maintenance or administer allocations. In such circumstances collective 
action can often be the only feasible solution to reaching common decisions about common 
dilemmas. Successful collective action requires information availability, communication 
between users, symmetry of information between users, monitoring and enforcement (Ellis 
1993:268). Collective action can lead to networks of solidarity and reciprocity which permit 
the survival of marginalised and disenfranchised groups (Castells 1997:62; Scott 1985). It can 
also lead to the creation of hierarchies. Historically collective action has been reflected in the 
growth of trade unions and, in more recent years, the proliferation of NGOs.
Returning to CPR, a key issue is the extent to which competition can be resolved without 
government control. I shall be examining instances of where this was the case. However it is 
important to distinguish between types of CPR, that is whether a CPR problem relates to the 
resource system or the resource units. If it is the resource system then analysis needs to be 
focused on the way resource appropriators jointly use it and contribute to its maintenance. 
Where there is not joint use, the problem of resource units can be addressed by allocative 
decisions and then by monitoring and enforcement, as in a fish catch. The maintenance and 
sustainability of CPRs revolve around free riders, crowding and overuse. This study provided 
an instance where a fishery was being severely jeopardised by the lack of policing and an 
inability to organise collective action. This could be attributed to the size of the fishery and the 
extent of coordination and policing required. However where a CPR was amenable to 
community control, such as irrigation water, behavioural norms, community cohesiveness and 
self interest all worked in favour of creating institutions which produced a degree of collective 
action and reduced opportunistic behaviour. The difficulties of CPR management are those 
of organising, that is specifying activities and sequencing them. Ostrom (1990:42) highlights
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three areas which have been poorly resolved: supplying new institutions, making credible 
commitments and monitoring, all of which will be touched on in the empirical material.
The Moral Community: In the circumstances of a weak state administered by a government 
incapable of regulation, providing security, settling disputes over property rights and providing 
welfare, alternative means of handling these crucial issues have to be found. In post-communist 
Albania these matters were being addressed at the local level. There was seen to be a re- 
emergence of community and kin institutions which had certain monitoring and regulatory 
functions but which also provided the basis for cooperation and reciprocity. These features 
contribute to the formation of what is referred to as the moral economy, a notion first 
suggested by Thompson (1971:78) in his analysis of mass actions used in defence of traditional 
rights. He suggests such actions were legitimated by a community consensus so strong that it 
overrode motives of fear and deference. The moral economy has come to refer to a community 
consensus over certain baric values, in the examples provided by Thompson (1971), they were 
of the right to life. The notion was then applied and extended by anthropologists (see Scott 
1976, 1985; Hann 1994,1996) and integretated into the arguments of new institutionalists (see 
Nee 1998). Durkheim states that everything which is a source of solidarity is moral. To take 
others into account is moral. Morality is thus concerned with dependence and serves to make 
the individual an integral part of a whole (Durkheim 1964:398). However while mutual trust 
is essential for the close coordination of economic activity, there is a need to separate the 
moral economy from profit-maximising behaviour (Granovetter 1994:468).
Where an omnific state, such as that of communist Albania, has provided, if not wealth, then 
at least an absence of destitution, it has inevitably created a degree of dependency. Therefore 
when such a state collapses, the existence and nature of a moral economy is of particular 
significance. In meeting the exigencies of poverty and the uncertainty associated with post­
communist economic reform, at the local level there has been an increased reliance on 
cooperative arrangements and acts of calculated altruism. Examples included desisting from 
profit maximising behaviour in order to build neighbourly relations; collective action over 
CPRs; and investing time and resources in kin and other networks. Although investing in social 
and economic relations may be at the expense of immediate personal gain, such actions can 
provide opportunities for future advantage through creating obligations, networks for future 
use or to permit an outsider to become accepted and integrated into a village community. 
Moral communities arise where there is a consensus and solidarity over certain key values.
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They are concerned with a measure of redistribution between rich and poor. They are 
maintained largely through the sanction of exclusion which is the fate of those who do not, or 
can not, meet the norms of membership.
However in circumstances where there has been an inability to concert activity beyond that of 
the family then an ethos can occur which is termed by Banfield (1958) as amoral familism. This 
he suggests exists where there is poverty arising from high death rates, particular land tenure 
conditions and the absence of the extended family networks (ibid. p. 10). Amoral familism is 
not a normal state of culture. It represents a polar type of socialisation which reflects an 
inability to act conceitedly in the public interest. As a form of behaviour it diminishes when 
families are able to see beyond narrow, short-run advantage, where a few community members 
have the moral capacity to act as leaders and where people have a measure of toleration and 
are not gratuitously destructive (ibid. p. 158). Since it concerns the maximisation of short run 
advantage of the nuclear family and assumes that others will do likewise, I will be using the 
notion of amoral familism to form a counterpoint to my analysis of the moral community.
4.6 Structuration:
Structuration represents the final body of theory used to explain the empirical material. It 
provides a matrix in which the diverse theoretical perspectives used in this analysis can be 
located. It offers an explanation of how transformative processes take place and provides a 
means by which the changing nature of identity can be better understood.
In proposing the theory of structuration Giddens has contributed towards resolving the 
disparate and somewhat antagonistic approaches concerning the roles of agency and structure. 
He disentangles and defines the concept of structure in the light of the fact that "the production 
of society...is always and everywhere a skilled accomplishment of its members." (1976:126). 
Giddens sees structures as constituting and at the very same time being constituted by the acts 
they engender: "every act which contributes to the reproduction of a structure is also an act 
of production, a novel enterprise, and as such may initiate change by altering that structure as 
the same time as it reproduces it" (ibid p. 128). Organisations or collectivities are not structures 
as such but are rather systems of interaction which are dependent upon the modes of 
structuration whereby they are produced (ibid p. 157). From the perspective provided by the
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dual nature of structuration, it is argued that structures do not simply constrain human agency 
but also enable it.
Structuration therefore differs from a structural/functionalist approach (see Leach 1982:44-48; 
Layton 1997:37) in that structures are regulated not only by homeostatic loops but by reflexive 
self-regulation which causes structures to be neither stable or fixed but to be generative 
institutions which permit the production and reproduction of society (Bryant and Jary 1991:9). 
From this perspective society is viewed as the product of a highly dynamic process conditioned 
by the dual structure of systems of generative rules and resources (Giddens 1976:127). 
Structuration therefore signifies the means whereby structures are brought into being and 
which also addresses the mutual dynamic relationship between individuals and the social 
structures of which they are a part. The theory sees time-space relations as being inherent in 
the constitution of all social interactions (Bryant et al. 1991:13). Society can thus be perceived 
as being made and remade in a constantly reflexive process.
The argument continues that in the modem world reflexive monitoring, which is a core feature 
of structuration, has reached new levels of intensity. Giddens asserts that information and 
knowledge are not incidental to modem institutions but constitute them. The modem world 
is in a constant process of revision which, while challenging philosophers, is existentially 
troubling for ordinary individuals (Giddens 1991:20/1). Within this context the impact of 
electronic media is exceedingly pervasive.
The stream of images and ideas resulting from heightened levels of communication leads to a 
questioning of traditional institutions and undermines trust in them. In "Old Societies and New 
States" Geertz (1963) refers to the stresses which occur in modernisation and the 
reformulation of the state when the reflexive understanding of meaning, norms and power 
relations remains deeply rooted in traditional values (ref.§4.3.2). One aspect of social 
transformation in such circumstances is associated with the generation of new perceptions of 
self and new dimensions to agency. As Giddens remarks (1991:32), the reflexivity of modernity 
extends into the core of the self and in the context of a post-traditional order, the self becomes 
a reflexive project.
Returning to the theme of the thesis, the renegotiation of identity in post-communist Albania. 
Structuration theory provides a synthetic framework in which to analyse the nature of
95
structural change. It explains how individual agency, informal institutions and values form and 
are formed by larger social, economic and political structures. In so doing it illustrates the 
embedded nature of social and economic transactions. The constitution of the modes of 
structuration, or systems of interaction, is therefore mediated by the attribution of meaning, 
morality and relations of power. In providing this framework for the explication of social 
reproduction, structuration theory also offers a means of explaining how identity can be 
understood by changes in the nature and relationship of structural factors in twentieth century 
Albania.
Structuration and Civil Society: The conclusion of the empirical chapters, respectively 
entitled Community, Economy and State, summarises each chapter's findings in relation to 
identity. The final chapter provides a synthesis of these conclusions. Informed by a model 
based on the notion of structuration, this synthesis illustrates how identity has been 
transformed during the course of the twentieth century. I now introduce a model which I use 
to illustrate this transformation. It is presented in the form of a series of diagrams which 
demonstrate particular sets of reflexive of interrelationships. Figure 2 (overleaf) illustrates how 
an ideal-type of civil society can be understood to operate.
As previously noted, a dvil society has its roots in liberalism and the notion of the primacy of 
the individual. The liberal vision is one in which autonomous actors, empowered and 
safeguarded by a wide range of enshrined rights, negotiate with the state and the market. An 
important means of so doing is through associational activity. This starts with the family and 
can extend to a wide range of groups and networks. Therefore individuals do not only interact 
directly with the market and state, they also participate in, and interact with, these institutions 
through a variety of forms of community or association which contribute the building of social 
capital. Thus "community" in its various forms, including and extending from the family, plays 
a vital role in the process of mediation inherent in a civil society. For example, although 
individuals cast votes in an election, this is usually a relatively rare event. In order to further 
their interests in a more organised and constant manner individuals might choose to belong to 
a form of political community, or party. Alternatively a commercial organisation can be seen 
as a form of community in which an individual voluntarily merges a degree of his/her identity 
in order to participate in the market. Networks also play an important mediating role in 
assisting individuals to manage their social, economic and political interests.
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Figure.?:




The notion of structuration is signified by the various connections/relationships displayed in 
Figure 2. The solid lines represent the more formal reflexive interactions existing between the 
three elements of state, market and the individual. These include voting, laws, transactions, 
welfare payments etc. The broken lines refer to the influence of the no less important informal 
institutions. This diagrammatic abstraction, which will be further elaborated upon in the 
conclusion, provides an additional means of demonstrating the relationships between 
structures. It is included here to further illustrate how the notion of structuration will be 
applied. It lays the basis for the set of propositions advanced in the conclusion about how the 
relationship between the institutional features of state, community and economy have 
undergone radical changes during the past century
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4.7 Summary:
This theoretical chapter started by defining and discussing identity as a phenomenon and then 
in relation to Albania. The sociological dimensions of transformational change were set within 
a discussion of tradition, modernisation and modernity which concluded that the Balkan 
cultural traditions of nationalism, religion and the family have survived communism and 
deepened the gulf between Balkan particularism and Western cosmopolitanism. The political 
and economic dimensions of transformation were set within a discussion of civil society which 
concluded by posing two questions of the thesis. The first concerned the relationship of civil 
society to the state and the second concerned the patriarchal nature of civil society and its 
blindness to alternative systems of organisation and patterns of behaviour. This was followed 
by the presentation of bodies of theory by means of which the empirical data could be analysed 
and interpreted. These were institutions, social capital and theories which describe and make 
comprehensible the complex nature of communities. Finally structuration was discussed as a 
means of integrating the findings of the study.
As was stated in the introductory chapter, this thesis does not see the developments in post­
communist Albania as being simply a Mtransition,l but rather as part of a more complex process 
of social change. It seeks to elucidate what that complexity means by reference to the lives of 
residents from two villages in north Albania. It sets out to understands the collapse of Albanian 
communism within a wider transformational context. The theoretical perspectives outlined in 
this chapter provide the basis for this endeavour.
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5.0 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
5.1 Introduction; As has been noted, this thesis is concerned with the presentation of data 
derived from observations from two northern Albanian villages and an examination of their 
institutional settings. The intention is to integrate its findings into the discourse on post­
communist Albania. Having presented the theoretical basis by means of which the data will be 
analysed, I now wish to address the methodological aspects of the research.
As I noted in the introduction (§ 1.2) I will be examining the changing nature of structure and 
agency as reflected through their impact on identity. This chapter therefore starts with a brief 
discussion of the epistemological issues surrounding structure and agency and their relevance 
to this research. I then describe the actor-orientated approach and explain why I am using it. 
This is followed by an account of the practical details associated with the field research. The 
chapter concludes with a rationale for the use of the analytical categories of community, 
economy and state and a description of how they are being understood within the context of 
this endeavour.
5.2 Structure and Agency:
The argument for the approach I have used to undertake this research is crystallised by the 
political anthropologist John Gledhill (1994:22) who states ’’Power actually rests on the 
everyday social practices which are the concrete form taken by relations between the governing 
and the governed.”. Implicit in this statement are issues concerning structure and agency. I 
would like delineate how I am understanding these phenomena.
Structures, in their sociological sense, are concerned with relationships, inherent in which is 
the notion power (see Molm 1997). Structures can be interpreted as a fixed or purportedly 
objective sets of relationships, as is the case with the presentation of neo-classical economics 
or modernisation theory. However, I believe that a discourse which incorporates notions of 
agency and mediation, such as the embedded nature of markets (Granovetter 1992), provides 
a more productive means of examining structures. Structures operate on every level of social 
life from the micro through to the global. Micro level structures, such as the household, 
operate within the context of larger structures ranging from the clan, to markets, to 
government. The discussion of reflexivity in the previous chapter (§4.6) describes the manner
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and extent to which structures interpenetrate and interact with each other. However the way 
in which structures are perceived determines the way in which they are examined as objects 
of empirical articulation. The degree to which structures are seen to be external or internal to 
the individual, are seen to be discrete or synthetic, rigid or flexible determines the functions 
attributed them and thus affects the way in which agency is perceived. I use the example of 
modernisation theory to illustrate this.
Development theory as it evolved after World War II was heavily committed to a vision of 
modernisation which saw development in somewhat narrow economic terms. Development 
practice reflected a belief in the primacy of western industrial models of development. 
However when these models were transposed to other settings they frequently resulted in 
various forms of skewed development, unequal distribution of benefits and relations of 
dependency. These problems were exacerbated by the relative weakness of civil society in what 
were often newly independent states. Modernisation theory tended to exclude any 
consideration of society and its historical setting. The swing in the 1960s to a neo-Marxist 
approach to development practice provided a much needed antidote to some of the socially 
destructive aspects associated with the rigid application of modernisation theory. The focus 
of neo-Marxist analysis revolved around structural issues of dependency and the use of 
aggregated analyses. The interpretation of specificities tended to be analysed in structural terms 
which precluded consideration being given to the perception, validity and influence of local 
actors who were essentially seen as being collectivities being acted upon. The debate about 
agency therefore revolved around macro political and economic issues at the expense of 
consideration that it could rest with even the most marginalised of actors.
In contradistinction, the structuralist school of thought has understood structures as being 
internally derived, as being something concerned with ideas of wholeness, transformation and 
self regulation (Piaget 1968:5) This led to the generation of an anthropological viewpoint 
which rejected functionalist arguments and proposed that structure was a theoretical construct 
but one observable through social relations. It thus belonged to behaviour and was expressed 
in norms and rules. The arguments advanced, most notably by Levi-Strauss, concern the notion 
that while structures are a product of the unconscious, they are open to transformation through 
human action so that human beings structure themselves by constructing structures (ibid. 
pp.97-119). Bourdieu (1977) develops this structuralist debate by drawing attention to the way 
in which larger frames of meaning and action shape individual behaviour. The emphasis placed
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by Bourdieu (1990:52) on cultural dispositions and notions of embodied history, which he 
called "habitus" gave a novel primacy to interactions and the notion of agency. He describes 
habitus as unarticulated knowledge which creates a disposition to act in a certain way. It 
provides an ability of which one is unaware and therefore concerns improvisation, choice and 
agency. Habitus represents an "infinite yet strictly limited generative capacity" (my emphasis) 
which transcends the antimonies of determinism and freedom (ibid p. 55).
By showing how structures constitute action and at the same time are constituted by the 
reflexive actions of skilled and accomplished actors (ref. §4.6), Gidden's theory of structuration 
undermines the determinist conclusions which derive from purely structural analyses. He does 
so by incorporating the notion of agency into that of structure. Such an approach supports my 
contention that what is taking place in the aftermath of communism is not so much a transition 
from one set of structures to another, rather what is taking place is a negotiated approach to 
the unknown in which agency plays a vital role in influencing the nature of transformation. In 
such a way the particular trajectories from state socialism are formed.
However agency is more than the transforming of capacities and capabilities through the 
exercise of power, it entails social relations and can only become effective through them. It 
requires the strategic operation of networks of social relations (Long and van der Ploeg 
1994:66). While the social institutions which constitute structures might constrain actors, they 
do not determine their actions. The way in which actors can influence structures is illustrated 
in the embedded nature of markets, the notions of a moral community and collective action. 
The social capital analysis is concerned with the impact of human agency, as reflected in forms 
of cooperation, on structures relating to governance. Structure and agency are therefore 
intimately linked and cannot be seen as separate.
5.3 The Actor-orientated Approach:
The emergence of a debate which questioned the nature of structures and gave greater value 
to agency has contributed in the shift towards a more inclusive and richer paradigm which has 
permitted a fresh contextualisation of the role of the lay actor. Long (1975) for example used 
a case study approach to support a growing critique of neo-Marxist theory. The turning of 
attention away from macro level debates was reflected in Chambers (1983) where he presented 
a rationale for a more participatory approach to development practice. There arose a difference
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of analysis between those "scholars concerned with the testing of more general models and 
those interested in depicting the ways in which people manage in the face of structural change" 
(Long and Long 1992:18).
Through examining the culturally constructed nature of human agency, the actor orientated 
approach has led to a reconceptualisation of knowledge, power and agency. In terms of 
practical research it has proved to be particularly suited to uncovering information which is not 
amenable to discovery by more formal and quantitative methods. This reappraisal of how 
knowledge is defined, applied and interpreted has become integrated into the development 
discourse and has led to greater value being given to indigenous knowledge and to 
understanding actor response. This is especially relevant when seeking to understand patterns 
of hegemony.
Local Knowledge: Gudeman (1986) argues that measuring different cultural models against 
Western or supposedly "universal" sets of references makes for an internally circular set of 
comparisons which results in nothing more than tautology. Hobart (1993:10) describes this 
dominating paradigm as being "western scientific, technical and managerial knowledge". He 
further argues that the language and metaphors used in the development discourse have tended 
towards aggregate description (which have for example ignored gender), and various forms 
of loaded phraseology which further compound the hegemonic dimensions of the development 
discourse. Policy language therefore becomes a form and source of power (Apthorpe 
1997:54).
The primacy of a paradigm, as is suggested in this western model, implies a universal set of 
norms and values which reflect a purportedly objective vision of rationality, of understanding 
what the world is and how it works. While it might serve certain strategic and functional goals, 
such as creating structural dependencies, the results of applying this universal model in 
situations where it does not fit with locally held patterns of perception and organisation can, 
and frequently does, lead to dysfunction. The role of micro level analysis has come to play an 
increasingly influential role in development theory and practice. At the epistemological level 
this research seeks to demonstrate the value of local knowledge in making more 
comprehensible the changes associated with the collapse of communism in north Albania.
Geertz (1983:56) describes local knowledge as something which is amenable to being
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understood in an inside as opposed to outside way, as first person as opposed to third person, 
as phenomenological as opposed to objectivist, emic as opposed to etic and so on. He revalues 
common sense as being a cultural system used by non-experts as the basis for our actions. 
Common sense is composed of qualities which Geertz describes as naturalness, practicality, 
simplicity and accessibility (ibid.p.85) as opposed to formality, complexity and specialisation. 
Local knowledge is therefore a commonly held and comprehensible form of knowledge 
appropriate to local circumstances. It is the means by which local actors are able to make 
macro phenomena intelligible. While the terms used to describe local knowledge may seem 
mundane or un-intellectual, it would be a mistake to infer that local society, and the knowledge 
it generates, is necessarily other than a highly intricate set of norms, values and relationships 
which permit people to structure their social and economic environment. Furthermore since 
local knowledge operates in contexts which are shaped by other time and space arenas it is 
implicitly a part of macro phenomena (Long 1992:7). For these reasons I argue that local 
knowledge is intrinsically a valuable source of knowledge.
Nevertheless, the teleologically defined development agendas, although to some limited degree 
responsive to social policy critiques, continue to be the principal means by which donor 
policies are formulated. Policy is the domain of specialists who administer and deliver reified 
knowledge (see Sampson 1996). The problem has been that post-communist structural reform 
has not gone hand in hand with policies which adequately promote accountability or address 
persisting democratic deficits. The consequence has been that governing elites have been able 
to mediate the development agenda to their own advantage, as have the experts in "transition". 
For reasons of expediency these shortcomings have been compounded by governments 
supporting and/or turning a blind eye to corrupt regimes1. There are therefore a wide range of 
vested interests in maintaining the "transition" agenda which I am suggesting is too confined 
in scope to adequately address the needs of post-communist transformation. This research 
investigates in what way the "near" of local knowledge and local experience can expand upon 
macro interpretations of events during a period of intense and rapid change.
As noted in §2.5, die Berisha government was one such regime. Similarly during the 1990s aid has been provided 




5.4.1 Theoretical aspects: A number of approaches have been used in the research. The 
historical, political, economic and social context of Albania has required extensive research 
in books, periodicals and newspapers. This has been undertaken in the U.K. and the National 
Library in Tirana. However the core of the study revolves around the fieldwork in northern 
Albania. Apart from the time needed to undertake a limited investigation of government 
structures, all my time was spent in the villages as a participant observer. Bernard (1988:23) 
describes participant observation as a qualitative and phenomenologically orientated approach 
by means of which a researcher observes, recovers and records behaviour. Participant 
observation is best known as a means to gain qualitative data. It is especially useful when little 
is known about phenomena i.e. where there is a large gap between the inside feelings of the 
subjects of the study and the perceptions of those external to the situation. Poor 
comprehension as a result of a lack of information can occur for a variety of reasons: poverty, 
crime, war, geographical isolation and so on. In such circumstances the qualitative case-study 
type approach linked to participant observation is especially appropriate where there is an 
interest in understanding human meaning and interaction (Jorgensen 1989:12).
The essence of participant observation therefore entails gaining access to a community and 
becoming less of a researcher and less of a stranger with the aim of creating a familiarity with 
those being studied. By providing the researcher with an intuitive understanding of what is 
taking place in a culture, participant observation helps in understanding the meaning of the 
observations (Bernard 1988:150). However it is an eclectic approach since "to obtain analytic 
descriptions of complex social organisations dictates the use of several techniques, each of 
which is especially suited to obtain particular types of information" (Zelditch 1969:19). With 
the aim of description rather than simple classification, the techniques I have used included 
statistical surveys, household economy surveys, focus groups and semi structured one-to-one 
interviews. In addition a wide range of materials were used including local records, diaries, 
letters and photos.
Turning to the techniques used in this research, two broad approaches were used. The first 
concerned basic surveys of the villages and gathering background information relating to the 
study. Secondly, in respect of the interactive aspect of the research I used what has been called 
the Resource Profile Approach (RPA) (see Lewis et al. 1993:28; Lewis and McGregor 1992) 
to provide the framework for structuring my contacts and interpreting and ordering the daily
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flow of information. The RPA consists of analysing household resources in the following 
categories:
Material resources - including money and physical assets.
Human resources - people, their skills and capabilities, taking into account age, gender, health 
and education.
Natural resources - access to common resources of water, wood, pasturage, fish etc.
Social resources - relationships...withfis, in the market, with politicians etc.
Cultural resources - traditions and history, also as reflected in the strategic use of status
I have used the RPA in two ways. Firstly in the field to order my interactions with respondents. 
In a highly unstructured situation where either the researcher or respondent is frequently under 
some form of time pressure, information provided by respondents can be out of sequence or 
in some other way confusing. Where this is the case, the RPA framework is valuable in 
formulating interviews so as to capture as much diversity as quickly as possible. The richest 
vein in discussions and interviews was invariably in the spheres of social and cultural resources. 
The RPA also proved useful in analysing raw data from daily records.
Secondly the RPA contributed to the meta-framework of the research by assisting with the 
abstraction, analysis and theorising of information. The orientation provided by its definition 
of resources permitted the identification and elucidation of institutions, networks and coercive 
patterns so as to better understand the nature of agency, organisations and social capital 
formation. The RPA thus provided a means of grounding theory (see Glaser and Strauss 
1979:3-5) in this particular research context.
Once in the villages I had a range of contacts with people. In Gura I firstly undertook a survey 
which involved visiting every household in the village in the company of its mehalla 
representative. This enabled me to obtain a general social and economic impression of the 
village. In Malaj the approach was somewhat different. There, I undertook a much more 
detailed and systematised survey of 25% of the village households. A questionnaire was 
formulated (see Appendix 1) which was taken round to 53 households and completed in 
discussion with various household members. At least two visits were made to every household. 
Following this an extended semi-structured interview was undertaken with a cross section of 
households ranging from the very poor to the most successful. These interviews were usually
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undertaken with the head of household. In a few cases this was a woman. My intention was 
to understand how each household related to the three spheres of the community, market and 
the state. The Malaj study concluded with a focus group meeting. Tasks and discussions were 
concerned with eliciting information about how values had changed as a result of the collapse 
of communism with particular attention being paid to issues of status and economic strategies.
Most of my research time was spent in Gura where I worked in a less structured way than I 
did in Malaj. However the information I gathered in the village, apart from being valuable in 
its own right, provided a useful counterbalance to the harder data which derived from the 
Malaj study. The Gura research was loosely based on the resource profile approach in that the 
RPA provided a guide and an orientation around which to configure interactions. The RPA 
provided a systematic framework for data collection which is useful when operating under the 
pressures and pleasures of discussions in the field.
The incorporation of two villages into the project was as a result of the 1997 breakdown in law 
and the difficulties of travelling to Gura. As has been described, I worked in the villages in 
different ways. In Gura after I had visited every house to get basic information about the 
village, I allowed myself to be driven by circumstance and operated in an informal, 
unstructured way. This was in contrast to the approach taken in Malaj where the carefully 
structured social and economic survey allowed me to gain a systematic and detailed 
understanding of individual economic circumstances to a much greater degree than was 
possible in Gura. However the approach used in Gura permitted me to gain greater insights 
into social process. I later appreciated my good fortune in having worked in two sites and 
having used two slightly different research approaches. It permitted me to gain a considerably 
fuller understanding of what was taking place in the locality. Although the statistical data 
collected in the two villages was gathered for different purposes and was thus of a different 
nature, it nevertheless contributed to enhancing the comparison between the two villages.
5.4.2 Practical Aspects: Having decided to go ahead with the research, I was faced with the 
task of finding a location for the field work. I had spent some considerable time in Albania 
during 1992-3 when I was able to travel extensively around the country in the course of my 
work for an aid agency. Subsequently I was fortunate to be a regular visitor to Albania. I had 
therefore been able to achieve a degree of familiarity with the country and its people. My work 
had brought me into contact with Ministry of Agriculture through which I came to know a
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number of extension officers in different parts of Albania. This network proved to be most 
useful. Extension officers had an excellent knowledge of the districts in which they worked. 
They knew the details of every village within their sphere of responsibility. This information 
would include the reputation of the village and the name and qualities of the kryeplaks.
In selecting a site, I made several arbitrary decisions of my own. Since Albania was still a 
predominantly rural economy, I did not want to be too near the metropolitan region which was 
then growing rapidly and greatly influencing the economy and social circumstances of its 
immediate environs in a way that was not representative of the country as a whole. However 
I wanted to find a location which mixed the rural with the urban. I therefore set out to find a 
rural lowland village near an urban centre on the assumption that it would represent the type 
of location which would be attracting migrants from the overpopulated mountains. Such 
locations were attractive to migrants since house prices were lower than in towns and yet 
proximity to a town permitted access to employment opportunities and better health and 
educational facilities. The food which could be grown from the small amount land that went 
with a village house was an additional bonus. It was for these reasons that I chose to locate 
my study of post-communist Albanian transformation in a peri-urban village.
Using the contacts I had made in the extension service I visited a number of areas by bus. 
Finally I narrowed my choice to Elbesan in the east and Shkoder in the north. I ended up 
choosing the latter, more for subjective reasons of having got on better with the people I had 
met rather than anything else. I was slightly influenced in choosing to work in the Shkoder 
District through it having been the region in which a study had previously been undertaken by 
Lewis and McGregor in 1992.
Having settled on Shkoder, I then set about gaining an understanding of local government 
structures and hierarchies. I came to the conclusion that in seeking permission to undertake 
research in a village, I should avoid higher administrative officers. I found that such officials 
were always looking over their shoulders to avoid responsibility and I soon realised it would 
be difficult to obtain a response to my request for permission to work in a local village. The 
prospect of being subject to frustrations and delays caused by the need to take the request to 
ever higher levels caused me to desist from this approach. Nevertheless the issue of consent 
was important to me for both ethical and practical reasons. I therefore decided to visit 
Commune offices and explain what I wanted to do and then seek consent from the Commune
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Directors. I visited three Communes in the Shkoder Rreth. They were all situated in the 
lowlands and had relatively easy access to the town. I was listened to politely and attentively 
by Commune Directors. In each case the Director gave his consent to my undertaking the task 
I had described. My guess was that they reasoned that if I stuck with the project, there was 
more to be gained from my presence than there was to be lost. However I am not sure that the 
Directors fully appreciated the nature of what I intended to do and what it could reveal. Had 
they done so, I suspect that they would have been less willing to give their permission.
As I travelled around the Communes my principal concern was to find a village which was 
neither too big or too small, which had a reasonable balance between Muslims and Catholics 
and which had a kryeplak who was willing to support my activities. The size criteria 
automatically eliminated a number of villages. The issue of religious affiliation posed a 
problem. I soon realised that most villages were either predominantly Catholic or 
predominantly Muslim Given the widespread rhetoric that there were no tensions between the 
different friths in Albania, this struck me as odd. If the rhetoric were true, why were there not 
more villages where there was a closer parity between the two main faiths? I was to learn more 
about this issue during the course of the research. Gura, the village I finally selected, was 60% 
Muslim and 40% Catholic. It was one of the few I could find which had an approximate parity 
of numbers between the two faiths. The final criteria concerned my confidence in the kryeplak.
Despite emphasising that my presence would not bring any material benefit to the village, I
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think it true to say that the kryeplaks believed I would in some way draw attention to their 
village or be useful to them in making connections in the world beyond the village. I was thus 
welcomed by them. When I told the Gura kyreplak that I would like to work in his village, he 
was pleased. However as my work progressed and I became more aware of what was 
happening in the village, our relationship was not without tension.
This process started in 1995. Although I had selected Gura on the basis of it being an 
agricultural village with roughly equal numbers of Muslims and Catholics within commuting 
distance of Shkoder, it was not without some regret that I rejected Malaj where I had 
established some good contacts, especially with the kryeplak, but its economy was far from 
typical of the region. Gura had something of a bad name in the locality and was said to be the 
home of shady characters and criminals. On reflection, despite certain unpleasant elements 
within the village, I doubt whether it was substantially more criminal than any other in the 
region, apart that is from one family, the Sokols, who lived above Gura (ref. §3.2.8 and
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§3.3.6). Their presence frustrated the last phase of my work.
As a result of undertaking this project on a part-time basis, the fieldwork took place in a 
phased manner. The first period consisted of two month visit to Albania to improve my 
Albanian and to find a research site. This was followed by 3 field research periods of between 
2 and 3 months each. The first two phases of the fieldwork took place in the spring and late 
summer of 1996. The final phase was to have taken place in the spring of 1997, however the 
civil disturbance and anarchy which came about as a result of the collapse of the fraudulently 
run pyramid schemes caused this final phase to be postponed until the late summer of 1997 and 
the research strategy to be modified.
I arrived in Shkoder at the beginning of August 1997 to find the city centre and government 
buildings heavily damaged. The Commune offices responsible for Gura had been razed to the 
ground. Travel, and even movement around the dty, was restricted to daylight hours. However 
the main problem for me was that Gura was the home of the Sokol gang. The village was much 
feared and rumours abounded about what was going on there. During the summer I had kept 
myself appraised of developments in the region and was aware that there could be problems. 
In cooperation with my supervisors I had formulated a social and economic village survey. 
Once in Shkoder I travelled out to Gura and realised I could no longer work there as I had 
before.
I therefore investigated the village of Malaj where I had previously established cordial 
relations. As discussed in §3.3, it was an older community than Gura. It was a non-agricultural 
village with a mixed economy which had much closer links with the local town. Since the 
kryeplak and other leading members of the village had no objection to my presence and 
activity, this was where I undertook the survey. The inclusion of a second village enhanced the 
validity of the research by increasing the range and nature of data. It provided information 
which complemented and could be compared with the information gained from Gura. Although 
very different in character to Gura, Malaj proved to be an ideal site to undertake a detailed 
socio-economic survey which provided data for a paper on economic differentiation (see 
Lawson et al. 1999). Concurrent with undertaking the Malaj survey I visited Gura once a week 
but alway shifting the time and day of travel. In this way I was able to maintain contacts and 
continue to learn about the responses to the breakdown in law and order as well as to keep in 
touch with what had been going on in the lives of various families.
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During the period of the research I was steadily improving my knowledge of local government 
institutions and their mode of operation. I was able to observe the effects of the 1996 national 
and local elections and then the response to the national election in 1997.1 became particularly 
interested in the structure and operation of local government. My approach to discovering how 
it operated was straightforward. I would enter an office and ask to speak to the relevant 
officials. I was not affiliated to any official organisation and was therefore unable to justify my 
presence other than by telling staff about my research and that I was interested in what they 
were doing. There was very little public interest in local government per se. The national 
government gave it scant regard. Once officials got used to the idea of someone being 
genuinely interested in what they were doing, in all but the isolated case, they were extremely 
forthcoming. I was freely given detailed employment and financial statistics from both Rreth 
and Bashkia administrations. Senior officials could be extremely frank in their discussions with 
me. They openly expressed their frustrations and concerns. While there were those who used 
their position in local government for personal benefit, they were others who more diligently 
sought to apply their professional skills.
Conducting research in a community on an intermittent basis over a period of 18 months has 
both positive and negative aspects. On the negative side there are problems with discontinuity, 
such as not following through the phases of an agricultural cycle or not being able to develop 
relationships to the depth made possible by continuous contact. Along the participant/observer 
continuum, to be constantly present allows a greater degree of participation. However on the 
positive side, periodic visits provide time for stories to unfold, particularly in this case to 
witness the effects of state collapse. It also meant that I did not overdo my welcome and 
become an irritation to the communities in which I was working. Furthermore the episodic 
nature of the fieldwork afforded me the opportunity to discuss the progress of the fieldwork 
with my supervisors and enabled me to return each time with a considerably sharper focus. As 
Hoddinott notes (1992:73) there is no "right" length of time to undertake fieldwork and that 
time in the field is a function of many factors including the aims of the research and the degree 
of intimacy required. What is important is that the time in the field is adequate to fulfill the 
aims of the research and that the research is not overly impressionistic. As things worked out, 
I believe that the time allowed for the study and the manner in which it has been conducted 
permitted the collection of evidence which is of sufficient quality to support the conclusions 
of the thesis.
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Having my base in the town of Shkoder provided me with a neutral location. To live in one of 
the villages would have inevitably opened me up to charges of bias towards a particular family, 
fis  (clan), party or religion. The ensuing tensions and pressures on myself as a researcher 
would have compromised my work. I was not to regret residing in the town, since not only 
was there some tension in one of the Gura mehallas but, as I have described, the civil conflict 
of spring 1997 necessitated shifting the location of the research away from Gura. Residence 
in Shkoder was also useful in gaining access to officials in the Municipality and Rreth. By being 
unaligned through residence and by travelling around on a bicycle, I was able to remain 
relatively obscure. My unobtrusiveness in both villages came through the fact that I was always 
coming and going. The town was too large and busy for my presence to be noteworthy.
In order for the research to be actor informed, my approach was as a participant-as-observer 
in the lifeworld of two northern Albanian communities. Information was gleaned through 
casual conversations, observations and semi-structured interviews. As outlined above, I 
undertook a detailed survey of every house in one village and a socio-economic survey in the 
other. Interviews and research were also taken in the town to provide corroborative 
information about the role of the market and the state.
I would interact with people in a variety of ways, chatting to them in the road, field or over a 
coffee. In addition I would conduct more extensive private interviews. In Gura I set up some 
group meetings with the women of the village. I was invited to weddings and meals. In respect 
of the more detailed interviews which required a precise understanding of Albanian, I used the 
services of an English speaking student from the town without whom the work could not have 
been undertaken in the manner it has been. Apart from his qualities as a translator, this young 
man was of help to me in a variety of ways. His observations and insights about situations or 
people were at times most useful.
It is the quality of relationships which forms the most important arbiter of success in this type 
of endeavour, and relationships are very much a two-way affair. By this I mean that while I dig 
into the lives of people, I try to be as open as I can about my own life, my family, my opinions, 
my country and how I see the world. The ethics of this type of work inevitably bore into the 
researcher. Really, what right has one to intrude, to dissect people's lives and to touch upon 
many intimate matters after such a cursory acquaintance? Would I do so, could I do so to the 
same extent, in my own culture? The answer is no.
I l l
My approach to formal contact, such as before making an interview or conducting a survey, 
is always to obtain the permission of the person to whom I am speaking for their participation. 
Should they assent, I offer them the opportunity to break off whenever they wish. Secondly, 
if someone chooses to speak to me, I try to provide them with as much information as is 
practical about myself and what I am doing. Thirdly, I can only hope that the information I am 
given is never used in such a way as to cause harm to any informant. Upon such a slender 
ethical base was my work conducted.
There is inevitably a degree of identification between the researcher and the "subjects” of 
research. This can occur when investigations reveal the effects of injustice and corruption or 
when the observer realises the falsity of the stereotype ascribed to the subjects of a study (Gans 
1982:60). In actuality the relationship between the researcher and the researched is riven with 
interactions and interpenetrating agenda. In this case there was my dependency on the 
respondents. There was self-legitimation on the part of certain respondents. The kryeplaks saw 
the research as an opportunity to enhance their reputations and bring benefits to the village. 
Some villagers believed that contact with me would provide them with an avenue to charitable 
assistance while others would give me false information in the pursuit of a dispute with another 
party, and so on. My own supposed objectivity was affected by people who did not want to 
speak to me. I would start to build up a reluctance to visit a particular fis  or mehalla. 
Furthermore, try as I might, I am not able to instantly suppress my sentiments when confronted 
with certain issues. Partiality and bias have inevitably coloured my perceptions. In this respect 
I was fortunate to have an assistant with whom I could discuss certain matters.
5.5 Analytical Framework:
5.5.1 Rationale: The final part of this methodological chapter is concerned with providing a 
rationale for the use of the analytical categories of community, economy and state which are 
used in interpreting, evaluating and presenting my observations. Apart from providing a simple 
but comprehensive means of describing the social world, I justify using these categories for 
three main reasons.
Firstly, while identity is moulded in the personal sphere by gender, family and age, it is also 
highly influenced by a range of factors which include informal institutions external to the 
family, economic imperatives and the formal institutions of the state. Thus at the individual
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level identity formation is closely linked to the community, economy and the state.
Secondly, this choice of categories relates to a sociological explanation of the modem world. 
The twentieth century has been dominated by a conflict between left and right, between 
command and demand, between communism and liberalism. To a great extent that set of 
conflicts appears to have been resolved, more by the collapse of one ideology rather than the 
triumph of the other. Yet there remains a need to define our immediate society and its relation 
to the governing unit. A credible narrative of society has to be constructed. Uncomfortable or 
unpalatable realities have to be either hidden or confronted. Tradition has a function in 
providing meaning, but only to a point. Where change is too great, identity becomes 
threatened. After decades of isolation Albanians have had to interface with a radically novel 
set of circumstances. It has been a jarring process. With the left/right metaphor no longer 
applicable, new coordinates are needed if the understanding of society is to keep pace with 
unfolding realities. Beck (1994:33) suggests that in order to do so there are three key 
questions. These concern our attitudes towards strangers, uncertainty and the possibility o f 
shaping society. He isolates these because they condition how we describe or stylise our 
various predicaments and because they provide an inclusive framework by means of which we 
can set about managing them. The dominant characteristics of community, economy and state 
are respectively concerned with defining who are strangers, the management of risk, and the 
task of organisation.
Finally community, economy and state are useful in that they closely correspond with the 
principal components of civil society. As has been discussed (§4.4), civil society has become 
a notion widely used by policy makers and aid practitioners, particularly in respect of the 
"transition" from communism. The key institutions which define the nature of civil society are 
the collection of formal and informal institutions which constitute "community", the market and 
the democratic state. While these institutions represent poles of behaviour, through reflexive 
interaction, most processes have implications in all three of them.
5.5.2 Definitions: Analysis and evaluation require the ordering of information. For the reasons 
outlined I am using the categories of community, economy and state provide the framework 
within which and by means of which the research data can presented and discussed. While the 
meaning of these structures and institutions will be further elaborated upon in their individual 
chapters, what I am taking them to signify is as follows:
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Community: The term community is laden with meaning. It has a geographic connotation. It 
describes an entity created by the coming together of people with a common interest. A 
community can exist in almost any location in society. We have seen how the nation has been 
described as an "imagined community". Community also refers to the realm of affiliation and 
common memory which is represented as tradition. This form of community can be said to be 
contingent on common beliefs and values, direct and many sided relationships and reciprocity. 
Community exists by virtue of sanctions of approval and disapproval which are reinforced by 
forms of exclusion. Community, as I frequently use the term in this thesis, revolves around 
relationships. More specifically, it includes relationships between individuals, families,^ and 
village members. It is concerned with religious affiliation and also the bonds created through 
traditional belief and practice.
In the light of the development of market relations and the contraction of the state, this study 
is concerned with understanding the changing nature of "community". Re-traditionalisation 
was one response to the uncertainty arising from precipitate economic and political change but 
the opportunities offered by the market combined with the newfound freedom to move, 
organise and speak freely were bringing about new forms of affiliation.
The Economy: Although the economy is primarily understood here in terms of the market, 
it needs to be located in the Albanian context. Until World War H, Albania had a largely 
undeveloped agricultural economy. Despite the introduction of a national currency after 
independence, barter was a common form of exchange. Markets were weak and poorly 
articulated. The communist regime sought to eliminate the market and centrally plan all 
economic activity. The results were disastrous.
The market is at the core of the neo liberal vision: "no one has discovered a more efficient 
device than the market for coordinating the multifarious private purposes of a heterogeneous 
peacetime society" (Marquand 1988:6). The free market is based on the principle advanced by 
Adam Smith postulating the existence of a coherent society making sensible allocative 
decisions where individuals are permitted to pursue their self interest without government 
constraint. However in practice the health and vigour of the market is directly related to the 
state which sets the conditions under which it operates. The state provides and enforces a 
range of regulations, fiscal and monetary policies. The state itself is a participator in the 
market. It depends upon a flourishing economy to maximise its income and minimise its
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expenditure, it therefore influences the market by means of tax, various forms of regulation and 
public provision. However actor strategies of various kinds, which include exit and outright 
flouting of the law, also influence and constrain state regulatory and taxation policies. The 
study of economic activity and relationships needs to take into account the effect of mediating 
j influences (ref §4.5.1).
The market is therefore a space in which exchange occurs, where there are a quantity of buyers 
and sellers. For the market to operate optimally it needs to be responsive to the signals of 
demand and supply and be allowed to operate in a neutral manner. Information needs to be 
freely available, costs in making and enforcing bargains should be non-discriminatory; and 
costs of entry and exit of markets should not be prohibitive. The research looked at the nature 
of the market and how villagers were ordering their economic life, what they were buying and 
what they were selling.
The State: represents the seat of sovereign power set within national boundaries. It controls 
and administers a number of important formal institutions operating within its territory and has 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. The functions of the state are influenced by a 
range of external regimes some of which may compromise its sovereignty. The state is a 
solution to sets of organisational problems which individuals cannot address satisfactorily by 
themselves. It provides internal security and security against external forces. It creates and 
enforces civil and criminal law. In the field of the economy the state is responsible for the 
maintenance of sound macro-economic management. The state has a planning function 
particularly in respect of infrastructure, communications and the environment. Finally, it may 
have a redistributive function.
In reality citizens tend to view the state as being a provider and a body to which they have a 
right of appeal and a right to make demands of. In a democracy a government is elected to 
administer the functions of the state. In theory elections provide the mechanism by which the 
national community determines the nature of the formal institutions which will structure their 
lives. The research was concerned with understanding how the state-govemment-bureaucracy 
was structured and operated at the sub-regional level. It examined the nature of its institutions 
and how they operated by observing how villagers were perceiving the state and how the state 
was responding to their demands.
5.6 Summary:
The research methodology has been based on the contention that identity is culturally 
embedded and that it is shaped by a range of social, political and economic factors. Hie 
methodological approach has been constituted so as to understand the nature of structure and 
agency as they were observed to operate in two Albanian villages five years after the collapse 
of the communist regime. I have discussed structure and agency and shown how they are 
intimately linked and cannot be seen as separate. I have argued that individuals have 
endowments of knowledge and agency and that these capabilities and functions need to be 
taken into account in any meaningful analysis of change. This has determined my use of an 
actor orientated approach to the field research.
My source has been local knowledge. Its richness and diversity demonstrated how actual 
Albanian people were coping with the stresses of the transition to a market economy, if indeed 
that was what was taking place. Listening to the expression of local knowledge or ’’common 
sense" provided a means for the outsider to understand more clearly the nature and significance 
of the social, political and economic transformation taking place in post-communist Albania.
Having described the theoretical and practical aspects of the methodology used in the research 
and provided a rationale for the analytical framework of community, economy and state, I now 




"Community" is the first aspect by means of which I wish to analyse the information which 
derived from my time spent in the villages of Gura and Malaj. It is examined in a number of 
overlapping contexts. The account begins with a description of the traditional Gheg fis. It 
describes how ihefis survived in the villages through the communist period to the present day.
Linked to this description of the fis, the changing nature of social relationships are analysed, 
particularly in respect of their impact on identity. Attention is paid to the issue of gender, not 
only because it is a fundamental defining feature of identity, but because it has been an aspect 
of identity which has been subject to exceptional pressures through the different phases of 
change which have taken place in Albania during the twentieth century. The final aspect of 
identity to be examined relates to belief and belonging. Belief is concerned with religion and 
also how the world was apprehended. Belonging is concerned with the cardinal features of an 
individual's existence and refers to metaphysics and the norms, values and traditions which 
form the basis of identity.
As has been discussed (§5.5.2), community is a multi-faceted structure. It refers to a realm of 
common beliefs and values, direct and many sided relationships and reciprocity. As institutions, 
communities exist by virtue of sanctions of disapproval and ultimately exclusion. Although 
communities are subject to change as result of external forces, they also represent a set of 
relationships which empower members permitting them greater agency in their interactions 
with the world outside their community. The changing nature of communities, the diminishing 
role of the fis; the increased importance of the family, shifts in gender stereotyping and greater 
individuation were all reflections of the way identity was being renegotiated and how people 
were re-"imagining" themselves (to continue Anderson's motif) now they had freedoms of 
association, worship and expression.
6.2 Social Structures and Relationships:
6.2.1 The Gheg Fis: The Gheg inhabitants of Northern Albania are notable in that they are 
the only example of a true tribal system existing in Europe until the mid 20th century 
(Whitaker 1968:254). Edith Durham (1928,1987) and Margaret Hasluck (1954) have both
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contributed invaluable information on how this system operated earlier this century. Their 
work has been drawn upon and supplemented with reference to Albanian, Italian and German 
sources by Whitaker (1968, 1976).
In Chapter 2 it was briefly noted how the tribe and clans were structured. The basic unit of the 
fis  was the household, the shtepi. This formed the single residential and economic unit. An 
expanded shtepi could hold as many as 60 or 70 inhabitants. The position of head of the house, 
the zoti i shtepi (literally god of the house), was chosen by the older members of the 
household. Primogeniture was given consideration, but wisdom and understanding were the 
more important criteria used in assessing a potential leader. Often an individual would be 
nominated by the zoti i shtepi as his successor. This man would then take over some of the 
more irksome tasks such as marketing and trading. The zoti i shtepi always maintained a 
commanding role in the household. His position reflected an authoritarian pattern which 
underlay much of traditional life in the Balkans. No one spoke to him without him speaking 
first and none would be addressed in the presence of the zoti i shtepi without his prior 
permission.
The counterpart of the zoti i shtepi was the mistress of the house. She would be a woman 
whose capacity to handle physical work was declining. Typically the woman charged with 
running the house would be between 40 and 50 years old. Durham (1987:65) describes the 
heavy work of the women: they fetch firewood and water; they spin and knit incessantly; they 
weave and make clothes; they bake, cook and clean the house; on the land they have to sow, 
hoe, reap and thresh.
The household was composed of brothers (yllazni) plus uncles and cousins. Naturally at some 
point the household would need to split, yet the head of the household would still retain a 
measure of authority over the new house in the form of being the elder (plak) of the 
brotherhood. The head of the strongest of such kin groups, which usually formed a village, was 
known as the kryeplak (literally chief elder). The term dropped into abeyance during 
communism but is now used to describe the elected village leader who still has no special 
privileges and lives as any other member of the community.
In the Gheg tribe a sense of community was fostered in every way possible. Each member of 
the household was encouraged to regard everything in it as his own. Even the humblest was
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encouraged to regard the village as his personal property, thus any success in the village was 
as if it was his own and any slight or insult to a village member was as if it were to himself If 
a fellow behaved unworthily then his own honour would be besmirched. "The patriotism so 
bred was narrow, perhaps, but it was genuine, free from egregious self-seeking, and by its 
emphasis on the need to keep the community's honour untarnished, a good deterrent from 
crime" (Hasluck 1954:11). These primordial themes relating to the construction of identity 
continue to resonate to this day. While acknowledging the necessity for resolute and firm 
leadership, one important aspect of these traditions was to have mechanisms capable of 
constraining authoritarianism Although a leader and a prestigious man, the kryeplak could do 
nothing without the authorisation of the village elders who were also responsible for sentencing 
miscreants. In an ad hoc form, these "councils" were seen to operate in Gura and Malaj to this 
day. The egalitarian nature of these social constructs prevented the creation of oligarchies. 
Such concentrations of power would have undermined the social solidarity which was a vital 
element in, and was integral to, the survival of the family and fis.
Driven by his desire for complete authority, Enver Hoxha sought to eradicate every form of 
allegiance other than to the Party and state1. The model provided was that of the New 
Communist Man which represented an identity whose paramount loyalty was to the state. It 
could be said that it was through this idealised model that the communist polity operated. 
Communist leaders spoke to the people as though they were this person and remonstrated with 
them when they fell short of the ideals attributed to the archetype. The impression given to me 
by respondents, both ordinary villagers and former communist officials, was that the proletariat 
approached their leaders mimicking the discourse associated with this amorphous identity. It 
was a fiction, but one that both sides, the elites and the masses, cynically played along with: 
the elites in order to maintain their privileged life style and the masses in the knowledge that 
if they deviated from prescribed conduct they, and their families, were liable to permanent 
exclusion and misery.
6.2.2 The Fis in Gura: The APL's efforts to extinguish traditional loyalties met with limited 
success. The following is a tale from Gura. It illustrates how deeply rooted was the institution 
of the fis  and introduces the concept of honour (irider). It was made all the more rivetting for
i
Although, as is noted in §8.2, tribal affiliation  was a factor in gaining high position during the communist period 
(Lendvai 1969:196).
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me by the fact that all its protagonists were alive:
Ymer Dardha was a committed communist who was head o f the village People's Council. In 
1974, when he was 43, he struck up the most intimate o f relationships with 27 year old 
Flutura, a fellow party member married to Azem Hoxha o f the Dibra fis. Flutura and Azem 
lived amongst the Dibra fis  near the river. The affair between Ymer and Flutura became 
intense and they sought every opportunity to enjoy each other's company. Unbeknownst to 
them the liaison had become public knowledge and was causing great problems with the 
Dibra fis  who felt dishonoured by what was taking place. The only person who appeared to 
be ignorant o f the matter was Azem. He left the house one Saturday on family business to visit 
relations in a village some distance away. Flutura had informed Ymer that Azem would be 
absent for a night and he came to her house. Very little happens in the village which does not 
become known. So incensed were the fis  when they learnt that Ymer Dardha was consorting 
with Flutura, wife o f Azem, during their kinsmen's absence that they broke down the door o f 
the house and caught Flutura and Ymer in a highly compromising situation. The Dibra fis, 
whose leader wasMuhamet, were enraged about the assault to their honour and were about 
to kill Ymer when an elder from another fis who had been appraised o f what was taking place, 
came on the scene and told them to desist or it would be the worse for them. Ymer bounced 
off the ropes and thundered that he was the most powerful man in the village and they could 
not do this to him. In any case he was only picking up passport details from Flutura (it was 
midnight). Azem came back the next day to find his life in ruins. When the matter came to 
public investigation, as it soon did, Azem was given the alternatives o f either being expelled 
from the fis  and leaving his house, or o f condemning and divorcing his wife. The honour o f 
the fis was at stake. Azem said that above all else he wanted to stay with his wife. He would 
not give evidence on behalf ofMuhamet Dibra (the present head o f the mehalla/fis) and other 
members o f the fis. As a consequence they were convicted o f breaking into the house and 
assaulting a Party official. Muhamet was jailedfor 6 months and the others for lesser terms. 
Azem and Flutura were ejected from the fis and went to live in the Dardha mehalla very near 
to Ymer. Ymer had got away with things in a sense. However when the elections for chief o f 
the People's Council came up afew months later, his name was not put forward and Bardhyl 
Plaku, in 1997 the most prosperous o f the Gura shopkeepers, became the new leader. Ymer 
and Flutura were posted to the State Farm in the neighbouring village where they were able 
to maintain a close relationship. Azem remained an outcast. He lived in another area of the 
village mildly despised by others in the mehalla where he resided and in latter years was
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unable to get work It was suggested that his 27 year old son was one o f the village criminals.
Above all else this story illustrates the power of the fis  and the shame which goes with 
rejection and banishment from the institution. The account directs attention towards a number 
of other things. The Party could never be wrong or challenged. It looked after its members. 
Ymer was therefore quietly sidelined as an embarrassment. Implicit in these events is the 
existence of a moral community (ref §4.4.3), albeit masked by the APL’s need to be seen as 
the sole source of authority. Yet despite the power of the Party, traditional norms, values and 
rights continued to exist and were legitimated by a community consensus which overrode 
sentiments of fear or deference.
Furthermore this story raises issues of power and sexuality as it relates to “prostitution” and 
enforced sex during the communist period. It transpires that it was not uncommon for party 
officials to take advantage of women on the state and collective farms. Furthermore officials 
would grant rights to women to their cronies or to men from whom they wanted something 
or wished to favour. This remains a hidden and highly sensitive subject. Enough was gleaned 
from a variety of sources to make one aware that in a male dominated society which, at least 
in a formal sense, had been cut off from the ethical bases supplied by religion and customary 
law, party power was used by men to obtain sexual gratification from women. Much remains 
unsaid on this subject however I doubt that it will ever be publicly remembered. It would cause 
too much harm to the reputation of the abusers and the abused. It was almost as though there 
exists a pact of forgetting concerning this and other matters, such as those who worked for or 
informed the sigurimi (secret police). The willingness and capacity to forget is an important 
component in any transformation. In the Albanian context it is likely that coming to terms with 
issues such as this was to some extent reflected in party affiliation and in the vitriolic nature 
of the political discourse.
To return to its main point, the tale illustrates the strong sense of solidarity, honour and pride 
which remained associated with the fis, even during the communist period. However for the 
public at large, fis  related relations operated under confined parameters. Those condemned as 
armiq te popullit (enemies of the people), were isolated from everyone (ref. §2.4). Members 
of their fis  were compelled to keep a distance from them. Despite the pervasive control 
attempted under communism, an ethic rooted in Albanian tradition still prevailed in the village. 
It transcended even the defining feature of religion and was in part reflected in the Kanun.
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These traditions, fundamental in the construction of identity as witnessed in these two villages, 
were rooted in the ethic of nder (honour) and besa2. The latter quality implies trustworthiness 
and was spoken of in the highest terms, though one elder said that besa was "to tell the truth 
without hurting others". Such a description adds a pragmatic twist to the concept and draws 
attention to the politics of survival in a poorly endowed society.
It was said if a person is seen to do something bad, it harms first of all themselves as 
individuals, then the family and then the fis. This influence of the fis  in constraining anti-social 
behaviour was still considerable and contributed to the maintenance of social order, although 
not to the same extent as in the past. The ultimate sanction is exclusion. An elder said that 
conduct is related to the nature of thefis. "bad behaviour is associated with marriage to a bad 
fis". Lineage remained an important feature in Gura. The village was structured around the fis. 
So important was the fis  that it was said: "without the fis you cannot live". The above tale 
illustrates how deeply the fis  was interwoven with social life and survival. As mentioned in 
§3.2.9 each of Gura's 5 mehallas was dominated by a particular fis. However fis  segregation 
was being eroded as a result of three pressures: relocation of other fis  members during the 
communist period, economic differentiation as a result of increasingly family-based strategising 
and the development, of a market in property. Despite these changes the village remained 
predominantly spatially structured in fis  groups with gaps between mehallas, the exception 
being the two mehallas in the village centre. These had no clear boundary between them 
except that one mehalla, consisting of one of the oldest fis, had its entrance from the main 
street through a double iron gate set across a track which was symbolically closed on 
occasions. The other central mehalla had a number of relative newcomers and fis  members 
from other parts of the village who had relocated during the communist period.
Within mehallas extended families had grouped their dwellings in a variety of ways, the most 
extreme of which was where a father and the houses of his married sons were constructed in 
a compound which was fenced and gated. In the Catholic mehalla, although relatives built their 
houses near each other, there was generally a much greater distance between them. In the 
Muslim mehallas, now that the opportunity and materials were available, many were building 
stone walls up to two metres high around their houses and gardens. This was being done for
2
“a term rich in meaning: word of honour, faith, trust, protection, truce” and of the uncompromising
protection of the guest. (Gjecov 1989: XTV)
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reasons of security, to allow dogs to roam in the compound and to stop chickens wandering 
but also, according to the Catholics, to stop people seeing the womenfolk. The fences around 
Catholics' properties tended to be of palings sufficient to hold livestock but through which the 
house and it surrounds were not obscured from sight. Thus in Gura the Muslims tended to 
cluster together more closely than the Catholics, and within those clusters, where they existed, 
vllazni formed tight residential units increasingly being bounded by solid walls.
Apart from one or two exceptions, the handful of families which came to Gura during the 
communist period were related to a family already resident, either on the male or female side. 
The first stage of settlement post 1990 occurred as a result of financial negotiations with the 
Commune Director, of which more shall be said in Chapter 8. Suffice to say that Gura had 
relatively few immigrants from 1990-1996 compared to other villages in the Commune. 
Despite the lack of a system of land registration and government regulation3, a market in 
property started to develop around 1995 which resulted in migrants without local relatives 
settling in the village. Acceptance in the village was contingent on respect. Respect represented 
a form of status essential for turning surviving into thriving (ref. RPA §5.4.1).
In 1996 one vllazni of a father and 4 grown sons had left Geshtenjas, a village in the lower 
mountains, as a result of declining living standards. They were representative of the new type 
of migrants who had purchased land in the village in order to benefit from the greater 
economic opportunities in the city. They had no family connections in Gura, but they needed 
the benefits which came through integration and cooperation. The father lay the foundations 
for his sons during the year before his sudden death in 1997. He attended all funerals, 
weddings, births and other life events in the village to pay his respects and offer some money. 
By going out of his way to ensure that his family assisted others in practical ways and by 
showing respect and hospitality, the family rapidly achieved a good name and a high degree 
of integration into village life. This enabled them to receive information, obtain work and 
eventually to create a customer base for a transport business which the eldest son was to 
establish. We see in this behaviour the importance of institutions. Membership derives from 
acceptance of the norms and values associated with these institutions. In order to become 
accepted into a network of reciprocity, it was necessary to be as assiduous as possible in
3
The redistribution of agricultural land began in 1992 under legislation which did not permit the sale of 
such land after 3 years.
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making visits and as generous as possible in making donations. Social acceptance and the 
establishment of economic relations were closely interlinked. This behaviour can also be 
interpreted as being a form of social capital building.
In a rhetorical sense the fis  remained the key feature of an individual's existence. Without it his 
or her life would have had infinitely less meaning. The comment was reiterated "without the 
fis you ccomot live”. It provided all manner of support in times of difficulty. Since the houses 
of its members tended to be grouped together, the fis  also provided security. It was with other 
fis  members that work tended to be shared. In adversity the fis  provided its members with a 
variety of support from looking after children, ploughing or mending a roof destroyed through 
fire. In commercially related activities such as transport of goods to market, ./is members would 
receive preference and discounted prices. It remained a source of loans, although this role was 
becoming compromised by the breakdown of besa. One example of this was the case of a man 
who guaranteed his cousin's debt of $500. However the cousin left for Italy leaving the 
guarantor to pay his debt and causing a break in relations between the families.
The pressure and competition associated with the market economy was resulting in a re- 
evaluation of time. The state was no longer in a position to manipulate the economy in ways 
which expropriated people's time by compelling them to search or queue for goods (ref. 
Verdery 1996:56 and §4.2.2). At different speeds and in different ways people were becoming 
independent agents making decisions about the way they allocated their time in a way never 
possible under socialism. Associated with this new form of agency was the re-evaluation of 
networks in which reciprocal labour arrangements formed a key element. It was evident that 
the fis  was diminishing in importance and that the family was fast becoming the principal unit 
of economic solidarity. However this was bringing about new sets of tensions. The family 
could best be described as a sphere of cooperative conflict (Sen 1984:369). Even in Gura, the 
more traditional of the two villages, it was evident that the fis  was diminishing in importance. 
Where familial bonds remained strong, the vllazni was the principal institution.
The nature of the household was therefore seen to be changing in response to circumstances. 
Very few households operated in an exclusively nuclear fashion. Most enjoyed a range of social 
and economic relations with their kin in the village. The institution could best be understood 
as one which took many forms so as to permit "kinship-mediated economic flows" (Kabeer 
1994:114). Typically in Gura an extended family would be composed of elderly parents living
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in the house of their eldest son. Younger sons and their wives would live nearby in nuclear 
families. Issues surrounding poor schooling, the economic benefits of child labour and presence 
of young men who had worked abroad, aU had their impact on the composition and nature of 
household relationships. The economic dimensions of the household and the role of the nuclear 
family will be more extensively covered in the subsequent chapter on the economy.
6.2.3 The Fis in Malaj: In examining the development of a market economy and the 
accompanying atomisation, Malaj represented a more "modem” set of circumstances. As has 
been noted in the last 50 years, there was substantial Catholic emigration with their houses 
being acquired by Muslim immigrants. The "old” residents of Malaj had a distinctive communal 
identity within the village but they would accept those whose status, life style and communal 
conduct was in accord with their values. The "old” residents were characterised by the 
presence of a basic level of trust which derived from at least one generation's span of 
knowledge and familiarity between their families. Genuine friendships, as opposed to the 
acquaintanceships associated with market relations, had developed in Malaj to a far greater 
extent than they had done in Gura.
Malaj as a community had metamorphosed. The village had grown by expanding from the 
centre. Where possible fis  members clustered together. More usually vllazni were to be found 
living in semi-detached dwellings, close to each other or in several cases sharing houses. The 
"newcomers", those who had come since around 1970, tended to occupy houses outside the 
centre and around the periphery of the village. Many of those who had come after the collapse 
of communism had done so because they had fis  in Malaj, however they had to settle where 
properties were available or where they were permitted to construct houses. Consequently fis , 
insofar as they existed, were for the most part somewhat spatially dispersed.
Without the elemental grouping of fis which provided a range of assistance as well as security, 
the importance of neighbours was paramount. Malaj villagers went to great lengths to get on 
with their neighbours by assisting each other in a variety of ways, particularly with the 
provision of water. So important were neighbours that there was a convention in the village 
that if a family was to migrate to the town, it would be their neighbours who would seek out 
a buyer for the property and arrange its sale, even though this would more often than not be 
at a substantial discount to the market value. In a smaller, more isolated village nearby if a 
family emigrated, their house would be rendered uninhabitable in order to avoid any problems
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which might occur as a result of new neighbours. Emigrants from this latter village therefore 
tended to keep their houses as summer homes.
In Malaj I undertook a number of semi-structured interviews which specifically focused on the 
nature of relationships. The following comes from a talk with a 45 year old fisherman. It 
illustrates a number of points concerning the operation of the fis  and vllazni, the development 
of the nuclear family and about moral codes.
Ahmet Skenderi stated he was the zoti i shtepi and that the ordering o f the house was his task. 
However he worked closely with his wife and was dependent on her. In fact she looks after the 
economy o f the house since he was often away fishingfor a week or two. He said it was most 
important for there to he a deep and strong loyalty between the husband and wife. This they 
had There were no secrets between them and they respected each other greatly: "There is not 
time for conflict in this short life.” After his wife, the next most important relationship was 
that with his parents. When he and his wife got married he told her that if she did not respect 
his parents then she did not respect him. When Ahmet has a problem or difficulty he goes to 
discuss things with them. They have greater experience and experience was a most important 
thing. It would be a lack o f respect to make an important decision without consulting his 
parents. It is an Albanian tradition to respect the parents. Not to do so is to insult them and 
you cease to be human. You need to maintain their respect and pride in you. His parents lived 
in the village and he often helped them with small things such as taking them to the city, 
doing things for them in the house, lending items they might need and buying the occasional 
necessity for them. These things make for a close family. It was important to respect the 
elders.
Ahmet has the same love for his son as he has for himself. He is trying to make him one and 
the same. But he does not express his love for the son. He has to maintain his position o f 
,,dictator,, to keep him on the straight and narrow and to stop him doing things which will be 
detrimental to his well being. He has sent his son to college to train as a mechanic. He will 
have to decide what he wants to do when he has finished this training.
The Vllazni: ’No one in the world can ever achieve the closeness which comes through blood 
The first person to help you is your brother. ” Ahmet is the eldest son o f the family and is 
respected the most. He gives advice. The brothers help each other, mostly in small ways since
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they operated as separate economic units. The first loyalty was always to their own family, 
fo r which each had to provide. But they supported each other in emergencies. Even if  a 
brother brought dishonour to the family, he was still your brother. I f a brother committed a 
crime or misdemeanour then it was the duty o f his brothers to make him correct this and to 
apologise.
"After brothers, neighbours are o f the greatest importance. I f  you buy or build a house in a 
new area, the first thing you look at is the neighbours. I f you do not create good relations 
with your neighbours you will be your own worst enemy. Whether they are good or bad you 
have to get on with them. They are vital to your well being and survival. The most important 
thing that good neighbourly relations bring is security. This is a most important thing." 
Ahmet had good relations with his neighbours. They sleep in each others house if  one o f the 
families have to go away. The relationship with neighbours is not directly financial but 
provides support in a range of ways - short term lending o f flour or sugar, helping out during 
illness, child minding, sharing water and so on. In this case one o f Ahmet's neighbours sold 
fish in the Shkoder market and despite having a permanent agreement with another family, 
he would occasionally sell some o f hisfish through his neighbour. Ahmet's wife said that one 
of their neighbours damaged the water pipe to their house. Rather than complain about him 
and risk damaging their relationship, she takes her washing down to the lake until he can 
mend it.
Thefts provided the next significant tier for the family. The most important members o f the 
fis were the paternal uncles and their sons i.e. cousins. The fis  provided an important network 
of mutual support. It is to these people that he addressed his first enquiries as to how best to 
find a job, buy something, issues o f trade, the loan o f capital etc. However in the market 
economy people were becoming increasingly ambivalent about the role o f the fis. "If you 
started a business and employed a member o f your fis, you have to pay this individual more 
than you would another person and he would have a say in conducting the business." Fis 
relations can therefore create complications in the conduct o f independent commercial 
activity of one o f its members. An importantfunction o f the fis  is to act as the prime provider 
in the case o f important family events such as marriage, the birth o f a child or death. A 
successful member o f a fis is expected to contribute proportionately at such an event. He 
gains respect by so doing and opprobrium if  he is stingy.
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The village consists o f much looser connections. Friendships and acquaintanceships are made 
which might revolve around having a drink in a bar, visiting for a cup o f coffee or meeting 
together for a game o f cards or dominoes. Respect was an important feature o f these 
relationshipsfor Ahmet, " If he respects me then I  will respect him ". I f a friendship develops 
then one o f the parties could expect an invitation to a joyous event, such as a wedding.
The life of this hard working fisherman revolved around the family, vllazni, neighbours and fis, 
in that order. His world revolved around the economic and social relations of the village. The 
emphasis he chauvinistically placed upon his role as the zoti i shtepi and the concept of respect 
reflect a typically traditional Albanian set of attitudes, certainly in this region. However the 
reality of their life was much softer than these views would indicate. Security, both physical 
and economic, governed the relationships of the family. Respect was a most important 
commodity. Unwittingly I gained a degree of respect in the village, especially with Ahmet, as 
a result of my paying a visit, and making a small gift of money, to express my condolences to 
the family of a man who I had interviewed the previous year. It transpired that this man's wife 
was Ahmet's sister. Respect was thus gained by certain forms of public behaviour and a 
willingness to contribute in various ways. Without respect it was not possible to share in the 
griefs and joys of village life and therefore to belong. The acceptance achieved through respect 
enabled connections to be made and improved information flows. It thus played an important 
role in enhancing the quality of the social and material aspects of an individual's life.
Overly self-preoccupied families which did not participate in village life inevitably became 
somewhat isolated and alienated from the village community and suffered a consequent loss 
of status. Such households did not participate in larger networks and operated within restricted 
horizons and tended to look for short-run advantage. Their behaviour veered towards 
Banfield's (1958) description of amoral familism. Such families tended to be referred to in a 
demeaning way. This was particularly noticeable in Malaj where fis  relations were looser than 
in Gura. In Malaj individual families and households had to make positive efforts to achieve 
sufficient integration to be accepted into networks. Exclusion, or failure to achieve inclusion, 
was associated with poverty and lack of status. It was not a coincidence that the two wealthiest 
individuals in the village were generous. Not to have been so would have undermined their 
status.
The gaining of respect was therefore an important feature in becoming accepted into these
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communities. Participation, generosity and reciprocity were the means by which it was 
achieved. Being rurally orientated and composed of 20th century migrants, inclusion in Gura 
was largely //s-based, although this was starting to change with the ingress of non-related 
newcomers. Malaj, or rather the "old" Malaj villagers, operated more as a community of 
individual families in which relationships had developed organically through people becoming 
good neighbours or from affinities which developed into friendships. Gaining acceptance in 
Malaj was a complex matter which took time but the benefits deriving from social acceptance 
were considerable. Here is an example of a Catholic migrant who came in 1992 :
Initially Poulin Shkumbi stated that after his wife and children, his three brothers formed the 
next most important sphere o f relationships but he did not see much o f them. One lived in a 
nearby village and the others in Tirane and Italy. In practise, he said, his closest relationship 
was with his neighbour Rexhep Hajdari (a Muslim) who allowed them to pump water from his 
well. Without this assistance it would have been impossible to live in their house which is 
located on the top margins o f the village. The Hajdari family were very kind In the difficult 
times when they were building their house, Rexhep1 s wife would take note when they had 
visitors and would discreetly bring foodfor them to give their guests. In return Poulin helped 
Rexhep in any way he could Although he has a firm friendship with one o f the Lushaj fis  (an 
old Malaj family), who had helped him come here, he was on greeting terms with villagers 
but had no other close relationships. He said Malaj was a fine village where he was happy 
to be living. The people were good There were certain critical stages when building a house, 
such as laying concrete floors and making roofs, which had to be done quickly and were 
labour intensive. In Malaj everyone came to help him construct his roof and he does the same 
fo r others. This is done without payment. In fact, he said, relations in the mehalla 
(neighbourhood) are more important than the fis. Paulin said, " ifmy house catches fire it is 
my neighbours who will come and help me, not my fis".
Paulin made a point of participating in village life. He always visited the house in which a birth 
or death had taken place and where there was illness or to be a marriage. These visits, where 
a token of some money is presented, were short and more often than not little was said. 
However they were a most important way of showing and gaining respect. The sharing of joy 
and sorrow is also a way of building relations between people. Paulin worshipped once a week. 
He even visited the school regularly to see how his children were doing. As a result of 
demonstrating concern and participating in the way that he had, Paulin has gained respect and
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brought benefit to his family in a range of psychological, social and material ways. He had been 
able to supplement his permanent poorly paid state job with building work in the village which 
he had obtained as a result of his contacts.
What I wish to illustrate in this section is the changing nature of social structures. An elderly 
Malaj man said: "The fis  was the only way to survive...but now there is much less respect for 
it. My children no longer keep in touch vAth their cousins. They have to be dragged to name 
day parties and Christmas and Easter celebrations The young work on Sundays and don't go 
to church. They don't cross themselves before they go to sleep and when they wake up. Now 
everyone is looking after themselves." This comment encapsulates the complexity of change 
coming about as a result of a range of dynamic processes.
The fis  was diminishing in importance as brothers and cousins became more mobile, formed 
new relationships and developed skills which each wanted to use for the benefit of their nuclear 
family rather than that of the vllazni. Though cousins could be a source of loans, it was 
becoming more rare. Intra^/zs relations were becoming predominantly social rather than 
economic, so that if a man assisted his cousin he expected to get paid. In former times this was 
not the case since little distinction was made between brother and cousin. Even though, as is 
described in the subsequent chapter, the economic functions of the^5 were dwindling quite 
rapidly, the institution still retained an important role through being a valued source of social 
intimacy and pleasure. These qualities were especially valued during this period of rapid change 
when almost all organised cultural activity in the form of theatre, cinema and concerts had 
ceased. Within a climate of uncertainty the fis  retained economically important functions 
through providing a network of trusted contacts useful in providing information and various 
forms of preferential treatment.
Extrapolating from the survey sample, household composition in Malaj was as follows: 66% 
of families were nuclear, 30% were extended families (i.e. containing three generations) and 
4% were joint families in which married brothers, and sometimes parents, ate from the same 
table. Although nuclear families predominated, the tendency for them to be clustered according 
to fis relations influenced the nature of support they gave each other. There were a number of 
female headed nuclear households occurring as a result of the high number of men who were 
away from home for extended periods of time. However in all but 5% of the families in the 
Malaj survey, there was evidence of support networks based on neighbourly relations or the
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fis, or both.
6.2.4 The Villages as Communities: The need for informal organisation in the two villages 
was in greatly influenced by the nature and extent of each village's capacity to negotiate with 
the state. As is discussed in Chapter 7, the Malaj council was more effective than that of Gura. 
The preceding sections have described the differing ways in which the fis  operated in the two 
villages. Thus in Malaj such matters as assistance with construction and water provision took 
place within the context of neighbours and mehalla, whereas cooperation in Gura tended to 
take place mainly within the fis. Owing to the relative failure of Gura to negotiate with state 
structures, when it had a village-wide problem, its residents looked to their own resources 
while the reaction in Malaj was to turn to the state. I give four examples concerning electricity, 
water, roads and security.
When its electricity transformer broke down, Gura was unable to persuade the state enterprise 
to repair it. They therefore organised the repair themselves. A dozen men gave their labour and 
everyone gave a $1 contribution to cover the cost of materials required for the repair. The 
canal feeding the Gura irrigation system had been damaged as a result of vandalism and the 
effects of winter storms. As a result of the failure of the kryeplak to obtain assistance from the 
Commune and the water enterprise, repairs were organised by a group of elders. Every villager 
contributed either with labour or with a cash donation for materials (cf. collective action 
§4.5.3). Roads in and around the village were unsurfaced. Although a villager was employed 
to maintain the roads, he hardly did anything. As a consequence the tracks were in a poor 
condition until the Sokols decided to resurface them.
Finally there was the breakdown of law and order in March 1997. There was much looting, 
robbery and violence. During these events the Sokols, whose family home was above Gura, 
established their dominance in the city and its environs. During that period rumours abounded. 
In the city it was put about that the Muslims from the upland areas were coming to Shkoder 
to take the houses of the Catholics and make Shkoder a Muslim city4. The rumour which 
shook Gura villagers was that a group of townspeople were coming to attack their village as 
it was the home of the Sokol clan. It was a time when anything could happen. The villagers
This tale is indicative of the tensions which existed between the two faiths, see also §6.4.4.
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held a meeting and formed a militia to defend themselves. They mounted a 24 hour armed 
guard on the bridge leading to the village but it was never attacked. There was an eerie 
quietness to the place when I visited it later in the year. Residents said that it had never been 
more peaceful.
The Malaj response to these issues was very different. A number of villagers had jobs in the 
part privatised electricity enterprise which enabled them to ensure the village supply system 
was in good order. Irrigation water was not an issue but drinking water was. The kyreplak was 
constantly lobbying the Municipality, officials and deputies to improve the provision of 
drinking water. Similarly the village council and the kryeplak ensured the Municipality 
maintained the tarmacked road which led to the village. It was Malaj's dependence on the state 
for security which provided a telling difference between the two villages. During the tensions 
and instability of 1997 there were a number of explosions in the village and letters were 
delivered demanding protection money. One shopkeeper was robbed at gunpoint and the first 
blood feud in living memory took place. The residents of Malaj were slow to respond to the 
failure of the state to provide security and were reluctant to mobilise themselves to provide this 
good.
The villages could be contrasted by the differing nature of cooperation which took place in 
them. The response by Gura villagers to the rapid decline of state support was collective action 
to solve common difficulties. Whereas in Malaj, the capable village council and trusted village 
elders were relatively effective in negotiating with the state and lobbying for resources. Direct 
collective action tended to take place between neighbours in self-help measures over such 
issues as water supply. In Gura, where there was weaker articulation with the formal 
institutions of the state, collective action in response common dilemmas was the only 
alternative to solving their problems. The advantages of traditional forms of allegiance and 
organisation and the disadvantages of reliance on the state become apparent when the state is 
inefficient or breaks down. However, as this analysis develops it will be seen that patronage 
systems and the bounded nature of traditional forms of organisation resulted in a range of 
systemic drawbacks which encouraged primordial loyalties at the expense of civil values. 
Despite the setbacks and difficulties experienced in Malaj during 1997, the nature of social 
linkages and the degree of communal association, both of which are linked to social capital 
(ref.§4.4.2), made it possible for the village to be more effective in negotiating with the 
external world than the more traditional and y?5-orientated community of Gura.
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6.3 Women and Marriage:
6.3.1 Background: A clan was theoretically an exogamous unit. Villagers still claimed that 
seven generations must separate marriage partners on the male side. Durham (1987:21) noted 
that although a man gave his daughter outside his tribe there tended to be fairly close breeding 
through the female line since men commonly went to neighbouring tribes. To a great extent 
marriage was a political and economic arrangement made by the zoti i shtepi, after discussion 
with his brothers, to strengthen the household and the tribe. The young people would have 
no say in the matter. There were cases where betrothals would be made before the birth of a 
child. A girl could only escape marriage if she could find 12 elders of her tribe to act as 
witnesses in front of whom she would swear perpetual virginity. It was not easy to find such 
witnesses, for if the vow was broken the honour of these elders was blackened and a blood 
feud ensued.
If a marriage could be arranged with a distant fis, local rivalry would be diminished and there 
was less chance of the bridegroom being troubled by tensions arising from proximity to his 
wife's family: for it was the wife's family which had ultimate responsibility for her honour, not 
her husband. Marital ties in Gheg society were largely based on economic and social factors 
with little power of one partner over the other. Since both were subject to an external authority 
(the shtepi and the village unit), joint decision making tended to be over minor details rather 
than more strategic issues which would be discussed between men. Romance or emotional 
dependence had little part to play in the expected behaviour patterns of married couples. The 
man obtained the services of a woman so that she might labour and produce children, 
preferably sons (Whitaker 1976), hence the oft quoted passage from the Kanun that a woman 
was "A sack for carrying things". When women got killed, vengeance would be sought by her 
husband on the grounds of loss of property rather than as an insult to the family. It was to her 
natal kin group represented by her brothers that a women would turn to for protection 
throughout her life (ibid. p. 198). The cost of a bride did much to ensure a women was treated 
reasonably well although fear of an avenging brother was another important factor. Based on 
reports that cases of syphilis only became evident when government prohibition caused the 
blood feud to decline, Whitaker (1981:153) believes that feuding channelled male energies 
which might otherwise have been expended in a more sexual form.
The ethnographic descriptions of the place of women in traditional Gheg society paint a bleak 
picture. A Gheg chieftain said to an American traveller, Rose Wilder Lane (1922:147/9): "..as
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for happiness, his people do not expect happiness in marriage; happiness comes from other
things Marriage is a family question. One marries because one is old enough to marry, and
that is the way that the family goes from generation to generation". In rural areas, marriage for 
love was considered immoral and practically unheard of (Prifti 1975:112).
In his drive to modernise the Albanian economy into one which was agriculturally and 
industrially self-sufficient, Hoxha and the APL sought to maximise the potential labour force 
by liberating women from their traditional role of drudgery so that they might contribute to the 
national economy. The State also sought to increase the population in order to meet the 
demand for labour. The main problems facing women were: male supremacy within the family; 
a patriarchal system which denied the individuality of woman; parental authoritarianism; and 
a curious Puritanism regarding love and sex which frowned on romance (Prifti 1975:128). 
Building upon legislation enacted under Zog, the APL expanded and enforced previous 
measures prohibiting abduction, forced marriages, engagements below the age of consent and 
bride price. The economic independence of women was seen to be the basis of their 
emancipation. The Party line was: "Participation in social production enabled women to 
contribute to the socialist construction of the country and in the process to emancipate not only 
themselves but the whole of society" (Begeja 1984:59). The provision of health care and 
maternity facilities and allowances were also a means to encourage population increase. 
Abortion and contraception were forbidden. The policy was to encourage the nuclear family. 
Divorce was frowned upon and the Party went to great lengths to reconcile couples whose 
marriages were in difficulty. The drive to liberate women was also closely linked to the desire 
to undermine tradition and any form of power which rested in the fis, vllazni or family such 
as choosing the bride and the payment of bride price. Traditional loyalties were perceived both 
as a threat to the regime and an impediment to modernisation. There is no doubt that Hoxha's 
policies assisted with the partial emancipation of women, nevertheless attitudes deriving from 
the patriarchal and chauvinistic traditions of northern Albania continue to exist in a more than 
vestigial form.
6.3.2 In the Villages: The way in which the sexes relate to each other is integral to the way 
in which identity is constructed and how the household functions (see Moser 1993:15-36). 
Albania, especially north Albania, remains a society heavily influenced by patriarchal attitudes 
despite the policies of emancipation under communism (Prifti 1978:96). The 
retraditionalisation (Sievers 1999) which has taken place since its collapse has had negative
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consequences for women. Seen within the context of Geertz's (1963; §4.3.2) model of change, 
the status of women in these two villages represents an instance of where primordial relations 
and traditional norms are at odds with those of a civil society which reflect norms of equality 
and non-discrimination. Gender relations are a key feature of social transformation. In order 
to provide a basis for understanding how women were negotiating change I sought to examine 
how the disparities between women and men were constructed and the social and economic 
implications of the identity ascribed to women.
Approaching women in Gura was not without difficulties for me. In the relatively conservative 
culture of this village I was able to have only rather brief and stilted conversations with them. 
In order to better understand their thoughts and feelings I arranged for focus group meetings 
in a Catholic and Muslim mehalla. In each case the (male) mehalla representative was present. 
Nevertheless these groups were a valuable source of information and alerted me to a number 
of issues which I subsequently pursued when the opportunity arose.
The accounts from Gura told of the heavy burdens placed on women, most of whom worked 
six days a week in the cooperative. They would start an 8-10 hour day at 7am with a break of 
between 2 and 4 hours (depending on the season) which they would use for cooking and 
household chores. At the time of the tobacco harvest they would start at 4 a.m. During this and 
other critical periods in the agricultural calendar they would have to work seven days a week 
for six day’s pay. Discipline was harsh. If someone was a few minutes late they would lose a 
day's pay. "Those women who were educated, members o f the Party or who were beautiful got 
better jobs and worked less" said one woman in a focus group. Women's wages were either 
given to their husbands or mothers-in-law but, they said, that did not matter since it was all 
spent on food. The state kindergarten required payment which they could not afford. Therefore 
most pre-school children either stayed with their grandmothers or were left alone.
The women said they now have to work harder and have much more to do but they are happier 
since they have control over their lives even though they have lost the nominal independence 
they formerly had through earning money. They thought health care and education were better 
during communism Staff attended the school and clinic regularly and these services were free. 
The women were angry with the Commune for not ensuring state employees worked properly. 
They commented on the growth of a class society. In the past the privileged had the better jobs 
as agronomists, administrators and store keepers. Now the better off families were sending
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their children to school in the city and were able to buy better health care. The Catholic women 
complained bitterly about the Muslims and the kryeplak who they believed were taking all the 
assistance allocated to the village. There were distributions of food at Bajram (the Muslim 
festival) to poor Muslim families but not to Catholics on their festivals. Despite all these 
irritations and difficulties life was better. The most important freedom for the Catholics was 
that of worship.
Both groups of women valued being able to own animals and not having people tell them what 
to do. Now they could meet on rainy days to knit and chat or stop for ten minute's gossip at 
the well if they felt like it. Life in this respect was thus infinitely better, but they felt burdened 
by the economic pressures and uncertainty of "democracy1'. This reinforces the point made by 
Arce et al. (1994:169) that despite tough economic circumstances women were nevertheless 
capable of creating, appropriating and conserving space for themselves, once the opportunity 
existed to do so.
In Malaj the situation was very different. I was able to relate to women more as I would in my 
own culture. So much so that on one occasion while I was awaiting the arrival of an elderly 
woman who I had arranged to meet, her daughter-in-law suddenly started to unburden herself 
about the difficulties of her married life. Her husband drank heavily. Often he got so drunk that 
he could not get up to go to work. Five people were trying to live on his meagre wage, much 
of which he wasted on drink. Their daughter was 16 and coming to the age when she should 
be married but there were no longer any suitable young men about. She complained how 
difficult and vexing life was for her. Initially I was shocked by her frankness. The differences 
between the two villages were reflected in the position and role of women. In one village 
women mostly kept themselves away from me, only entering the room to provide some form 
of refreshment as I spoke to their husband, while in the other village I was even able to visit 
the house of an unmarried 20 year old woman without the presence of her parents.
In the introduction to this section I described the paternalistic nature of Gheg society in which 
women were formerly little more than chattels. My interactions with Gura women were 
coloured by the more traditional perception of gender which existed in the village. The women 
of Malaj were far less influenced by these norms and provided a further example of how social 
and economic development was reflected in attitudes and behaviour. In Malaj women were 
better educated. They were not brought up within such a^5-orientated set of structures as in
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Gura, where women's economic contribution still largely revolved around the land and animals. 
Having at best only minimal areas of productive land, Malaj women had been forced to seek 
employment in the city. They therefore worked in the formal sector to a far greater degree than 
did the women of Gura. In so doing they came into contact with ideas and attitudes of the 
more liberated urban women. Urban migration of relations and the marriage of family members 
with the city dwellers had further contributed to Malaj women having a more cosmopolitan 
outlook.
In the more fis  orientated Gura the relationships between husband and wife, mother and son 
were distinctly more authoritarian and distanced. As the fis  diminished in importance, the trend 
was towards the nuclear family, implicit in which was a greater equality and intimacy between 
husband and wife. In Malaj it was not uncommon for a man to say how much he depended on 
his wife whereas this was never admitted in Gura. The strength of the nuclear family revolved 
around the relationship between husband and wife which required a degree of privacy and 
distance from the fis. The responsibility of managing the home in a difficult economic 
circumstances largely rested on women's shoulders and was exacerbated by the additional 
burden and uncertainty associated with husbands working abroad. The effect of economic 
transition was resulting in a renewed emphasis on the institution of the family, the management 
of which was largely undertaken by women (see Kabeer 1994:95-134).
Despite these differences in the role and status of women, it appeared that in both communities 
the main goal of a girl was marriage. Once married, women were primarily concerned with the 
well being and success of their families. It was issues of health and finance as they related to 
the family, rather than personal needs or self-development, which was at the forefront of their 
concerns. It was women who had to eke out budgets, provide a balanced diet, clothe and care 
for the health of the family. This was in addition to often having to spend substantial amounts 
of time on various forms of income generation.
In Gura education was very poor. No child received schooling beyond eighth grade, which in 
any case few girls completed. In Malaj although there was a good village school, in 1997 only 
2 girls over 15 were receiving further education in Shkoder. This was as a result of the high 
level of violence against women and girls during the period of this research. Parents wanted 
to avoid the risk of their daughters losing their reputation through being abducted or molested. 
This concern was further exacerbated by the complete breakdown of law and order in 1997.
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The bright 14 year old daughter of the above mentioned Paulin Shkumbi had just left the 
village school and badly wanted to receive further education. After much debate it was decided 
that they would try and get her registered at the secondary school in Shkoder. The parents 
were negotiating registration, and associated payments, in a college where a member of the 
wife's fis  worked. All the other female leavers from Malaj school were staying within the 
village bounds helping around the house, essentially waiting for marriage. I met and talked with 
several young women who were all deeply frustrated by the dull lives they were forced to lead. 
They all wanted to leave the village as soon as they could.
Marriage therefore remained the main goal for virtually every young woman in both villages. 
Families sought the best possible alliance they could for their daughters. Arrangements were 
still made in a traditional manner. One robustly happy 50 year old Gura couple told how they 
were not even introduced to each before their engagement ceremony "but our fathers chose 
welt' they joked. Under communism young people were able to strike up relationships when 
they went on "Actions" to build roads or the railway. In the north these "Actions" were 
introduced around 1974. They contributed to the undermining of traditional ties and values by 
allowing youngsters to make associations, and thence marriages, of their own choice rather 
through the influence of their parents.
With the collapse of communism more traditional attitudes came to the fore, nevertheless 
young men and women were being given the opportunity to refuse the matches proposed by 
their families. There were many nuances to the process but a fairly typical way in which a 
village marriage would be arranged would start with a debate within the family and between 
the vllazni. Enquiries would then be made through fis  and other connections, sometimes using 
the services of a middle person who would be rewarded for their efforts. Mothers and sisters 
would have their say but decisions regarding suitability and final approval of a match would 
be made after consultation between the father and his brothers. The young couple would meet 
in the presence of a chaperone before anything was agreed. A Malaj girl spoke of how her 
parents had discussed her marriage with connections in Shkoder. A suitable young man had 
been found. He was a carpenter legally resident in Milan. When he came home to visit his 
family, the two were introduced. They met a couple of times and then she said "we came to 
love each other and wanted to get married'. Wedding preparations were in hand and a 
trousseau was being assembled. Costs of weddings were high. An average was around 250,000 
lek ($1,500), equivalent to that earned by all members of an average Malaj family over the
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period o f a year.
Marriage, setting up house (if that was possible) and having children was part of growing up. 
There was something akin to shame for a family to have a daughter over 20 years old who was 
unmarried. There was the implication that something must have had occurred to have affected 
her honour. A girl had to be a virgin when she was betrothed. The engagement ceremony was 
seen to be of great significance and represented a form of avowal tantamount to marriage. An 
engaged couple could sleep together. The act of marriage was often related to setting up a 
home. The act of breaking an engagement was very serious indeed, particularly for the woman 
since she would be unlikely to be accepted by another man. Nor was it good news for the man 
whose honour and reputation would be besmirched through the breaking of this agreement.
Marriage in the villages did not necessarily involve a church service, although it was customary 
for a hoxha to oflBciate at a Muslim ceremony taking place in a house compound. What was 
important was the celebration. Dressed in their finery the bride and groom would welcome the 
guests who would very soon get down to the serious business of eating and drinking. Gifts 
were given. It was customary for the bride to look as miserable as possible during the wedding 
feast as a sign of her unhappiness at leaving the parental home. There were several instances 
of where a couple had "married” in the post-communist period but not gone through any civil 
or religious ceremony. In Gura it was considered disrespectful to have a wedding celebration 
if the father or an uncle of the groom had died within the last year. In such cases a couple 
would just come together and be considered married.
Attitudes to women and marriage were subject to a complex set of pressures. Firstly, despite 
the uncertainties of the market economy disposable income had significantly increased for 
most of the population. Women stated that they enjoyed the choice this had brought in terms 
of fabrics, fashions, and cosmetics which had refreshed their sense of femininity after decades 
of communist utilitarianism5. Secondly, the availability of birth control linked to the 
development of autonomous economic decisions being made by families was creating a 
situation where women were reassessing what they wanted out of marriage and the family now
5
This could be interpreted as a reaction to what women suffered in the 1970s during the cultural revolution and 
subsequently when "the odour of sweat was glorified, while the fragrance of perfume was hated” (AgolliJ). quoted 
inEmadi 1993:93).
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that they were no longer under pressure from the state to produce children. Thirdly, looking 
back over the years since 1991, education and job opportunities combined with the influence 
of media, news and ideas coming from abroad had contributed towards a less restrictive set 
of social attitudes, even in the more conservative north. Nevertheless in the villages this 
gradual assertion of a more independent female identity remained constrained by traditional 
norms. An increasing number of young men were finding work abroad. Those who returned 
were increasingly asserting their independence by choosing their own wives rather than the 
ones selected by their families. With a reduced number of young males tending to select higher 
status females, marriage of daughters was becoming increasingly problematic for less well 
endowed, lower status families.
6.4 Belief:
6.4.1 Religion: As noted in §2.2, Christianity was introduced to the Albanians by the Romans. 
The Albanians of the central and southern regions were Orthodox with allegiance to 
Constantinople. Those following the brand of Christianity emanating from Rome were 
clustered in the north of the country (§2.2). The growth of Ottoman power in this comer of 
the Balkans was briefly checked by Skandefbeg. As a child, the Albanian national hero was 
kept as hostage for the good behaviour of his fis, the Kastriotis, in Constantinople where he 
was brought up as a Muslim. Skanderbeg was serving in the Turkish army when, with a small 
band of followers, he mutinied, embraced Christianity and for a period of 20 years established 
an independent entity composed of an alliance of Albanian tribes. However after his death this 
alliance crumbled and the Ottomans absorbed the Albanian speaking people into their empire. 
The period of Turkish domination was associated with extensive Islamicisation leaving a small 
number of Catholics in the northern mountains and a somewhat larger number of Orthodox 
Christians in southern Albania. Conversion was sometimes enforced, but more frequently the 
avoidance of extra taxation and access to a variety of privileges inherent in being a more 
trusted member of the Ottoman empire provided incentives for conversion to Islam.
The commonly quoted figure is that approximately 70% of Albanians are from a Muslim 
background, 20% are Orthodox and 10% are Catholic. Although there was persecution of 
Christians during Ottoman rule, the rhetoric has always been that Christians and Muslims have 
always got on well together and that the Albanians have been religiously pragmatic. It is often 
stated that Albanians have shifted faith as the situation demanded, this being reflected in their
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saying <4where the sword is, there lies religion” (Skendi 1967:20). Albanian nationalism largely 
transcended religious differences. The Albanian state has never had an official religion. Islam 
in Albania is represented by Hanafi Sunnis and the Bektashis, a pantheistic Sufi sect which 
challenged the interpretation of Islam promoted by the Sunni Ottomans. The Bektashis had 
called for a militant Shiite response against the Turks but were tolerant of all non Islamic 
creeds.
Enver Hoxha saw religion as a threat to his authority. It was a bourgeois ideology which 
perpetuated and fostered superstition and backward customs. His regime blamed both 
Christianity and Islam for the inferior status of Albanian women. Once in power the 
communists introduced a series of legislative acts which compelled religious leaders to work 
with them. Those who did not, such as the Muftis of Shkoder and Durres, were eliminated. 
Due to their having "headquarters outside the state", the Catholics were particularly severely 
dealt with. A law promulgated in 1949 resulted in the closure of the Jesuit and Franciscan 
orders. The ensuing property reforms resulted in the loss of a whole range of ecclesiastically 
owned institutions from churches to schools. Of the 253 Catholic churches existing in 1945, 
only 100 remained in 1953. All the schools, seminaries, convents, orphanages were suppressed 
(Skendi 1957:299).
"The Party could tolerate no alternative authorities as they could have questioned its absolute 
control over minds, spirits, its hegemony over all domains of life" (Lederer 1994:341). The 
process of undermining religion finally resulted in the extinction of all religious organisations 
in 1967 when Albania was proclaimed the world's first atheist state. This status was enshrined 
in the 1976 constitution. Religion was seen as a force for reaction. Secular festivals supplanted 
religious festivals. Religious books, pictures and other material were destroyed. It was even 
discouraged to give children religious names and lists of appropriate alternative names were 
published.
6.4.2 Religion in the Villages During Communism: There used to be a church and a mosque 
in Gura. In the neighbouring village there was a seminary. One old man recalled the Catholic 
Fathers preaching about the dangers of communism during the 1920s. The negative attitude 
of the communists towards religion contributed to their loss of popular support. Priests, and 
even those who had completed high school, were not permitted to join the Party. The 
destruction of the religious buildings in Gura took place around 1955 but the priest remained
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in the village and conducted clandestine baptisms and marriages in his home. He was arrested 
in 1959 and went before a court in Shkoder. Several of the villagers, including at least one 
Muslim, attended the trial. After the accusations were read out the court was cleared. He was 
sentenced and shot. This sent a clear message to the villagers. Many, including Muslims, still 
felt awkward and shamefaced about the part they played, or rather did not play, in that event.
In Malaj the mosque was turned into dwellings for two families. The marvellous rococo facade 
of the church was defaced. Although one or two old women would go to pray in the church, 
most people were scared of incurring the displeasure of the Party and avoided being seen near 
the building. It was eventually destroyed in 1967. There was guilt associated with the 
acquiescence to the anti-religious policies of the APL. The scars associated with the denial of 
faith still ran deep but were rarely openly acknowledged.
During Ramadan, brigade leaders and party officials would make a point of eating with the 
workers or would visit the house of a Muslim who was thought to be observing the fast in 
order to be served with the refreshments which, as Albanian custom demands, are shared by 
the host. Meat would be saved for festivals. One Catholic described how he would get up at 
4 a.m. to kill and dress a pig which had been concealed in a shed6. The next night they would 
cover their windows, say prayers and eat the meal by candlelight. Any religious observance 
could lead to the imprisonment or exile of the offending family. Despite this, religious belief 
and expression persisted. In Malaj one man hid a picture of Jesus and Mary in his attic. In Gura 
a Bible and a Koran were passed around the village. Most Muslims contrived to ritually wash 
the bodies of their dead before burial. The collectivisation of animals prevented ritual sacrifices 
on Muslim feasts. Despite these constraints and penalties, religious practices were maintained 
covertly but in great fear of discovery.
6.4.3 Religion since 1991: Although under communism religion officially had no significance, 
each person's identity was influenced by religious affiliation even if it was only in their name 
and family background. Given the freedom, many were returning to their religious roots or 
exploring their religious inheritance. A number of male Muslim teenagers were receiving
6
Periodic searches were made for livestock. One family told me how having received intelligence of such 
a search they had fed a young pig raki until it was senseless and then concealed it in bed alongside their 
daughter claiming she was very ill and could not be disturbed.
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religious instruction every week. The inhabitants of one Gura mehalla were noticeably more 
pious in their approach to Islam than the others. One of its number was studying in a 
Macedonian medrassa. He returned during Ramadan with his teacher to talk in local mosques 
and hold discussions in the village. The more devout Catholics from Gura walked every 
Sunday to Shkoder to attend Mass, a round journey for some of about 4 hours. The Vatican 
was supporting a large church reconstruction programme in the region, of which the repair of 
the church and priest's house in Malaj was just a part.
Isuf Zeqo (bom 1939) was from the most overtly Muslim mehalla in Gura. His family was 
close, hard working and sober. Isuf stopped drinking in 1991. His eldest son stopped in 1995. 
As a boy in pre-communist days, Isuf remembers the travelling hoxha (Muslim cleric) who 
used to stay at their house and teach him about Allah, but he forgot all he learnt. Now he tries 
to go to the Mosque every day during Ramadan and every Friday during the rest of the year. 
He has learnt some Suras. "Islam teaches not to steal and to live by your own efforts. It 
teaches to praise God for everything, both good and bad and to build strong relationships. 
After I  pray in the Mosque Ifeelfull ofpeace and do my work with joy. I  hope to go to Mecca 
one day. I  still do not pray 5 times a day. Islam is useful in the development o f Albania It 
provides a moral order and makes people behave well towards each other. We need this since 
the country has been isolated for so long and many new things are coming into the country. " 
For Isuf, Islam had an emotional appeal. It provided values which were not available 
elsewhere. His comment about religion providing a moral order was echoed many times over. 
Others also noted the value of a moral order not linked to the state and said that religion 
provided guidance to those who had not received education. One man said "Even if  God does 
not exist, religion is a good thing. It is important in helping the creation o f a harmonious 
society and gives people a sense o f values."
Both villages had a Mosque Council responsible for seeing to the reconstruction of the 
mosques and for the collection and distribution of welfare, particularly on the festival of 
Bajram. In Malaj this body had been successful in obtaining funds from an Arab source. The 
Council met regularly. Worship and discussions took place in the part-constructed mosque. 
In Gura the Council had been unsuccessful in getting support. The project was mired in a 
contractual dispute over money and title to land which the patrons insisted on being sorted out 
before the project could be approved. Since it had been impossible to resolve they had 
withdrawn their offer of support.
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6.4.4 Tensions Between Religious Groups: The role of religion in Albanian national life is 
ambiguous. Claims are made in the literature and from a variety of other sources that the 
Albanians are a people whose religious conviction is governed by self-interest and force of 
arms. Such views imply that religion is of superficial significance to the Albanians. I question 
this. It is frequently said how there is no difference between the religions in Albania. While it 
is true that there is a considerable degree of religious toleration, indications deriving from this 
study suggest that religious affiliation has a significant part to play in identity formation. 
Vickers (1995:108) recounts how in 1923 the British ambassador to Albania informed his 
foreign office that the Muslims' view of the Christians were unchangeable. They believed the 
Christians to be inferior. Though Albanian ministers of that time protested there was no 
discrimination, they believed since the Muslims were in the majority, they should keep the 
upper hand. These attitudes were still observable. There remained considerable sensitivity 
surrounding the issue. The proportional element of the contemporary Albanian electoral system 
operates by means of party lists. Ranking is therefore critical. In order to avoid any charges 
of religious partiality in the 1996 local elections the Shkoder DP lists were ordered, after a 
reportedly heated and rancorous debate, on the principal of alternate Catholic and Muslim 
candidates rather than on merit.
Without exception every Muslim with whom I spoke in Gura stated that there was no tension 
between themselves and the Catholics. However the story from the Catholics was veiy 
different. With the notable exception of two or three families which lived in Muslim mehallas, 
there were varying degrees of mistrust of the Muslims. Many Catholics expressed resentment 
of the dominant position of the Muslims during communism and subsequently. Some expressed 
an underlying dislike of Islam and what they perceived to be its philosophy.
The Catholics saw themselves as being the original religion of Albania and the standard bearers 
of Albanian tradition. It was the Muslims who had collaborated with the Turks. However the 
Muslim position was that Islam had proved to be a vital force in uniting and maintaining the 
independence of Albania. Without it they would have been subsumed by the Greeks, Serbs or 
Italians. From this perspective, they believed, Islam formed the basis of Albanian national 
identity and should provide the foundation upon which its state was constructed.
A Catholic man in Gura complained how even under communism they had suffered 
discrimination: Party officials would simply ask a person's name and by this ensure that
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Muslims were given the best jobs. He said the same coterie of Muslims controlled Gura now. 
It was these "so called Democrats" who had administered the distribution of land and had 
ensured the Catholics received the poorest ground. On another occasion a group of Catholics 
spoke admiringly of Salman Rushdie. Apparently after a heated national debate The Satanic 
Verses remains unavailable in an Albanian translation. A Catholic who arrived in Gura during 
1995 bought a house in a Muslim mehalla but left after one year to live in a predominantly 
Catholic village nearby. One of the reasons he gave for doing so was so that his children could 
play with other Catholics.
Generally, the Muslims were magnanimous towards the Catholics. The cynic might say that 
they could afford to be so because nationally they were in the majority. Yet not far below the 
surface there was a degree of disdain for the Catholics. In Gura Catholic migrants reported that 
the Muslims called them ”kaur", a most unpleasant derogatory term used by the Turks to 
describe Christians. Intermarriage was an indicator of the significance of religious difference. 
In the softer environment of Malaj there were reported to be 5 marriages between Muslims and 
Catholics whereas in Gura there was only one. I heard a Muslim slurring the husband of this 
union who he had accused of corruption by saying "What do you expect? He married a 
Catholic”. The Malaj perspective on the difference between the two faiths was best expressed 
by a quiet, undemonstrative man from a Muslim family who had become deeply attracted 
towards Islam. He had come to feel a small but distinct difference between himself and 
Catholics. As a result he felt easier in the company of Muslim villagers and did not have such 
close Catholic friends.
Whatever might be said to the contrary, there were real differences between Catholics and 
Muslims. At the most basic of levels Gura was segregated into Muslim and Catholic areas. The 
same situation existed in Shkoder where the dty was broadly split into neighbourhoods defined 
by faith with the Roma living on the southern outskirts of town. Yet there were many in the 
younger generation who did not see religion as being important. A Gura man spoke of a recent 
trip to Tirana where he noted the irrelevance of religion as to how people related to each other. 
He had met there a Muslim girl he knew who had converted to Catholicism. "No one blinked 
an eye" he wistfully commented.
I came to know an Italian priest. Amongst other things he was responsible for the 
reconstruction of Malaj's church and the priest's house. This latter structure was by far the
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biggest residence in the village. As a representative of an important source of patronage, the 
priest had to keep a constant sharp eye on outgoings. He spoke with some bitterness about his 
flock. "They are not even Christians. They live by the rules o f the tribe rather than the 
Church The teachings of Christ and the Ten Commandments are rarely understood They lie 
to get money (the Church gave $250/year to very needy families). You could compare it to 
Southern Italy after the War but here they give you nothing when you visit, not even an egg. 
There are 60, GOO Catholics in Shkoder but they hate each other and quarrel over anything. " 
These comments stand as said. My experience was different, particularly in respect of 
hospitality. The comment about people living by the rules of the tribe rather than the Church, 
also mentioned by Durham (1987:21, 152), expresses the frustration of would-be hegemons, 
be they spiritual or temporal, as they grapple with wresting influence and authority from 
primordial structures.
6.5 Belonging:
Esat Zerishta was a loyal Party member who was permitted to move to Gura in 1976 where 
he became secretary to the People's Council. He was the only person Ife lt who talkedfrankly 
to me o f his relationship to the communist party. A lean and wiry man in his mid fifties, Esat 
continued to work hard He said that communism destroyed much. It undermined the Jis. 
However Gura today reflects how the village was managed under communism. There had only 
been one killing in Gura in recent memory (discussed in §7.6.2) whereas in the neighbouring 
village, formerly a state farm which was slow to decollectivise and was thus attractive to 
migrant Dukajnis, there were now many problems. Esat was one o f those reared under 
communism. He found it difficult to understand or become engaged with religion. He had 
believed in communism. The Party was his God It had been hard for him to come to terms 
with its demise even though he recognised it was a terrible system. Being a Party member 
made life worse in many ways since he had to set an example all the time. He had never had 
a bed in his house until 1992. Because the regime said it was important, he and his wife had 
9 children. His children now think him stupid For Esat his land in Gura means everything. 
This is not so for his sons who want to work in the city or to emigrate. He remained an atheist. 
For him the most important qualities o f the Albanians were besnik (loyalty, faithfulness) and 
hospitality. Besnik he described as the moral and ideological concept o f which besa (truth) 
is the practical expression. He maintained these qualities were becoming stronger now. 
"Under communism from morning until night everyone was trying to find ways o f taking
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something. Now people were more respectful o f property and a new moral code was becoming 
established The freedom to worship was contributing to the creation o f a new consciousness." 
Contact with the outside world was helpful. One o f his married daughters was working as a 
cleaner in an Italian retirement home. When she came back and went shopping with her 
sisters she did not look to see what she could steal. On the other hand this new world was one 
of dog eat dog. The businessman was a symbol o f this.
This testimony forms the starting point of a brief exploration of belonging. I have touched 
upon religion and described its role in identity formation as being complex, ambiguous and 
enigmatic. I was never convinced that it formed the primal element of belief or that it formed 
the core of belonging. In seeking to explore belonging I invariably met responses which 
involved place. More expressly, the veneration of place.
This was articulated most graphically to me by an elderly Gura villager with whom I was 
chatting in a field. It was not uncommon for men of his age to claim he had no religion.9It was 
extinguished by communism" he said. But he was proud of his country. When asked to 
describe this pride, he did so by speaking of the love or rather primal attachment between him, 
his family and the land. It was what they sprang from (he picked up some soil and ran it 
sensuously through his fingers). The land provided the food by which they lived. It was to what 
they will return when they die. It was important to be buried beside your parents.
It is hard to find words which adequately express the power behind these widely held 
sentiments. One migrant worker said "even the rocks in Albania are softer than the soil of 
Italy". Or as another man explained to me "Exile is worse than being killed since it separates 
the family from the village which is the core o f its existence and the basis o f its identity. A 
man knows the customs o f the village, its climate, its ways and rhythm o f life. Not to be 
familiar with these things and to participate in them means you are not a person. Worst o f all 
he will leave the cemetery where his forefathers and mother have been buried and thus will 
not be able to join them in the hereafter. ”
These expressions of belonging represented a cosmologically satisfying interpretation of the 
lifeworld. For those not enmeshed and conditioned by the ideology of rationality and of market 
forces (much as I have been), this interpretation of the world remains embedded in an 
elemental paradigm which encompasses the known and comprehensible. Identity was directly
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related to locus, of which ancestors, by the act of burial, were a mystic part. It provided the 
cultural setting in which the Kanun had been a perfectly logical set of regulations, structured 
to meet the needs of justice in circumstances where there was no effective central authority (cf. 
Black-Michaud 1975:146-47). Blood was a metaphor for the spiritual force inherent in life. 
The spilling of blood through vengeance evoked ancient ideas of purification by blood 
(Durham 1987:3 l).This cosmological interpretation was vivid and real. As Yamomoto 
(1994:239) writes "blood, food and guest constitute the ethical structure of the Kanun". Blood 
is the life force, food is sustenance and the guest is god incarnate.
Respect, honour and pride were closely intertwined and continued to play an important part 
in forming the ethical and moral base of non-urban society in Northern Albania. I have noted 
the atypicality of Malaj as a village and have suggested it represents something of a halfway 
stage between rural and urban society but in terms of belonging, the fis  still remained an 
important institution. As one 36 year old carpenter said: It is with the fis that you share 
everything, the good and the bad, joy and sadness. The fis provides security. The moral code 
provided by the Kanun remains important since it teaches you how to behave and says what 
you should not do. Nder (honour) is vital, for without honour everything you do and are is 
without value. I f you have honour you have respect and you can be proud I f you do not keep 
the besa no one will trust you. You will have no friends. I f you lose honour, you will lose face 
and then you will lose the respect and trust o f your fis. Inclusion and exclusion were tightly 
bound up with adherence to values which governed acceptance by the fis  and local society. In 
the absence of civic trust these institutions formed an important means of mediating the market 
and the shortcomings of corrupt government.
One aspect of respect was reflected in the way in which the visitor was welcomed. The Kanun 
(Gjecov 1989:134-6) elevates the guest to be an equal with God7. The householder is required 
to honour him with bread, salt, an open heart, a fire and a bed. A special guest must be given 
coffee, raki and special food in addition to that eaten ordinarily. Not to do so is to be 
disgraced. Moreover the Kanun requires that a guest be accompanied by the host lest he be the
7
Yamamoto (1994) links the Kanun with the ancient Japanese religious concept of "Kotadama". He draws 
attention to the remarkable similarity between the two institutions, particularly in respect of the 
relationship between blood and honour. Gjecov (1989) notes similarities between the Kanun and 
Caucasian traditions.
148
victim of some wicked act or he harm someone while under the host's protection. If a guest 
commits some evil act while under the host's protection, the host is responsible for it. If 
hospitality is violated the Kanun demands it be avenged through blood. The alternative is 
dishonour. To a dishonoured man everything must be given with the left hand and passed 
under the knee until he avenges his guest. These traditions continued to be expressed but in 
a considerably more attenuated form. Though I was frequently asked to spend the night with 
families in Gura, I did not interpret such invitations literally but rather saw them as referring 
to these traditions of hospitality. As a guest I was invariably offered coffee and raki. If I 
declined these, as I often was compelled to do for reasons of digestion and coherence, then I 
would always be offered juice, sweets (at least two) and cigarettes. This was so even in the 
very poorest of households to whom such outlays were not insignificant. On my departure 
from the house the host would always accompany me to the edge of his property. When I said 
my final farewells, one village representative walked with me to his mehalla boundary as a 
mark of respect.
Belonging is a multi-faceted phenomenon. As discussed in §4.4.3, membership of a community 
is related to issues of competition and opportunity. I have so far focused on the more intimate 
and local institutions of family, ^ 5 and village. However identity is subject to fusion with larger 
groupings and allegiances which can encompass the nation and a common religion (ref. 
Gluckman 1963). While identification with the national community certainly existed, regional 
loyalties were more dominant. Shkodrani claim to be in the forefront of Albania. They believe 
the best intellectuals, writers, musicians, actors and poets have come from Shkoder and the 
north. Shkodrani are famous for their humour. They are proud of their distinctive accent. They 
claim the north to be the home of democracy in Albania: a famous anti-communist revolt of 
1946 took place in Postrribba (Shkoder) and then in 1990 the first ''martyrs1' in the struggle 
for democracy were Shkoder students. The northern Ghegs define themselves in opposition 
to the southern Tosks who are looked upon as effete and communists. While this rhetoric 
represented a strong sense of regional pride and identity, it was also a mask behind which lay 
an incomprehension about the relative decline of the north. A national community requires 
regional cohesion. But with crumbling infrastructure, poor communications and the lack of 
implementation of a rule of law the north had become increasingly impoverished relative to the 
metropolitan region. The consequences were emigration and disillusionment with the centre.
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6.6 Matrix:
In order to assist summarise the information and compare the two villages, their key 
characteristics are shown in a matrix. The matrix permits the presentation of those features 
which form the focus of the subsequent discussion on community and identity. The differences 
which are identified assist in the analysis which takes place in the final chapter, particularly in 
respect of the way in which social capital is formed. However reducing complex information 
in this way can lead to the assumption that the assertions being presented represent hard facts. 
They do not, rather the matrix components seek to capture constantly evolving circumstances 
so as to identify key features and highlight differences so as to more clearly elucidate how 
identity was being renegotiated and the way in which a civil society was being formed in the 
aftermath of communism. As such the matrix is a useful analytical tool.
SUMMARY OF VILLAGES AS COMMUNITIES
Gura Malaj
Fis relations predominate;^ grouped in 
mehallas; the fis was an important factor 
in determining relationships; poor 
communications between mehallas
Fis membership one among a number of 
networks;^ members more dispersed in 
village; greater corporate sense in the 
village
Relatively new village; subject to 
migratory waves; increase in unrelated 
newcomers
Long established village, not subject to 
migratory waves; most migrants related to 
existing families
Assistance and preferential treatment 
provided by fis
Neighbours and friends provide assistance 
as well as fis
Women lower status; more secluded; most 
worked on land; patriarchal values;
Women higher status; treated more 
liberally; more equal relations between men 
and women
Mehallas largely defined by religious 
affiliation, one interfaith marriage; covert 
resentment between religious groups
Members of religious faiths interspersed 
through village; five interfaith marriages; 
greater tolerance between religions; 
absence of criticism of different faiths
6.7 Community and Identity:
In examining the villages from the perspective of community, this chapter has been primarily 
concerned with understanding the social aspects of transformation. Trust was seen to be
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fundamental to the notion of community. I have described a number of bounded entities: 
villages, mehallas, fis, vllazni, households, families, Catholics and Muslims. To varying 
degrees each of these institutions had a physical as well as a social component to their 
boundaries. They were entities concerned with membership and belonging. They formed a 
focus for trust and implicitly or explicitly contributed to the formation of identity. They 
represented both the component parts of the moral economy and the means through which it 
operated.
The Gheg fis  was a remarkably egalitarian community. It provided for the security and 
sustenance of its members, to the extent that individual identity was largely subsumed in the 
greater identity of the shtepi and the fis. The most severe punishment meted by the community 
of the fis  was banishment (Durham 1987:33). It was on this identity that the APL sought to 
impose that of the New Communist Man and eliminate loyalty to all other social institutions 
and religious organisations. The process which took place is in certain respects redolent of 
SholokoVs (1970) description of the impact of communism on the Cossack culture. However 
APL policies of retaining the population in rural areas and exerting strict control over 
movement worked against its desire to eliminate traditional relationships. Despite the 
intimidating manner in which these policies were implemented, the regime proved incapable 
of wresting trust from the fis  (ref. Azem §6.2.2), latent though it was compelled to be. It also 
failed to quash religious sentiment. In the aftermath of communism, the fis, and more 
particularly the vllazni, contributed to social solidarity through the provision of loans, labour 
and physical security. The practical and psychological support provided by these institutions 
enabled people to survive acute resource scarcity, social breakdown and political uncertainty 
during the post-communist period.
As APL control weakened and eventually collapsed, the ensuing political uncertainty and 
economic dislocation created the impetus for social change, one feature of which was the rapid 
increase in migration and emigration. Although the fis  regained some of its former social and 
economic significance, this occurred in lieu of effective state institutions. Where the fis  was 
not so strong, as in Malaj, greater emphasis was given to the creation and maintenance of 
neighbourly relations. However even in the more ^ -orientated village of Gura the influx of 
migrants was resulting in a new stress being placed on developing neighbourly relations. In 
both villages the importance of primordial attachments was diminishing as a result of the 
development of market relations. The nuclear family was becoming the principal social unit and
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this had implications on the role of women.
Perceptions of gender are a key aspect of identity formation. In both the villages the position 
of women was still firmly rooted in a patriarchal culture. It is probably misleading to view the 
limited re-traditionalisation which has taken place in the aftermath of communism in terms of 
being either beneficial or retrogressive in respect of women. Despite the nominally progressive 
stance of the APL towards women's rights, the reality in these villages was that they had to 
work appallingly hard. Women now welcomed being free from the tyranny of the collective 
farm. However the post-communist reversion to more patriarchal norms and the development 
of chauvinistic attitudes among young men had seen the public role of women being diminished 
and their domestic contributions increasingly being taken for granted. This was particularly so 
in Gura where women were more evidently being subordinated to traditional patterns of 
patriarchal power (cf. White,S. 1988).
Although women no longer had their own organisations or the same level of public 
representation, these were not the issues which troubled them most. Security was their major 
concern. The absence of security prevented girls receiving further education and constrained 
the employment opportunities available to young women. After security women were 
concerned about economic issues, a part of which involved a desire for a measure of financial 
autonomy. However in an oversupplied labour market even when it was possible for women 
to work, men not only took jobs in preference to them, they also took the better jobs.
Social attitudes in the two villages reflected their respective economic development and 
capacity to integrate with the state. The more open and egalitarian society of Malaj ascribed 
a significantly higher status to women than did more traditional Gura. Notwithstanding this, 
marriage remained the main goal of young women in both villages. Their chattel-like status 
(ref. §6.3.1 and Durham 1987:35,63), the utilitarianism of communism and the persisting 
patriarchal nature of Albanian society has constrained the development of Albanian women 
during the twentieth century. Despite this, women now had the opportunity to receive 
education, the freedom to express their femininity, to have a say in the choice of husband, to 
have a measure of control over their bodies, and, security and connections permitting, greater 
job opportunities. Social attitudes were changing, albeit slowly.
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The final aspect of identity discussed here concerned belief and belonging. Although religious 
belief played an important part in self-definition, its role in the formation of a social identity 
was ambiguous and difficult to define. References in the literature that Albanians have been 
opportunist in respect of their choice and observance of religion conceals a complex situation. 
The vigour with which Enver Hoxha sought to eliminate every form of religious expression 
indicated the important part it played in people’s life. The enthusiasm with which many people 
returned to religion given the freedom to do so, further indicates its significance. Despite 
differences between the faiths being energetically denied and the evidence of many forms of 
cooperation in which religious background played no part, there was nonetheless a distinction 
between faiths which frequently defined location of residence and forms of association.
There was a metaphysical dimension to identity which extended beyond that provided by the 
sense of belonging offered by religion and the national community. I understood it to be a 
realm in which ancestors and locus, belief and belonging, nder (honour) and besa (truth) were 
intimately interwoven in such a way as to link the past, present and future. My belief is that this 
cosmology was, and to a limited extent still is, integral to the ascribed identity of north 
Albanian tribal society. It was this identity that the APL and Enver Hoxha sought replace with 
that of the New Communist Man.
Tribal society, state socialism and market democracy are composed of formal and informal 
institutions which regulate daily life (§4.5.2). This chapter has shown how informal institutions 
were linked to the formation of social capital. They have formed the basis for trust, reciprocity 
and exchange, information dissemination and of sanctions. In the post-communist period, the 
acceptance of these norms and values was crucial in maintaining inclusion in the fis  and gaining 
acceptance in village society. Inclusion was achieved and maintained by means of a consistent 
level of participation which formed the basis for various types of redistribution. This occurred 
in monetary form on the occasion of life events and also through the donation of labour or 
other forms of assistance as circumstances demanded. A key element in these institutional 
arrangements was the notion of respect and the status it conferred. As has been discussed in 
the RPA (§5.4.1) and illustrated by the evidence presented here, status is a resource which can 
be just as useful as other more material resources, if not more so.
The radical changes which have taken place in the nature of authority in Albania during the 
course of the twentieth century have been accompanied by a corresponding shift in the locus
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and nature of agency. In tribal society, agency was largely vested in the fis. The communist 
regime sought to capture almost every form of agency to itself. In the post-communist setting 
while agency was becoming more an individual matter, new forms of cooperation were also 
taking place in the marketplace, over common resources and the management of village affairs. 
The partial reversion to traditional institutions was accompanied by a frustration at their 
inability to meet present needs.
Although there was a general recognition of the social and economic benefits which could 
come from integration into the larger community of the nation, there was a well-founded 
apprehension of shifting allegiance from the local and known to the abstract or imagined 
national community. Trust is a social good which can only operate in circumstances where 
structures are familiar and relationships and roles understood. The communist projection of 
the state was discredited but villagers had scant grounds for trusting the new "democratic” 
state. To invest identity in the state as the symbol of the nation requires formal and informal 
institutions which are credible and worthy of trust. These are the institutions of civil society. 
Setting aside religion and primordial institutions, in neither village was there evidence of the 
more formal type of civic engagement as described by Putnam (1993).
At the village level transformation represented a reorientation of the way in which the social 
world was comprehended. It was no longer perceived in terms of a being a common absorption 
into a metaphysic where past was integrated into present and future. Old certainties had 
vanished. Life involved coming to terms with the modem world which operated in a linear 
fashion embedded in, and the product of, scientific and managerial rationality. The past forms 
less of a reference point and is largely ignored. "That's history" is a dismissive turn of phrase 
used by English speakers. The apogee of modernity is an information rich society of atomised 
individuals in which belief and identity are a pick-and-mix affair (Smart 1993:98; Bauman 
1994:191). Identity becomes a negotiated phenomenon which departs from the ascriptive 
forms dictated by traditional norms and allegiances. Rapid political and economic changes 
compounded by the influx of new ideas created the quandary for villagers of where best to vest 
sentiments of belonging. After five years of democratic government, individuals had little 
confidence in the institutions of their state. While the younger generation were capable of 
adapting with greater rapidity, for many villagers the social transformation associated with 




The economy forms the second analytical perspective by means of which the empirical 
evidence is examined. In order to understand the way in which identity has been moulded by 
economic factors a fairly straightforward approach is adopted. It commences with a brief 
description of traditional economic arrangements, the Albanian command economy and the 
subsequent reform process. The account then proceeds to discuss specific aspects of the post­
communist economy. These include migration, a description of labour markets, small business 
development and non-legal activities. Having examined these issues within the context of 
village life, credit strategies, formal and informal redistribution, and the effects of corruption 
are discussed, followed by an analysis of how recent developments have impacted on the 
household. The chapter concludes with the presentation of three case studies which illustrate 
the way in which the Albanian market economy produced losers as well as winners.
The chapter sets out to explain how villagers were responding to the demands of that key 
component of civil society, the market. The nature of an authoritarian centrally planned 
economy is that it captures agency, reduces autonomy and creates dependency. Therefore, for 
all but a few, involvement in the market was a highly challenging experience. Under the 
socialist system, personal goals were to a great extent achieved through the cultivation of 
linkages with the Party. With the precipitate demise of the APL, it was those able to 
understand the market and market relations who were most immediately successful and were 
able to capitalise on this success. The ideological dimensions of this transition were profound. 
Individuals were compelled to discard the frames of reference which they had previously used 
to give meaning and order to their lives and, within a completely novel set of parameters, to 
reconstruct livelihoods and relationships. From being portrayed as a system described by a 
Gura villager as one "which exploited the masses, which caused people to die o f hunger and 
be forced to sleep under bridges", capitalism, or rather its more neutral facade of the market 
economy, was projected by the post-communist DP government as providing the means for 
a golden future. While this might be true for some, it was also an arena of risk and of 
increasing differentiation.
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Villagers adapted to the market economy as best they could. A market economy is a structure 
composed of a complex and evolving web of values, norms and institutions which shape and 
govern its operation. The market is a key component in the liberal vision of society. Non 
interference of the state, unfettered market access and individual freedom compose the 
theoretical foundations on which economic liberalism is built. Imperfect arrangements though 
they may be, modem market democracies have taken a long time to achieve their present level 
of organisation. In Britain we can trace the attempt to tame authoritarianism, mitigate the 
control of capital and gain the civil freedoms associated with the ability to participate in 
economic activity as far back as the Magna Carta. Over the centuries this has been followed 
by civil war, collective action, riot and legislative reform to achieve a particular version of 
"civil society", a significant part of which is composed of economic freedoms.
Seen from this perspective the demands being made by the West of post-communist societies 
such as Albania to undertake a transition to a market democracy are daunting. The way in 
which economic arrangements are constructed patterns our socialisation. Based on evidence 
from the villages of this study, this chapter is concerned with describing this patterning as 
reflected in the adaptation of economic behaviour and the development of market relations. 
It concludes by examining the impact of these changes on identity formation.
7.2. Background:
7.2.1 Communism: Markets were slow to develop in post-independent Albania. The economy 
in north Albania remained largely influenced by tribal norms until the communists took power 
in 1944 (see Hasluck 1954). Prior to this nearly 90% of the national population were engaged 
in agriculture (Prifti 1978:53). In the north, which as opposed to southern Albania was not 
subject to feudal control, there was little specialisation and a rudimentary division of labour. 
Productivity was low and markets were small-scale and poorly articulated. Exchange was 
largely undertaken on a personal level and dealings were founded on personal trust. Trust 
existed because of common values symbolised by nder and besa. Failure to maintain the norms 
associated with these values led to a lack of trust and ultimately to social and economic 
exclusion. With weak central government there was little formal regulation of economic 
activity. Economic arrangements were largely regulated by means of the moral economy (cf. 
Thompson 1971) which was constituted from tribal norms and by what Hasluck (1954) called 
"the unwritten law" of the Kanun (Gjecov 1989). These institutions were the means by which
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economic life in this pre-industrial society was embedded in non-economic institutions (cf. 
Polanyi 1992:39).
The economy inherited by the APL was one in which infrastructure development had occurred 
only to the degree to which it was in the geopolitical interests of colonising powers and to the 
extent to which it enabled them to exploit Albania's natural resources. At its liberation from 
the Axis powers in 1944 Albania was profoundly under-skilled, underdeveloped and bankrupt. 
The APL set about the wholesale nationalisation of the country's economic resources. It started 
by redistributing agricultural land amongst the peasantry but with unclarified rights of tenure. 
The country was heavily dependent on outside support. Initially Yugoslavia provided credits 
equivalent to about 60% of the state budget. With the break from Yugoslavia in 1948, Albania 
became dependent on the Russians who provided credit at the same level as the Yugoslavs, 
paid favourable prices for Albanian exports and gave concessions on imported goods.
The APL sought to set the country on a path of economic self-reliance by means of 
Marxist-Leninist policies of industrialisation. The intention was to transform the Albanian 
economy from one which was agrarian in character to one which was predominantly industrial. 
The Albanian system of central planning was set in place to accomplish this economic 
transformation. It was in essence the standard Soviet development model (see Nove 1969): 
highly centralised, rigid and authoritarian. It left little leeway for the transfer of any decision 
making to lower levels of the economic structure (Prifti 1978:55). Furthermore economic goals 
were periodically subordinated to the desire of the Party leadership to remain in power. The 
main constraint inherent in Hoxha's Stalinist development strategy arose from the conflict 
between the high rates of domestic savings needed to develop the economy and the 
requirement of maintaining the acquiescence, if not support, of the population in pursuing these 
goals. The crux of the APL's problems was to meet growth targets whilst avoiding balance of 
payment deficits (Schnytzer 1982:3/5). This was done by utilising assistance offered through 
the political alliances made with Yugoslavia, Russia and China between 1945 and 1978.
The drive to capture domestic surplus began with the establishment of cooperatives during the 
1950s. However whatever means were used, they were never enough. Albania continued to 
remain highly dependent on foreign aid to fund its large and persistent trade deficits. 
Essentially foreign aid was used in the early years as a substitute for domestic savings in the 
generation of investment and was the cause behind the rift over development policy between
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Albania and the Soviets. The APL wanted to develop Albanian industrial and manufacturing 
sectors. This was at odds with the advice given by the USSR which sought to encourage 
Albania to develop a competitive advantage in agriculture produce and to integrate its 
economy with those of the other CMEA countries (see Kaser 1967). As tension developed 
between China and the USSR in 1961, Chinese aid was substantially increased to meet the loss 
of Soviet Block support. Nevertheless the economic discontinuities caused by the break with 
Russia were high (Lendvai 1969:199). Chinese support was utilised in the establishment of 
heavy industry, hydroelectric projects and mining development. Economic policy became 
heavily tilted towards self-reliance (Backer 1982) and ever deepening state control. Self 
sufficiency in grains was achieved but at a high environmental cost. Agriculture was eventually 
completely collectivised and electricity extended country wide.
In 1978 Albania was exporting a small surplus of electricity generated through hydro power. 
It had developed its mining, iron processing and oil production sectors and in favourable years 
was able to produce sufficient food grains. Albania was thus able to precariously maintain itself 
at a meagre level of self sufficiency. The costs of the break with China in 1978 were high. 
Between 60-70% of foreign trade was with China. Albania needed machinery, electrical 
equipment, spares and other products it could not manufacture itself. By repudiating 
agreements when it shifted allegiance with economic patrons Albania avoided paying debt. 
China was left being owed $5 billion (Vickers 1995:209). The consequence of being a known 
as a non-paying debtor made partners reluctant to develop trade with Albania after the break 
with China. The policy of self-reliance then became a practical necessity rather than an 
ideological option. It has been frequently argued that Albania has been unable to maintain an 
economically viable existence without external support to cover a chronic balance of trade 
deficit. Prifti (1978:77) observes how the tensions between the need for economic assistance 
and the costs of political allegiance/subservience has been a persistent dilemma for Albania. 
The ability to formulate an economic strategy independent of external support has posed a 
threat to the political viability of the Albanian state since its formation.
After the withdrawal of Chinese support Hoxha rejected any decentralisation of economic 
decision making or the diversification of foreign trade. As a consequence the economy went 
into steady decline. It was beset by three fundamental problems: firstly, the persistence of
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globalism1 in plan fulfilment at the expense of the quantity and quality of individual goods 
produced; secondly, widespread absenteeism and low work norms; and thirdly, the 
re-emergence of small scale private economic activity (Schnytzer 1982:56). Problems were 
further exacerbated during the 1980s by a series of severe droughts. Economic growth and 
labour productivity declined sharply after 1983 (Sandstrom and Sjoberg 1991:934/5). The 
failure of the oil, chrome and hydro-power industries to meet planned targets resulted in the 
deterioration of convertible currency earnings. The consequence was severe stagnation with 
Net Material Product per capita remaining more or less constant after 1975 (ibid. p.943). 
Towards the end of the 1980s the APL under Ramiz Alia sought to develop foreign trade and 
made some limited internal reforms but the changes were minor and had little effect. Reckless 
speculation on the international money markets during 1990 resulted in the doubling of the 
country's external debt to $190 million (Kaser 1993:309). Credit lines were removed and the 
country went into an economic vortex. In a situation which verged on anarchy, property and 
livestock were seized by the public. The failure to plant crops, originating from uncertainty 
over tenure, caused extreme shortages of food. There were large problems with public order 
and widespread vandalism of public property.
7.2.2 Post 1992: By the end of 1991 the capital stock was heavily depleted across all sectors. 
Most state enterprises had shut down or were working at very low levels At its worst, inflation 
was running at 260% a month and 70% of the workforce were idle. The budget deficit for 
1991 was 34% of GDP (Blejer 1992:54). With the election of the Democratic Party in 1992 
macro economic stability was achieved by the implementation of an IMF package of 
devaluation and tight monetary targets which reduced inflation from 226% to 30% in the space 
of 2 years. Prices were liberalised, apart from subsidies kept until 1995 on certain foodstuffs 
and fuel. A land privatisation programme distributed a national average of 1.2 hectare2 to 
every rural family. A wide range of state assets such as shops and small enterprises were sold 
off. The closure of the larger heavily subsidised state industries was phased over a 5 year
Meaning that targets for gross industrial output were fulfilled but that this masked inefficiencies in manufacturing 
output so that targets for assembled goods, especially consumer goods of reasonable quality, were grossly under 
fulfilled.
2
There are two caveats to this official figure. Firstly, even by October 1997 land redistribution had not been fully 
completed in the lowlands. Secondly, though the size of holdings in die highlands is much larger than in the 
lowlands, there is a large difference in productivity between the low quality soils and harsher climate in the 
mountains and the better soils and more clement climate in the lowlands.
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period with the many employees being laid off. The study which took place in Malaj as part 
of this research showed that 90% of full time salaried jobs had disappeared since 1991 
(Lawson et al. 1999). Rights to oil and minerals were sold to foreign concerns.
From a very low base (1992 GDP per capita $222), the economy grew significantly reaching 
an annual growth rate of 8.6% in 1996 when GDP per capita was $799. The economy received 
a check as a result of the civil disturbance in 1997 when GDP temporarily dropped to $708 per 
capita (statistics EBRD 1998). The budget deficit for 1997 was 11.5% of GDP (estimated at 
$3 billion) and the national debt was 63% of GDP (RFE 4/2/98). Despite the positive trend, 
albeit from a low base, these aggregated statistics mask differences between the metropolitan 
zone and the regions, between town and country and between the lowlands and the highlands. 
The Malaj village study revealed for the year 1996/7 that 19% of households could be classed 
as thriving on a median average annual income per capita of $773 p.a., 42% were classed as 
surviving with a median average annual income per capita of $361 and 38% were struggling 
on a median average annual income per capita of $287 (Lawson et al. 1999). Albania continues 
to remain the poorest country in Europe. Economic development has been severely constrained 
by a steadily deteriorating infrastructure. Transport and telecommunications networks were 
in an appalling condition. Water and electricity were subject to frequent and prolonged breaks 
in supply which hampered production and caused health hazards3. These features, combined 
with the lack of democratic transparency and mafia capitalism, have presented strong barriers 
to foreign investment.
Despite the redrafting of laws and the introduction of new regulatory procedures, much 
remained to be done towards the creation and enforcement of a legislative framework which 
would provide the foundation for a flourishing economy capable of sustained growth. 
Essentially the informal trading sector supported the urban population, mineral and petroleum 
production financed the operation of government and subsistence level agricultural production 
acted as a safety net for most of the population. Investment and additional income came from 
Albanians working abroad, estimated as being in excess of 300,000 (18% of the adult 
population). Their remittances accounted for approximately 50% of official transfers and were 
thought to be somewhere between $500 million and $1 billion per annum (Korovilas 1998).
3
In Autumn 1996 there was an outbreak of poliomyelitis which required a nationwide vaccination campaign (see 
Sallabanda et al. 1996; WHO 1996)
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The declaration of a state of emergency in March 1997 was the culmination of spiralling public 
disorder resulting from the collapse of pyramid investment schemes, the first of which failed 
in November 1996. The Government was linked with the promotion of these schemes. In at 
least one instance a pyramid company gave $50,000 to the DP prior to the parliamentary 
elections of May 1996. Such support contravened legislation on the support of political parties. 
Over $1 billion, equivalent to 1/3 of GDP, was invested in these schemes by perhaps as many 
as 300,000 Albanians (Financial Times 4/3/97). The loss of these funds has been to the 
detriment of small business development, savings and the construction of new housing. 
Average public sector wages were well under $100 per month. Regular strikes by public sector 
workers took place during 1996. In order to supplement their low wages many public sector 
employees took on second or third jobs or have used their positions for personal advantage. 
Such practices resulted in low levels of performance across a wide range of important services 
and administrative activities.
7.2.3 Adaptation in Shkoder Rreth: The extreme economic dislocation occurring in 1991/2 
caused a steadily stagnating economy to dramatically worsen and resulted in acute and 
widespread hardship. After the anarchy and looting had subsided, people set about devising 
strategies by which to exist. One of the first requirements for the operation of a market 
economy is capital. A certain amount had been accumulated during the 1980s especially after 
Hoxha's death in 1985. Much to the irritation of the United Council (the communist equivalent 
of the Commune) Gura people began to keep small animals: chickens, sheep and the occasional 
pig. In Malaj a few were illegally fishing at night. It was a risky activity. Anyone caught was 
subject to severe penalties but protein was scarce and there was a ready market for fish. 
Reflecting the failings of central planning a similar trade developed in livestock. Black 
marketeers travelled into the mountains buying animals to be butchered and illicitly sold in 
Shkoder. Quantities of gold had been concealed before the communists took over. As the 
economy deteriorated during the late 1980s a few enterprising individuals travelled in the 
mountains buying gold. Profits were good since price information was scarce and need was 
high. One respondent also made money dealing in luxury items smuggled from Yugoslavia by 
those state employees and drivers who were trusted to travel across the border. As the 
communist regime started to crumble, private enterprise and limited capital accumulation was 
taking place as risk-takers were able to find and exploit markets. They did so by making 
generous payments to officials. Even so some fell foul of the law. Despite a slight relaxation
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of control in the years after Hoxha's death, the political upheavals which took place in Tirana 
during 1990/1 were a complete shock for most people in the villages of this study. Though 
everyone was acutely aware of the deteriorating economy, Albania's isolation and its extreme 
communist regime had made it particularly difficult for the public at large to conceive of other 
forms of organisatioa The Albanians were therefore ill-prepared for the economic dislocation 
which came about in the early 1990s.
7.3 Migration:
The response to the disastrous economic decline in 1990 was emigration, predominantly by 
young males. The storming of foreign embassies in Tirana and commandeering of cargo vessels 
caught the world's attention. Although relatively few northerners left at that time, migration 
has formed an important feature in the development of the region's economy. Administrative 
restrictions on urban bound migration were a part of the APLs policy to retain rural 
populations in the villages, particularly those in the mountains, at unrealistically high levels (see 
Sjoberg 1991). The intention had been to produce as much food as possible through 
maximising labour at the expense of other factors of production.
Despite the wretched circumstances of highland communities in the early transitional years (see 
Lewis and McGregor 1992:15-22), families were generally cautious to leave even though they 
had the freedom to do so. Initially, fit young males left with a view to emigrate, on a 
permanent or temporary basis. Many returned (cf. Hall, D. 1996:186). By 1996 a pattern of 
regional immigration and emigration had emerged. After an initial rush during the early years 
of democracy, migration from the mountains to the lowlands slowed down. In this period 
people from the northern mountains, called "Dukajin" after the name of the mountain range, 
either squatted in lowland villages or negotiated themselves a place in a village. In the latter 
case documentation proving residence in a village prior to 1990 was allegedly being sold by 
the Commune Director for $1,000 per family. A family demonstrating proof of residence in a 
village prior to 1990 would be eligible to receive land in the privatisation and redistribution of 
state and cooperative farms. It was not until around 1995 that title to property started to 
become established and that the 3 year moratorium, imposed by the government in 1992, 
lapsed on the sale of agricultural land.
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The populations in both villages of the study increased by about 10% between 1992 and 1997. 
This was less than many other villages in the locality. The lack of agricultural land was a 
disincentive to settling in Malaj. Furthermore the Malaj council tried to prevent settlement by 
immigrants from unknown families since they believed, with some justification, that "Dukajini" 
immigrants brought many problems. Thus with only two known exceptions, all the post 1992 
incomers had fis  in Malaj. In Gura the land redistribution took place speedily and was overseen 
by the Commune Director who was also a resident of the village. The village neighbouring 
Gura was much slower in redistributing state land. As a consequence significant numbers of 
Dukajini settled there in the hope of obtaining allocations of land. This complicated the 
distribution process and caused violent arguments some of which ended in bloodshed and 
death.
The growth of migration in response to economic pressures was occurring throughout Albania. 
The statistics provided by the Municipality of Shkoder (Appendix 4) showed that its 
population increased 17% from 85,436 (1991) to 100,000 (1997). However this masks a 
steady emigration from Shkoder to the more prosperous metropolitan region and abroad. In 
1996 the Municipal records show that 2,900 people (3% of the municipality) left during 1996.
In the two villages of the study post 1992 newcomers were mainly those who had fis  members 
present. Usually they were either cousins or families whose wife originally came from the 
village. More rarely, someone would come through the introduction of a friend, such as 
occurred in the case of Paulin Shkumbi (ref. §6.2.3). In Gura there were few unrelated 
newcomers in the village until 1995 when property transfers started to take place. The 
Frasheris were an example of a vllazni which arrived in 1996. They came from Geshtenjas (the 
site of the Lewis/McGregor study). They illustrate a range of migratory strategies.
Bashkim Frasheri was the eldest o f 4 brothers, two o f whom were married. They had been 
living with their father in one house with 3 denim o f land in the village o f Geshtenjas. Life 
had become increasingly difficult. Even though the brothers were slipping across the border 
to undertake agricultural work in Montenegro for $7/day (Shkoder rate then $3/dqy), their 
standard o f living was declining. With the intention o f improving their position they decided 
to sell up and move closer to the city where there were greater economic opportunities. They 
had bought land in Gura in 1997for $1,000per denim. Their land in the mountains was sold 
for $900 per denim, indicating that those remaining in the highlands were prepared to pay
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to increase the size o f their holdings. The brothers were building a house for each o f them on 
their plot o f land Having built a rude monopitch dwelling, Bashkim left for Sardinia in 1996 
where he had a friend working in a milkfactory. It cost him $700 to get smuggled into Italy 
and travel to Sardinia. He worked for 10 months earning 1.5 million lire/month. He saved 8 
million lire($5,000). It was far more than he could have earned in Shkoder even if  it were 
possible to find work He came back to find hisfather had died and he was head o f the family. 
He had bought 2 broken down vans for $1,250 and by using the best from each had a 
serviceable vehicle for the transport o f people and goods. The remains o f his savings were 
to be used to build a better house. He was waiting for the new moon since it was inauspicious 
to start building when it was waning. I f there was not adequate security to enable him to run 
the transport business he intended to return to Italy one more time even though he was loath 
to leave his wife and child
This example is slightly unusual in that it illustrates two forms of migration taking place 
simultaneously. Bashkim was able to go to Italy by virtue of his father and brothers looking 
after the family affairs. The decision for the initial migration from the mountains came about 
as a result of the vllaznVs deteriorating economic situation which they were unable to check 
no matter how hard they worked. Their remedy was to seek to benefit from the economic 
opportunities deriving from living near an urban conurbation. In discussing their affairs they 
spoke openly of the difficulties they were having in fairly allocating resources and 
responsibilities within the vllazni for house building, income generation etc. The brothers 
candidly admitted that their vllazni was breaking up as each family was increasingly fending 
for itself. Nevertheless the way in which this and other vllaznis were functioning illustrates the 
close link between institutional structures and economic behaviour (ref. NIE §4.5.2).
In both villages there was permanent and temporary emigration. The permanent emigrants 
consisted almost entirely of young unmarried men who had taken their chances and established 
themselves by one means or another mainly in Italy, Germany, Switzerland and Greece. 
Sometimes remittances would be sent back to their family, sometimes not. When remittances 
were sent it was not uncommon for them to cease after a while and for the contacts between 
the young man and his family to dwindle. The exceptions to this were skilled men with young 
families who had emigrated illegally and had managed to gain rights to permanent residence 
in another country which once achieved enabled them to bring their families to join them. 
There was one such case in each of the villages.
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The second and larger category were temporary migrants, very few of whom were over thirty. 
Although a good number went to Italy, most travelled over the mountains to Greece. They 
would go for periods of 6 to 9 months with the intention of earning sufficient to build a house 
and get married, or if married, to earn sufficient to be able to leave the parental home. Despite 
the periodic sweeps undertaken by the Greek authorities, such trips would be repeated on an 
annual basis with the proceeds used to establish a business or else build houses for other 
members of the vllazni. Where a vllazni operated as an economic unit then it was usually the 
task of the eldest son to remain at home and look after the family interests while the younger 
brothers travelled abroad. As in the case of the Frasheri family above, remittances were the 
principal source of investment capital.
7.4 Labour markets:
7.4.1 The State Sector: The transformation of the way in which state institutions are 
organised is a key component of the structural change taking place in post-communist 
societies. In the economic sphere this has meant that firstly most planning decisions are no 
longer made in accordance with a state plan and secondly the state has shed its role in actively 
participating in economic production. These two changes have had significant implications in 
respect of the labour market. From being the country’s sole economic organiser and employer, 
the state had ceased to have any direct participation in the economy4. Nevertheless the state 
was still a significant employer. It required a bureaucracy to administer its activities. The 
security services, health professionals and teachers were all employed by the state. The 
statistics issued by the Shkoder Municipality for 1996 (Appendix 4) indicated that state 
employees made up about 16% of the workforce in the municipal region. The proportion was 
less in the rural areas.
The role of the state will be explored in the following chapter. Here I wish to draw attention 
to the financial implications of being a state employee at the time of this study. Although state 
employees received very low pay, there appeared to be little pressure placed on them to 
perform. Although I came across the occasional official in Shkoder-based administrations who 
worked conscientiously, most employees attended their place of work for very limited periods
Apart from a controlling interest in die extraction, processing and distribution o f oil and petroleum at the time o f 
writing.
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and on an irregular basis, however the deconstruction of the state apparatus goes beyond the 
scope of this project. Suffice to say there was a weak formal economy producing low revenues 
which was further cramped by poor rates of tax collection. In the struggle to produce balanced 
budgets state salaries were kept at unrealistically low levels. The response to this by state 
employees was to use their position in a rent seeking manner and/or non-performance of tasks 
as a result of undertaking other work.
A few examples. A Malaj man worked as a petrol pump attendant for the state petroleum 
enterprise. His 1997 salary was $3 5/month, a sum which was impossible to live on. This was 
increased by about $50/month through pocketing returns made from utilising "natural wastage" 
plus additional income made by repairing bicycles. In 1996 the clinic serving Gura consisted 
of a doctor earning $80/month and 3 nurses receiving about $60. They were rarely present. 
The official salary of the head of the Health Service in Shkoder was $90/month. The teachers 
in Gura received $50/month in 1996. At best, these professionals worked part time. They 
either had other jobs or practised privately in Shkoder. I will touch further upon the role of the 
police and commune officials in due course.
State salaries were raised in 1997, bringing teachers' pay to $80. The issue was again addressed 
in 1998 by the Socialist Party government which introduced new civil service salary scales in 
a bid to reduce corruption. The salary for the office of President was doubled to $845, that of 
ministers raised to $647-$760 a month and other civil servants were given a 20% increase 
(RFE 28/1/98). The widespread lack of trust in the state as an institution for impartial 
regulation affected the approach and attitudes of its employees. Little was expected or 
demanded of them. Employment in the state sector was widely perceived as a sinecure to be 
used as part of a range of income generation activities.
7.4.2 The Formal Sector This refers to the state regulated employment market in which the 
state monitored working conditions, contractual issues and compliance with fiscal and social 
insurance legislation. A number of enterprises fell in this category: semi privatised utilities, civil 
engineering contractors (formed either from privatised former state enterprises or organisations 
specifically created to tender for government infrastructure development and maintenance 
contracts) and finally joint ventures with foreign investors. The statistics issued by the Shkoder 
Municipality for 1996 (Appendix 4) indicated that within its sphere of responsibility those 
employed by such private businesses made up about 14% of the workforce. This proportion
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was much less in rural communities.
Electricity and water were semi-privatised, or in the process of being so. Private enterprises 
created as a result of the reduction of functions formerly the responsibility of government 
employed the most able workers. While such organisations did not pay particularly well, they 
did not place excessive demands on their workforces. In many instances employees were able 
to negotiate their working time to enable them to undertake other forms of employment as was 
the case with Paulin Shkumbi (§6.2.3), a mechanic in a hydro-electric station. Formal 
employment required the payment of insurance contributions by employer and employee. It 
brought with it a pension, sickness and maternity benefits and, should circumstances arise, 
rights to unemployment benefit. As in the state sector the principal advantage of such 
employment was security. These were relatively safe jobs bringing in a regular, secure wage.
Owing to the predominance of agriculture in Gura, relatively few were involved in the formal 
sector. However a larger proportion of Malaj residents had formal employment obtained 
through influence and connections. Several men worked for the electrical enterprise, generally 
considered to be a good employer. There were also digger drivers, caretakers, mechanics and 
machinery operators. Prior to the civil disturbance of 1997, employment in this sector provided 
a regular income for about 25% of the families surveyed. Approximately half were women who 
worked in the Italian shoe factory in Shkoder where wages were as low as $l/day for a 27 day 
working month. These were usurious rates which created resentment in the workforce. As the 
security situation worsened in early 1997 the Italian proprietor refused to pay protection 
money to a local gangster. Consequently the factory was destroyed by disgruntled elements 
of the workforce who sold the machinery for scrap. Those made unemployed received the 
equivalent of $ 16/month for 1 year.
With competition so great, access to employment in this sector was never simple. When the 
Italian shoe factory opened in 1989 one man stated that he gave 10 kilo of fish, worth at that 
time the equivalent of 4 days' pay, to an official in the employment department. A more recent 
example was that of Hajdar Shkembi (ref. §6.7), the Malaj DP representative, a member of the 
former village council and an employee of the electrical enterprise. Hajdar used his relationship 
with the head of the electrical company, a fellow DP member, to have a number of vacancies 
in the enterprise filled by unemployed Malaj men. By showing how linkage to the DP could 
directly benefit people, Hajdar believed he was behind the party's successful showing in the
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1996 national elections where 750 out of 846 Malaj villagers voted for the party. As will be 
further discussed, Hajdar was also creating a body of support to be called on to assist him 
politically and commercially. Participation and inclusion in networks which provided 
information and preferential treatment were essential to gaining employment in this sector and 
again illustrates the embedded nature of economic organisation.
7.4.3 The Informal Sector: Informal sector employment primarily revolved around the 
construction industry. The building of residential and commercial property was the main use 
to which savings were put. Buildings constructed during the communist period were poorly 
designed and small. Families sought to improve their living conditions as soon as they were 
able. Pressure on accommodation was made worse by the steady influx of migrants. These 
factors had created a strong demand for the construction of apartments and houses. The 
increase in trade had created a need for commercial premises. Construction had become the 
major economic activity of the region. As was described in Chapter 3, it provided work for 
specialist businesses such as steel fabrication, joinery, electricians and haulage contractors. In 
addition to this there was a demand for a range of building supplies.
The demand for building labour was considerable. Along with remittances and the sale of 
agricultural produce, the income earned by skilled and unskilled labour in construction 
activities was important to many villagers. The most skilled tradesmen were plasterers and 
masons followed by carpenters and then labourers. Rates in the city and the villages differed. 
During 1996 the rate in the city for unskilled labour was $2/day and for skilled labour it was 
$6/day. Skilled labour could charge about $4/day in the villages. Surprisingly the rioting in the 
spring of 1997 did not stop the construction of houses and premises. It was a useful way to 
launder illegal gains. It provided a more secure way to maintain ownership of savings and 
prevented their value being eroded by inflation. In 1997 labour differentials increased 
significantly. Unskilled labour fetched around $3/day while the demand for skilled labour was 
exceeding its supply. Skilled labour was able to command $7/day in the village and 
occasionally up to $ 12/day in the town.
Xhqfer Selimi was 58. He moved to Malaj in 1994 borrowing $4,500from his cousin in order 
to build a house. This debt was being repaid at about $35/month. Since there was no work for 
his three sons he had brought them together to form a construction team. His eldest son was 
following his footsteps as a mason/plasterer and was gradually taking over the skilled work.
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The other two boys acted as labourers. Xhafer’s position in the market was dependant upon 
his reputation. He had been a plasterer for 40 years. He was known as a skilled craftsman 
and for being honest. He never filched building materials. People came to him because o f his 
good reputation. In 1996/7 the team earned about $2,000 which had to support 9 people. 
About half their work was in Malaj and half elsewhere in the region.
A consequence of the increased demand for labour in the construction industry was the 
reduction of labour available for agricultural work. In Gura this was reflected in a demand for 
casual agricultural labour where none had existed before. Poorer villagers were able to earn 
$2/day on a fairly regular basis working the land of people employed in the city. However in 
Malaj the supply of labour was high, particularly amongst young women who undertook sub­
subcontracted work stitching footwear. The price payed to subcontractors was $15 per 100 
pairs (a week’s work) who then got the stitching done by unemployed young women for half 
the price they were paid to do the work.
7.5 Small Businesses:
The neo-liberal rhetoric is that in the deregulated environment of a post-communist polity small 
businesses will flourish to form the backbone of national prosperity. In order to examine the 
extent to which this was so, I now look at small businesses as they were seen to operate in the 
two villages. The main prerequisites for small business development are appropriate skills, a 
certain level of capital, the capacity to take risks, the ability to forge new types of relations and 
a demand for the supply of the good or service. Additionally there is a requirement for a basic 
level of security and law and order (see Lawson and Saltmarshe 2000). There were a diverse 
range of enterprises in the villages. These are now discussed so as to illustrate their potential 
and the factors constraining their development. The subject of credit is dealt with separately.
Small businesses included bicycle repair, shoe making, shops, stalls, restaurants, bars, a 
butcher, fishing, a bakery, tractor hire, furniture making, TV repair, steel fabrication, haulage, 
taxis, boat building, net making, joinery, hairdressing and the marketing of agricultural 
produce. The skills of woodworking, bicycle repair, TV repair, shoe making and tractor 
driving were acquired during the communist period. Apart from bicycle repair, these skills 
were taught by means of either full or part-time vocational training courses. The colleges 
providing such education had ground to a halt by 1990. In recent years courses in agriculture,
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building skills, automotive repair and hairdressing had been established in Shkoder but I was 
aware of only one young person in the two villages who was currently attending such a course. 
In the case of hairdressing, the qualification for enrollment was membership of the ex-political 
prisoner's association. To attend the construction school it was necessary to obtain one of the 
places allotted to each commune. This required either a payment to the Commune Director or 
direct negotiation with, and payment to, the school director. The value of training was widely 
recognised within the villages. Those who had skills had more secure and better paid jobs than 
those who were reliant upon casual labour.
In Gura, the marketing of smallholder produce provided a significant proportion of income for 
many families. Some sought to maximise their capacity to produce vegetables, dairy products 
and meat for sale in the market, while others saw their interests being best served by becoming 
predominantly engaged in wage labour. In the case of the latter their land contributed towards 
keeping them self-sufficient in foodstuffs. As the events of 1997 showed, the capacity to grow 
food and keep animals provided an economic cushion which was particularly valuable in times 
of crisis. If intensively used, three denims (0.8 acres) of good irrigated land and free ranged 
livestock was just sufficient to provide for the needs of a single family. The average holding 
in Gura was 3.71 denim, but not all was good soil nor was there universally good access to 
irrigation water. Only those few who had secure employment with the state chose not to give 
a high priority to cultivating their land. The majority depended upon an income from their 
marketed surplus. Usually milk from the cow or goats would be retained as a source of protein 
for the family and crop surpluses sold. Marketing was generally undertaken by individual 
families but with preferential transport arrangements being made between fis  members. The 
choice of whether to sell to wholesalers or in the street was dependent on time pressures 
confronting families. In 1996 leading members of one fis/mehalla had secured a lucrative 
agreement to supply produce to traders from the highlands. Members of the fis  pooled their 
land and labour to form a cooperative and by means of intensive techniques of cultivation were 
able to earn as much as $2,500/hectare. This trade collapsed as a result of the general 
insecurity which persisted through 1997.
The situation in Malaj was very different. There was very little land available for cultivation. 
Some dried and marketed a few figs. The poorest families sold their surplus grapes. Goats and 
sheep grazed on the mountainside. These animals were used by a few to invest their savings 
to be cashed as needs demanded. Fishing had been Malaj’s primary industry. During the
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communist period access to the fishery was confined to the state fishing enterprise. Problems 
of over fishing started to occur after 1991. Although only 150 fishing licences were granted, 
many people took fish from the lake using fine mesh nets, explosives and electricity. Weak 
regulation and lax enforcement resulted in the lake being overfished. In 1993 the assets of the 
former state fishing enterprise were sold on preferential terms to a group of ex-political 
prisoners, much to the anger of many Malaj fisherman. The arrangements made by the ex- 
political prisoners to supply an Italian company collapsed due to persistent problems obtaining 
sufficient quality and quantity of fish. Those who fished legally in Malaj had unsuccessfully 
tried to prevent non-licenced fishing through the courts and by lobbying the government in 
Tirana. Concern was also expressed in Malaj about pollution of the lake by sewage, waste and 
animals. The meagre livelihood produced by fishing and the constant problem of net stealing 
had resulted in a steady drift away from the activity. Nevertheless in 1997 the catching and 
marketing of fish still provided a source of income for 20% of the Malaj survey sample. In 
addition two families derived income from boat building and one from net making. The lake 
was fast becoming depleted and many former fishermen had turned to other forms of economic 
activity, chief amongst which was cross-border trading. Frequently it was the cost of replacing 
stolen nets which pushed fishermen to seek other means of income generation.
Where the state is incapable of regulating, allocating and enforcing the use of a common 
property resource (CPR) then the resource comes under pressure. The problems associated 
with the management of this fishery illustrated the complexities involved in the maintenance 
and stability of a CPR in such circumstances. The resource was being destroyed by crowding 
and overuse. The size of the fishery and the extent of coordination required to organise and 
coordinate issues of allocation, monitoring and policing was beyond the capacity of the 
communities claiming rights to the resource. In order to prevent its continuing degradation 
there was a need for new institutions, achieving a policy consensus among users and then 
monitoring and sanctioning free riders (cf. Ostrom 1990:42).
Other products of the commons were used in Malaj. There was a medicinal herb (sherbil) 
which grew on the mountain and was picked, usually by women and children, to be dried and 
sold on for export. Animals were grazed on the mountainside and wood was scavenged from 
forests. However sherbil, grazing and timber were resources which required a high labour input 
to exploit them and none were valuable enough to be overused. Their management and 
regulation did not present a problem to village residents and users.
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The marketing of local production be it vegetables, meat, dairy products or fish was important 
to the survival of a large proportion of families in these two villages. Although the technologies 
used were rudimentary, the skills and long hours required to a make a success of these 
activities were considerable. Additionally villagers had to develop marketing strategies and 
market relations. However the production and sale of primary products provided barely 
sufficient to survive. The more enterprising individuals therefore sought to move beyond 
primary production and wage labour by adding value to products, applying a skill or providing 
a service. Such individuals perceived the benefits offered by the market, gave careful 
consideration about investing their resources and then took the risk of starting a business.
The emphasis of NEE on the qualitative aspects of economic activity and the role of networks 
provides the theoretical setting by means of which this economic activity can be analysed. 
Success could be seen to be linked to the embedded nature of economic processes and was 
closely connected to the ability to create networks of trust. Three examples are provided which 
illustrate how economic interactions are an extension of social constructions and cannot be 
divorced from them. The first is that of the 45 year old butcher in Malaj whose success was 
to a large part due to his membership of a socio-economic institution called the zadruga (see 
Moseley 1976) or communal joint family.
A former steel worker, ArifMejdani was one o f three brothers, all o f whom were married and 
lived in the same house. They were one o f the only families in Malaj which had a reasonable 
amount o f cultivable land: one denim in the village (1/10 hectare) plus one denim ofpasture 
land on the mountain. Each contributed to tending the land and livestock which produced 
all their food with the exception o f items such as flour and sugar.
Each brother had a trade. One was a partner in a Shkoder joinery business. One had earned 
enough money cross border trading to buy a minibus which he was operating between 
Shkoder and Tirana. Arif had expanded his trade as a butcher. He supplied the needs o f the 
village and some o f its restaurants. He bought suckled calves from families in Malaj and 
neighbouring villages. These private sources were supplemented by purchases at the Sunday 
livestock market in Shkoder. He bought animals to meet orders and sold what remained to 
regular customers.
The consumption o f meat was a good indicator o f the strength o f the economy. I f people had
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disposable income, meat was one o f the first things they bought. Nevertheless cash flow was 
always a problem for Arif In 1995 he was killing 5 calves and 10 sheep a week In 1997 he 
was killing just three calves a week. Arifs business was highly dependent upon networks o f 
sellers and buyers. He needed to have comprehensive information about who kept animals 
and to maintain regular contact with them. He also needed to cultivate his customers. 
Personal relations were vital to the development o f this business. Arif was an extremely 
affable individual and also a very shrewd one. In a quiet way he was one o f the leaders o f 
the community. He was one o f those who accompanied the kryeplak to petition the Bashkia 
for improvements to the school.
Arif provides a good example of how a skill had been developed to form the basis of a business 
which required relatively modest working capital. The success of his business revolved around 
his ability to create and maintain networks in order to cultivate and capitalise upon social 
resources (ref. RPA §5.4.1). In order to create these networks he had to be trusted to produce 
a good product, to strike a fair bargain and to settle his debts promptly. His approach to capital 
accumulation was to minimise costs by utilising the joint use of family labour, the sharing of 
resources and intra family credit arrangements. The production of food from land and livestock 
by the zadruga resulted in very low outgoings. External to the joint family, Arif had gained a 
degree of status in the community which could be understood as being composed of trust and 
respect. This case provides an example of what is classified as a cultural resource in the RP 
approach. Arif s ability to capitalise on this resource allowed him to establish relations with a 
diverse range of people and was an important factor in the success of his business. Where 
cultural resources in the form of trust and reputation did not sufficiently exist, then despite the 
availability of capital, success was seen to be elusive, as can be seen in the following example.
A bakery was started in May 1996 by Rifat Mehmeti the 31 year old brother o f the head of 
a Gura mehalla. Rifat has spent a few years working in Greece. He returned to Gura with 
what in local terms was a considerable amount o f money. He married an attractive young 
woman by whom he had a son. He wanted to use his money to start a business. Bread was 
brought to Gura every day from Shkoder and sold with a 25% mark up. Rifatjudged that a 
good profit could be gained by producing bread to supply the needs o f Gura and its 
neighbouring villages. He built and equipped a small bakery for about $6,000, a substantial 
sum in village terms. The business started in May and folded in July. He employed an 
experienced baker and after initial teething problems he produced 500 loaves a day giving
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a turnover o f $1,400/week. However the success o f the enterprise was based on the 
assumption that his fis  would buy their breadfrom him. With this guaranteed base o f sales 
Rifat believed that after some predatory pricing he would be able to capture the market for 
bread in the locality. What he did not adequately realise, until too late, was how much he was 
despised by his fis. On one level they were wary o f the non-traditional values and attitudes 
he had absorbed while in Greece. More significantly he was under a cloud because o f his 
amorous attachment to the wife o f his cousin (i.e. the son o f his father's brother). This affair 
appalled the village. It had brought disgrace upon the fis. ‘How can the blood of a fis  be 
good if one o f its members falls in love with his cousin's wife? ” I  was asked The matter was 
perceived as one verging on incest rather than adultery. How was it possible to do this to 
someone who was tantamount to a brother? Rifat's fis  fe lt this shame and declined to buy his 
bread thus causing the business to fo ld
Such was the power of attachment to village norms and concepts of honour. This story 
illustrates the exclusionary and sanctioning aspect of social capital. Even though its role was 
diminishing, the fis  remained a source of social solidarity and still retained the capacity of 
quietly wreaking vengeance on those who violated its codes. This instance demonstrated how 
success required more than financial and human capital. It required a respect for tradition and 
the ability to cultivate a range of relationships and thus demonstrates the vital importance of 
cultural resources (ref. RPA §5.4.1) as reflected in status, and of social resources, as reflected 
in networks, in facilitating the successful development of a business venture. The way in which 
social and cultural resources were successfully utilised was illustrated by the case of 38 year 
old Musa Lushaj, the wealthiest and most powerful man in Malaj. His profile is one which 
illustrates the balance between honour and competitiveness and the relationship between status 
and pragmatism needed for success in the context of post-communist north Albania.
Musa spoke nostalgically o f how Malaj had been a tightly knit community. As a young man 
he used to play football for Shkoder. He was very close to his parents and ensured they lacked 
for nothing. They in turn helped him in various ways. He complained about how the village 
had been changed by newcomers who valued the fis  more than the village community. 
Nevertheless because o f his status in Malaj, which was linked to his success in business, he 
gave double when paying visits on the occasion o f a life event taking place in a village family 
(see §7.8).
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Musa had the most prestigious restaurant/bar in the village which produced a stated profit 
o f $600/month. He had worked hard, taken risks and lobbied intensively for what he had 
achieved. After school he had trained and worked as an electrician. During the 1980s he 
fished illegally at night in order to supplement his income. After the 1991 collapse he 
smuggledpetrol into Yugoslavia making between $5-10,000. This was important capital. He 
set about negotiating the purchase o f land formerly owned by M s family on which had been 
constructed a hotel/restaurant. An active member o f the DP in its early days, he used his 
contacts with them to assist him in the purchase o f the property when state assets were being 
privatised He was able to negotiate its purchase in 1995for the very reasonable price o f 
$5,700.
Having acquired a dilapidatedproperty, Musa required a further $50,000for refurbishment, 
furnishings and stock. Access to loans through the formal banking sector was impractical. 
The high interests charged in the private capital market made this source suitable for only 
very short term loans. So rather than seek assistance from his fis with the pressures, 
obligations and leverages entailed, he chose to enter an 8 year profit sharing partnership with 
a Shkoderfriend, each putting up half the required capital. Musa raised his share from within 
his own and his wife's families. To purchase and operate his business had required regular 
contact with regional officials in the offices o f privatisation, licensing and commerce. 
Although he stated he never gave bribes, he spent a considerable amount in hospitality.
Musa had avoided involving Jus fis in the business since they would demand higher pay than 
others and there could be problems with discipline. Musa's contact with his fis was thus 
purely social. He went out o f his way to be generous to them and gave about $600/year in 
gifts and assistance. These donations were a way o f buying distance. As friendships were 
becoming more important, the role o f the fis  had changed. Although his brother, a local 
fisherman, was the person to whom he said he was closest, this was belied by other comments 
he made about the role of friendship andfamily. The relationship he had with his brother had 
become primarily social. The fish his brother gave him were accepted as a token rather than 
as something needed by the restaurant. Musa's success had disturbed a rather delicate 
equilibrium. What Musa called "friends" were a varied set o f relationships, ostensibly social 
in character but with important economic implications. He invested much time and energy 
in this network. Most o f these friends were from Shkoder. He regretted how the market 
economy was dictating relationships. He spoke sadly o f a close boyhood friend with whom
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he used to do everything. They used to meet everyday to chat and spend time together but now 
with all the pressure on him they were lucky to meet once a month. He observed how 
increased income differentiation had created an unspoken division between people. He 
regretted this but saw it as inevitable as each man tended his own interests.
Customers came to his restaurant to enjoy good food and a pleasant atmosphere. In order to 
provide these Musa had concentrated on recruiting and training good staff selected solely on 
the basis o f quality and trustworthiness. Most came from Shkoder. His cook was trained in 
Italy. The other staff were trained by an expert in the hotel trade. The inability o f government 
to maintain an effective rule of law during 1997 had reduced his turnover by half. He wanted 
to expand the restaurant and hotel facilities as well as build a new house for himself. 
However he was not prepared make any investment in the climate o f political and economic 
insecurity which was then prevailing.
This example demonstrates how a perceptive man harnessed his energy and ambition to realise 
his goals. He innately understood the way in which markets were socially and politically 
mediated and made full use of this knowledge. As he observed the development of politics in 
post-communist Albania he judged it best to become politically unaligned. He carried into his 
business dealings many of the values of the old Malaj. Unlike the other Malaj restaurant owner 
who had close contacts with the mafia, he eschewed bribery on principle. Although a self- 
confessed atheist, Musa's adherence to the moral precepts of besa gave him status and 
authority in the village. The respect and status Musa gained from being known as a man who 
respected the cultural values of the community was further enhanced by his generosity.
This case study also illustrates a negative aspect of social capital. Communal solidarity, as 
represented by the fis  and the networks of trust which existed in the village, were the means 
by which claims could be made on Musa for assistance and employment. His generosity was 
means of buying distance from the village community as well as maintaining his status. He was 
aware that not to select his employees on merit was likely to result in poorer service to 
customers and that there could be complications in disciplining and dismissing^ members 
should he employ them. Bounded solidarity and reciprocal obligations, of which social capital 
is in part composed, can present an impediment to business and growth and expansion if free 
riders have to be carried or if the quality of the product or service is diminished (cf. Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1998:141).
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When things became more stable, as Musa was sure would be the case, he intended to proceed 
with the expansion of his business interests. However while Musa had a range of resources 
which enabled him to ride a difficult period, this was not so for others. The absence of security 
and the resurgence of the blood feud was a serious constraint on commercial activity. Inter­
regional trade had shrivelled. The dependency on cash as a result of the absence of a banking 
system further hampered business development. In such circumstances it was not illogical to 
turn to the mafia gangs for support and protection.
7.6 Illegal and Extralegal Activity:
While external support has been provided to assist in the creation of a legislative framework 
consonant with a market democracy, from the evidence gathered during this research, that is 
until 1997, little effort had been made to promote or enforce those reforms which had been 
enacted. This could be attributed to the extensive corruption taking place at the heart of 
government which had percolated down to Deputies and to most, if not all, government 
institutions. The formal economy had been undermined by the failure of government to enact 
a constitution, the lack of enforcement of existing regulations and low levels of infrastructure 
development. Within the context of uncertainty, weak and inconsistent regulation, the absence 
of a banking system, participation in the formal economy offered little attraction to all but a 
few individuals who had close links with government. As a consequence the economic vitality 
of post-communist Albania largely derived from short term extralegal commercial dealings. 
This was noted by Wortman (1995:5) as having serious negative implications for long term 
political and economic stability. Little did he know how right he was.
There has always been an illegal element in post-communist Albania. While Albania had been 
the destination for vehicles stolen from western Europe since 1991, illegal activity grew rapidly 
from 1993 and pervaded the whole economy5. Large amounts were made through breaking 
sanctions on Serbia, particularly by the supply of fuel, until international pressure eventually 
forced the Albanian government to halt such activities. There was a mushrooming of organised
Police investigations of car theft revealed that dozens of luxury cars used by high-ranking Albanian government 
officials were stolen in Italy or Germany. Investigators suspected that government officials had requested to buy 
cars from legal importers at market prices but then bought cheaper, stolen cars on the used car market in Durres, 
pocketing the substantial difference. (RFE 26/1/98)
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crime. The Albanian "mafias” forged links with those in Italy. So pervasive was organised 
crime in Albania that it was hard to see how its activities could take place without the tacit 
knowledge of government. The mafias were particularly active in smuggling illegal immigrants, 
both from Albania and countries further east, into the European Union. Even before the state 
collapse of 1997, arms and drugs were smuggled through the country with comparative ease. 
The collapse of government power in 1997 saw organised crime taking to piracy in the Straits 
of Corfu. Gangs even committed robberies on Corfu itself (Guardian 12/5/97). There were 
reports of large areas in southern Albania being planted to marijuana with the crop being 
marketed by Italian mafias.
The vast majority of villagers were law abiding people, however there were a number of 
unemployed and disaffected young men who caused trouble. Cattle rustling was widespread. 
A cow was usually the highest value asset a Gura villager would own. In Gura there were two 
or three men known to be part of a cattle rustling gang. In 1996 members of this gang had 
been arrested on a murder charge. On payment of a bribe the police had released them "owing 
to lack of evidence". After their ascendency in the spring of 1997, Gura was under the strict 
control of the Sokol clan who acted as law makers and enforcers. However prior to this the 
prevalence of armed robbery was a constant cause of concern to Gura villagers. In Malaj much 
money had been made by smuggling fuel to Yugoslavia. Capital so accumulated enabled a 
number of villagers to improve their standard of living and, as in the case of Musa Lushaj, to 
develop their business interests. With the general breakdown of law and order in 1997 there 
had been widespread looting of military hardware. One small time crook from Malaj was 
smuggling guns and ammunition into Montenegro. Apart from these instances there was no 
other evidence of villagers receiving direct benefit from illegal activities.
However what could be termed extra-legal activities formed an important part of the economy, 
particularly in Malaj where 20% of the sample surveyed were involved in cross-border trading, 
mostly on a regular basis. It was a strategy that men turned to with reluctance. While it was 
not without its uncertainty and perils, smuggling could produce a far better income than could 
be gained through working in the local labour market. As soon as villagers had accumulated 
sufficient resources for their needs they tended to stop this form of trading. Such was the case 
with one of the Mejdani brothers (§7.5) who bought a taxi. Income from smuggling formed 
a significant part of the regional economy. Cross-border smugglers were actually incorporated 
into the employment statistics issued by the Shkoder Bashkia in 1996 where 1,900 people
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(4.6% of the workforce) were recorded as earning a living by this means (see Appendix 4).
Ismet had enjoyed being afisherman for almost thirty years. When the fishing enterprise was 
privatised he lost his job and was tenable to find a dependable source o f income so he turned 
to cross border trading. He did so with reluctance for it was a gruelling and dangerous 
existence but there was no other way he could realistically provide for his family. Like the 
other Malaj villagers involved in this trade, Ismet specialised in selling toys and other goods 
for children. The sellers o f these items usually escaped the attention o f the police who tended 
to be primarily concerned with the sellers o f higher value products such as cigarettes or 
cosmetics. Ten Malaj traders had banded together and rented a house in Montenegro which 
they used as a base for their activities. They crossed the frontier at night in groups o f two or 
three either on foot or by boat. They sold their goods individually. I f trade was good Ismet 
could clear his stock in a day; though with increasing political tension and the deteriorating 
economy in Montenegro, the market in 1997 had tightened so that selling his goods could 
take up to 5 days.
The police kept a close watch on the contraband trade. When offenders were caught they were 
usually beaten up, fined and had their goods confiscated Over the period o f a year Ismet had 
been caught and fined twice. Losses so incurred took a number o f trips to make good but 
there was a steady trade for children's toys throughout the year. The constraints on the 
Yugoslav economy had meant that such non-essential items were not imported to a degree 
sufficient to meet demand Ismet has developed a relationship with a Tirana wholesaler who 
had become a "friend”. He gave Ismet a particularly favourable price on his goods which 
could be returned if damaged and would also give him credit.
One man could carry about $150 worth o f goods. After deduction o f transport costs and other 
expenses he made a net profit o f20-30%. I f a man kept going and avoided trouble he could 
earn about $3,000per year which was around double what an entire average family was able 
to earn in the Shkoder region - i f  its members could find work. Since there were no other 




Integral to the development of a flourishing market economy are the intertwined features of 
credit and contract law. Without a body of civil law which provides a framework within which
I credit can be offered, there is little incentive to offer credit. The Albanian financial system was
| bedevilled by a weak legal framework, inconsistent judgements and a lack of publici
| understanding of the principal of foreclosure on collateral. Where credit had been given, 
non-performing loans were the rule rather than the exception. Furthermore the banking system 
was underdeveloped with no private banks and only a few joint venture banks which primarily 
acted as a facility to transfer currency rather than for deposits and credits. As a consequence 
all transactions were made in cash, even payment of state salaries (see Wortman 1995).
For these and other reasons transactions undertaken in the villages of this study were made by 
cash or barter. The absence of credit is a characteristic of low income economies and is one 
of the features which impedes their development. Prior to the events of 1997, credit was 
theoretically available through the National Bank. Applications for small business development 
loans required the loan-seeker to ask the Commune Director to apply to the bank on his behalf. 
If his recommendation was accepted then negotiations could start directly between the bank 
and credit applicant. Relatively cheap formal loans (20% p.a.) were thus available. They would 
be for a maximum of two years and given only to those with strong political contacts. Up until 
the end of the research in late 1997 no villager was known to have received such a loan. 
Informal credit was available in Shkoder but interest rates were very high (120% p.a.) and the 
compounding of interest made them suitable only for short term bridging loans. They were not 
applicable to the situation of small holder farming although one or two individuals in Malaj had 
made limited use of them.
A number of small loans were made in the villages. Where they took place in Gura it was 
betweenfis members. In Malaj, though loans were usually made within the fis, they were also 
made between neighbours. In one instance an "old” Catholic family had become very good 
friends with a "new” Muslim family who had moved in next to them. A member of the "old” 
Catholic family needed a serious operation. The new neighbours gave them an interest free 
loan of $500 with repayment deferred for three years. Such loans are best categorised with in 
a community context as being a part of the moral economy rather than under the label of 
formal credit. They served to reinforce relations within bounded communities and strengthened 
social bonds. No interest free personal loans given for the purpose of business expansion were
180
encountered, making the type of loan given in this example all the more interesting.
As has been described, the fis  and the vllazni provided the main source of support for villagers, 
be it financial or otherwise. They were the source for the more sizeable loans to be used in land 
purchase or for house construction. Although it was by no means uncommon for fairly 
substantial loans of say $5,000 to be made within the fis  to enable a family to migrate from the 
mountains and start to build a house, loans were increasingly being confined to the vllazni 
rather than cousins and the wider fis . The principal feature of all these loans was that interest 
was never paid. It was not unlikely that the obligations created by the acceptance of a loan 
were becoming of less value to the creditor than the alternative uses to which the money could 
be put. Hence the decline in loans betweenfis  members. As one man said "Ihave only a social 
relationship with my uncles and cousins (the vllazni). I  would not go to them to borrow 
money. Only your brothers and your children will help you financially”.
Many individuals were thus coming to use ’’friendships" as a preferred source of credit. 
Arrangements thus made were more straightforward and carried none of the obligations they 
would have done if the fis  was used. Yet for many the bonds of blood were the only ones 
which could be trusted. I encountered only one instance of debt default within a fis. So it 
should not have been a surprise to see traditional norms and values integrated into credit 
relations, as indeed they were:
Given security and stability there was plenty ofpotential for tourist development in Malaj. 
Hajdar Shkembi (mentioned above as a worker in the electricity enterprise and DP supporter) 
sought to benefit from this potential by building and operating a cafe/restaurant in 
partnership with one of his brothers and a close friend They had put together $50,000 to 
cover construction and fitting out. The partnership came about because the Shkembi brothers 
did not have sufficient funds. They also needed the involvement o f another fis since the 
success o f the enterprise depended upon fis  and friends providing core custom (the lack o f 
which caused the failure o f the Gura bakery). The brothers were able to achieve this sum 
through entering into partnership with a close friend Since there was no enforceable law o f 
contract, the signing o f any formal agreement was meaningless, yet it was essential to all 
parties to feel secure in their arrangement. The solution to the problem lay in tradition. 
Hajdar became godfather to his friend’s son. This created an indissoluble relationship. The 
ceremony o f becoming a godparent involves being the first person to cut the hair o f a child
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This makes the men as brothers and prohibits intermarriage between the families. Hajdar
described this as an old Muslim custom. In fact it is an ancient Albanian custom. The Kanun
f
states:“The Godparent of first haircut: Godfatherhood/motherhood... belongs to those legal 
bonds which are indissoluble... forbids intermarriage generation after generation between 
the fam ilies” (Gjecov 1989:144). “The godfather/mother are considered as brother and 
sister, and are treated as members o f each others families. ” (ibid p. 145). The Godfather cuts 
the hair in the following order: a lock on the forehead, one from each temple and one from 
the nape o f the neck. He then wishes the child a long and healthy life, kisses him and gives 
him to his mother. In the absence o f an enforceable civil contract, start-up capital for the 
business was arranged by means o f this type o f agreement. For good measure the partners 
also slaughtered a sheep on the building site before construction began.
From the standpoint of classical economic theory the use of such strategies to combat credit 
scarcity are somewhat cumbersome and inefficient. From a sociological perspective it 
represents an ingenious approach to making economic arrangements in an uncertain 
environment where trust is in short supply. It provides an example of where in lieu of effective 
formal institutions, informal institutions are used. While such arrangements were not common, 
the principle of creating partnerships specifically for the business development was being 
increasingly used. The practice served more to solve problems of credit rather than to dilute 
risk. Musa Lushaj (§7.6), the Malaj restaurateur, used a profit sharing arrangement to gain 
access to capital. The partnership arrangement he entered into was structured so that he would 
have full control of his business after eight years. Partnerships were also commonly used by 
Malaj fishermen. It enabled the investment required for the purchase and maintenance of a 
boat, outboard and nets to be shared by two or three people and produce a livelihood for each 
of them.
7.8 Income from State and Community:
The Malaj survey revealed the extent to which the state was providing welfare payments and 
pensions. While payments were low, they were received by most members of the community. 
Around 90% of Malaj households were receiving a state payment of some sort. There were 
state pensions, disability benefits, unemployment pay, food compensation payments, a 
supplement for persecuted families, ex-political prisoner’s pension, maternity benefit and social 
assistance. The largest amount paid was for social assistance. While the extent of government
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support to this peri-urban community might be surprising, what gave cause for concern was 
that for about 38% of those surveyed in Malaj, government payments provided the main source 
of income. Without this support some families would have suffered acute privation. The 
situation in Gura differed as a result of families having received allocations of agricultural land 
on which they were able to grow food. About 16% of Gura families received social assistance 
compared with 32% in Malaj.
Markets in food and fuel had been completely liberalised by 1995. However the government 
was paying a food compensation payment in 1997 of about $2.5/month to eligible claimants 
from non-rural communities such as Malaj. What was also revealed by the Malaj survey was 
the extent of non-payment of electricity bills. Three families (5%) of the survey sample were 
paying their bills, of which two had members working for the electricity enterprise. Initially the 
poorest families stopped paying these bills in 1994. Electricity prices were raised to meet 
production costs. By 1996 the average monthly electricity bill was half the average social 
assistance payment. As a consequence increasing numbers of families stopped paying for their 
electricity. Widespread non-payment began in autumn 1996. In January 1998 the Albanian 
Energy Corporation reported customer debts for electricity amounted to $52 million (about 
15% of GDP). The largest debtors were state-owned companies and private households. (RFE 
12/1/98). This non-payment of bills represented a form of resistance to the state. As increasing 
numbers refused to pay, it proved politically impossible for the government to cut supplies to 
defaulters. Thus the state became burdened with providing another subsidy. However without 
this extensive range of state support the more vulnerable families in both these communities 
would have been in great trouble. The problem for the state was poor targeting of assistance.
The other important source of support in village communities was the tradition of giving gifts. 
On the occasion of a birth, death, marriage or serious illness, villagers would visit the house 
in question, pay their respects and leave a sum of money. The amount was carefully noted and 
was usually exactly reciprocated when a similar event occurred in the donor’s house. This 
system of social support served two main functions. Firstly, it provided financial support at a 
time when there was a high level of need. Secondly, it was a means of promoting solidarity on 
a community wide basis and as such provides a good example of social capital building.
As we have seen in the cases of Frasheri (§6.3) and Shkembi (§6.2.3), visiting, paying respects 
and donating a sum of money were an important means of participating in village society and
183
becoming accepted by it. Visiting was a way of sharing of happiness and sadness on the one 
hand and a way of providing practical assistance on the other. The average expenditure on gifts 
in Malaj was remarkably similar between income categories with families donating just under 
3% of their total income (Lawson et al. 1999:29). In the case of one family in which a child 
was bom, it received $130 to help cover the immediate costs associated with the birth. Those 
who did not participate in this ritual were generally excluded from such support when a life 
event took place in their own house. This meant that the most needy families tended to receive 
less assistance. Anything given to them was as charity. Their inability to reciprocate reinforced 
their lack of status and deepened their exclusion.
There was also what could be termed self-exclusioa There were a very few cases where newly 
arrived families would not or could not make the efforts to assimilate undertaken by those such 
as the Frasheri and Shkembi families (referred to in the previous paragraph). As such their 
behaviour (also referred to in 6.2.3) fitted closely to the paradigm described by Banfield (1958) 
as amoral familism or an inability to concert activity beyond the family. It appeared that certain 
personal characteristics, perhaps reinforced by reputation, would contribute to an extended or 
joint family living an isolated existence within the village, eschewing the networking 
possibilities provided by membership of village society and being unwilling or unable to act in 
concert with other villagers. Their vision of social and economic life was confined to achieving 
narrow short-run advantage, part of which was to avoid the expenses involved in participating 
in the custom of reciprocal visiting.
7.9 Corruption:
Bardhan (1997:1321) defines corruption as "the use of public office for private gain, where an 
official (the agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in 
some sort of malfeasance for private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal". 
However the notion of corruption, as defined here, excludes many discriminatory and 
preferential practises which also distort the operation of the market, not the least of which 
being the growth in the influence of organised crime. There was also the problem of a-legal 
behaviour arising from a poorly developed civil and criminal code. Examples which illustrate 
the extent of the abuse of public position and how it affected the public are now presented. It 
is hard to recall an instance where some form of rent was not being charged by a state 
employee.
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Charges by health personnel received the most attention. Doctors would require to be paid $5 
for a visit to a hospital bed and the nurse required $2 a day. Even the gatekeeper to the 
hospital would get a tip. Failure to pay these unsolicited amounts would result in patients not 
receiving best quality or timely attention. Entry to a popular educational establishment could 
incur a payment. A newly qualified teacher whose family remained without work because her 
family could not afford the $500 (10 months pay) demanded by Rreth and Commune officials. 
University tutors required payment for anything but the briefest tutorial. A Malaj woman with 
spinal problems had poor mobility and was unable to work. She applied for a disability pension. 
She was awarded a pension of $23/month upon payment of $233 (ten months benefit) to the 
medical panel making the award. An acquaintance paid a regular sum to a "friend" in the post 
office to ensure that his mail was delivered safely. As a matter of routine payments were made 
to state employees either to ensure the delivery of a service or as a means to obtain preferment 
in some way or other.
While anger was expressed about the excessive venality of the medical profession and disgust 
with the pliability of the police force, where it was possible to obtain money from the state the 
ordinary citizen was not averse to doing so. Social assistance was being received by those who 
had steady income flows, who had substantial land holdings and in one case a car. In order to 
receive a maternity benefit payment of $200 (eligible to those employed in the formal sector), 
in the early stage of his wife's pregnancy one man paid $55 to a firm to register her as being 
formally employed by them. The state was seen as a source of largesse to be tapped in every 
way possible.
In the following chapter the organisational and political issues relating to the decollectivisation 
and privatisation of state assets are discussed in some detail. Suffice to note here that local 
government institutions were heavily involved in corrupt practice, the income from which 
provided substantial benefits to the then governing party. These practices served to further 
undermine the public's regard of government. The absence of a sense of ownership in the state 
and the widespread lack of respect for the institution can also be interpreted as part of the 
overhang of political attitudes, social relations and economic management deriving from the 
communist past (cf. Stark 1992:8).
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7.10 The Household:
Of all the institutions existing in these villages, virtually every respondent would claim that the 
family was the most important. Families presented themselves to the outsider as a unified 
grouping. The family was an important, if not vital, resource for its members, yet it was also 
arena of tension aptly described by Sen (1984:369) as a zone of cooperative conflict. How 
household members in the two villages have responded to choice and the influence of market 
forces forms the substance of this section.
Gura's economy was predominantly agricultural. All but a few of the more wealthy households 
were heavily dependent on their land and livestock. Needs beyond what could be provided 
from the land were purchased from the earnings of males, most commonly from casual work. 
Agricultural practice was characterised by the sexual division of labour with men usually being 
responsible for ploughing, cultivating and irrigation while women would undertake sowing, 
hoeing, harvesting and milking. Since ploughing and cultivating were usually undertaken by 
a contractor with a horse or tractor, most of the agricultural tasks on family plots were 
undertaken by women who also often marketed surplus production in the town. Children were 
extensively used to take animals to pasture and watch over them. The work of running the 
house was undertaken entirely by women. It was customary for men to control the family 
finances.
In Malaj fishing provided an income for only about 20% of households. There were a few small 
businesses in the village. The remaining households depended on earnings from sources outside 
the village. Most men worked as casual labourers and a significant number were involved in 
cross border trade. The closure of state enterprises as a result of the post-communist structural 
adjustment impacted disproportionately on women with most losing their jobs. In 1997, it was 
estimated that in Malaj 224 men had employment whereas only 36 women still had jobs. 
Consequently women remained in the village and looked after the home and earned what they 
could, how they could. They would be involved in gardening, gathering sherbil, drying figs for 
sale or collecting wood. Some undertook subcontracted sowing of shoes. One woman sold 
snacks outside the school during the lunch break. Another collected aluminium cans for scrap. 
Where a family had animals it was usually the children who looked after them while grazing. 
It was not unusual for women to control the family finances.
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In comparing the two villages it was evident how economic processes worked through cultural 
relations and that cultural rules had concrete material effects (Kabeer 1996:134). This was 
illustrated in the differences between the villages noted in this and previous chapters and was 
particularly evident in household organisation and gender relations.
Historically the residents of Malaj had close contact with the town. Having at best only 
minimal areas of productive land, Malaj women had been forced to seek employment in the 
city. The quality of the Malaj school meant they were better educated. Several women had 
received higher education whereas in Gura none had done so. The less fis  bound nature of 
Malaj, marriage to city dwellers, male urban migration, had all contributed to creating a more 
open village society. Patriarchy and the role of women was easier to discuss in Malaj where 
these issues were viewed in relaxed way. In Gura to discuss the status of women was either 
too sensitive or dismissed as not being noteworthy: these reactions may well have been two 
sides of the same coin. However in both villages, child care and the domestic chores of 
cooking, cleaning, washing and the making and mending of clothes were undertaken solely by 
women. A few suitably qualified women were able to work as schoolteachers and nurses, 
otherwise women took what work was available, the preference being for formal sector 
employment in a Shkoder factory. Domestic work was undertaken by women in addition to 
their paid employment but assistance would be provided by a mother-in-law if living in the 
household. Market forces were impacting upon traditional norms, most notably those 
concerning gender. Women were becoming more independent. In Malaj where men worked 
away from home for extended periods there were a substantial number of female headed 
households. There were a lesser number in Gura where fis  or vllazni networks would take 
responsibility for the wife and children of absentees. In Malaj this did not occur to the same 
degree.
The household could be seen to operate in gender and generational senses as a zone of 
conflictual cooperation (cf. Sen 1984). The bargaining power of women in Gura was weak 
compared to Malaj and this was reflected in the extent of their participation in commercial 
affairs. In Malaj a woman owned and ran a grocery store whereas in Gura no woman exercised 
such independence. As far as gender is concerned, equality or what Kabeer (1996:120/21) 
terms parity of bargaining power, is a culturally defined relationship. In these circumstances 
it depended on the degree to which wives were permitted, were needed to, or were able to 
assert responsibility for managing household budgets. Their bargaining power was greatly, but
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by no means totally, influenced by how they were regarded by men. The evidence showed that 
women had much greater control in this respect in Malaj. In extended families, parents-in-law 
could overrule the views of their son’s wife in respect of household budgeting. This could 
cause wives to be deeply resentful. Intergenerational stress was caused by young migrant 
workers who had returned with substantial amounts of money and very different ideas about 
how it should be used than their parents. Children were co-opted into economic activity, 
extensively so in Gura. They tended animals, picked sherbil, undertook crop production 
activities, assisted in the house and cared for younger siblings. The extent of childrens’ 
economic activity was observed to be closely related to the lack of resources available in their 
household.
The social implications of recent changes were thus considerable. The household was 
increasingly becoming the home of the nuclear family. A jobbing welder from Malaj said "Now 
there are two classes; the poor and the rich. Now there is more stress. Before others thought 
for us, no one thought for themselves. It was a simpler life. Now it's a struggle but there is 
choice. I get worried. Yes, I  talk to my wife about things but I  don't turn to my fis  any more, 
its function has changed Each family must look after itself "
7.11 Losers:
Market economies are composed of winners and losers. Competition and the exploitation of 
advantage are integral features to the market. Success can be ascribed to a supportive family, 
networks, education, skills, capital, good health, hard work or simple luck. However an 
unmediated market economy deals harshly with those who are unable to capitalise on their 
assets, or who have few assets upon which they can capitalise. This type of research, 
particularly as guided by the resource profile approach, offers an opportunity to understand 
something of the causes and nature of poverty. Before examining some specific examples from 
Malaj, a word about Gura.
Every Gura family had some agricultural land which dependent on quality and availability of 
water could provide it with something approaching subsistence. There were a handful of 
extremely poor families who had been disadvantaged even during the time of the cooperative. 
In one there was a case of mental illness and in another chronic sickness. The life of such 
families was undoubtedly wretched but they still had resources to call upon. They could
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produce some food from their land. Family members could find occasional work. They 
received some assistance from the fis. They received state welfare payments. The key elements 
to survival were therefore self-produced food, fis  support and welfare payments. In the more 
"urban" circumstances of Malaj, and one assumes also in cities, the inability to produce food 
and weaker fis structures intensified poverty and deprivation. Thus while on an aggregate level 
Malaj was significantly more wealthy than Gura, this masked the degree of exclusion and 
destitution which existed within it. There were a number of families in Malaj who were 
experiencing difficulties. Here are three examples.
(DSali Zheku was 57. He was made redundant in 1996 as a result o f the privatisation o f the 
forestry enterprise. He received redundancy money of$26/month for one year. He invested 
$150 in building a hut by the road adjacent to his house as shop/cafe. He then bought $40 
worth o f stock - raki, cigarettes, chocolate etc. Goods were marked up by around 10%. The 
old men who could not afford the prices ofproper cafes would play draughts on his rickety 
tables. When I  met him in 1996 the enterprise had been open for 5 days and their best day's 
profit was $3. One year later disposable income had dwindled and his little business was only 
turning over $5 on a good day. One son had left for Greece but had not yet found a job. His 
other unmarried son had lost hisjob as a bodyguard for the DP in Shkoder. On his first visit 
to Yugoslavia he was caught and his goods were confiscated, then he was badly wounded in 
a dispute which developed into a bloodfeud The son's treatment had so far cost $400 which 
had been borrowedfrom the fis  ofSali's wife.
(D Suat Drini was a forty year oldformer teacher from Kukes who started a retail business 
there in 1992 producing a profit o f $1,000pm. He and his brother borrowed $40,000 and 
set off to purchase goods in Macedonia Someone knew they were carrying money. They were 
ambushed and robbed at gunpoint. Suat had repaid a quarter o f what he owed through the 
sale o f the shop and his house in 1993. He then moved down to his wife's family in Malaj 
where he was living with his wife and four children in a one room hovel. He had kept his 
vehicle from which he earned money by transporting goods and people. Seeing the returns, 
he sold his van for $1,000 and invested this in a pyramid scheme. Within six months he had 
lost it all. Having been given permission from the Bashkia he was building a 2 room house 
using money borrowed from his father and brother. He planned to go to Greece to earn 
money to repay his debts. He hadjust managed to achieve registration for social assistance 
and will receive $19/month. His wife and children gathered more sherbil from the mountain
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than any other family in the village. The youngest children cared for the cow and scavenged 
for wood.
©Mark Frosina was a simple man. He lived with his wife Rosa and their 20 year old son. 
Mark had difficulty in formulating and coherently expressing his thoughts. He depended on 
his wife for negotiating with the world They appeared to be a couple brought together rather 
than driven apart by life’s adversities. They had lost 3 children within a year o f their birth. 
Their 20 yo son was unemployed
Mark found work in 1993 as an asphalter in a recently privatised enterprise. Employment in 
the private sector had led to greater insecurity since he was laid o ff without pay in bad 
weather. The work was arduous and involved unsocial hours. He walked to work in Shkoder 
usually leaving at 5 am. He received $40/month, which was barely sufficient for food The 
addition o f his wife’s pension o f $12 provided them with just enough to eat but with little to 
spare for necessities such as wood Rosa managed the finances, such as they were. They had 
no TV or radio.
Mark had three brothers one of whom lived in Shkoder and through whose connections he got 
his present job. This brother visited occasionally and gave them a little money. Rosa’s fis  
helped a little. She was one o f six sisters who still remained close to each other. When one 
was widowed 2 years ago she came to live with them and contributes her pension o f 
$4.3/month Another sister occasionally gave them small sums o f money or bought them some 
flour.
Rosa was friendly with two o f her neighbours. When there was no alternative she borrowed 
up to $5 from them for a couple o f days, but she preferred to borrow from her sister who did 
not require repayment so quickly. They had no other contacts in the village. They had no 
money so they were not part o f the visiting network. Mark had no friends but enjoyed the 
camaradie o f his workmates. Their faith was the most important feature o f their life. Mark 
was at his most animated when speaking o f the Church They attended services 3 times a week 
but despite being regular worshippers they had no social relations associated with the church.
Living in a rough house with no water and virtually no land, Mark was desperately poor. He 
had asked the kryeplak if he could receive social assistance but was informed he was not
190
eligible since he had a job. He then went to the Bashkia and asked to receive supplementary 
assistance. They told him that he needed a note from the kryeplak to certify he met the criteria 
needed to qualify for social assistance. Confused by these arrangements Mark had given up 
looking for help from the state.
These examples demonstrate three different experiences of poverty and illustrate some key 
issues which relate to development in Albania. In the first, an older man was made redundant 
with a small pension. His sons had failed to find work in Greece and were unsuccessful in cross 
border trading. Additionally the family had become involved in a blood feud, which unless 
settled was likely to involve more conflict. Conflict was expensive, particularly in respect of 
foregone opportunities. His little cafe started in better times with so much hope had become 
a sad affair. The second man was one who worked extremely hard. He was a risk taker in a 
lawless and unregulated society who, from a mixture of bad luck and bad timing, ended up 
penniless. His main hope was to find work in Greece. Finally there was an instance of grinding 
poverty. The Frosina family was characterised by its restricted social networks and a disabled 
breadwinner. Their poverty was a barrier to integration in the village. They illustrated how 
without reciprocity the village self help system broke down. The family had lost status and 
were socially excluded. They had a miserable and isolated existence. Despite the diminishing 
importance of the fis, it was Rosa’s fis, or more accurately her sisters, which prevented the 
household from becoming destitute. By giving a home to Rosa's widowed sister, the Frosinas 
too were reciprocating. Religion was an important source of strength to Mark and Rosa who 
enjoyed regularly attending church.
7.12 Matrix:
As in the previous chapter, a matrix is presented in order to assist the summary of information 
presented in this chapter describing the village economies. The matrix permits the presentation 
of the features which form the focus of the subsequent discussion on economy and identity. 
It has been used to capture elements of an evolving situation so as to assist in elucidating how 
economic issues affected identity formation. The differences which are revealed between the 
two villages contribute to the analysis in the final chapter, particularly in respect of illustrating 
how the socially embedded nature of economic activity accounts for different outcomes.
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SUMMARY OF THE VILLAGE ECONOMIES
Gura Malaj
Predominantly agricultural economy Fishery in decline; diverse sources of income, 
mostly outside the village
None had received secondary education; 
very few had received vocational training
Several adults had received secondary 
education; a number had received vocational 
training
Few working in state and formal sector; 
most males undertaking casual work in 
informal sector
More state and formal sector employees; 
more skilled workers in informal sector.
5 small businesses 12 small businesses
High incidence of crime constrained 
economic activity; the village had a bad 
name
Low incidence of crime; visitors felt secure 
travelling to the village
No x border trading Significant x border trading.
Credit relations largely limited to fis and 
vllazni; businesses kept within the family or 
vllazni
Credit relations occurred with non-^s as well 
as fis members, establishment of business 
partnerships with outsiders
16% receiving social welfare assistance 32% receiving social welfare assistance
Agricultural labour heavily reliant on 
women; household management undertaken 
entirely by women; limited degree of 
independent decision making by women
High unemployment of women relative to 
men; household management undertaken 
entirely by women; women commonly 
controlled household budgets; one woman 
owned and ran a shop
Tighter fis structures contributed to a more 
protective environment for the very poorest 
and disadvantaged.
Looser fis relations resulted in greater degree 
of isolation and exclusion for the very 
poorest
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7.13 Economy and Identity:
As noted in the discussion of community and identity (§6.6), in the society of the Gheg fis, 
individual identity was to a great degree subsumed in the larger identity of the shtepi and fis. 
These institutions provided physical and economic security to their members. The common 
ownership of resources and the sharing of labour created not only a powerful sense of 
belonging but also of dependence on these institutions. The greatest punishment for a 
householder was banishment and the destruction of his house, crops and trees.
The communists inherited a poorly articulated and essentially rural economy. The APL 
embarked on a Marxist-Lenmist inspired programme of economic modernisation with the aim 
of achieving national self-reliance. Policies of extreme economic centrism enforced by a 
powerful internal security service were supplemented by a welfare regime (Prifti 1977:63,99) 
which rude and simple though it was, represented a substantial improvement on what 
previously existed. While the initial stages of industrialisation produced some impressive 
growth rates, albeit from a very low base, the autarchic policies of the APL were unsustainable 
and the economy collapsed in 1991. The prohibition of almost every form of private ownership 
and the refusal of the regime to devolve economic decision-making produced an alienated 
workforce which complied to the extent it was compelled to do so. Albanian communism 
produced anomie, a pervasive fear of the state and a paradoxical dependency upon it.
The changes required to operate in the arena of choice and risk which constitutes the market 
were considerable. The market demanded a reappraisal of attitudes to work, mobility, savings, 
ethics and social relations. Agency existed in a way that it had not done within the living 
memory of most people. While the less well equipped were confused and bewildered by the 
exigencies of the market, a more prosperous class was emerging whose members were steadily 
improving their situation by dint of hard work, ingenuity, the application of skills and a 
willingness to take risks. While it is stating the obvious, those who achieved material success 
gained confidence. For those who were not successful the obverse held true with anger, 
resentment and frustration never far below the surface.
The gradual social atomisation associated with the advent of market relations was compelling 
individuals to become increasingly self-reliant. It brought into question a number of cultural 
issues such as the place of women in society. Unsurprisingly, it was the younger generation 
which proved more able to adapt and respond to the demands of the market. When linked to
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exposure to and absorption of various aspects of western materialist culture and attitudes, their 
greater mobility and earning power led to the challenging of traditional norms and values. The 
fis  was diminishing in importance as an economic resource and was coming to assume a 
predominantly social role. Although the vllazni retained some significance, it too was in 
decline. What remained from these institutions was the family.
In the absence of an effective state, a moral economy embedded in traditional institutions still 
served a number of practical functions. It played an important part in risk management and 
softened the harshness of the market. Nevertheless a class society was emerging. The situation 
of those in genuine need was made worse by the widespread corrupt diversion of state welfare. 
While welfare payments prevented starvation, those households heavily reliant on pensions or 
disability benefits had been savagely hit by the contraction of state support.
Post-communist Albania illustrates the problems occurring when a reforming state assumes the 
liberal goal of sustained growth but is unable to achieve the requisite levels of organisation to 
implement policies which will achieve this. The consequence was high transaction costs. These 
existed for the following reasons. Firstly, the state's failure to provide adequate security had 
substantial implications for the viability of small businesses and the continuity of employment. 
The prevalence of banditry and highway robbery made the carrying of cash and the transport 
of goods risky and expensive. Civil disturbance raised transaction costs to temporarily 
inhibitive levels. Secondly, the failure of the state to provide an effective banking system which 
could supply credit and facilitate transactions. Thirdly, the inability of the state to provide a 
body of enforceable civil law, particularly contract law. Fourthly, the inefficiencies and lack 
of legitimacy created by a state bureaucracy in which rent-seeking was the norm.
These failings were indicative of the halting pace of Albanian political and economic reform. 
The information derived from these villages demonstrates the socially and politically embedded 
nature of economic process. The manner in which economic activity took place, mediated as 
it was by ideology, morality and relations of power, represented the particular mode of 
structuration (cf. §4.6, §9.3) which has constituted Albania's transformational pathway. From 
the evidence of this research, I contend that the degree to which this economic transformation 
has met with success has been as much, if not more, due to the risks taken, efforts made and 
privations experienced at the micro-economic level, than to the bodging together of structural 
adjustment policies aimed at affecting a transition to some illusory end state.
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With Albanians no longer prevented from travelling abroad, the opportunity existed to earn 
money on scale not possible in their country. Large numbers took advantage of this and 
remittances were playing an important part in post-communist economic development. 
However the problems lay in generating new institutions capable of handling the demands of 
what Geertz (1963) describes as the integrative revolution (ref. §4.3.1). The promotion of the 
notion of transition raised expectations that it was possible to achieve and reap the rewards of 
a system which produced constant growth through increasing consumption, as Bauman 
(1992:169) describes the market economy. Identity was being reflexively reshaped in response 
to such ideas as well as to the messages and images coming from a world characterised by an 
increased rate and scope of change (cf. Giddens 1991:215). The failure of the government to 
provide a framework for development contributed to the undermining of its legitimacy. The 
growth of gangs, the privatisation of security and the resort to illegal activity took place in the 
vacuum created by a weak state. Alienation from the national construct constrained the 
development of civil society and resulted in the persistence of traditional institutions. The 
failure of the state to use its powers to ensure the benefits of the market were not captured by 
a few at the expense of the many, was a further cause for disillusion with the institution.
Returning to the subjects of this study, it was not enough to know that the command economy 
was inefficient and corrupting, the problem was knowing how to adapt to the demands of a 
market ordered society. It was understood that economic transformation needed to be 
incorporated into a new form of polity, but posing the problem is not the same as 
understanding how solutions might come about. A Malaj school teacher said: "Communism 
brought security, work, electricity and education to the villages. The present economic 
circumstances have brought us to hate our country. Ultimately a country is founded on its 
economy." This frustrated outburst illustrated the emotional rawness and the acuity of 
perception which existed in "ordinary" people.
This chapter has discussed that aspect of transformation concerned with adaptation to the 
market. The market was a novel and complex set of arrangements which brought increased 
choice but greater stress. At the individual level it required increased self-reliance, improving 
efficiency, learning new skills, becoming more mobile and taking risks. Inevitably some were 
more successful than others. However it was evident that the establishment of a market 
economy in Albania involved more than liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation as 
suggested by World Bank policy documents (ref. §1.4). On the basis of the evidence presented
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here I suggest it also requires counteracting the shortcomings of the market, not only by means 
of social safety nets but by the implementation of effective regulatory procedures and other 
policies which ensure that existing social institutions are recognised and valued and not 




The state is the last perspective by means of which the research findings are analysed. The state 
represents the body politic and supreme civil power of a country. The functions of the state 
in a democratic society are administered by an elected government. The state is concerned with 
the organising and shaping of society. Although the state represents the primary focus of the 
chapter, it is also concerned with other forms of organisation which have emerged during the 
post-communist period.
In order to provide the background to the empirical material, the chapter begins by outlining 
the structure of the Albanian communist state and then describes how it was experienced at 
the village level. The chapter continues by examining the post-communist state from the 
perspectives of its capacity to provide for, organise and protect its citizens. My intention is to 
examine how the functions and operation of the state have influenced the nature of the 
Albanian polity. Finally, the local, national and international dimensions of the Albanian market 
democracy are examined as they were perceived and experienced in the villages of this study. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of identity and the state.
The principal focus of this chapter is concerned with examining the political and organisational 
aspects of transformation as they were observed in the villages of Gura and Malaj. This entails 
reporting on how people responded to the pressures arising from the precipitate cessation of 
a political and economic system in which almost every form of agency was proscribed other 
than that sanctioned by the state. It is concerned with examining how a civil society was being 
formed in the context of a fast changing world. It requires understanding the extent to which 
primordial loyalties were being replaced by civil sentiments (ref. §4.3.2) and the implication 
of this for the way in which identity was being negotiated.
In the aftermath of communism individuals were being required to understand and accept an 
unfamiliar state and polity (§4.2.1). This involved the generation of a new sense of belonging 
and trust in the national community. The way in which this takes place determines the path of 
post-communist transformation and is concerned with the development of an interpretive 
system for the new political experience and its realities (Bloom 1987:266). The chapter studies 
with whom and in what way villagers invested their trust. In the two previous chapters the
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discussion on social and economic life was largely concerned with informal institutions. While 
there is a shift of focus in this chapter towards the formal institutions of the state, it also 
examines the way in which political and administrative activities were socially embedded. 
Finally the chapter is concerned with studying the development of a civil society from the 
perspective of the two villages. It begins with a description of the Albanian communist regime.
8.2 Communism:
At the time Albania was taken over by the communist partisans, it was essentially a rural 
economy. It had barely been touched by those features which, even then, were assumed to be 
part of the modem state. Having won the December 1945 elections, the Democratic Front 
(forerunner to the ACP/APL) set about extinguishing all opposition and tightening its hold 
over the economy. In January 1946 a newly elected Assembly abolished the monarchy and 
declared Albania a republic in which all citizens had equal rights. A Presidium was established 
and later in the year a constitution was adopted similar to that of Yugoslavia. All property was 
eventually nationalised with the exception of rural dwellings which remained transferable. The 
State directed the economy through a regime of central planning. Its structure reflected control 
by a single party organised on authoritarian lines. (See Figure 3 overleaf)
An Assembly was elected every 4 years on the basis of one deputy for every 8,000 people. This 
was theoretically the highest organ in the country although in effect it was just one of a number 
of rubber stamping bodies. It met twice yearly to pass laws and amend the constitution. 
Membership of the Assembly was seen as a reward to faithful party members. The Assembly 
elected the Presidium which consisted of a President (Head of State), vice presidents, a 
secretary, plus other members. The Presidium was responsible to the Assembly. Under the 
Presidium was the Council of Ministers led by the Prime Minister. He was responsible for the 
various ministries, the most powerful of which were the Ministry of Interior and National 
Defence. In addition, the Prime Minister was responsible for a number of Commissions 
including Planning, Procurement and Control. The Judiciary was theoretically an independent 
institution with the members of the Supreme Court being elected by the Assembly. Courts in 
the regions were elected by People's Councils. The penal system was used to organise forced 
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In fact the government, the commissions and the courts formed the executive branch of the 
APL. All key figures were Party members and most of the initiatives made by the government 
were in the form of fiats and administrative measures rather than laws. Skendi (1957:102) 
notes that from the time of the 1950 Constitution which formalised the "controlling" position 
of the Party, the relationship between government and Party was demonstrated by the name 
of the Party always being mentioned before the State.
Local government was administered by Peoples' Councils (PCs) elected every 3 years and 
which controlled the affairs of the district (rreth), city (<qytet), locality (localitet) and village 
(fshat). This control involved administering economic and cultural matters and ensuring the 
maintenance of law and order at every level down to the village. PCs were simply 
administrative bodies used by the APL for purposes of regulation and control.
The influence of the Party was pervasive. The APL was a three tiered organisation. The Party 
Congress was the highest organ followed by district and local organisations. The Congress met 
every 4 or 5 years to ratify reports from the Central Committee and an Auditing Commission, 
both bodies being elected by the Congress. The role of the Central Committee was to direct 
Party activities between sessions of Congress. These included organising and directing all state 
and Party institutions. The Central Committee delegated its authority to the Secretariat which 
was responsible for party organisation and to the self-nominating and self-electing Politburo. 
The Politburo was the seat of power. Its General Secretary also chaired the secretariat. It was 
at this level that the tensions between autocratic and oligarchic control of the system were 
played out.
The nature of both party and state was profoundly influenced by the system of nomination 
(nomenklatura) whereby it was ensured that candidates for all positions of significance, even 
down to village level, were approved at an appropriate level by the party. The other important 
organ of the party was the apparat, the paid party bureaucracy, which again operated at every 
level of the political system. Its primary function was the collection and processing of 
information. A large part of the apparat's responsibility concerned the monitoring of economic 
matters. Although not supposed to directly manage the economy, they provided advice to the 
Central Committee and Politburo. The Council of Ministers presided over by the Prime 
Minister controlled the Planning Commission under the general supervision of the Politburo 
aided by the apparats of the Central Committee.
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Once established in power, the ratio of Party members to the Albanian population remained 
almost stationary at about 4%. In 1976 membership of the APL was recorded as being 101,500 
(Prifti 1978:30). The appeal of the APL lay in its exclusivity and the opportunities it offered 
for personal advancement. Membership of the party conferred status by allowing individuals 
the possibility of elite jobs which gave them and their families access to privileges rather than 
monetary wealth. The Party had and important part to play in permitting social mobility. 
Membership made internal migration, particularly to the cities, infinitely easier. Additionally 
it provided better access to health, education and job opportunities. Over time the Party organs 
became selected and purged to reflect a small group of predominantly Tosk clans who could 
be trusted by Enver Hoxha. Lendvai (1969:196) notes that of the 31 members of the 1948 
Central Committee only 9 survived until the mid 1960s. 14 were liquidated and 8 were retired. 
In the early sixties there were 5 married couples and no less than 20 persons related to each 
other in the 61 person Central Committee.
There were a number of organisations created to serve the needs of the Party and its 
leadership. They formed an important means by which the Party could monitor, control and 
utilise the resources of a particular section of the community. The main mass organisations 
were:
- The Democratic Front (DF): a mass organisation originating from the National Liberation 
Fronts formed by the partisans which were coopted and absorbed by the communists. Despite 
its declared function being an umbrella organisation under which a diversity of opinion could 
be expressed, the DF was in reality a channel of communication for APL policy. Its main 
administrative function was to approve candidates presented for local and national elections. 
Everyone was a member except "the outcasts", "kulaks" and other "enemies of the people". 
The DF party card was essential to obtain a ration card and work..
- The Union of Working Youth: was a mass organisation of young people between the ages 
of fifteen and twenty five. It was a recruiting ground for party members and a source of 
"voluntary" labour for work on roads, railway and other projects. It was used to disseminate 
propaganda and sought to influence young people against the traditional attitudes and beliefs 
of older generations. It was also responsible for the Pioneer organisations to which children 
from seven to fourteen belonged.
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- The Union of Albanian Women: provided a forum for women to meet from local to 
international levels. It sought to encourage women to play a fuller part in national life and in 
the economy. It assisted women undertake professional training to enable them to undertake 
duties formerly the preserve of men. "Voluntary" work brigades were also drawn from the 
ranks of the Union.
- Trade Unions: were in reality a part of the Party machine. They were created to maximise 
production from the work force by ensuring the fulfilment of plans and the maintenance of 
labour discipline rather than to look after the interests of workers. The absence of wage 
differentiation was a disincentive to acquire higher qualifications or skills amongst the 
workforce. It led to low productivity and poor workmanship.
8.3 The Experience of Communism in the Villages:
From the foregoing it can be seen how deeply the APL penetrated Albanian society. Under 
its influence the state took on a completely novel meaning as it penetrated almost every 
interstice of social life. The Albanian communist polity demanded that people be completely 
accountable to the Party and state. Village level PCs were formed to meet the administrative 
and regulatory requirements of the new communist state. Gura's PC had 8 members, each 
having a specific area of responsibility such as education, security etc. The krye (chief) would 
liaise closely, sometimes on a daily basis, with the head of the United Council (equivalent of 
the contemporary Commune ref. Figure 1, p. 54) based in a village about 5 km. away. The 
United Council would meet every week. Discussions were confidential and included issues of 
economic production, welfare and maintaining the class struggle. The authorities were 
particularly concerned about people escaping the country.
Village DF meetings, chaired by a Party member, took place several times a year. Everyone 
attended apart from those designated as enemies of the people (armiq ie popullit). The DF had 
an important part to play in the dissemination of propaganda, policy decisions such as changes 
in cropping patterns, increases in production norms and controlling theft of state property.
The regime proscribed any deviance from the party line. Those judged to have contravened 
norms or regulations were rigorously dealt with by a variety of means including isolation within 
the community, internal exile, prison and labour camps. The important aspect of punishment
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for crimes deemed to challenge ideological orthodoxies was that the whole family was 
punished as well as the individual offender. The notion of there being any other form of 
organisation never occurred to villagers. "I thought that this life would go on for ever," said 
one old man, "communism., forbade religion, took all the rewards o f people’s toil and 
frightened the people." He was so scared that he never expressed his thoughts to his family 
in case his children would talk to their friends and get him into trouble.
The communist regime maintained its vice-like grip on the population by means of fear and 
social exclusion. The latter was achieved by instituting and maintaining a class of pariahs in the 
community who provided resident exemplars of what would happen if anyone deviated from 
the party line. Once a family was declared to be an enemy of the people, it was impossible to 
remove the stigma. Those so designated were initially composed of families whose members 
were formerly capitalists or intellectuals. It later included dissenters and families from which 
a member had escaped from Albania. Members of this pariah group were publicly insulted, and 
always given the worst jobs and food. Their children were not allowed to receive secondary 
education. They were excluded from all Front meetings and relatives were forbidden to visit 
them. They were compelled to marry within their class. "It was worse than prison " one woman 
said in tearful remembrance. Cruel and painful though labour camps and internal exile were, 
it appears nothing was so successful in maintaining the level of fear needed to maintain 
obedience to the wishes of the Party than the presence in every community of this officially 
proscribed group. The emotional and political scars stemming from the creation of this pariah 
community ran deep and were one aspect behind the development of intransigent, bitter and 
partisan politics in post communist Albania.
I was able to identify the krye of the PCs in both villages going back to the 1960s. These 
individuals were party members who had proved themselves to be ideologically committed to 
the communist cause. Until the system started to collapse, they tended to be the most able and 
astute members of the village. Certainly this was so in Gura, perhaps less so in Malaj. The 
benefits which came from being krye included not having to work, the opportunity to receive 
bribes in kind or cash and a range of privileges and benefits which came through being in a 
position of power and patronage. In many ways the evidence indicates that the attitudes of 
villagers towards contemporary government institutions were rooted in the "memory" of the 
formal institutions which were established under the APL.
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There was by no means a universal antagonism to the various forms of organisation which 
existed under communism. Women remember with pleasure their group meetings and 
excursions when they could shed the responsibilities of work and family for a short period and 
enjoy the company of their own sex. The younger villagers also welcomed the opportunity to 
escape the strictures and disciplines of the parental home and their village. The "Youth 
Actions" provided an opportunity for young people to enjoy social activities and form romantic 
attachments. While the trade unions were primarily organs of state control, they also provided 
a channel for communicating issues of concern to workers, particularly in relation to labour 
conditions and safety at work.
8.4 The State as Provider:
8.4.1 Introduction: In the previous chapter (§7.8) information was given about the extent 
of state financial support to its citizens. Here I wish to describe other forms of state provision 
and their impact upon the villages. The information is presented so as to permit comparison 
between Gura and Malaj, particularly in relation to the mobilising capacity of the village 
communities. As mentioned in §3.2.4 and §3.3.4, the services important to the villagers were 
the supply of irrigation and drinking water, electricity, road maintenance, education and health. 
These are now examined in detail.
8.4.2 Water: The lack of drinking water and its poor quality during the summer months was 
constant source of complaint in Gura. Wells serving a neighbourhood were situated within the 
compound of a house. Although there were no overt disputes, the intrusion caused by people 
entering a compound could be a source of irritation and tension. The village council was asking 
for a mains supply to be installed. However its members realised that the state, in the form of 
the local government authorities, would not pay for this. The State Water Directorate was 
formerly responsible for the delivery and allocation of irrigation water. By 1996 Gura villagers 
had realised that it was no longer willing or able to accept responsibility for the repair of 
irrigation channels and that if anything was to be done, the villagers themselves would have 
to do it. Furthermore the state had abrogated its responsibility for allocating irrigation water 
thus requiring these decisions be taken by users. The resultant tensions were to some extent 
diffused by negotiation but never eliminated. The costs of system maintenance and the 
responsibilities of allocation were being reluctantly undertaken by the village in 
acknowledgment that the state was no longer capable of these tasks.
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Malaj, in contrast, had networks of neighbourly arrangements which ensured that most houses 
had sufficient potable water to meet their basic requirements. The exceptions were the most 
marginalised households situated on the village periphery whose members had to carry water 
quite long distances. It was observable that in Malaj, the shortage of water had brought people 
together rather than the reverse. It was not a subject for internal dispute but of cooperation and 
collective action. Moreover instead of accepting the situation, the villagers had made their 
representative aware that they expected him to achieve improvements in water supply in his 
negotiations with the Bashkia.
8.4.3 Electricity: The electricity supply to Gura was poor until the Sokols provided a new 
transformer. Prior to this, villagers pooled labour and raised funds by internal levy to repair the 
old transformer. However although problems of voltage reductions had diminished as a result 
of the improvements, supply remained subject to cuts. This caused an additional burden for the 
two small manufacturing enterprises in the village (the shoe maker and joinery business) and 
prevented the development of others. No lobbying was done on this issue. In Malaj it was 
recognised that since electricity shortages were a universal problem, lobbying officials was 
unlikely to be productive, so informal channels were used. As has been noted, the ability of 
Malaj men to utilise networks resulted in a number of them working for the electricity 
company. Once there, they used their positions to ensure Malaj obtained the best supply 
possible. One of this group, the village DP representative, also used his position in the 
electrical company to obtain jobs for other Malaj men in order to demonstrate the influence 
of the DP and the advantages which came from supporting it (ref. §7.4.2).
The widespread non-payment of electricity bills meant that the government was losing an 
important source of income, estimated at 15% of GDP, vital for the improvement of the 
electric generation and supply system. Secondly, it was encouraging the notion that electric 
power was a free good. The Malaj survey indicated that virtually all consumers had stopped 
paying for electricity by December 1996. The DP government's failure to enforce payment was 
indicative of their declining legitimacy. The consequences of reintroducing a payment regime 
were likely to be fraught with political difficulties.
8.4.4 Roads: Road links with Gura were bad. Virtually no funding had been provided for road 
maintenance by the Commune. In the summer of 1997 the Sokol gang spent several thousand 
dollars improving the road network in order to provide quick and comfortable access to their
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family stronghold above Gura. Apart from making life easier for the village as a whole, a 
number of villagers benefited from payments for haulage and labour. These improvements to 
their road network graphically demonstrated to villagers how poorly the government was 
serving them.
The road to Malaj was relatively good. Once the village had transferred from the Commune 
to the Bashkia, access to city budgets, meagre though they were, was sufficient to ensure their 
road was adequately maintained with no more than gentle nudging of the Bashkia. However 
a major problem for Malaj was the bridge linking it to the city. This had been built in 
communist times and was no longer strong enough for the heavy lorries which had become 
commonplace. Its condition was rapidly deteriorating and only kept passable by stopgap 
repairs. A new bridge was vital to the economy of the villages on the Malaj side of the river. 
This problem illustrated the urgent need for infrastructure development if the region is to have 
the opportunity of prospering.
8.4.5 Health: Medical care in Malaj was good. The clinic was housed in a substantial building 
in the village centre. It was well equipped, clean and tidy. It had consulting and operating 
rooms. A nurse was in full time attendance. The clinic dealt with minor matters and was 
backed up by the centralised medical service in the city. The doctor was in attendance 5 days 
a week for 5 hours a day. She had been happily working in the clinic, which served Malaj and 
two neighbouring villages, for the past 16 years and was a known and trusted figure. Her 
services were not conditional on payment although villagers were grateful for her help and 
would in most cases remember this in a material way. The doctor was responsible for 2,170 
people and stated she had about 1,800 consultations a year, a number of which were house 
visits. Malaj benefited through being linked to the Bashkia since it spent more per capita on 
health and dealt with matters more openly and speedily. Moreover being under more effective 
scrutiny, health budgets were not reallocated, as sometimes happened in the commune.
The clinic serving Gura was in a neighbouring village. It served 3,000 people in three 
settlements and was one of three in the Commune. The clinic had never been checked and was 
in a terrible condition. The roof leaked. Mould was growing on the walls. The floors were 
pitted concrete. There was no equipment, drugs or filing system. The gloomy consulting room 
had a rickety table covered with a grubby plastic cloth. It was only possible to meet the doctor 
in the clinic after making an appointment to meet him there. Although the doctor and three
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nurses received their wages regularly, they were poorly motivated. There were many social 
problems in the village where the clinic was situated. It had a high proportion of poorly 
educated and unskilled Dukajinis. Many had guns. Unemployment was high. The doctor stated 
that the stress caused by an inability to align aspirations with current realities caused much 
physical and mental illness. Poor water supply and inadequate sewage systems were 
responsible for the prevalence of scabies and gastro-intestinal diseases. Information from 
villagers indicated that the low quality of medical care had led all but the poorest villagers to 
use private medicine. Being forced to pay for health care resulted in many people complaining 
about profiteering by health personnel. Poor health service management had created 
resentment against the state and mistrust of its officials.
8.4.6 Education: Gura school had four rooms and was in poor condition. In early 1996 one 
classroom had a few benches and desks. In the other rooms children sat on rocks. Windows 
were broken. The roof leaked. It was cold and damp. There was no electricity. At that time 
staff rarely attended the school. Several, if not all, of them had other employment. Their 
teaching salaries appeared to be a bonus for which they had to show little account. The school 
was staffed entirely by outsiders who had no sense of belonging to the village. Gura villagers 
sullenly accepted the situation. No parent, or group of parents, was willing to complain about 
the situation to the kryeplak or elsewhere. Parents who recognised the value of education were 
angry. Others needed their children to help with the animals or care for siblings. Not one child 
from the village went on to secondary education. One father who realised the importance of 
education took his son every day to a city school. Apathy, resignation, resentment and mistrust 
were the result of an inability to gain access to authorities and an incomprehension of how to 
negotiate with the state.
There was a substantial multi-storied school building in Malaj. While in need of maintenance, 
it was essentially sound. Desks and stoves were in the classrooms. Glass was in the windows. 
The school was open very day. There were 12 teachers each of whom made detailed teaching 
plans for the term and worked a full day, every day. A number of them lived in Malaj. The 
children were motivated. On the first day of term they all wore their best clothes. Malaj was 
proud of its school. In 1995 it had 156 pupils of whom 3 went for further education in 
Shkoder. In 1997 a regulation was introduced requiring knowledge of a second language as 
a prerequisite for entry to secondary school in Shkoder. At a stroke this disadvantaged 
virtually every village school in the Rreth. Malaj residents successfully lobbied for a foreign
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language teacher thereby ensuring their children had the possibility of access to further 
education. As will be discussed, secondary education was problematic for girls through 
concern for their security.
8.4.7 Commentary: One of the immediate effects of post-communist structural adjustment 
was the contraction of state funded goods and services. The evidence presented here illustrates 
how the decline in resources available for infrastructure, health and education impacted upon 
communities. The state having played such a central role, it was difficult for many to 
understand and come to terms with what was taking place. Individuals lacked confidence and 
knowledge about how to assert their concerns and demands. The options were to accept a 
particular situation, move to another location or act, either individually or in concert with 
others.
Since moving was a complex, risk-laden and expensive process, in most cases the options were 
acceptance or action. Action could be in terms of direct community mobilisation or through 
forms of political negotiation. The difference between the two villages was highlighted by the 
quality and extent of collective action which took place within them. Gura as a community was 
defined and segmented along fis  lines much more than Malaj. It had a weaker corporate 
identity. This influenced the way in which individuals related and trusted each other. The less 
fis orientated structure of relationships in Malaj had produced a stronger communal identity. 
As has been noted in §6.2.4 the differing nature of village institutions was reflected in their 
differing responses to similar problems.
In Gura, village-wide self-help activities took place in lieu of the villagers' collective inability 
to negotiate with the state or other organisations. Although cooperation took place freely 
within the fis  and vllazni, this represented a form of social closure and was one of the factors 
which made it harder and slower to achieve community-wide consensus over contentious 
issues. I was surprised at the extent of non-communication. On occasion even I was asked by 
respondents about what someone from another fis  thought about a particular issue of 
communal interest. People knew what others did, that was observable, but information about 
what others felt or thought did not spread freely. The divisions which this signified made 
resource allocation troublesome, especially in respect of irrigation water. Disputes tended to 
be grudgingly settled and problems lingered. Those who did not receive what they thought to 
be a fair allocation were reluctant to assist in maintaining the main canal and this led to further
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disagreements.
This contrasts with the situation in Malaj where collective action tended to take place as a 
matter of course at a neighbourhood level in respect of house minding, water sharing and 
construction. The basis upon which assistance was proffered tended towards common need 
rather than common kin relations. This contributed to the creation of an ethos which made 
# Malaj a far more cohesive entity than Gura. One aspect of this was the way in which 
information flowed freely about matters of communal interest. This proved to be an important 
factor in the development of the village's capacity to act in the political arena.
These differing responses to the decline of state provision can be explained by the differences 
in bounded solidarity, reciprocal exchange and information flows between the two villages. 
These features, rooted in institutions specific to each village, can be seen to be linked to the 
different aspects of social capital (ref. §4.4.2). The generation of positive social capital was 
contingent on the capacity to generate trust across the various divides which existed in the 
communities. Where this occurred sufficiently, as in Malaj, it was possible to achieve 
consensus and support for an effective representative body to argue on behalf of the village for 
the delivery goods and services from the state. Where social solidarity was highly bounded, 
with trust to a great extent restricted to the fis, as in Gura, social capital formation could be 
seen as a form of closure (ref. Coleman 1988; Putzel 1997). The success of Malaj relative to 
Gura in being able to form itself into a cohesive unit capable of negotiation with the state was 
therefore a measure of the degree to which its institutions were able to generate trust across 
internal divides. This had certain organisational implications which will be discussed next.
8.5 The State as Organiser:
8.5.1 Central and Regional Government: The development of government in post­
communist Albania has been described as a transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism 
(HDR 1998:60). The establishment of democratic institutions has been highly problematic. 
After the heady days of its accession to government, the DP administration became 
increasingly intolerant. By 1996 Albania showed clear signs of becoming a one party state. 
During its period of office the DP government frequently ignored Parliament by making use 
of directives rather than legislatioa There was a decline in standards in the bureaucracy caused 
by the sacking of civil servants deemed to be influenced by socialist values or sympathetic to
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the opposition. In every tier of government a large proportion of the civil service was replaced 
by poorly qualified professional staff known to be loyal to the DP. There was a consequent 
decline in standards. In the DP, any dissent or threat to the authority of President Berisha led 
to dismissal. Most DP representatives of any ability left the party. Berisha's cavalier treatment 
of parliament led to a curtailment in the quality of legislation and impacted negatively on the 
conduct of government departments (Vickers et al. 1997:270). Parliament was used to push 
through legislation intended to weaken the opposition. The independence of the judiciary was 
compromised by the President's sacking of the head of the Supreme Court in 1995. The 
evidence of this research, supported by other more comprehensive studies (e.g. Human Rights 
Watch 1996), indicated the existence of widespread electoral malpractice. Extensive corruption 
in state institutions and government collusion with the pyramid operators (RFE 25/2/97; 
Albania Daily News 11/10/96) combined to produce a serious decline in the state's capacity 
to discharge its function of providing for its citizens.
Upon its election in 1992, the DP reorganised local government. The political, administrative 
and economic autonomy of local government was nominally recognised and local government 
was separated into two distinct, supposedly independent, tiers. Local elections were organised 
for Rreth and Communes and took place regularly. However as noted (§3.4), the DP 
government maintained a high degree of centralised authority leaving District administrations 
with minimal autonomy. Government appointed Prefects, Secretaries and representatives of 
central government ministries, particularly the Finance Ministry, ensured local government 
operated strictly within parameters defined by central government. Central government 
provided 95% of local government revenue (HDR 1998:74). Central government therefore 
kept regional government under tight administrative and financial control. Resources allocated 
for local government were low prior to the 1997 state collapse. As a consequence of that 
collapse local government administrations suffered acute financial difficulties (§3.4.4).
In part the problems associated with the establishment of the formal institutions of a 
democratic state could be attributed to a widespread lack of comprehension about the meaning 
of democracy and civil society among politicians and public alike. The consequences of this 
are frequently referred to as the overhang of communism. One aspect which came through 
strongly in this research was the issue of access, firstly relating to information and 
communication, and secondly as it was affected by corruption.
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Access to government was difficult. In §3.1 attention was drawn to the existence of barriers 
in Albanian society. Constraints to communication encourage the formation of barriers. Poor 
communications were an inheritance of the communist desire to frustrate and inhibit any 
interaction which it could not monitor and control. The telephone system was an example of 
this. In 1995 the entire Shkoder District (pop.220,000) had 1,500 phones (average 7 per 
1,000). Of these, 500 were for government and business purposes. The 1990 averages for 
Eastern Europe and FSU were 123 phones per 1,000 people. Switzerland had the highest with 
856 per 1,000 (UNDP Human Development Report 1990). In the Town Hall there was no 
system in place to make appointments. Secretaries, as they operate in the more usual 
administrative contexts, did not exist. I was once speaking to a deputy mayor who had locked 
his office door to prevent us being interrupted, when a stone whistled past my ear. It was 
thrown through the open window to get his attention. He leant out of the window and dealt 
with the query. One of the consequences of this lack of administrative and communication 
infrastructure was that officials had little time to do anything other than placate those 
demanding attention. Creating ordered mechanisms of accessibility and communication 
represent important challenges for the post-communist Albanian polity. While improved road 
networks and new telecommunications systems will enhance some aspects of communication, 
the administrative overhang of inaccessibility inherited from the communist past also needed 
addressing.
During the communist period (§8.2) there were no formal channels by means of which villagers 
could have access to officials. Despite the reorganisation of local government in 1992, in 
practice it was difficult, if not impossible, for citizens to obtain access to government by formal 
means. If an individual sought action or assistance with an issue then s/he would be compelled 
to make personal representations. The result was that plaintiffs would crowd outside an office 
hoping to encounter the relevant official. In the education sector, teachers wanted relocation, 
newly qualified teachers wanted jobs, parents wanted their children to attend a certain school 
and so on. Administrative decisions of this type were understood by villagers to be made on 
the basis of contacts and payments to officials (see §7.9). The endemic nature of corruption 
had a pernicious effect in the way it influenced public perceptions of state employees and thus 
of the state itself.
8.5.2 The Commune and Bashkia: Turning to the tiers of local government closest to the 
subjects of this study, a description of the Commune offices and its administrative functions
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was provided in §3.4.6 and Figure 1 (p.54). While the Commune Council responsible for Gura 
and Malaj had a potentially important role in improving the quality of life in the villages, it had 
not lived up to that potential. Instead it had become just one more vehicle for the enrichment 
of office holders. This study provided an opportunity to understand how at the local level 
political and administrative matters were being conducted during the early post-communist 
period.
The original Director of the Commune in which Gura and Malaj were located emigrated soon 
after his election in 1992. Dir Shkurti, then 24 years old, was the kryeplak of Gura and among 
the first in the village to join the DP. He lobbied hard and was able to muster enough council 
members to vote him into the position of Commune Director (1995 salary $ 100/month). He 
then set about earning more. Entitlement to land redistributed under the privatisation regime 
was contingent on a family living in a commune village prior to 1992. It appeared that Shkurti 
sold documentation for $1,000 to newcomers which registered their family as being resident 
in the Commune prior to 1992. Such families were thus eligible to receive holdings under the 
land privatisation programme. Informed villagers estimated this operation brought in over 
$100,000 from this one Commune.
There were constant complaints in Gura about the diversion of humanitarian aid. $20,000 
allocated for the reconstruction of roads, the school and clinic in the village was reportedly 
unaccounted for. There were also irregularities with the disbursement of social assistance. 
Since assistance could not be received by families with land, there existed an incentive for the 
redistribution commission to exploit the period of time between allocation of land and its 
registration. By not registering changes in land ownership the Commune was able to supply 
a considerably inflated list of those eligible for assistance for which it would receive payment 
from the Finance Ministry. However disbursements to claimants were made by the Commune 
on the basis of the publicly stated policy that those with land were not eligible for assistance. 
The difference between the two lists was pocketed by commune officials. The survey data 
provided detailed information which indicated that commune officials used their position to 
favour certain relatively wealthy individuals by putting them on social assistance lists (cf. 
Alderman 1998:2). The Commune Director also received a share of payments associated with 
the placement of teachers, nurses and other state salaried positions within the jurisdiction of 
the Commune.
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In fact it was more than probable that Shkurti was just one cog in a DP regional government 
scam which was extracting money in a variety of ways from citizens. It was not unlikely that 
Shkurti payed a rent for his position inasmuch that a considerable proportion of his takings 
were passed to DP functionaries higher in the RrethIParty structures. He later virtually said as 
much. He was young, gullible and greedy enough to agree to negotiate and take payments for 
registration, and probably offered little resistance to doing so. His conduct as Director made 
him many enemies, particularly in Gura, so much so that he never returned once he had moved 
into his new villa in the town. Shkurti's fall from grace stemmed from public knowledge of 
these financial irregularities. When Shkurti was jeered off platforms in the 1996 local election 
campaign, the local DP realised their support was fading. They jettisoned Shkurti and used him 
as a scapegoat for the failings of the Commune administration. Reviled in Gura, spurned by the 
DP, Shkurti ended up a bitter man trusting no one and earning a living smuggling cosmetics 
into Yugoslavia.
Dissatisfaction with the conduct of the Commune resulted in Malaj seeking to leave it. The 
villagers did not feel the Commune had their interests at heart. It did nothing about their 
problems, especially that of water. The Malaj Council was particularly incensed about the 
Commune granting planning permissions in Malaj without reference to them. Their move to 
the jurisdiction of the Bashkia was greeted with public acclaim and is described below. The 
operation of the Bashkia is as outlined in §3.4.5. It appeared to be a relatively effective and 
transparent public institution.
8.5.3 Gura: A brief description of the Gura Council has been given in §3.2.9, the salient points 
of which were that its council members were representatives of the main fis  in each mehalla, 
that there was a DP majority; and that the kryeplak was elected by DP members in closed 
session and not by an open vote.
As the communist state disintegrated, the younger generation in the village were more willing 
to take the risks associated with changing allegiance than were their elders. Early membership 
of the DP was to prove crucial to personal advancement. The years of 1991 and 1992, when 
the DP swept into power, was a time when a dream was projected and promises made about 
making that dream come true. Networking through DP connections and DP patronage were 
an important means of self-advancement (as in the example of Musa Lushaj §7.5). However 
that the DP won control of Gura village council did not mean there was any change of those
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in power. Four of the existing five member council were members of the former People's 
Council. Four councillors were under 35 years old. Apart from the eldest councillor who was 
fifty and a socialist, the Muslim members aligned themselves to the DP. The Catholic 
councillor opposed the Muslims and for this reason chose not to formally align himself with 
the DP. He also kept his distance from the Socialists.
In 1992 it was the adroit manoeuvring of the aforementioned Ilir Shkurti which resulted in him 
being elected Gura kryeplak. This led to a seat on the Commune Council and thence to the 
post of Commune Director. Until Shkurti's failure to be renominated for Commune Director 
by the DP in the 1996 local elections, Gura politics was dominated by him in one way or 
another. He retained, de facto, his position as kryeplak until 1995. It was by virtue of retaining 
his position as kryeplak that he chaired Gura's land redistribution commission and remained 
responsible for the allocation and distribution of social assistance in the village. Both these 
positions offered the opportunity for rent taking.
The first phase of land redistribution in Gura was completed by 1994. Determination of plot 
size, based on number per family, was relatively straightforward. However decisions over plot 
location were more contentious and complicated by pre-communist ownership. One of the first 
disputes involved property Shkurti wanted to allocate to one of his uncles who lived in a 
neighbouring village. The house and 2 denim had been occupied by a Catholic family for many 
years. The matter came before a land tribunal. The paperwork provided by Shkurti and his 
uncle satisfied the adjudicator who ruled in their favour. The Catholic family, who had no 
documentary evidence, because none had ever existed, were incensed. Eight armed men of 
their fis  called at Shkurti's house one evening and suggested he withdraw the plan. He 
acquiesced.
This was an early example of where force, or the real threat of force, was used as a last resort 
to fight a perceived injustice. It was impossible for the family to argue against the bogus 
documents in court. However failure to respond to this injustice would have further 
marginalised an already poor fis  through having to support their dispossessed relations. Also, 
importantly, they would lose face. They had no choice but to challenge the local "lord” (cf. 
social banditry in Hobsbawm 1974). Shkurti learned about the constraints of power. Despite 
the (spurious) legality of the documents, the state did not have the power to support its ruling. 
If he was to achieve his ends, he needed to meet such challenges with a greater threat of
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violence. In such ways did links between local politicians and hired thugs and gangs start to 
develop. Speaking of a later dispute, the head of the socialist mehalla said "Communism was 
a cruel system which imprisoned people. But it was better than now when murderers can buy 
their freedom from the police. How can you trust a state official (referring to Shkurti) who 
receives $ 100/month and within two years has bought a car and is building a large house? 
The money must come illegally. I f you complain about a senior official or seek remedies you 
will be silenced either by being beaten up or killed No one dares do anything about Ilir 
Shkurti."
Ordinary people soon learned that the state legal system could not be trusted. The consequent 
settling of disagreements by violence reinforced the commonly held view that since corruption 
was the norm, then ultimately the only effective way to settle disputes was by force. Such 
perceptions contributed to the sense of alienation from the state experienced by those not 
sharing in its spoils.
With the forthcoming national elections of May 1996, the Commune secretary needed to 
regularise the leadership of Gura village council and appoint a kryeplak, if for no other reason 
than to ensure that the ballot rigging would be effectively conducted. In January 1996 on the 
basis of their majority on the village council, the DP councillors elected in closed session one 
of their number as kryeplak. He proved to be a weak and ineffectual leader who never 
organised meetings. Councillors understood their roles in various ways. One understood his 
role as to identify those in need of social assistance and to negotiate for a better allocation of 
irrigation water to his mehalla. Another saw his job to improve the drinking water supply, 
since fifty families shared one well, and get a fair share of social assistance for his mehalla. 
The socialist councillor did nothing since he claimed he was excluded from all council 
meetings. The Catholic representative stated the council only met annually so as to avoid the 
DP members being criticised for their failure to do anything. Coming from a formerly 
persecuted family, the new kryeplak hated the socialists who he categorised as communists. 
I was reliably informed that he served the DP well by using his position as electoral officer to 
contribute to its success in the May 1996 elections by ensuring that an adequate number of 
appropriately marked ballot papers were substituted when the boxes were opened1. Gura
The SP had instructed its candidates and supporters to withdraw from the election during the afternoon of polling 
day claiming widespread malpractice by the DP.
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village politics were a reflection of national politics. They were acrimonious.
8.5.4 Malaj: The village councillors were elected in the 1992 local government elections. One 
of their number was elected kryeplak in an open public meeting. This procedure was then 
undertaken every two years as required by law. Until 1997 the council met at least once a 
month to discuss issues of planning consent, trading permits, social assistance and 
infrastructure. The kryeplak (pay $8/month) attended monthly meetings at the Commune. 
There were six councillors: three DP members and three independents.
I attended a council meeting to request permission to work in the village. After my business 
three issues were discussed. The first was a boundary dispute. The second concerned the 
Commune's refusal to provide funds for improving drinking water supply on the grounds that 
other villages had greater need than Malaj. The third issue concerned an instance of permission 
given by the Commune for the erection of a building without the consent of the village council. 
The latter was one among a series of planning disputes between the village council and the 
Commune. Villagers were angry about a number of construction projects in Malaj approved 
by Commune officials without consulting their council. They believed that backhanders were 
being passed. The council meeting I attended happened to be a critical one. It was resolved to 
bring things to a head by sending an ultimatum to the Commune requesting clarification on six 
specific planning cases, threatening that unless they were provided with satisfactory 
explanations, matters would be taken further. Planning and water were the two main issues of 
contention between the Malaj council and the Commune administration.
The village of Malaj and its council were weary of dealing with the Commune which they knew 
to be corrupt and incompetent. The village councillors were frustrated by regularly being at 
loggerheads with the Commune and having to deal with the constant complaints of their 
electors. The shift of administrative locus to the Bashkia had become the village's main 
political goal and was successfully negotiated in the autumn of 1996.1 was informed by an 
administrative assistant in the Commune that the council had fought hard to retain Malaj within 
its jurisdiction in order not lose the benefits associated with giving planning consent and 
potential tax revenues. The Malaj council achieved the shift in administrative locus through the 
interventions of a well known DP politician bom in the village. It was admitted that without 
his support it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to achieve this change of status. In
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the power struggle which took place, his influence was greater than that of the Commune. It 
was to be noted that this politician was building a substantial hotel in Malaj.
A year after the shift to the Bashkia the fortunes of the village were mixed. While the graft and 
non-consultation associated with planning consents was no longer a problem, nothing had been 
done about water. The businessman Musa Lushaj (§7.5) was highly critical of the former 
kryeplak; now the village representative (i.e. the bye's agent, ref. §4.5). He was particularly 
concerned about the non-enforcement of building regulations which had resulted in the 
construction of unsightly (and competing) unregistered restaurants and cafes. The failure of 
the village representative to prevent tree felling, keep the beaches clean and maintain the 
water-front was a further cause of vexation to him. Musa had told him in forceful terms that 
if he could not do his job he should step down and give it to someone who would actually do 
something for the village.
Within Malaj information flows were good. Most villagers were aware of the issues of village 
concern and were active in support of their council. Setting aside the shift of administrative 
locus, these issues included improvements in the water supply, regularisation of planning 
procedures, a foreign language teacher for the school and regulation of the fishery. As a result 
of its move to the Bashkia the village council no longer had official status. Paradoxically Malaj 
suffered from something of a democratic deficit. However the former councillors formed a 
council of elders which regularly met and discussed matters to be raised at the Bashba by the 
village representative. The change in administrative jurisdiction brought a number of practical 
benefits such as better administered welfare payments, improved availability of medicines, the 
opportunity of employment in the Bashkia and a higher priority access to the new telephone 
system which was being installed. However the move did not appear to benefit disadvantaged 
individuals. Since the village council no longer existed, individuals like Mark Frosina (§7.10) 
and others who did not have the contacts, knowledge or ability to address a particular issue, 
had lost an important resource which could advise them and take up matters on their behalf. 
Such people now had to negotiate their own way through the more distant and complex set 
of structures in the Bashba. For them the loss of the village council appeared to be negative 
in effect.
8.5.5 Commentary: In examining the state as an organising agent, this analysis addresses 
more directly the growth of civil society and the way in which democratic institutions were
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being established. Communism had debased the notion of the state. It had snuffed out the 
constituent elements of democratic political culture. The state was widely perceived as being 
either an institution to be cultivated for personal advancement or as a force to be truculently 
obeyed. "Democracy" was largely understood in negative terms, by what it was not. It was 
not domination by the state. "Democracy" was more often interpreted in terms of the new 
economic freedoms, rather than as a set of arrangements by means of which individuals could 
participate in national and local decision making,
The contraction of the state and its capacity to provide the financial and organisational 
resources for health, education and infrastructure initially caused bemusement. As this account 
has shown, although village people were adaptable and resourceful, there were a range of 
perplexing disjunctures associated with precipitate change and with their emergence into a new 
set of circumstances which I have described as the world of modernity. Giddens (1991:20/1) 
refers to these disjunctures and the reflexive revisions they demand as being existentially 
troubling. For the villagers these disjunctures derived from the contrast between their every
V
day experience and the world they believed to be outside this. Expectations had been created 
by the new government. However the reality was that life was hard and uncertain and made 
more difficult by the drastic reduction of state provision. The descriptions brought back by 
those who had lived and worked in western Europe coupled with the images of the 
contemporary world projected through the media implied an ease and affluence lying beyond 
the borders of Albania which highlighted the harshness of daily life in the country.
The impression and experience of modernity served to bewilder villagers' attitudes, 
relationships and expectations, particularly in relation to state institutions. This was reflected 
in the confused and uncertain way they dealt with the new bureaucracies which all to easily 
could result in anger and ultimately violence. The functions of central and regional 
government, and the relationships between these institutions, were at best hazily understood. 
It was taking time to learn about and adjust to the new state. Most people had no basis for 
conceiving of the state other than as an exploitative entity. In a situation where people had no 
knowledge of their rights or their responsibilities towards the new state, nor of the 
responsibilities of state officials and what could realistically be asked of them, there was often 
exasperated frustration. The placing of DP appointees in the bureaucracy served to further 
confuse the understanding of "democracy" and led many to interpret the notion as being, in 
part, an extension of tribal relations.
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Corrupt, unjust and illegal behaviour needs to be integrated into any analysis of transformation. 
Formerly, power was concentrated in communist regimes to such an extent that they were able 
to obtain the compliance of citizens through fear rather than consent. This led to the growth 
of elites who despised the people they lived off and administered. State socialism undermined 
a whole range of values, most notably public values and produced a widespread cynicism of 
the body politic. It was what Solzhenitsyn (1972) called "the lie". The absence of standards 
in public life percolated through society and resulted in ambivalent attitudes towards corrupt, 
unjust and illegal conduct which have persisted beyond the demise of communism. The 
generation of institutions which provide protection and benefits for the many and not just for 
the few is one of the major tasks facing post-communist states. It involves developing and 
legitimising the institutions of civil society which are specific to each state (see Stark and 
Bruszt 1998).
Turning to the village councils. The Gura council was subject to three forms of influence: tribal 
relations; the notion deriving from tribal and communist norms, that societal organisation was 
a zero sum game where what you lose your opponent gains (§4.4.1; Schelling 1984:213); it 
was composed of members of the former People's Council. These features formed the basis 
upon which villagers related to their council and from which they constructed their 
understanding of the other layers of state administration.
As was discussed in §3.2.9 and subsequently, the Gura council was a fairly ineffective 
institution which met rarely and which villagers knew little about. To some extent this could 
be attributed to the way in which the village was administered during Shkurti's period of 
control when there was no effective kryeplak. Organisation in the village was characterised by 
its attachment and dependence on the institution of the fis, a certain capacity to act collectively 
when under pressure to do so and by a low opinion of the village council. Discussions within 
the village about the allocation of resources or duties had a tendency to acrimony but 
settlements eventually took place. The council was the focus for disagreement, accusations of 
discrimination and misuse of position. It was not seen as being an institution which could act 
for the village. Village politics was therefore something of a minefield. The kryeplak, a man 
not of the highest talent, was thrust into the position because none of the other mehalla leaders 
wanted the job. When the council did eventually try to effect change through the formal 
institutions of government, its members tended towards a combative and hectoring approach 
which was not successful in producing results.
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The situation in Malaj was significantly different (ref. §3.3.9). Its council was remarkably clear 
in setting out its goals and in formulating and acting upon strategies to achieve them. 
Information on issues of communal interest flowed freely through the village. The Council was 
a part of the village community and was held accountable by it. The kryeplak was a school 
teacher of modest means. IBs status within the village, and that of the other councillors, would 
have been undermined if any of them took any undue personal advantage from their position. 
As noted in §7.5.4, where performance did not meet expectations the kryeplak could expect 
some stinging criticism. The pragmatic approach used by Malaj councillors incorporated 
reasoned persuasion, persistence and the use of diverse networks including party connections. 
This was an evidently more successful approach than that of Gura.
The socio-structural differences between these two communities can be attributed to the nature 
of reciprocity, the way in which information was passed around the villages and their particular 
norms (cf. Coleman 1988). Segmentation was distinctively more pronounced in Gura 
compared to Malaj. Thefis  as a defining entity was much stronger in Gura. It defined location 
in the village and defined allegiance to a greater extent than in Malaj. Religion also defined 
location in Gura whereas this was not the case in Malaj. The degree of integration between the 
two main religious communities, measured by the number of inter-faith marriages, was greater 
in Malaj. The use of the Kanun and customary law (see §8.6.1) was used to a greater degree 
in Gura. These features illustrated how different norms, values and institutions in the two 
villages affected the capacity to create social capital.
The evidence therefore demonstrates a linkage between social capital, effective governance and 
the development of civil society. The greater degree of internal cohesion and cooperation in 
Malaj contributed to its ability, relative to Gura, to integrate with the state and other 
organisational networks. The greater importance of fis  relations in Gura was accompanied by 
elements of distinction, suspicion and even enmity between groups. This resulted in a more 
fractured community less able to negotiate for itself in an emergent civil society. Having to a 
greater degree shed dependence on the fis , Malaj was a more homogenous community, more 
able to place its trust in the state and its government. The way in which its institutions were 
socially embedded conditioned the nature of social capital, the quality of which was directly 
connected to the village's ability to form and support a representative body capable of 
negotiating on its behalf. Malaj provided an example of how social capital affects the goal-
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seeking behaviour of a collectivity (cf. Portes et al. 1998:129).
Finally, the evidence from these two communities supports Gellner’s (1984) assertion that the 
creation of the modem state requires a shift of loyalty from kin groups to a national culture 
(§4.2.4) and the need for inclusion in the political process. This shift of loyalty is also at the 
core of Geertz's (1963) integrative revolution (§4.5), that is social aggregation into the larger 
national frame of reference. In this context transformation requires a reorientation of the locus 
and nature of trust from traditional and kin-orientated institutions to those of civil society. 
However these were not easy judgements for individuals to make. The relatively greater level 
of self-sufficiency in Gura and its reliance on non-state actors to provide protection during the 
period of state collapse, saw the village survive this period in some ways better than Malaj. Yet 
despite the chaos of 1997 and persistently high levels of corruption there was more to be 
gained by engaging with the state than not.
8.6 The State as Protector:
8.6.1 The Rule of Law: The final feature in this examination of the state concerns its capacity 
as a protector. One of the most important functions of the state is to protect the sovereignty 
of its territory against external forces and within its area of jurisdiction to maintain security of 
person and property in accordance with a rule of law. In a democratically constituted state, the 
rule of law is composed of a body legal instruments which are given general public assent 
through the activities of an elected legislature. A rule of law serves to enable a society to 
operate politically, socially and economically. Its existence and enforcement is an essential 
feature of a democratically constituted state. However in a modernising or modernised state 
where the generation and implementation of a rule of law is exclusively in the hands of a 
centralised unchallengeable authority then reflexivity diminishes and the legitimacy of the state 
is undermined. The dream of all autocrats has been development without democracy. Such was 
the case in communist Albania.
One of the major disjunctures associated with the collapse of communist regimes has been in 
the reconstitution of legal and constitutional frameworks. It has been suggested that the 
changes in Albania during 1991/2 only signified a change in ideology and not in political 
culture or practice which continued to be authoritarian in nature and influenced by former 
habits and attitudes (HDR 1998:61; Mestrovic 1993; §4.3.2). While a measure of legal reform
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took place in Albania during the first half of the 1990s, it was against a background of 
profound disagreement over a new constitution. Nowhere was the weakness of the post­
communist Albanian state more evident than in its capacity to formulate and enforce a rule of 
law. Its failure to do so represented an abdication by the state of its legitimate powers and was 
a predisposing factor in the growth of mafia type organisations (cf. Anderson, A. 1995).
The response of the villagers of this study to the consequences of a weak state, resource 
scarcity and high levels of uncertainty was to revert to customary law and practice in the 
regulation of their lives. While the crisis of 1997 may in hindsight be interpreted in terms of 
anarchy, civil war, popular revolt or delayed democratic revolution (HDR 1998:77), at the time 
it took place it, for most Albanians, it simply increased their problems. The following account 
describes the response of villagers to a weak and corrupt state which was unable to provide 
adequate security.
8.6.2 The Kaniin and Customary Law: As noted in §2.2, the Kanun was a code used by 
northern Albanian tribes during the period of Turkish occupation. It was a form of regulation 
closely integrated into the traditions of the region. Various interpretations of the code evolved 
and were used in other parts of Albania. During the twentieth century Zog sought to diminish 
the influence of the Kanun and Hoxha tried to extinguish it. Religious organisations, 
particularly the Catholic Church, have sought to anathematise it. The Kanun has been seen as 
a threat to their authority symbolising as it does a uniquely Albanian interpretation of morals 
and cosmology. Yet the Kanun, and the culture within which it was set remained alive. Fis 
loyalty and the traditions of hospitality still played a part in every day life and ritual. Besa 
[meaning pledge, word of honour, faith, creed, loyalty, agreement, promise, pact, treaty 
armistice and, in the Kanun, "truce" (Gjecov 1989:xx)] formed an integral part of North 
Albanian identity as did nder (honour), a notion strongly associated with pride. The norms 
assosdated with these values have provided the basis upon which the Kanun has been used to 
regulate social and economic relations (Kadare 1990). As Gjecov (1989: xiv) says of the Kanun 
"It has left its mark on the character of the people as is demonstrated in their moral and ethical 
standards such as a sense of honour, vengefulness, courage and decisiveness in critical 
situations and a feeling of closeness within the family, the brotherhood and the clan."
The Kanun defined the family, vllazni, gjini (kin groups), clans, fis  and flamur (banners) which 
together constitute the nation united by one homeland, common blood, a common language
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and common customs (ibid. p. 14). It outlined the rights, customs, relationships and duties of 
each and every actor. Most significantly it defined the means of enforcement as being the 
destruction of property, banishment and the matter of blood and honour... "Every man's honour 
is his personal affair and no one may interfere with or constrain the defence of that honour in 
any way.... There is no fine for an offense to honour. An offense to honour is never forgiven. 
An offense to honour is not paid for with property, but by the spilling of blood or by a 
magnanimous pardon (through mediation)....A man who has been dishonoured is considered 
dead according to the Kanun (ibid. p. 130). However as Black-Michaud (1975:179) states, 
honour is at once an extremely simple and extremely complex phenomenon. It is concerned 
with personal and group prestige, the affirmation of political status and leadership. Resource 
scarcity is a key characteristic of sedentry feuding societies such as have existed in north 
Albania. Where this is so, honour is ultimately concerned with struggle for power and 
dominance. However, since each assertion of honour is individual, the complexity in analysing 
it derives from the ethnological diversity associated with what constitutes honour (ibid. p. 181).
Once the anarchy associated with the collapse of communism dissipated, the newly elected 
Democratic government sought to establish public order. In the north little confidence was 
placed in the police who exploited their position in a variety of ways, including involvement 
in illicit trade with Yugoslavia. In 1996 the visitor was aware that the police were barely able 
to handle their public order duties. A major problem lay in the public ignorance of the extent 
of crime. Crime statistics were then classified as state secrets since the government believed 
they could be used for political purposes. So while individual murders were reported in the 
local press, no aggregate statistics were available upon which a public debate could be 
conducted. All that people knew was that theft and murder were common. In Shkoder during 
the last 10 days of April 1996, for example, there were seven murders. This was a particularly 
bad spell, but at that time there seemed to be an average of 2 killings a week in Shkoder and 
the surrounding villages2.
Therefore prior to the events of 1997, security was widely regarded by the majority of Gura 
villagers as being the most pressing cause for concern. It ranked above economic well-being.
2
After it came to power in 1997 the SP government made criminal statistics available. In 1997 murder and attempted 
murder constituted 83% of reported crimes against the person. In the same year there were 90 killings reported in 
Shkoder city, just under 2 a week. Murders classified as vendetta and revenge constituted the motive for 73% of 
violent deaths in Albania during 1997. (HDR 1998:41,42)
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Crime, or perhaps more accurately, fear of crime and the consequences of disagreements 
developing into a blood feud, was constantly at the back of people's minds. All movement in 
Gura ceased after dark. One shopkeeper slept in his shop every night with a loaded gun, the 
other kept a shift watch during the night. Fear was omnipresent. The main problem for most 
families was the theft of their most valuable possession, the cow. A good young cow was 
worth $500 and was easily disposed of by the unemployed young men who had formed armed 
gangs. I estimated that in Gura about 10 cattle had been stolen in the year prior to April 1996. 
In 1995 one of these gangs was apprehended by the local police but they bought their release 
before the matter came to court. Villagers had little confidence in the protection afforded by 
the state or its justice. One said ”It is not a question o f more police but o f getting the existing 
ones to do theirjobs and stop their corrupt practices”. The knowledge that the gangs had links 
with the police and government officials was just one more factor which contributed to 
undermining trust in the state. Although the bulk of my work in Malaj took place after the 
1997 collapse, my impression was that prior to those events security was not so much of a 
problem.
In the vacuum created by an ineffectual and corrupt legal system which did little to enforce 
criminal or civil law, much regulation took place at a local level using customary law derived 
from the Kanun and interpreted by "Commissions of Blood" (Komision i Djakut) or Councils 
of Elders. Elders were selected byfis  to be external representatives and internal arbiters. After 
the events of 1997, gang leaders were seen to be playing an increasingly important role in the 
adjudication and enforcement of justice. Prior to further discussion of the way in which 
criminal and civil issues were handled in the villages, I wish to discuss the blood feud.
The Gura survey revealed families fleeing to the village as a result of blood feuds up until 
1942. Blood feuds were largely contained during the communist period but with the collapse 
of the communist regime there was a mushrooming of extra-judicial killings caused by the 
settling of old scores, some predating communism. There were frequent reports of men being 
killed as a result of disputes over land and business deals. In Gura there was only one unsettled 
blood feud. It dated from 1978 when one young man killed another in a murky dispute over 
a girl. The family of the murdered man, since moved to Shkoder, had declared a blood feud 
in 1991 and refused to settle the dispute by negotiation. So although the murderer had served 
a sentence for the crime, he, his brothers and first cousins left the safety of the village only 
rarely since they were all under the threat of death.
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The reasons behind the rise of blood feuds were complex (see Schwandner-Sievers 1999). On 
a structural level the substantial population increase over the past fifty years had resulted in 
disputes over inheritance once property had become transferable. The incapacity of the state 
to undertake an effective mediating role further exacerbated these problems (de Waal 1995). 
However alongside this, the causes of a range of contemporary feuds tended to be petty and 
banal. Perpetrators were often hoodlums and minor gangsters with financial interests to 
protect. Business deals would go wrong and tempers rise. There were numerous instances of 
pride being hurt in one way or another and, under the name of honour, bloodshed was the 
result. Thus would start a cycle of reciprocal killing which had high economic and social costs.
It was the responsibility of the police and courts to deal with such killings but their inability to 
do so resulted in the resuscitation of the Komision i Djakut. The Gura Komision consisted of 
five respected elders. Its work might start with one of them being asked by a party to a feud 
for assistance in negotiating a solution. If both feuding parties accepted such mediation then 
the elder, a group of elders, or the entire Komision would work to bring about a solution. In 
some instances the Komision was invited to mediate in another village. Typically in the type 
of feud such as has been described in Gura, but where both parties were prepared to negotiate, 
a settlement of between $2-3,000 would be arrived at. While most of the discussions would 
take place between elders from the respective families, in particularly problematic disputes an 
arbitrator would be sought to assist at key stages of the negotiation. His task was not to judge 
but to bring about a compromise by making each party perceive the point of view of the other 
and emphasise the advantages deriving from the restoration of good relations, even if the price 
was high for a blatantly guilty party (Black-Michaud 1975:100). In 1996 the principal 
arbitrator in this locality was charging in the region of $1,500 per dispute (cf. Carver 
1998:302-307). He used a mixture of compensatory payments combined with compurgation 
or collective oath taking (cf. Black-Michaud 1975:104). In this case the arbitrator used a 
mixture of religious and nationalist symbolism, the Bible and the Koran, and the flag of Albania 
to sanctify the financial settlement and associated compurgation.
The government did not recognise Komisions or mediators since these institutions undermined 
the operation of state law. However in practice the courts gave de facto recognition to 
Komisions by using evidence and agreements resulting from their work to give lesser sentences
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if it was shown that a feud had been resolved3.
In lieu of being able to turn to the state, the Kanun was used to settle a range of disputes. One 
case of rough justice, which was accepted into village case lore, concerned the theft in January 
1996 of a cow. Five men from the aggrieved family waylaid the person who they believed had 
taken the beast and threw him into the freezing river. They would not let him out until he had 
confessed and promised to pay settlement of a refrigerator, a TV and $200. Another example 
concerned the theft by a family of bad reputation of electric cable serving an isolated house. 
The fis  of the aggrieved family responded violently and surrounded the house of the putative 
thief and threatened him. Once tempers had cooled the matter was settled by a meeting of 
elders, four from each fis. This was in the tradition of dispute settlement described by Hasluck 
(1954).
Councils composed of prominent fis  members would also formally represent one of their fis  
in a civil dispute. An example of this concerned an allocation made by the Gura Land 
Distribution Commission which had left one particular individual feeling deeply aggrieved. 
Heated tempers had led to extreme and partisan positions being taken. A Council of Elders 
from the complainant’s fis  managed to difiuse the tensions between him and Hir Shkurti, the 
chairman of the Commission. The role of the Elders in this dispute was to intervene in such 
a way as to avoid prosecutable acts taking place as a result of one of their fis  not backing down 
through fear of losing free. As has been described, the lack of an enforceable contract law led 
to business partnerships being made through creating what was tantamount to kin linkage with 
a business partner (ref. §7.6). In such ways villagers used customary legal practices to protect 
their lives and property, to administer civil justice and to enforce contracts. This description 
relates to the situation prior to the state collapse of 1997. The results of the breakdown are 
next described.
8.6.3 Breakdown: It has been suggested (Zartman 1995:1-2) that state collapse in the 
contemporary era is not a response to civilizational decay rather it is a process in which society 
carries on while ideology, regime and order change. In proposing this Zartman describes state 
collapse as being a response to circumstances which have a narrow and identifiable political
3
Information provided by a judge from die regional criminal court
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cause and effect, the social and economic implications of which impact upon the state's 
legitimacy and on national identity. Where a state proves itself incapable of delivering services, 
it ceases to be the target of demands in these areas. Where the state is unable to offer sufficient 
protection to its citizens, it ceases to be trusted and political and economic decision making 
becomes increasingly localised. This results in a rise in local tensions and in the contraction of 
economic activity. This is what happened in Albania in early 1997.
The detailed events which brought about this collapse of the Albanian state do not belong here 
but see Chmies-Ross et. al (1998:20-29). Suffice to say an unpopular and corrupt government 
was ultimately unseated through its inability to maintain the loyalty of the army and thus of its 
monopoly of violence.
From early 1997 local gang leaders were becoming increasingly powerful. Many of them 
contributed in full measure to the breakdown in March and April. The linkages which emerged 
between political factions and gang leaders formed an important part in the competition for 
power which occurred as state legitimacy deteriorated and finally collapsed. In a situation 
where most people held weapons looted from government armouries, security of a sort was 
enforced by the gangs. In July 1997 a new government, with temporary international support, 
was able to establish a measure of control over the country. In north Albania, which has tended 
to have a political bias to the right, this control was very limited. The police remained 
intimidated and ineffectual.
The Sokol cousins were common criminals whose family home, unfortunately for me, was just 
above Gura. They had cultivated links with the DP. When one of them was arrested at the 
beginning of 1997 his release was facilitated by a prominent local DP deputy. As power was 
slipping away from the DP, Berisha opened up the state armouries in early March to DP 
supporters in the vain hope that they would quash the socialist supported insurrection. It was 
no coincidence that the violence and destruction in Shkoder began on 13 March, the day after 
Berisha had bowed to national realities and international pressure to appoint a socialist 
premier. Shkoder was ransacked. Government offices, the police station, the courts and the 
national bank were looted and destroyed. The Sokols were said to be behind this insurrection 
and to have been the beneficiaries of the $3 million reputedly held in the bank. It was from this 
moment that they established their dominant position in the region.
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A number of embryonic gangs expanded as state control waned and finally collapsed. Their 
emergence symbolised the problematic nature of constructing a state based on novel and 
poorly understood principles. The gangs claimed they operated under traditional law, the 
Kanun. Hated and feared though they were, they provided a measure of security, at least more 
than the state could offer. Gang leaders achieved dominance in the first instance by brutality 
and establishing an aura of fear which intimidated any competitors. One such thug was 22 year 
old Zef Kalla. He established his authority on the pretext of being insulted by the dominant 
gang leader in his llagja. Zef ambushed him, beat him up and shot him through the knees. 
"Killing," said Zef "does not give sufficient revenge. I f you can cripple a man, he will suffer 
all his life." However in order to consolidate his status and be in a position to confer 
patronage, he needed money. He started by committing armed robberies in Greece and Corfu 
where he stole cash and jewellery. He then moved his activities to Italy where he and a 
growing band of men worked in cooperation with other Albanian and Italian criminals. The 
number of Albanian prostitutes which Zef admitted to controlling was four in Turin and a 
similar number in Florence. He received two thirds of their takings, some of which he sent back 
to their families in Shkoder. He did not deal in drugs, he said the mortality rate was too.high. 
He maintained contacts with gangs in southern Albania to whom, and from whom, he would 
take illegal migrants for smuggling to Italy and elsewhere.
Zef used the proceeds derived from his foreign criminal activity to build a house and start a 
business in Shkoder. He returned permanently at the end of 1996 when it became evident that 
central government control was crumbling and it was possible to establish a power base and 
extend his influence. His Shkoder gang consisted of fifteen men between the ages of 22 and 
29. His (somewhat perverse and contradictory) criteria for accepting recruits was:
1. The individual must have besa and conduct himself properly (i.e. have a conscience)
2. He must swear total obedience to Zef.
3. He must not molest girls or rob in their locality.
4. To respect the state and not defy it any way.
5. To observe Albanian traditions (the Kanun).
The first characteristic of this gang leader was that he claimed loyalty to the state. As a minor 
power broker, Zef was anxious to receive public recognition and approbation. He sought to 
be seen as upholding the law in the face of a corrupt government. Secondly a gang leader
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needed to maintain a level of legitimacy within his community. Thus his gang did not touch 
property or women in their Llagja. Their protection rackets were a means of extortion which 
were also portrayed as being socially beneficial in that they were protecting productive assets 
and thus maintaining employment. The largest employer in the region was the Italian shoe 
manufacturing enterprise whose proprietor had baulked at paying Zef $67,000 per month for 
protection. It was not until his workers had started to vandalise the factory that he agreed to 
an arrangement. But it was too late, the machinery was being stolen and sold for scrap in 
Yugoslavia. The third characteristic concerned a respect for the Kanun. ”1f  people respect the 
Kanun there is no needfor state order. It is a system with which everyone is familiar and they 
know it works. The state can be corrupted but it is impossible to corrupt the Kanun". Zef 
maintained an avid interest in the Kanun and sought to increase his knowledge of it through 
discussions with elders. The Kanun was one of the means he used to bolster his status and 
establishing legitimacy (cf. Schwandner-Sievers 1999).
The power of a gang leader depended upon his achieving respect. He would seek to weave a 
myth about himself by inducing fear and flaunting the trappings of wealth and power. This fear- 
induced respect was perversely blended with a degree of trust created by people’s dependency 
on him for security. The power of a gang leader was constrained by competition, in this case 
between the six gangs which controlled Shkoder of which the Sokols were then the strongest. 
Zef maintained good relations with the Sokols but kept his distance from them, even though 
they wanted him to join them in their contraband trade with Yugoslavia. In order to create a 
positive image, and also for the pragmatic reason of maintaining power and influence when the 
state re-exerted its control, gangs forged links with political parties. Zef cultivated contacts 
with the right wing Balli Kombetar and provided them with security during their election 
campaigns. Zef confirmed reports that as the DP lost their grip on government they had urged 
the gangs around Albania with which they had connections to increase their criminal activity 
in order to destabilise the new Socialist government.
In the deteriorating economic situation caused by the collapse, many people turned to 
smuggling. Despite the closure of the Montenegro frontier in March 1997, large numbers of 
trucks passed across the border paying a reported $16,000 a night which was shared between 
customs officers and their superiors on both sides. In August 1997 fifteen kilometres of railway 
line connecting Shkoder to the border were removed and sold for scrap in Montenegro. None 
of these activities could have taken place without the knowledge of the police. In an attempt
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to exert some control over the Shkoder police in January 1998 the Socialist government 
appointed a police chief from another region. This prompted an armed rebellion by the police 
who kidnapped the Prefect and there was again widespread rioting and looting in the city 
(RFE 20/1/98). Interior Minister Ceka blamed the attacks and other explosions on the 
Democratic opposition, saying it was "pursuing a policy of banditry and inciting the population 
to keep weapons and set off explosive devices." The Socialist government believed that 
Shkoder officials had long been involved in smuggling, particularly oil to Montenegro from 
1991 to 1995, arguing that the Shkoder police force had either turned a blind eye or was itself 
involved (RFE 23/1/98).
Setting aside the serious economic implications, one of the most troubling aspects of the failure 
of the state to provide security, which was exacerbated by the collapse in 1997, was the 
increase in the molesting and kidnapping of young women. In some cases they were taken 
abroad and forced into prostitution4. More often ransom was demanded. Frequently they were 
simply raped. A journalist reported that fifteen girls had been taken in Shkoder during August 
1997. The consequence of such kidnapping, even if there was no molestation, meant that the 
girl was unmarriageable. This caused a particular problem in Malaj where several girls who had 
left the village school were prevented from attending secondary school by parents who were 
concerned about their safety and future happiness.
In comparing the situation in the two villages during this period, it was evident that the greater 
self-sufficiency afforded by the agricultural economy of Gura caused it to be less affected by 
the closure of markets. However when it became possible to trade, there was only a limited 
demand for agricultural produce as a result of the security problems associated with 
transporting goods outside the region. The ensuing drop in income caused increasing numbers 
of Gura villagers to resort to casual labouring. The roads in Gura and its electrical system 
benefitted from Sokol money (ref. §8.4.3; §8.4.4), however the other major change was 
ironically an improvement in their security. Robbery and cattle rustling had ceased. Frightened 
by the reputation of the Sokols, people avoided visiting Gura. The village had become eerily 
calm.
The HDR reported 30,000 Albanian women working as prostitutes in Europe. Kidnapping, trafficking and 
managing these women was therefore a substantial business. During the period 1991-97, two hundred individuals 
were arrested for involvement in these activities (HDR 1998:51).
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Almost the reverse was the case in Malaj. The deterioration of the Albanian economy as a 
result of the events in spring 1997 caused many to start trading in Montenegro or seek work 
in Greece. The dangers of travel caused a sharp decline in the number of visitors to the village 
with the result that those few restaurants which remained open were taking less than half the 
business of the previous year. A gang from Shkoder had delivered notes to several business 
demanding money. Two of these suffered from the effects of explosive devices and one 
shopkeeper was robbed of $700 at gunpoint. Indicative of changing circumstances was a 
shooting incident between two young men of the village which resulted in a blood feud 
between their families (ref. Sali Zheku, §7.11). This was the first feud to take place in Malaj 
within living memory.
8.6.4 Commentary: The situation which had existed in this region of Albania since 1991 
illustrated how the need for justice, security and its enforcement is integral to all forms of 
human association. The connection between a weak state and inadequate security is self- 
sustaining and self-reinforcing. Where the state can no longer provide security and justice, as 
was the case in post-communist Albania, other suppliers appeared. In this case norm 
enforcement was based on customary law, overlaid after the 1997 breakdown by criminal 
elements which sought to legitimate themselves through, and act as arbiters of, traditional laws 
and practices. Despite this, the Kanun, as it was interpreted and enforced by elders, councils 
and commissions had been effective in a rough and ready way, even though it was recognised 
as unsatisfactory and was essentially disliked by many as being retrograde. However the state 
collapse and breakdown of law and order in 1997 was not an isolated event. It was the result 
of the intensification of certain processes which had been evolving at least since the breakdown 
of communist authority.
What has been described is a situation where there was a lack of security caused by weak state 
institutions administered by a corrupt government. The response to this was the development 
of multiple sovereignties in the form of gang leaders (cf. Duffield 1998) and in the resurgence 
of traditional institutions such as Councils of Elders and Komision i Djakut. The evidence from 
this research illustrates how those traditional institutions which drew upon, adapted and 
administered customary law played an important role in maintaining a measure of order in the 
immediate post-communist years. While these institutions were widely recognised as being less 
than satisfactory, they were the only alternative to the corruptly administered state law. Their 
operation provide an example of how the imposition of a "transition" regime can overlook the
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value of what already exists in a culture. The imposing of such a development model impedes 
the possibility of harnessing internally generated responses to change and fails to capitalise on 
traditional values and relationships (ref. Long 1997:18). A transformational approach to 
change would direct research with a view to seeking ways in which benign informal institutions 
could be adapted and incorporated into the formal sphere.
One further point to be made about transitional aid programmes concerns legal reform, a key 
feature in the development of a market democracy. The promotion of legal reform has played 
an important part in the assistance provided to post-communist states. However those who 
have funded and structured transition programmes have not adequately taken into account the 
extent to which new laws are mediated or quite simply ignored by the political elites who 
formulate and administer them. This has occurred time and again, most extensively in Russia 
but also of course in Albania. This research alone came across examples of the organised way 
in which revenue was derived by state actors from the sale of state property and Yugoslav 
embargo breaking.
In the face of escalating violence and pillage orchestrated by gangs with close political 
connections and the power to control trade, there were limits to customary law (cf. Keen 
1998). The events which took place in Albania during the breakdown (tabulated in Vaughan- 
Whitehead 1999) were typical of what Duffield (1998:97) calls post-modern conflict. In this 
case mobile, well informed groups had become established by violent means and were 
operating seamlessly across international frontiers dealing in goods and services including 
stolen cars, illegal immigrants, women, drugs and arms. So just as the growth of mafias in 
post-communist Albania represents the dark side of social capital (ref. Ostrom 1997:162), the 
transnational nature of crime represents the dark side of globalization and modernity.
The evidence presented here supports the view that if post-communist transformation is to be 
a positive process, it needs to be linked to the development of civil institutions which inform 
and support the creation and impartial enforcement of a rule of law. Where there are excessive 
social, economic or political discontinuities, security is inevitably threatened. The inadequate 
supply of security reduces output and employment, raises costs and prices, lowers returns to 
entrepreneurship and investment, skews investment, constrains the development of capital 
markets and encourages crime and corruption. The consequent contraction of economic 
activity reduces cooperation and undermines trust between market actors. In the case of
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Albania, the failure of the state to provide security resulted in it being appropriated by non- 
accountable, rent-extorting actors and organisations and a reversion to reliance on primordial 
relations and customary law.
8.7 Politics and the State:
8.7.1 Introduction: Although villagers were preoccupied with their economic affairs, many 
were keenly aware of local, national and international political issues. However they only had 
their shared experience to use as a basis for understanding the new politics. Their main source 
of information tended to be state controlled television. While there was an independent, if 
highly partisan press, newspapers were relatively expensive and in any case most villagers were 
not in the habit of using written material. A good few were barely able to read and write. I 
cannot recall one instance of seeing a newspaper in a village dwelling although if I happened 
to have one with me, some one would soon ask for it. Gossip was a vital means of spreading 
information and permitting individuals construct a picture of what was taking place in the 
world around them. Villagers therefore received most information through the spoken word 
either via the television or by word of mouth. Radios were rarely used.
Democratic party politics was a novel concept to villagers. They had never before had the 
genuine option of exercising their choice in the formal political arena. Within the tribal setting, 
and then during communist period, their political allegiance was largely ascribed. Making 
political choices, and the theoretical possibility of doing so in secret, was an unfamiliar form 
of agency. It signified how the focus was shifting away from the self being perceived 
exclusively as part of a social grouping. It formed one of the ways in which individualism was 
given meaning. This section presents my interpretation of the responses in the villages to what 
was taking place in the local, national and international political arenas.
8.7.2 Local Politics: The local political setting has been extensively discussed, however in 
order to integrate the findings within larger frames of reference some key points can be 
emphasised.
While Malaj was not a typical village of the northern plains, it nevertheless provided an 
example of the connection between effective institutions, social capital and a capacity to 
negotiate with the state. Whereas in Gura there was a lack of confidence in the village council
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which did little, either for individuals or the larger community. The differences between the 
two villages in their capacity to integrate with the state were substantial. Gura's administrative 
shortcomings occurred within a setting of a poor understanding of the role and function of 
local government and a lack of interest in their own council.
There was a widespread awareness in Gura about the maladministration and corruption 
associated with the poor delivery of goods and services. Villagers were also aware that to 
demand remedies for these Mures was to threaten vested interests and that to complain could 
be the worse for them. Security was a major issue. It was ironical that the control exerted by 
the Sokol gang brought a degree of security to Gura unknown since communist times. Trust 
firstly rested with the family and then to a lesser extent in the fis, but not in the institutions of 
the state which were perceived as operating for the benefit of those who controlled and 
worked in them.
Many understood "democracy” as being just another mechanism whereby individuals could 
achieve position and influence to personal benefit. Those who did not share in the fruits of that 
power had become disillusioned with the political process: “Now we are free to speak but no 
one will listen to us. " commented one man. While it was recognised that economic 
liberalisation was improving the general standard of living, albeit at a slow rate, this was 
accompanied by a growing frustration and resentment over the abuse of political power. The 
problem was that no effective mechanisms existed to constructively act upon these concerns.
8.7.3 National Politics: The contempt with which the Albanian people were treated by the 
DP in the rigged national elections of 1996 resulted locally in the sullen acceptance of its 
results. The intimidation which took place was just one aspect of a grim form of rule which 
was turning Albania into a one party state. The Democratic government was brought down by 
force of arms. Apart from its links with criminal elements and the pyramid schemes, the regime 
had been guilty of arbitrary killings, police brutality, interfering with the judiciary, electoral 
malpractice, violence against journalists, restriction of press freedom and much else (see 
Abrahams 1996). There have since been worrying reports indicating that the Socialist 
government has not been immune to some of the failings of the previous government. In 
September 1998, the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe and the WEU jointly criticized the 
Albanian government and opposition for renewed turmoil and accused the socialist government 
of being lax in fighting crime and corruption and in reforming the justice system, the police,
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and the civil service (RFE 24/9/98).
Historically there has been a tendency for the Gheg north to favour more conservative, inward 
looking andyzs-orientated approaches to political organisation whereas the south, by the nature 
of its topography and history, has been more open to outside and progressive influences5. The 
two parts of the country retain a certain distinctiveness to this day. The rebellion against 
Berisha and the DP started in the predominantly socialist south of Albania. In the villages of 
this study most electors voted either for the Socialists or Democrats with only a scattering of 
votes cast for the smaller parties. Malaj, which characterised itself as being anti-communist, 
was predominantly Democrat. Although most people in Gura voted Democrat, there was a 
sizeable minority concentrated in one Muslim mehalla who voted Socialist. The SP secretary 
said "Allegiance to a political party in this village, was like being a Muslim or a Catholic. ". 
This indicated how individual political choice still remained tied to identification and solidarity 
with primordial forms of organisation.
Politics seemed to be understood simply as a battle for power which gave the victor the right 
to exert patronage through every tier of government. There was an absence of policy debate. 
As a consequence there was little examination of the inconsistencies in party programmes. For 
example there was little discussion about infrastructure development and contingent issues of 
geographic and sectoral prioritisation, organisation and finance. While the Democrats assumed 
liberal goals and policies, the Socialists promised more redistributive government and wanted 
to retain what they saw as being the more positive elements from the communist past. It was 
the popular appeal of the SP which angered and perturbed the DP who used every means at 
their disposal to frustrate them once they formed a government in 1997. The SP office in 
Shkoder was blown up in August of that year. The vitriol and hatred which characterised party 
politics was reflected in regular fist fights in the Assembly. In August 1997 the arguments and 
insults generated by the debate over the Socialist government's wish to raise VAT and custom 
duties reached a dreadful climax when a Socialist deputy, Mazreku, shot a Democratic deputy, 
Hajdari, five times inside the Assembly building. This turn of events was brought about by
See Amery's (1947) analysis of Tosk and Gheg social organisation and its influence on Albanian political culture 
in Appendix 6.
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Hajdari6 publicly insulting Mazreku across the floor of parliament. Mazreku was placed in a 
classic bind. With which set of conventions did he operate, tradition or modernity? He chose 
tradition and once this was so, it became a matter which could only be settled by blood. And 
so it was. He retained his honour by shooting his fellow deputy but in so doing he brought 
further international opprobrium on Albanian politics.
Many people expressed an exasperation, which sometimes bordered on despair, with every 
level of government. It stemmed from the widely held belief that their politicians were 
incompetent and corrupted by close links with business and mafia. As one man said "All the 
politicians have their own interests at heart and not those o f the people. The example they set 
has become reflected in the way people now behave towards each other. This was formerly 
a society where people were civil towards each other. This is no longer the case." Another 
man, a teacher, spoke in despair about the Hajdari shooting. " We have no tradition o f 
democracy and do not know how to conduct ourselves. We need an honest government and 
security so that we can get on with our lives. It will take a generation before we are able to 
govern ourselves properly ” he concluded despondently. Other less articulate villagers quite 
simply could not understand what was happening to their country.
8.7.4 International Politics: One of the DP slogans for the May 1996 elections was "Europe 
- our future". It was presented on a poster showing a group of young people surrounded by 
the gold stars of the European Union flag. Europe was largely synonymous with the European 
Union. It was an important symbol projected by the State as a fabulous, affluent society to 
which Albania should belong. There was no critical discussion of European values. Being a 
part of Europe was an emotional issue. Economic and cultural links, especially in the north 
where most Catholics live, tended to draw Albanians toward Western Europe. The debate over 
the script for the Albanian language, resolved in 1908, was a debate about orientation. Yet 
the Albanians have by no means been welcomed in Europe and the west, indeed whenever 
possible they have been excluded (cf. Collinson 1996). Economic migrants are often exploited 
and suffer discrimination. While some Albanian emigrants have settled not to return, others 
have come back to appreciate and embrace Albanian values, sometimes reinforcing certain 
sensitivities and prejudices about the outside world.
6
Hajdari was later killed in September 1998 by unknown gunmen in Tirana.
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The Balkan cultures have been influenced by extensive contact with the East, particularly the 
Ottomans. Albanians maintain certain historically founded allegiances, sympathies and 
interests. The Albanian government is a member of the Black Sea Cooperation Group and the 
Islamic Conference. Secular and spiritual links with Turkey remain particularly strong. There 
was a Turkish madrassa in Shkoder and a number of young men were receiving education in 
Turkey. Islam provided the basis for a range of contacts which drew Albania towards the east 
(see Clayer 1997). A number of Muslim villagers expressed the view that Albania forms an 
important bridge between east and west, while others associated the east with communism.
One way in which nationalists define themselves is against those who they are not. This form 
of national self-definition was not prevalent except in the case of a few of the more fervent DP 
supporters who were prepared to listen to an xenophobic sub-theme promoted by party 
ideologues. Their distrust of outsiders was a weak imitation of national definition so forcefully 
developed by Enver Hoxha. Nationalism and pan-Albanian sentiments were more evident in 
the town, particularly among university students, a number of whom came from Albanian 
communities in nearby states. Balli Kombetar, the pan-Albanian nationalist party, had 
considerable support among the younger generation and students but in the villages extreme 
nationalism and the notion of a greater Albania were not given any consideration.
8.8 Matrix:
As in the previous two chapters, a matrix is presented to assist in summarising and comparing 
data. The reductions permit key elements of an evolving situation to be highlighted. The 
information contained in this matrix makes it possible to more clearly see the way in which 
relationships and resource availability differed between the villages. In so doing it permits a 
comparison of the villages' organisational capacity and their degree of integration with the 
state. Building on the evidence presented in the previous two empirical chapters, the 
information contained in the matrix highlights the link between institutions, forms of social 
capital and governance which are discussed in the subsequent section on identity and in the 
conclusion.
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SUMMARY OF RESOURCE AND ORGANISATIONAL ISSUES
Gura Malaj
Shortage of drinking water caused friction 
between villagers; competition over 
irrigation water; repair and maintenance of 
electricity and irrigation undertaken by 
collective action
Water shared between neighbours; 
shortages created an opportunity for 
cooperation; poor supplies of water and 
electricity addressed by lobbying
Unable to obtain any significant help for 
road maintenance from state
Adequate maintenance received from state 
for roads
Health provision bad Health provision reasonable.
Poor provision of education Good provision of education
Subservient relationship to commune Fractious relationship with commune
Poor Village Council Effective Village Council
Poor information flows in village Good information flows through village
Village Council derided Village Council respected
Fragmented village; spatially defined by fis 
and religion
Homogenous village;^ members and 
members of religious faiths mixed
Prior to 1997 highly insecure Prior to 1997 low levels of crime
Dependent on customary law Largely dependent on the state for justice
Corrupt practice in Village Council Transparent Village Council
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8.9 Identity and the State:
Enver Hoxha was a cunning, perceptive and brutal man obsessed with control. He understood 
on which fears he could best play to maintain ascendency over his fellow Albanians. Hence his 
use of banishment and internal exile to destroy that core feature of Albanian identity, the link 
between the individual and locus. Conformity, which had at its heart ideological conformity, 
was the axiom of the state. Any deviance from an array of trivial norms, such as those 
regarding dress and appearance, was pounced upon. The wearing of flared trousers by men 
was considered a provocative act, as was the growth of long hair, beards or moustaches. 
Barbers were even present at entry points so as to administer to excessively hirsute men who 
had been granted entrance visas (Ward 1983:8, 154). These seemingly trivial prohibitions were 
indicative of the extent to which the state sought to exert its control over the individual and 
wipe out, as far as it could, any sense of personal identity and independent thought. A large 
internal security apparatus and harsh penal regimes were the means used to ensure conformity 
to the ideals of the state and of “the new socialist man”. As one villager said, 'You had two 
mothers, your natural one and the Party"
As has been recounted, under communism the state underwent a radical change to become the 
predominant feature in the life of every Albanian. The state was the Party. While identity 
manipulation takes place in the modem state for reasons of economics and socialisation, it was 
integral to the communist state which sought to absorb the identity of every individual into 
itself. By imposing the model of the new socialist man, it sought to produce individuals who 
would serve the state and society without reference to self. Success in this endeavour was 
correlated to dependency. Kolakowski (in Rupnik 1988:269) describes how the sanctity of 
individuals was despoiled under communist totalitarianism through the manipulation and 
robbing of identity. The debasing and corruption of the institution of the state during the 
communist period has continued to have negative consequences in public and private spheres 
(ref. §8.5.5).
With the collapse of communism the role of the state as a provider of goods and services 
contracted. This compelled individuals and collectivities to become increasingly self reliant. 
The response to the withdrawal of the state was conditioned by the way in which trust 
operated in the two communities. In Gura it was defined by kin relations far more so than in 
the more homogenous community of Malaj where neighbourly cooperation lay the basis for 
greater village-wide cooperation. In Gura community-wide self organisation was occurring
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more slowly and hesitantly. Village-wide self-help activities in Gura took place in lieu of the 
villagers inability to jointly negotiate with the state and other providers.
The state was formerly a body which sought to incorporate and administer every form of 
interactioa Now, apart from the issue of conscription, individuals or collectivities had to seek 
interaction with the state. This research shows (see Matrix §8.8) that the development of 
organisational capacity was linked to features associated with social capital, namely the degree 
of reciprocity, the nature of social relations and the extent of information exchange taking 
place in the two villages. The less distinct corporate identity of Gura was reflected in the 
village's failure to lobby on matters of communal interest. The more coherent village identity 
in Malaj was reflected in its greater ability to negotiate with government. The Malaj council 
was an accountable institution which produced tangible results for the community whereas the 
Gura council was not trusted and proved to be singularly ineffective.
The most important resources provided by the state were security and justice. The way in 
which it delivered these goods was a key element in conditioning the relationship of the 
individual to the state. A Gura elder expressed a widely held sentiment about the need for a 
rule of law under which everyone was equal. He said "/ want to be part o f the modem world. 
As long as there is no constitution and a proper legal code, the Kanun will continue. I  want 
to see these oldpractices; ofwhich lam a part, die away." In the absence of an effective state 
administered rule of law, people were compelled to rely on the Kanun and its interpretations. 
Dysfunctional formal institutions of law enforcement and justice created disillusionment with 
the state, undermined the credibility of democratic process and the notion of an equitable 
economic transition.
The comparison between the two villages indicates how the shedding of traditional norms and 
ascriptive relationships in favour of more village-wide cooperation permitted the development 
of institutions more effective in negotiation with the state. This integration was enhanced by 
better information dissemination, which generated higher levels of trust, and was accompanied 
by better health and education facilities. While improved human and social capital contributed 
to Malaj villagers being more able to re-imagine themselves and identify with the new state 
than was the case in Gura, identification with the state as a symbol of the nation was weak in 
both villages. Identity remained vested in informal local institutions rather than the national 
construct. However this should not diminish what had been achieved. When asked about the
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personal significance of democracy, a common response was "It means freedom to worship 
and own animals" or a more considered view was "The freedom to make choices". As 
interpreted from the evidence of these villages, the rediscovery and reassertion of identity in 
the aftermath of communism was indicative of an exploratory and adaptive process rather than 
a transition from one set of circumstances to another.
The establishment of civil society as measured by the emergence of accountable formal 
institutions and the growth of interest groups and other forms of association was slow. It was 
the market which was promoting organisational responses and defining relationships. There 
was little trust in the state. Local government institutions were undervalued and under 
resourced with the consequence that their potential had not been realised. Villagers were 
exasperated and despairing of the political discourse and of the links between politicians, 
business and mafia. They understood that politicians were advancing their own interests at the 
expense of the people. It was unsurprising that certain aspects of the communist period, 
particularly law and order and the supply of social goods, were at times nostalgically 
remembered. The construction of civil society in Albania could be seen to be comprised of two 
interlinked challenges. The first was associated with building inclusive forms of social capital 
which were linked to the reconstruction of a society based on civil values. These would 
incorporate traditional norms and values while not being constrained by them. The second was 
the reconstruction of the state. This demanded rising above sectional interests in order to have 
a meaningful policy debate which could start to address the practical issues concerned with 




Taking into account events up until the end of 1998, this thesis has provided a description of 
how two communities in north Albania have adapted to circumstances in the aftermath of 
communism. The purpose of this final chapter is to summarise the evidence and conclude the 
analysis. It commences by summarising the discussions on identity formation in twentieth 
century Albania. Next, using the notion of structuration, the findings on identity are 
incorporated into an analysis of how the relationships between the institutional structures used 
to interpret the field-work, namely community, economy and state, have changed with time and 
circumstance. This explanation illustrates how reflexive interaction between structures brought 
about change in the nature of structures. The evidence of the research and its associated 
analysis is then incorporated into a discussion on the formation of civil society in post­
communist Albania, with particular attention being given to the locus of power and the 
significance of informal institutions. The thesis concludes with a discussion which points out 
the shortcomings of the transition agenda and argues for a transformational approach to 
development in Albania.
9.2 Identity:
Identity formation is a dynamic process embedded in history and culture. For this reason this 
study of village life in north Albania has been placed within a socio-historical setting. To 
conclude the discussion, I wish to briefly recapitulate on the various forms of belonging 
associated with identity formation. I have understood national identity (ref. §4.2) as deriving 
from generational continuities and shared memories producing distinctive cultures which are 
then extended into national contexts. Integral to the generation of a sense of belonging to a 
national community is the capacity of individuals to imagine themselves as being a part of 
larger structures, larger in terms of time, group and locus (Anderson,B. 1991).
The sweep of Gellner's (1984; §4.2.4) theory places the nation state in a social evolutionary 
perspective by viewing it as a set of structures developed to meet the results of increasingly 
sophisticated technological capacity linked to the generation of wealth. His contention that the 
maintenance of social cohesion is contingent on the supremacy of a common national culture 
over primordial loyalties was seen to be bom out by the circumstances in post-communist
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Albania. However Gellner fails to establish connections between the various collective units 
of which states are composed and tends to see states in isolation and not as part of an 
interactive global state system (Findlay 1995:149). This research has sought address these 
shortcomings by illustrating how the lifeworld of identifiable individuals was connected and 
influenced by wider political and economic forces.
A state, albeit not inclusive of all Albanians in the region, came about in 1913 which contained 
just under a million Albanians of whom 90% were illiterate and 10% of whom lived in cities 
(Pano 1997:287). The choice of the Latin script and the development of literature and 
journalism had contributed towards a more distinctive but still very rudimentary imagining of 
the national community. During Zog's period of autocratic rule, national cohesion developed 
more by default rather than policy. Allegiance remained directed towards the fis  and region. 
It was not until Enver Hoxha set about elevating a particular vision of Albanian national 
culture (§2.4 and §4.2.1), reinforced by xenophobic propaganda, that a coherent and pervasive 
national imagining started to come about. However it was never possible to completely 
eliminate regional or dialect-orientated identity (ref. Pipa 4.2.1), nor was the coercive state 
able to permanently extinguish attachment to primordial sentiments.
The emergence of Albania from the isolation and paranoia of communism has required from 
its people a renegotiation of national identity. The contemporary world order, while nominally 
affirming the sovereignty of states, is one in which sovereignty is compromised by international 
regimes and by the increasingly mobile and global nature of capital, labour and markets. There 
have been substantial increases in the pace and scope of change in the post-traditional world 
as a result of the rapid development of science, technology and communications. This has 
brought about a situation of heightened reflexivity in which values, information and structures 
are interacting in novel ways (§4.3.1). The notion of modernity has been used to provide the 
setting within which to understand these radical changes and their impact on identity 
construction. Within this context I have suggested there are two key issues which have a 
bearing on identity change, that of the nature of trust and the apprehension of time.
The differences between the two villages as illustrated in the matrices (ref. §6.6, §7.12, §8.8), 
reflect the dilemma associated with the redirection of trust, whether to trust the values of the 
modern world as represented by the nation state or traditional norms and values. Trust is 
intertwined with confidence. While there was confidence, perhaps an over-confidence, in the
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value of the scientific and technological aspects of the modem world, there was a widespread 
lack of confidence in organisational constructs other than the tried and trusted. Though it had 
created dependence on the state, the communist regime had undermined trust in that 
institution. After generations of one party rule there were initially conceptual difficulties in 
grasping a feature inherent to representative democracy, the ability of an electorate to replace 
the government of the state. Furthermore government was distrusted because it was seen as 
mechanism for selective redistribution and because it failed to provide security and a rule of 
law. Unsurprisingly the post-communist state was a poorly legitimated institution in which 
there was a low level of confidence, hence the reluctant use of customary law in the villages.
The links between time and identity were discussed in §4.2.2 and §6.5. Time in the traditional 
world places sel£ local associations and imperatives within a simultaneity where there is little 
distinction between past and present. This is described by Anderson, B. (1991:36) as being a 
set of circumstances where cosmology and history are indistinguishable. This was reflected in 
the importance of being buried alongside parents (§6.5). The acceptance of time as a linear 
process in which causal mechanisms are associated with perceiving the past as sequential 
history leads to a very different apprehension of existence, self and thus identity. The notion 
of present actions being used to consciously mould the future is a modem concept alien to 
those rooted in tradition and whose concern is with maintaining continuities and regulating 
existence on bases known to be stable and sustainable. The pre-modem world was a world of 
cycles, one woven from cosmologies and tradition (the Kanun, the symbolism of blood, ref. 
§6.5), of essential timelessness and changelessness. Whereas the world of modernity is one of 
purposiveness, chronological history, science and development operating in the context of 
linear time where events are understood to occur sequentially through cause and effect. Post­
modern analysis represents a further development of this theme. It is characterised by 
fragmentation and the establishment of various forms of authorship and autonomy, two 
consequences of which have been alluded to here in the form of localisation (Long 1994) and 
conflict (Duffield 1998).
By awareness of the tensions which exist between the way time is apprehended and the 
changing nature of trust, the assertions made for a particular Balkan interpretation of identity 
(§4.3.2) becomes more comprehensible. The Balkan legacy of seclusion from the mainstream 
of European politics and culture has seen the development of a particular and exclusive 
understanding of belonging which is woven around the nation, ethnie, religion and family. In
244
the face of foreign domination and ideology, these features have provided the means by which 
Balkan peoples have articulated who they are, where they belong and how they choose to 
conduct their lives. This research has been concerned with exploring Albanian identity within 
the context of developments during the twentieth century and is summarised as follows:
Community: Traditional norms and values have played an important part in forming Albanian 
identity. In both practical and psychological terms the strengths inherent in the fis  and vllazni 
have enabled people to survive periods of acute resource scarcity, social breakdown and 
political uncertainty, particularly as associated with the collapse of communism. However the 
limited retraditionalisation which has taken place in the aftermath of communism has served 
to constrain the development and participation of women in Albanian society. Women 
continued to be subordinated to traditional patterns of power. Membership of a religious 
community played an important part in defining identity, however relations between faiths were 
ambiguous. Religious faith was intertwined with a uniquely Albanian sense of belonging deeply 
rooted in ancestry and locus. Nder and besa, the cardinal values at the heart of traditional north 
Albanian culture, were being placed under pressure by the ethos of the market and the advent 
of market relations. The nature of social relations, issues of gender and religious toleration 
were seen to be linked to the development of a more corporate village identity (ref. matrix 
§6.6). The failure of the new democratic state to maintain security and dispense social and 
economic justice hindered the imagining of, and identification with, a coherent, trustable 
national community.
Economy: In traditional Gheg society common ownership of resources and the sharing of 
labour created a strong sense communal identity and loyalty to the fis. The elimination of the 
private economic sector and the refusal of the communist regime to devolve economic decision 
making created dependency and widespread anomie. The advent of the market had demanded 
a very different set of attitudes to relations, work and savings. The development of market 
relations had a powerful effect on identity formation and was an important factor behind the 
diminishing importance of thefis  (ref. §7.12). A class society was developing. At the individual 
level adaptation to the market required increased self reliance, learning new skills, becoming 
more mobile and taking risks. The socially embedded nature of economic activity was reflected 
in the differences between the two villages (ref. §7.12). The situation of the less successful was 
becoming further worsened by the contraction of employment and welfare provision. The 
failure of the state to provide security, a banking system, a body of commercial law and to
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prevent corruption served to undermine the public's regard of the institution.
State: The state, whether in Constantinople or later Tirana, was an administratively remote 
and alien power. Under communism the state became the predominant feature in the life of 
every Albanian. It sought to subsume identity into that of the "new socialist man" so that 
individuals would serve the state without reference to self. With the demise of communism the 
state was no longer a pervasive institution. Its resources had diminished. Its organisational 
abilities were weak. It was plagued by inefficiency and corruption. Although confidence in the 
state was low, it retained sufficient positional and distributional goods to provide incentives 
for cooperation. The ability to integrate with the state was linked to the development of human 
capital and positive forms of social capital. Comparison between the two villages (§8.8) 
indicated that the degree to which these types capital were present was related to their capacity 
to generate transparent and accountable institutions capable of representing them in wider 
spheres. The shedding of traditional norms and ascriptive relations in favour of wider forms 
of cooperation permitted the development of a more coherent and homogenous village identity. 
While there was a desire to believe in the state, the links between politicians, organised crime 
and business undermined trust in the institution.
9.3 Structures:
My hypothesis is that "transition" from communism can usefully be understood in terms of the 
transformations occurring within and between social, economic and political structures (ref. 
§1.4). Having stated that structuration (Giddens 1976; §1.4; §4.6; §5.2) is central to my 
explanation of the process of social reproduction, I now explain transformation in twentieth 
century Albania by casting the evidence from this research within a series of frameworks each 
of which represents a particular set of reflexive arrangements. This explanation is intended to 
illustrate how reflexive change between structures has brought about a change in the nature 
of structures.
For the purposes of this analysis I have chosen to view Albanian society as it existed in three 
periods: as it operated in traditional circumstances, under communism and in the post­
communist period. While this form of periodicisation permits the stylisation of structural 
relationships, it does not imply that each period is other than the product of an ongoing process 
of interaction located in wider time/space relations (cf. Bryant et al. 1991:13). Central to the
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notion of structuration is that structures have a dual nature which one at the same time 
condition human society and are simultaneously being constituted by means of human agency. 
Transformation is concerned with fundamental change, a change in the nature of structures. 
What these three different phases therefore represent are certain modes of structuration where 
interactions were mediated by particular meaning and ideology, morality and relations of 
power. However, to repeat, this form of modelling is not intended to infer that each period is 
separated by a clear set of disjunctures and that there has been a simple transition from one set 
of arrangements to another. While the models are used to highlight the nature of change, their 
use does not imply that transformation is anything other than a subtle and gradual process 
influenced by adaptive institutions. Within the context of the material presented about Albania, 
they provide a means of simply illustrating how structuration explains the transformative 
process and the development of Albania's trajectory from socialism.
I have analysed the research data in three institutional settings - community, economy and 
state. Each of these structures represents a pole of activity and not a discrete domain. The 
notion of structuration outlines the principles under which the dialectic takes place within and 
between these structures over time. As the nature of the structures has changed, so has their 
relationship one to the other. In order to illustrate how this is reflected in the social 
transformation of Albania in the three periods outlined above, the model introduced to describe 
civil society (ref. §4.6) is further applied. My contention is that the dynamics of the 
relationships described illustrate the nature of structuration and its role in the reproduction of 
social life in twentieth century Albania.
93.1 Traditional Society: Figure 4 presents a diagrammatic representation of the structural 
interrelationships which approximate to traditional Albanian society1 where the community of 
the fis  provided the main source of identity for an individual. Without the fis  a person had little 
meaning. The fis  was a product of reflexive responses by means of which individuals conceived 
themselves and established social and economic relations with the world. The fis  and tribal 
confederacies acted as political sub-units which interacted with the state, be it a colonial power 
or a national leadership. The fis, or "Community” in this diagram, would thus represent its
N.B. In each of these diagrams the solid lines with arrows represent die more formal reflexive interactions between 
structures while the broken lines refer to no less important informal mediating influences which might in certain 
circumstances be proscribed or illegal
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members and negotiate on their behalf with the external world. The archetypal fis would also 
act on behalf of its members in the market place and would regulate economic cooperation 
between them. The reflexively generated structures associated with traditional Albanian society 
created an arrangement which could be characterised as being fairly rigid, highly stratified and 
stable.
Figure 4:




9.3.2 Communist Society: The relationships between the state, community and 
economy/market evolved during the first two decades of Albania's independence. However 
prior to World War n, the country was a backward and largely forgotten part of Europe. The 
impingement of external factors and the seizure of power by the communists combined to 
produce a rapid and radical rearrangement of social and economic structures. The imposition 
of communist ideology created a rigid set of relationships between each of these institutions. 
The communist state became the dominant element of Albanian life. It established almost total 
control and to a very great extent formed the sole mediating element in Albanian society. 
Hence the arrangement of structures in Figure 5. By means of central planning, the state 
attempted to monitor and organise the economy. For ideological reasons it abhorred the
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reflexivity of the market, itself a prime example of the iterative responses associated with 
structuration. The state proscribed religion and all other forms of organisation not under its 
control. Despite these efforts, a very limited degree of agency existed as reflected in the 
favouring of kin (represented here by community) and some illegal economic activity. The APL 
prescribed the identity of the "new communist man", a mythical entity used by the regime to 
project the ideal to be emulated by all good citizens (see §5.2.1).
Figure 5:






The APL therefore concentrated power in the state over which it had complete control. 
Communist society was characterised by rigid, stratified and hierarchical structures in which 
information tended to travel from top to bottom rather than the reverse and was the antithesis 
of the reflexive. It can be argued that it was the inhibition of reflexive interaction which
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ultimately caused the failure of the socialist state. It was unable to handle and adequately react 
to the vast amount of information involved in managing the economy, let alone in responding 
to adverse external events over which it had no control. The control of any social or political 
activity was a sine qua non of the regime. The structures which the communist state imposed 
and sought to maintain were inherently unviable. The constraint of reflexivity had a range of 
negative economic outcomes not least of which was a failure to innovate. The social controls 
imposed by the Albanian communist regime stunted human development, intimidated the 
population and produced anomie. Albanian state communism was based on the ideological 
fixation that the structural arrangements it prescribed were sacrosanct. As in the case of the 
transition to a market economy, the prescription was the ideology, the difference being that 
under communism structures were deliberately imposed in order to constrain human agency, 
not to enable it.
9.3.4 Post-Communism: Figure 6 approximates to a description of the circumstances 
prevailing at the time the research took place. It describes Albanian society of that time as 
being a particular variant of the civil society model (ref. §4.6, Figure 2, p.97). In the aftermath 
of communism there was a radical realignment of structures. The three elements of individual, 
market and state related to each other in a configuration similar to that of civil society but with 
the crucial difference that the set of institutions which compose the structure of "community" 
did not occupy a central mediating role.
This mediating role had been largely captured by "mafia", a term I use to refer to the gamut 
of corruption, insider dealing, illegal and extralegal activity2. As has been described, such 
activities were endemic and had a pernicious effect on the reflexive responses which 
constituted the structures of the state, the market and community. The immediate post­
communist period was characterised by the generation of a certain mode of structuration in 
which newfound agency, desire for wealth and weak formal institutions were instrumental in 
determining the nature of the focal structures. Mafia-type activity conditioned and set the tone 
for structural relationships in post-communist Albania. Although the Albanian state had little 
of its former power and was pervaded by corrupt practice, it was nonetheless still able to 
undertake a number of coordinating activities including a small but valuable redistributive
2
The word used in Russia which more accurately describes this situation is "Mat".
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function. An examination of the differences between the two villages (see matrices §6.6, §7.12, 
§8.8) indicates the role of social capital in generating a capacity to negotiate with the state.
Figure 6:






With the withdrawal of the state from its former economic role, participation in the market had 
become essential to survival. Some were succeeding and others failing. While becoming more 
autonomous, the "Individual" could not be seen as divorced from the family setting. The family 
remained a core feature of identity and support. Although individuals were developing a range 
of "friendships", or non-kin relations founded on the basis of mutual economic self-interest,
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which represented the embryo of forms of community associated with the development of a 
civil society, these tended to have links with mafia-type activity. While there was little moral 
difference perceived between illegal and legitimately generated capital and income, the research 
nonetheless draws attention to the existence of a moral community. This was reflected in 
networks of informal institutions which enabled people to survive in lieu of an effective state. 
In addition to the commercial benefits already mentioned, these institutions were a means of 
gaining access to state resources. They also provided an informal social safety net, the basis 
for village political mobilisation and a mechanism for the delivery of justice. "Community'' 
therefore incorporated a range of institutions relating to customary law, social relations and 
welfare. However there was a marked absence of those cross-cutting forms of civil association, 
such as NGOs, which assist in the creation of social capital and play a significant role in the 
development of civil society.
9.4 Civil Society:
This thesis has been concerned with understanding how identity is linked to the changing 
nature of institutions and the structures of which they are a part. It has been pointed out how 
economic and political structures are socially embedded. Structuration has been used to explain 
the iterative process by means of which institutions constitute and at the same time are 
constituted by the acts they engender. The embeddedness and cultural particularity of 
institutions explains why the path of extrication from communism is unique to each country 
or set of cultural circumstances. I want now to examine how the findings contribute towards 
understanding the way in which a civil society was being formed in post-communist Albania.
To recapitulate, pre-communist Albanian society was a set of arrangements whereby agency 
was negotiated between communities and an autocratic state, with the demands of each from 
the other being low. Communism led to agency becoming concentrated in the state. As a 
consequence of it being concerned with production as well as administration, the state was a 
highly pervasive organisation which, despite its harsh nature, induced sentiments of attachment 
which still persisted in certain quarters. The post-communist period has seen the growth of a 
substantially unregulated market economy, a problematic transition of the state from being a 
controlling to an enabling institution and lastly, more diverse forms of community increasingly 
less defined by kin relations.
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While there is vigorous debate over the validity of civil society (see Hall, J. 1995, Hann 
1996:2, Tester 1992; §4.4), its relevance is that it is a widely recognised and promoted 
concept. In the world of practice and in the public mind, the term civil society is understood, 
largely uncritically, to describe the liberal democratic package. In seeking to understand how 
a civil a society was being formed in Albania, two concerns were raised about its ideological 
and ethnocentric nature (ref. §4.4.4). The first related to the locus of power and the second 
to its implicit dismissal of alternative systems of organisation and patterns of behaviour.
To respond to the first concern. The theoretical discussion of the relationship between the state 
and civil society was discussed from two contrasting perspectives (ref. §4.4). One was where 
the state was above civil society and controlled it either for purportedly benign reasons 
(Hegel), for exploitative reasons (Marx) or for hegemonic domination (Gramsci). The second 
perspective represented the view that a state is held accountable to civil society by a rich 
diversity of cross cutting organisations (de Tocqueville; Putnam) which provide citizens with 
the means to hold the state to account, the state being an extension of civil society with agency 
residing in the democratic process. Where did power reside in Albania's emerging civil society?
The formal institutions associated with civil society were weak or absent. Government was 
neither transparent or accountable. The vacuum created by a weak state was filled by mafia 
type activity which further undermined its credibility. There was little societal consensus over 
organisational and cooperative frameworks. Notwithstanding a considerable growth in the 
number of NGOs, their penetration outside the capital was poor and there were shortcomings 
in their development and operation (HDR 1998:54; Sampson 1996). In neither of the villages 
were there any forms of independent, voluntary civil association of the type which Putnam 
(1994:89) describes as being able to contribute to democratic stability through their inner effect 
on the individual and their external effect on the polity. Information flows were weak. The lack 
of newspapers in the villages and the reliance on government controlled media led to stilted 
and partial understandings of national events. These features inhibited the development of civic 
values and constrained the development of trust in the state and the national community.
In evaluating the way in which the values associated with civil society were being incorporated 
into Albanian political culture, the evidence indicated that government saw itself as being 
above the institutions of civil society, such as the courts and the press, and sought to control 
them. The connection of political power with personal wealth and survival remained strong.
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Hence the way in which, even in the villages, political elites swiftly switched allegiances when 
the need arose and maintained their influence and control. Although political developments in 
the early post-communist period support Mestrovic et al.'s (1993:4) assertion of a Balkan 
predisposition to authoritarianism, they can also be interpreted as an illustration of the 
particularism of liberal democracy (Parekh 1992). The path of Albanian post-communist 
reform demonstrates the problems associated with imposing cultural artifacts specific to the 
West (ref. §4.3.2). Whatever their external form, democratic institutions are extensively 
mediated by informal institutions and can move no further and no faster than these informal 
institutions will permit. Furthermore democratic politics can only productively operate where 
there is a basic consensus over the political framework. The lack of this was reflected during 
the early post-communist years in the acrimonious, vitriolic and at times violent political debate 
in Albania. The political discourse at the time was largely conditioned by the desire to achieve 
or maintain positional goods offered by control of the state and about past relations with the 
former regime. It was less concerned with debating the details of differing visions of the future 
or alternative means of achieving national goals. My perception was that at every level political 
differences stemmed from the inability to achieve sufficient agreement over a common 
interpretation of the past. This research has alluded to a few of the many deeply felt issues (the 
treatment of women, pariah groups, membership of the sigurimi) which formed an 
undercurrent to the political discourse. Furthermore, the emotional scars which remained from 
some terrible things which happened during the communist years inevitably coloured 
association and allegiance in ways it was hard for the outsider to fully appreciate.
The second concern related to the ignoring by "transitionists" of alternative frameworks of 
civility and cooperation which can contribute to civil society. It has been all too easy to cast 
post-communist states as having no civil society (e.g. McFaul 1993:xiv). In response to such 
views Hann (1996:20, ref. §4.4) has suggested that it can be more productive to view civil 
society as an expression of a moral community. One facet of this research has thus been 
concerned with understanding institutions, that is moral codes and forms of social organisation 
and cooperation. Its evidence offers the opportunity to establish how these have been able to 
provide a basis for a culturally distinct mode of existence fashioned to provide social cohesion 
and trust.
The research has indicated the significance of primordial relationships, the existence of a moral 
order "besa'\ and the reciprocal arrangement of village self-help systems. The premium placed
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on maintaining standards of hospitality signalled respect to the guest and contributed to the 
maintenance nder (honour) even in the poorest of households. Respect was given to those who 
were prepared to work for the community and to assist those in need. Many forms of 
cooperation, or practical civility, were evident in the two villages. Now there was freedom to 
worship, religion provided guidance, succour and security to many. While in practical terms 
the role of the fis  was diminishing in importance, it remained a treasured source of warmth and 
companionship. Although under stress, the family formed an arena of trust which provided an 
important source of emotional and material support. Despite the anger, frustration and 
fragmentation which have been a part of this period of intense change, there remained a 
reservoir of civility which has been all too easily overshadowed by the attention given to 
political shortcomings and social breakdown. It was, for example, because of the decency, 
hospitality and openness inherent in Albanian society that I was able to undertake this research.
What light does this debate shed on Holland's (1988:70) assertion that Albania's history had 
produced a vicious circle of distrust which has reinforced a primitive form of social capital 
residing in kin relations and not in the formal institutions of the state and market? Firstly, the 
evidence presented here and elsewhere indicates that the Albanians were extremely sensible 
not to trust those formal institutions Those misguided enough to do so paid a heavy penalty 
(ref. Suat Drini §7.11). Secondly the comparison between Malaj and Gura indicates that the 
way in which institutions were socially embedded conditioned the nature of social capital and 
was closely connected with the village's ability to form and support a representative body (ref. 
§8.9). Social capital, measured by the greater degree of internal cohesion in Malaj relative to 
Gura (ref.§7.5.5), was therefore seen to be closely linked to the existence of institutions 
capable of integrating with the larger and more difiuse frame of reference represented by civil 
society. The evidence gathered here indicates that rather than describe social capital as being 
primitive, it would be more accurate to describe it as being contingent, firstly on the nature of 
local institutions and secondly on structural factors (cf. Tarrrow 1996:396; §4.5.3) relating to 
good governance and economic management.
With little experience of formal democratic institutions, post-communist Albanian society was 
being required to integrate primordial sentiments, where identity was bound up with kin 
relations, locality and region, with dvil sentiments, composed of new identities and new forms 
of community invoked by class, party and business (ref. Geertz 1963). Since the compulsory 
nature of communist society was unable to capture the imagination and trust of the nation and
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M ed to eliminate primordial sentiments, it follows that new forms of social aggregation only 
occur when people feel confident enough to subordinate attachments linked to kin, locus and 
tradition. The research indicates that a range of tensions originating from the need to belong 
and to be heard had not been adequately answered by the new "democracy” in post-communist 
Albania. The evidence from Malaj and Gura suggests that if this is to come about political and 
economic transformation needs to include measures which lessen the need for dependence on 
primordial ties through assisting with the formation of new frameworks of identity which lead 
to inclusive, rather than exclusive, forms of civil association.
9.5 Transformation:
Five years after the collapse of communism, Albanian democracy could be described as a 
largely unregulated and sloganised polity which was in the process of establishing an 
interpretive system, a national imagining, around which there could be common agreement. In 
the absence of a set of public institutions which integrated commonly held norms and values, 
society was in flux. Families were primarily concerned with survival. In describing 
transformation from the village perspective, this research illustrates how Albanian cultural 
traditions have provided a source of support and cohesion without which this period of intense 
change would have been substantially worse. At the same time it points to the inadequacies of 
these institutions and their shortcomings in dealing with the demands of a market based 
democracy.
Using the example of Albania, this research demonstrates why the discourse on post­
communist change needs to be extended beyond that of being a transition to a market 
economy. While a certain degree of economic stabilisation has taken place, social stability and 
prosperity still remain far away for many (cf. Bryant 1994:75). Events in Albania and 
elsewhere have undermined the assumption that the operation of market principles form both 
the ends and means of a successful transition. The consequences of aid programmes 
constructed on these principals has led to involution, new forms of feudalism and anarcho- 
capitalism (ref. §1.4). This research has been concerned with describing how the market, and 
the political institutions which control the economic environment, were socially mediated and 
how, from a village perspective, existing institutional forms were being reconfigured. It has 
shown that what has been taking place in the wake of Albanian communism is a complex and 
ongoing process of transformation of which the economic is just a part. Its findings indicate
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that in such circumstances the negotiation of identity is an exploratory and adaptive process 
rather than one in which there is a rapid absorption into the ethos of the market.
While this study has emphasised the specifity of institutions, the problems identified are not 
unique to Albania. By basing an analysis on what is actually happening (Verdery 1996:228) and 
by exploring the different referents being used to achieve social stability (Hann 1996:24), this 
endeavour is one among an increasing number being undertaken to gain a fuller understanding 
of post-communist societies. The approach to understanding transformation by establishing a 
historical and cultural setting within which to place an examination of contemporary informal 
institutions so as to better understand the embedded nature of the political economy is one that 
has widespread applicability. In the context of the unexpected collapse of the bipolar world this 
research has shown the consequence of the West's failure to adequately address post­
communist development needs. From the village perspective it has shown how bad copies of 
western institutions and mafia driven politics have produced high levels of instability. It has 
drawn attention to the global setting of post-communist transformation where an increasingly 
aggressive capitalism is unchallenged and unchecked, the virtues of socialism are dismissed 
(Hann 1994:246) and inequality in the world continues to increase (ref. §4.3.1). In Europe the 
establishment of visa restrictions and ever stronger asylum laws (Collinson 1996) is creating 
a fortress mentality. The notion of Europe is increasingly becoming equated with membership 
of the Europe Union and new zones of exclusion are becoming apparent. It is within these 
contexts the research has shown how two groups of people were grappling with life in one of 
the peripheral states seeking a fuller European identity.
The identification and analysis of informal institutions (NIE §4.5.1) has assisted in providing 
greater explanatory detail of the Albanian pathway of economic and political reform. The 
institutional responses demanded by the "transition" agenda were shown to be greatly mediated 
by the pre-communist and communist inheritance of dense social networks. What has taken 
place in the aftermath of Albanian communism illustrates how when the preferences and 
interests of sub-groups are at variance with formal rules, there is a decoupling of informal 
norms from formal rule. The consequent failure to develop recombinant strategies for the 
equitable redistribution of assets and resources led to instability and social unrest. However, 
on a more optimistic note Grabher and Stark (1998:57) argue that the inability to address the 
neoliberal agenda at the speed and manner demanded by the west can be seen in a positive light 
on the grounds that resistance to change can actually foster change through permitting failure.
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Evolution can only take place where there is selection, in which process failure plays an 
important part. This implies that social and economic transformation need to be seen within 
longer time frames.
Trust was a key issue and closely linked to security, the need for which is fundamental to the 
development of a civil society. The liberal assumption that market reform will promote growth 
and order (see Duffield 1999) was shown to be unfounded. There was a need for the further 
development of formal institutions which provided for the impartial regulation of criminal and 
civil law. Without such a set of principles, market ties were distorted and trust was undermined 
in every social zone, excepting the primordial. Orthodox economic literature on transition 
implies that politics is the problem since it interferes with the logic of the market (Rutland 
1997:281). However I would suggest that politics is the solution. Albania has lacked a model 
of solidarity beyond kin and family in which confidence can be placed. The evidence from this 
study indicates the need to foster inclusivity and reduce political polarisation so as to allow 
other organisational dimensions to become possible. This would permit new forms of 
consociation to evolve and the development of appropriate strategies such as the sharing of 
leadership so as to prevent the abuse of majority rule, providing a veto to all significant groups, 
maintaining proportionality in administrative appointments and allowing forms of segmental 
autonomy (Lijphart 1977:25).
The tensions revealed in this research reflect those described by Geertz (1963). On the one 
hand there was an unrequited desire for a modem, fair and effective state to which belonging 
was a matter of pride, while on the other, the institutions of kin and tradition, in which trust 
had formerly reposed and still lingered, were no longer able to meet the demands of the 
modem world. On the basis of this work, I argue that the challenge of post-communist 
transformation lies not in imposing ideologically bound prescriptions, such those associated 
with economic transition and civil society, but of assisting in the development and articulation 
of new models of community and citizenship which do not ignore the depth of attachment to 
primordial and ascriptive aspects of identity, but use them to assist in the fashioning of new 




I. Name of head of house: 2. Respondent:
3. Religion:
4. Principal income characteristic: a)Govt/pvt co/other, b)own:trade,artisan,service c)other
5. Number in family: 6. Family type: Joint/ nuclear / extended
7. Details, each one including:
- Relation to HoH, sex, age, education level (1,2,3), econ contribution nature (Productive, 
Reproductive + 0,min,maj-1,2,3)
- Non residents: sex,age, econ.contribution, reason for non-res, location, expected length 
migration.
- Details of any migrant work done: where, when, how long.
8. Assets: House ownership, nos.of rooms, land, animals, vehicles, tools/equipment, TV, VCR, 
satellite dish, fridge, cooker, room heater, toilet type.
9. Length of time in the village: 10. Length of time in house:
II. Expenditures on water + electricity + other.
12. Expenditures on health + education
13. Expenditures on clothes, shoes + gifts
14. State payments - types and amounts received
15. Incomes:
16. Taxes: type, amount
17. % spent on food + % food grown + actual amount spent on food
18. How much do you save and how do you save it? Invest? From whom do you borrow and 
cost? Do you lend money, to whom and cost?
19. Heaven or Hell (was the communist regime - g/b. ) + CP membership + Persecuted status 
+ Present party membership + ? Voted in last election.
20. Notes on profile.
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APPENDIX 2
THE HISTORY OF GURA VILLAGE
Although Gura does not have a long history, it has changed much over the years. It was 
founded a little over 400 years ago. The settlement originated from one that was sited amongst 
the hills on the border of the forest. Landlords cultivated the flat land near the river for wheat. 
Gradually houses were built lower down. According to legends the first family which settled 
in Gura was that of Ali Vilaj around 400 years ago (16th century). They came from Dukajin. 
250 years later the family of Mark Prendi came from Shllak. From this family there are 
descended a group of 8 families including. ..Later on several other families came. During the 
First World War came the families... All came to Gura to get a better living.
Most of the families which now live on the land came as farm workers after the liberation in 
1944. These people came from Dukajin, Mirdite, Shllak and from the south. A number of 
families which are here today came as farm workers during the time of Zog. These people were 
able to buy some land for their own use. Other families also came in order to gain a living.
All the land which was worked by the inhabitants of Gura belonged to rich men and merchants 
from Shkoder. The Jesuits, who came to Albania in 1848 with their many corrupt practices, 
also had property in Gura. They had the best land on which was grown wheat, grapes and 
olives. The majority of villagers owned no land. Only 8 or 10 households had land of between 
8 and 10 denims. Every member of those families with no land, or only a very small amount 
of land, worked in the vineyards and olive groves of the merchants and Jesuits. It was a hard 
way for them to earn their living and they had many difficulties. A number of them were not 
able to earn a living on the land and these people worked as servants in the houses of rich 
people in Shkoder. These people also undertook seasonal work in Shkoder and other places.
Before the liberation in 1944 there were 331 inhabitants in Gura and they lived in a bad 
economic condition. Although the village was near to Shkoder it was very backward in many 
ways. The majority lived in huts. They had few cattle since the rich men from Shkoder owned 
the pasture land. As for the school, there is almost no need to speak about it. It was opened 
in 1926 but was soon closed by the regime of King Zog and his confederates. The Jesuits had 
a religious school for their young priests. Since this school did not accept village children, 
almost all the villagers were illiterate. There were 2 religious buildings in the village: a church 
and a mosque.
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As a result of religion and the policies of the former regime, people remained illiterate in this 
village and all the other villages of our country. Additionally the bad customs remaining from 
the Turkish invaders, the maintenance of the Kanun of the chieftains and the practise of 
religion have made the village different from the rest of the country and keep it separate. 
Religious traditions, customs of revenge, of engagements made between children and those of 
disparate age, the selling of brides and the expensive marriage celebrations of the privileged 
cliques were deeply rooted. Religious celebrations often took place. Good things inherited 
from the past were a willingness to fight for the defence of the country and the tradition of 
hospitality.
With the liberation of the country under the leadership of the Party these bad customs 
disappeared. The church was repaired and converted into a dwelling. The mosque was made 
into a clinic and a village advice centre. With the invasion of Albania by the Italians, life for the 
villagers of Gura became harder and more difficult. The Shkoder merchants and the Jesuits 
increased the area of their vineyards and olive groves and by so doing increased the difficulties 
being experienced by the villagers. The formation of the Party and the battle to liberate Albania 
from the occupiers and traitors met with a big response, even from the people of Gura. The 
poor families provided a safe place for the communists and liberation fighters to take refuge. 
The people of Gura were renowned as patriots. The patriotic traditions of the village made a 
big contribution to the war of national liberation.
Despite the large influence of the clergy and the bourgeoisie from the city, many village 
families collaborated closely in the war of national liberation. The partisans were given refuge 
and helped in many ways by the villagers. Many homes were used in the war of national 
liberation. A national liberation council was formed in June 1943. In addition to this unit, many 
villagers in Gura helped the partisans by giving refuge to the large numbers of communists who 
operated in Shkoder. The wife of the head of the National Liberation Council looked after the 
partisans, washed their clothes and sent food to them in the forest. Many other villagers 
worked closely with the National Liberation movement and gave great help to the partisans. 
Their houses were always open to them. With the liberation of Albania, Gura and all the other 
villages of the country were released from the exploitation and suffering caused by the clergy 
and the bourgeoisie. A life free from oppression and exploitation began for these villagers who 
had been so badly treated for generation after generation. The land, vineyards and olive groves 
created as a result of the sweat of many generations of villagers were taken from the Jesuits 
and the rich people of Shkoder and became the property of the people of Gura.
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In 1945 a school was opened. For the first time the village children could receive education. 
It was a great joy and happiness. The Albanian war of national liberation under the leadership 
of the Communist Party broke the rotten anti-populist regime. Then began agrarian and 
educational reform in the village. The villagers of Gura who had been farm workers and 
servants were now the owners of the land. The sun of freedom has now risen for them. They 
have woken from a century’s old nightmare of darkness and ignorance and were liberated from 
the rich people who had said that the ordinary villagers were stupid. Those people said this for 
their own interests in order to keep the villagers in darkness and ignorance so that they could 
be served by them. A school was opened but it did not have a building. In 1946 it was decided 
to build a new school with 2 classrooms and a room for the principal. From their own 
contributions the villagers built the new school. In the year 1946/7 there were 2 classes with 
50 pupils. In the year 1948/9 there were 2 teachers. As the number of pupils increased, so did 
the number of teachers. The school was damaged by an earthquake and was in poor condition. 
In 1964 it was decided, with the help of the Government, to build the school which now exists. 
The State paid 250,000 lek. Today the school has 3 classrooms and a room for the principal 
which today is used for pre-school children. There are about 160 pupils in the primary school, 
6 teachers and a nursery teacher. The children of 8th grade go to the school in a larger village 
nearby. Some pupils who finish this schooling go either to a professional college or to a 
general school so that they might become teachers, nurses, assistant doctors, midwives, 
brick-layers and vets.
At the time of Liberation many older people were illiterate. It was difficult for them to go to 
school. In 1951/2 were started literacy classes in the evenings in this and other villages. It was 
thus that illiteracy gradually disappeared in those below the age of 40.
A youth organisation was formed on 15 September 1945. A women's organisation was formed 
on 16 October 1947. In the year 1947 the village communist party was formed. A meeting was 
held in the village school and a secretary was elected. With the construction of socialism during 
the years of the People's Government a new life began for the inhabitants of Gura
Everyone profited from the agrarian reform because there were no rich men, this was as a 
result of no one being a landlord. People began to joyfully work the land which had been given 
to them by the Party however they also had to pay this debt back to the state. The Party and 
the State saw that private work which was conducted on an individual basis had low 
productivity. The Party and the State could not help people in such a situation since it was 
difficult to mechanise agriculture where there was so much private property so they instructed
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the people to collectivise agricultural production. The first people to be collectivised were 
those living in the lowland areas.
The party asked the people to join the agricultural cooperatives. Those who replied first were... 
Then following the example of these people the villagers were gathered together to create the 
agricultural cooperative on 15 September 1957. This was a great victory for the villagers of 
Gura because it created prosperity through the development of agriculture and created a new 
life for them. Immediately after forming the cooperative the villagers began to open up new 
land. They created new vineyards and olive groves. In the southern part of the village was 
created the Gura sector of a state farm where big changes were made breaking up new land, 
creating vineyards and groves of olives and figs. Before the liberation there was no irrigated 
land. Today almost all the land is irrigated. Two reservoirs were built which held enough water 
for the needs of agriculture. All these efforts resulted in an increase in productivity.
A good indicator of the increase in prosperity of the Gura villagers has been the building of 72 
new houses. Electrification of the village was completed in 1968. Today there are nearly 70 
radios in Gura. There are not only radios but 5 televisions. Today there are 50 families which 
have furnished their houses and which have beds in their sleeping rooms. There are 2 cultural 
centres, each with a television. There is a clinic, a nutritional advisor and 2 shops selling 
general articles and food. There are 2 creches for 29 children and a kindergarten. All these 
things illustrate the changes which have taken place in Gura. As a result of the efforts of the 
Party the productivity of the whole country has increased. There is a museum, irrigation, a 




DUTIES OF THE KRYEPLAK
Republic of Albania 22 May 1995 - Shkoder
District Council 
No. 139
1. In cooperation with the police, to be responsible for maintaining public order in the village.
2. To be responsible for ensuring that the services required by the village community are met. 
These include: the provision of a burial ground, the maintenance of cultural and sporting 
activities; the maintenance of roads, water system, telephone lines, electrical cables etc. This 
will be done with funds from the Commune budget or from several investors or even with 
contribution from the members of the village.
3. To be responsible for the maintenance of drinking water and its fair allocation. To be 
responsible for the maintenance of irrigation water and its fair allocation. To be responsible for 
the fair administration and fair allocation of those pastures and woods which are the property 
of the village or are used by the village.
4. To take note of the requests and complaints of village members and to take steps to solve 
disagreements between members of the village.
5. To take appropriate measures to improve the village environs and its security.
6. To superintend workers from the District (Rreth) who are employed in the village and to 
report on their work to the Chief of the Commune.
7. To inform the District and/or Government authorities of the needs of the village and charge 
these bodies with the responsibility of meeting those needs.
8. To provide references and any other relevant information in respect of the members of the 
village.
NOTE: THESE DUTIES ARE LAID DOWN IN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.7605 OF 
9th SEPTEMBER 1992.
Signed by the Head of Local Authorities in the District Council
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APPENDIX 4





At primary school (to 14 yo)
Pensioners
Sub total
Not available for work: 
Military service 
Middle school students 














In state employment 






24,171 = 59% of workforce
However they state from this figure of 24,171 should be deducted the following:
Emigres from district 
Market traders 
Private artisans 











BUDGET DETAILS OF THE BASHKIA OF SHKODER FOR 1997


















Administration for cult activities 
Sub total
Amounts in Albanian Leks 
1,100,000















31.800.000 - from Min. of Sport, Youth &
Culture
6. Social support:
Amount paid from 1/1/97 to 30/6/97 x 2 200,000,000 ($1,333 million) - from Min. of
Labour
7. Disability assistance
8. Income from local taxes to 9/97
13,850,000 - from Min. of Labour
8,000,000




- The expenditure of 1.1 million leks is expenditure for equipment, vehicles, fuel, repair of 
buildings, electricity, water etc.
- The work of the Civil Office concerns the registration of births, marriages and deaths. It is 
also concerned with the issuing of internal registration documents.
2
The reserve fund is retained by the Bashkia for emergencies.
3
Public works expenses are for waste disposal, road maintenance, public housing, city parks, 
cemeteries and transport.
4
The education budget is sent from the Ministry of Education. The expenses figure relates to 
expenses incurred for electricity, water, heating, maintenance of buildings and food for the 
secondary school students.
6
During the first 6 months of 1997 there were registered as being 7,400 families receiving social 
assistance. The average amount of money received per family was 3,648 leks.
7
Disability assistance is used to provide support for those with disabilities or mental problems 
who reside in their homes.
8
The main sources of tax raised by the Bashkia are from business rates, shops, small traders and 
and from the registration of businesses. These locally raised taxes are used for the payment of 
tax collectors, kryeplaks, the repairing of the electrical system, for kindergartens, and to make 
up shortfalls in the subsidies paid by central government for losses made by state enterprises. 
The Bashkia is allowed to keep 18,000,000 leks of the taxes it raises. Anything raised above 
this amount has to be sent to the central government exchequer. The average amount raised 
in 1995 and 1996 was 25 million lek. Because of the troubles in 1997 the amount raised until 
the end of August 1997 was only 8 million lek.
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APPENDIX 6
THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT DURING THE 2nd WORLD WAR
Julian Amery (1948:166/170) provides a useful sociologically grounded political/ military 
analysis of the Albanian guerilla resistance during the 2nd World War. To paraphrase Amery:
In revolt the heaviest burden falls not on combatants but on their wives, children, animals and 
property. This being the case those inclined to revolt against the fascist occupiers of Albania 
were the unencumbered young men to whom fighting offered excitement, a cause and the 
possibility of gaining wealth and prestige in the event of victory. However the majority of 
tribesmen would only go to war if they knew their families and possessions were safe from 
reprisals. Without the protection of these vital elements of family and property, their social 
order was under threat. Leaders of this type of society would therefore tend to postpone revolt 
until hopes of victory outweighed those of reprisals. This was very much the course taken by 
the royalist and republican Ghegs of northern Albania.
However the communist partisans had recruited the bulk of their support from southern 
landless peasants and urban youth who by joining them had become outlaws. These recruits 
could not turn back since they lacked both personal wealth and tribal support. With no 
resources of their own, the partisans had to fight to eat and were thus driven to conduct 
sustained guerilla raids. If these caused reprisals, this was all to the good since it increased the 
number of dispossessed who then became potential partisan supporters. The communist 
ideology was a combination of national liberation and social revolution. By means of the latter 
the partisans felt justified in plundering their more wealthy compatriots. Their only hope of 
safety lay in victory. The strength of the Ghegs on the other hand rested in their tribal social 
order. But the weakness of this was that no action could occur without protracted negotiations 
to attain consensus between the tribal confederacies. If going on the offensive they needed to 
be provided with adequate supplies and to be reasonably certain that they would not be subject 
to reprisals.
For the Ghegs, revolt had to be a paying proposition. For them, an effective revolt demanded 
joint, mass action which could provide the maximum weight of attack and deter the enemy 
from making reprisals. In the circumstances of the 2nd World War, this required the agreement 
of the 5 great chieftains of the north. However British policy was "no arms before action 
against the Germans" and since, for the reasons outlined, the Ghegs were reluctant to become 
involved in guerilla war, British arms and gold were sent to the communist partisans who were 
prepared to fight the Germans. Given the situation in Yugoslavia, perhaps it was inevitable that 
the communist partisans would gain ascendancy, nonetheless British policy encouraged rather 
than hindered that outcome.
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